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
Vernieuwend Ruimtegebruik



The Context of Neighbourhood Regeneration in Western Europe

A Comparative Study of Nine Neighbourhoods Undergoing Physical and Social Economic Regeneration

Wouter PC van Gent



The Context of Neighbourhood Regeneration in Western Europe

**A Comparative Study of Nine Neighbourhoods Undergoing Physical
and Social Economic Regeneration**

Wouter van Gent

September 2008

Nieuwe Prinsengracht 130

1018VZ Amsterdam

Nederland

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> Inhoud

Dit Engelstalige onderzoeksrapport is gebaseerd op een internationale vergelijking van wijkaanpak in negen wijken in vier Europese landen. Het doel van de vergelijking is om de context van wijkaanpak op verschillende niveaus helder te krijgen. De uitkomsten laten zien dat de richting en uitkomsten van wijkaanpak afhankelijk is van factoren op nationaal, regionaal stedelijk en lokaal niveau.

> Colofon

Dit onderzoek kwam tot stand in het kader van het onderzoeksprogramma Corpovenista, waarin wordt samengewerkt door tien grote woningcorporaties (de Alliantie, Haag Wonen, de Key, het Oosten, Stadswonen, Staedion, Vestia, Woonbron, de Woonplaats en Ymere), Aedes (de vereniging van woningcorporaties), Onderzoeksinstituut OTB Technische Universiteit Delft en onderzoeksgroepen van de Universiteiten van Utrecht en Amsterdam (zie: www.corpovenista.nl). Corpovenista is onderdeel van het wetenschappelijk programma binnen het Habiforum-kennisontwikkelingsprogramma 'Vernieuwend Ruimtegebruik'. Dit rapport is digitaal verkrijgbaar via www.corpovenista.nl

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Foreword

This report would not have been possible without the help of a lot of people. Researching the regeneration efforts in nine neighbourhoods, in five cities and in four countries required a lot of logistical and intellectual support. For their assistance and advice in doing the fieldwork, I would like to thank Roger Andersson and Emma Holmqvist (both Uppsala University), Lars Pettersson (Jönköping International Business School), Jan Igefjord (Jönköping Municipality), Peter Lee, Alan Murie, Rob Rowlands and Andrew Tice (all Centre of Urban and Regional Studies, University of Birmingham), Brechtje van Boxmeer (Procap), Maria Bruquetas (Universiteit van Amsterdam), Montserrat Pareja and Montse Simo (both University of Barcelona), Albert Terrones (Generalitat Catalunya), Ben Verkroost (Utrecht Municipality), Arjan Brokkaar (DHV, former Bijlmer Renewal Project Bureau), Ellen van Beckhoven (Utrecht Municipality), and Manuel Aalbers (Universiteit van Amsterdam). Jordi Ribot deserves a special mention for his translation and assistance work. My fieldwork in Barcelona would not have been possible without him. In the realisation of this report, Daniel Naamani and the Corpovenista/ Habiforum staff have also been very important.

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The arguments and opinions expressed in this report are solely the author's.

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Summary (in Dutch)

Inleiding

In West Europa is er de afgelopen jaren veel tijd en energie gestoken in het aanpakken en vernieuwen van zogenaamde probleemwijken. De gesignaleerde problemen beperken zich niet tot fysieke achterstanden zoals verkrotting maar hebben ook betrekking op sociale en culturele aspecten van de wijk. In het politieke en publieke debat worden ze aangeduid als aandachtswijken, buitengesloten gebieden, verticale sloppen, getto's, concentratiebuurten of als brandhaarden.

De aanpak van deze wijken bestaat uit complexe reeksen projecten en programma's waarbij niet alleen lokale actoren zoals gemeente en woningbouw corporaties, een belangrijke rol spelen, maar ook de centrale staat door middel van stedelijk beleid en volkshuisvestingsbeleid zijn stempel drukt. De aanpak is net als de gesignaleerde problemen zeer diverse. Grofweg gesteld kan er een onderscheid gemaakt worden tussen fysieke ingrepen en sociaal economische programma's, maar deze tweedeling is onvoldoende om een aanpak te typeren en te evalueren. Om een aanpak te begrijpen en om ervan te kunnen leren moet men zich realiseren dat zowel de interventies als de uitkomsten afhangen van de context.

Dit onderzoek heeft als doel om inzicht te verschaffen in de verschillende elementen van context, die een weerslag hebben op de praktijk van buurtaanpak in West Europa. Dit inzicht zal bruikbaar zijn voor praktische doeleinden. Actoren die (deels) verantwoordelijk zijn voor de staat en het beheer van wijk zoals overheden en woningbouw corporaties hebben vaak behoefte aan nieuwe ideeën en oplossingen voor de buurten waar zij een verandering op buurtniveau proberen te bewerkstelligen. Een gebruikelijke manier om nieuwe ideeën op te doen is om te kijken hoe men elders verandering in de buurt doorvoert. Soms kijkt men in dezelfde stad, soms naar andere steden, en soms zelfs naar het buitenland. Maar om te leren van successen (en falen), moeten er twee zaken in ogenschouw genomen worden. Ten eerste, worden wel dezelfde problemen aangepakt? Wat zal worden gezien als de belangrijkste problemen, zal prioriteit krijgen en de gehele wijkaanpak beïnvloeden. Zo kan op het eerste oog de bouw van nieuwe woningen in verschillende plaatsen op elkaar lijken maar het blijkt dat er verschillende doelen met nieuwbouw worden nagestreefd. Het is nodig om hiervan op de hoogte te zijn, want misschien is een activiteit of strategie niet geschikt voor alle doeleinden. Ten tweede, moet de vraag worden gesteld waarom voor een bepaalde aanpak of strategie is gekozen. Deze keuzes zijn afhankelijk van wie de belangrijkste betrokkenen zijn, maar ook van andere contextuele raamwerken die de keuzes beperken of sturen. Een belangrijk voorbeeld hiervan is de woningmarktsituatie die de vraag naar woningen grotendeels bepaalt. Een hoge vraag geeft een andere situatie met andere kansen en mogelijkheden dan weinig vraag en leegstand. Met andere woorden, niet elke activiteit zal in elke context dezelfde uitkomsten geven.

Dit rapport probeert een houvast te geven voor vergelijkingen van buurten door de verschillende relevante contexten in kaart te brengen. Hoewel dit onderzoek lessen trekt uit een internationale vergelijking, zijn deze lessen eveneens relevant voor het leren van andere praktijken van wijkaanpak binnen Nederland en binnen steden. De hoofdvraag van dit rapport luidt:

Hoe hebben contextuele factoren of raamwerken op verschillende niveaus invloed op de strategieën, activiteiten en uitkomsten (de praktijk) van buurtaanpak?

De invloed moet duidelijk gemaakt worden vanuit een institutionele benadering. Dit betekent dat gekeken wordt hoe de actoren zich gedragen en reageren op structurele elementen zoals beleid, woningmarkt, bewonersdruk, politiek. Deze elementen brengen een sociaal raamwerk van normen en waarden, regels, wetten, regimes, etc. met zich mee. Actoren maken strategische keuzes op basis van deze instituties die weer tot nieuwe instituties leiden en uiteindelijk de wijkaanpak vormen.

Onderzoeksstrategie: Vergelijkende case studies

Dit onderzoek maakt gebruik van case studies van wijken in West Europa waar enige vorm van wijkaanpak heeft plaatsgevonden. De wijkaanpak kan variëren van sociaal economische programma's en beperkte fysieke ingrepen tot grootscheepse complexe 'herstructureringsoperaties' met geïntegreerde fysieke en sociaal economische programma's. Dit onderzoek ziet deze verschillen overigens als contextafhankelijk.

Contextuele factoren spelen op meerdere niveaus. In dit onderzoek wordt context opgedeeld in verschillende raamwerken die niet alleen invloed hebben op de samenstelling van de belangrijke actoren en hun onderlinge verhoudingen, maar ook op de mogelijkheden en beperkingen in de keuze voor strategieën en activiteiten. Er zijn drie niveaus waarop institutionele raamwerken de praktijk van wijkaanpak beïnvloeden: een macro niveau waar de nationale en supranationale context onder vallen; een meso niveau waar de stad en de stedelijke regio onder vallen; en een lokaal niveau waar de buurt zelf onder valt.

De case studies worden vergeleken op verschillende niveaus (nationaal, regionaal stedelijk, en wijken). Het onderscheid tussen de verschillende niveaus zal niet altijd rigide zijn. De gemeente en woningbouw corporaties worden onder het lokale niveau besproken, hoewel zij ook op de andere niveaus actief zijn. Bovendien beïnvloeden de verschillende elementen elkaar.

De cases zijn de wijken en vooral de verschillende vormen van aanpak ervan. Aanpak is gedefinieerd als alle interventies van de staat, woningbouw corporaties en andere belangenhebbende organisaties die als doel hebben om een sociale, economische of fysieke verandering in de wijk te orkestreren. Regulier beleid zoals onderwijs of sociale verzekeringen, is grotendeels buiten beschouwing gelaten.

De gegevens voor dit onderzoek komen uit interviews met beleidsmakers, beheerders en experts. De semi-gestructureerde interviews vonden face-to-face plaats in de verschillende steden tussen april 2006 en januari 2008. Twee interviews zijn telefonisch afgenomen. Naast de interviews, is er gebruik gemaakt van census data, beleidsdocumenten en secundaire literatuur vooral in de vorm van onderzoeksrapporten. De gekozen wijken zijn namelijk eerder onderzocht in het kader van het RESTATE onderzoeksproject, waarbij onderzoeksteams uit tien landen onderzoek hebben gedaan in negenentwintig naoorlogse wijken. Het doel was om de belangrijkste problemen te identificeren evenals de verschillende facetten van de wijkaanpak en de meningen van bewoners over de wijk en de aanpak. Dit onderzoek heeft per land drie rapporten opgeleverd. Sommige onderzoekers van het RESTATE project zijn eveneens gesproken voor toelichting en reflectie.

De Wijken

Dit onderzoek heeft gekeken naar de situatie en wijkaanpak van negen wijken. De keuze voor deze wijken berust op twee criteria. Ten eerste, zijn er minimaal twee wijken uit vier verschillende West-Europese landen; Zweden, Verenigd Koninkrijk, Spanje, en Nederland. Deze landen zijn gekozen omdat zij verschillende typen van verzorgingsstaat kennen (zie hieronder), en daardoor een goede vertegenwoordiging van staten in West Europa zijn. Ten tweede is binnen elk land, en in enkele gevallen binnen dezelfde stedelijke regio, een zogenaamde 'tevreden' wijk en een 'ontevreden' wijk gekozen. Een bewonersonderzoek wijst uit dat er verschillen te zijn in de mate van tevredenheid onder bewoners over de buurt (zie Musterd & Van Kempen, 2005). De mate van tevredenheid wordt hier als aanleiding genomen voor verdere vergelijking. Het idee is dat het oordeel van bewoners de leefbaarheid van de wijk weergeeft. Daarmee zegt tevredenheid in ieder geval voor een deel wat over de kwaliteit van de wijkaanpak of over het ontbreken van een juiste wijkaanpak. Toch vormt tevredenheid in dit onderzoek slechts een aanleiding om een completer beeld te krijgen.

Zoals gezegd zijn er negen cases. De wijken worden hieronder kort gekenschetst:

Råslätt, Jönköping – Een hoogbouw wijk in de middelgrote stad Jönköping, gelegen in het centrale zuiden van Zweden. De wijk geldt qua werk en inkomen als relatief zwak. De vraag naar woningen in de wijk is laag. De wijkaanpak bestaat uit een sociaal economisch programma gericht op leefbaarheid, integratie en achterstand. Een 'tevreden' wijk.

Tensta, Stockholm – Modernistische wijk in de periferie van Noord Stockholm, omringd door groene velden. De problemen hebben te maken met stigmatisering vanwege concentraties van huishoudens met een laag inkomen en immigranten. De wijkaanpak bestaat hoofdzakelijk uit sociaal economische programma's. Fysieke ingrepen betreffen kleinschalige nieuwbouw en aanpassingen aan de publieke ruimten, aan galerijflats en parken. Een 'ontevreden' wijk.

Husby, Stockholm – Net als Tensta een wijk in de periferie van Noord Stockholm. Een verschil is de nabijheid van een groot winkel- en zakencentrum. De aanpak is vergelijkbaar met die in Tensta. Eveneens een 'ontevreden' wijk.

Hodge Hill, Birmingham – Een wijk aan de periferie van Birmingham, waar werkloosheid en de eenzijdige woningvoorraad waar weinig vraag naar woningen is de grootste problemen zijn. De wijkaanpak was gebaseerd op de oprichting van woningbouw corporaties maar na een stemming onder bewoners mislukte dit grotendeels. Een 'ontevreden' wijk.

Central Estates, Birmingham – Een wijk dicht bij het centrum van Birmingham die na jaren van verwaarlozing vernieuwd is. De vernieuwing bestond uit een omvangrijk fysiek en sociaal economisch programma. Een belangrijk onderdeel is de verandering van eigendomsverhoudingen en de vermindering van sociale huursector woningen ten faveure van eigenwoningbezit en vrije markt huur. Een 'tevreden' wijk.

Sant Roc, Badalona – Een wijk in de stedelijke regio van Barcelona die zonder plan is aangelegd. Naast achterstandsproblemen en sociale conflicten tussen immigranten, Roma en Spanjaarden, zijn er fysieke problemen. De kwaliteit van de openbare ruimte is laag en veel gebouwen lijden aan betonrot. De wijkaanpak bestaat uit een fysieke vernieuwing in één deel van de wijk en een aantal sociaal economische

programma's gericht op leefbaarheid en, in mindere mate, op integratie en achterstand. Een 'ontevreden' wijk.

Trinitat Nova, Barcelona – Een ongeplande wijk in de heuvels rond Barcelona. Betonrot in de gebouwen is het grootste probleem van de wijk. De wijkaanpak wordt gekenmerkt door de buurtvereniging die de vernieuwing heeft aangegrepen om sociaal economische programma's te initialiseren. Deze programma's richten zich vooral op de leefbaarheid. Een 'tevreden' wijk.

Kanaleneiland-Noord, Utrecht – Een wijk dicht bij het centrum van Utrecht die te maken heeft met overlast van jongeren, veiligheidsproblemen, een woningvoorraad die arme gezinnen concentreert. De wijkaanpak richt zich zowel op fysieke als sociaal economische interventies. De herstructurering heeft echter vertraging opgelopen. De sociaal economische programma's streven leefbaarheid, achterstand en integratie na. Een 'ontevreden' wijk.

Bijlmermeer (Oost), Amsterdam – Een grote wijk in de periferie van Amsterdam, waar werkloosheid, drugsoverlast, sociale achterstand, misdaad en vuil op straat een grootschalige wijkaanpak hebben opgestart. Fysieke interventies moeten de wijk qua uiterlijk, woningmarktfunctie, en bevolkingssamenstelling veranderen. Sociaal economische programma's werken aan leefbaarheid, achterstanden en integratie. Een 'tevreden' wijk.

Wijkaanpak gekenschetst en geclassificeerd

Om de hoofdvraag te beantwoorden moeten we eerst aandacht besteden aan hoe we de verschillende strategieën en activiteiten van buurtaanpak kunnen plaatsen. Vaak wordt een verschil gemaakt tussen fysieke ingrepen en sociaal economische programma's. Toch blijkt dat wanneer de doeleinden in ogenschouw genomen worden de situatie vaak complexer is. Fysieke interventies kunnen sociaal economische doeleinden nastreven en aan de andere kant kunnen sociaal economische programma's dienen om de fysieke omgeving op peil te houden, bijvoorbeeld anti-vandalisme of veiligheidsinitiatieven.

De doelen van wijkaanpak hebben over het algemeen betrekking op drie doelen: leefbaarheid, sociaal economische achterstanden, en integratie. Ten eerste, leefbaarheid is een subjectief begrip dat betrekking heeft op de tevredenheid van de bewoners met hun leefomgeving. De leefomgeving kan zowel het huis of appartement betekenen als daarbuiten de trappengangen en, weer verder, de straat en de buurt. Leefbaarheid kan betrekking hebben op fysieke aspecten van de wijk zoals fysieke achterstanden, onderhoud en beheer, maar ook op meer sociale aspecten zoals veiligheid en overlast. In Nederland wordt het adagium 'schoon, heel, en veilig' gebruikt om de verbetering van leefbaarheid te typeren. Ten tweede is een belangrijk doel de vermindering van sociaal economische achterstanden onder de bewoners. Deze achterstanden hebben betrekking op armoede, werkloosheid, en opleiding. Daarnaast kan het specifiek te maken hebben individuen en huishoudens die in een sociaal isolement zijn geraakt door hun omstandigheden. Vooral voor de kinderen is er in dit geval veel aandacht. Een derde doel heeft te maken met integratie. Dit heeft voornamelijk te maken met de sociale en culturele integratie van minderheden of immigranten, waarvan concentraties in de wijken wonen. De integratie heeft raakvlakken met het tweede doel waar het gaat om de participatie in de arbeidsmarkt, maar het uiteindelijke doel is een verhoogde mate van sociale interactie tussen bevolkingsgroepen, van politieke participatie, en van kennis van de taal en cultuur van het land en van diverse immigrantengroepen onderling.

Zoals gezegd, om deze doeleinden te bereiken kunnen we een onderscheid maken tussen fysieke ingrepen die veranderingen aanbrengen in de bebouwde omgeving, en interventies die via sociaal economische mechanismen werken.

Fysieke ingrepen zijn van oorsprong het meest kapitaal intensieve en meest in het oog springende onderdeel van wijkaanpak. Sinds de eerste stedelijke vernieuwingsoperaties, zijn ze gericht op de verbetering van de leefomgeving van bewoners door verkrotte woningen te renoveren, of te slopen en te vervangen met nieuwe woningen, en de kwaliteit van de publieke ruimte te verbeteren. Dus hoewel er een grote verscheidenheid in fysieke ingrepen is, kan gesteld worden dat zij voor een belangrijk deel dienen om de leefbaarheid van woningen en de wijk te verbeteren.

De leefbaarheid van de buurt in fysieke zin is echter niet het enige doel van fysieke interventies. Om de economie en werkgelegenheid in de wijk te verbeteren, kunnen fysieke interventies ruimte creëren (letterlijk) voor voorzieningen en bedrijvigheid. Nieuwe bedrijfsruimtes, of ruimte voor geloofsgemeenschappen, buurt-, vrijwilligers- en zelforganisaties geven deze organisaties meer faciliteiten om activiteiten te ontplooiën die de sociaal economische wijkaanpak ook nastreeft zoals verhoging van de lokale werkgelegenheid, sociale interactie en participatie (zei hieronder).

Naast ruimte voor economische en sociale activiteiten die zowel de integratie als de achterstanden van bewoners trachten verbeteren, worden in een aantal gevallen fysieke interventies geacht op een andere manier de sociaal economische condities van bewoners te verbeteren. Door de eigendomsverhoudingen in de woningvoorraad aan te passen, en daarmee de positie van de woningen en wijk op de woningmarkt, kan de sociale compositie van een wijk worden aangepast. Meestal gebeurt dit door het aandeel sociale huurwoningen te verlagen en het aandeel koopwoningen en vrije markt huurwoningen te verhogen. In het geval van de Bijlmermeer, Central Estates, Kanaleneiland en in mindere mate in Stockholm wordt getracht door middel van meer eigenwoningbezit in de wijk om meer middenklasse in de wijk te brengen of voor de wijk te behouden. In wijken waar al veel eigenwoningbezit is, zoals in Spanje veelal het geval is, wordt een middenklasse getrokken door de marktwaaarde van de woningen in de wijk te verhogen, onder andere door middel van fysieke ingrepen die de openbare ruimte aantrekkelijker maken.

Aan een grotere aanwezigheid van middenklasse worden een aantal voordelen toegeschreven. Middenklasse huishoudens kunnen als positief rolmodel fungeren, de 'juiste' normen en waarden verspreiden, toegang verschaffen tot sociale netwerken en sociaal kapitaal. Het imago van een wijk als probleem- of concentratiewijk kan ook verbeteren wanneer de bevolkingssamenstelling verandert. Daarnaast kan de middenklasse bovendien het sociale leiderschap in de wijk op zich nemen en als gesprekspartner met de gemeente opereren. Daarnaast zou er ook sprake kunnen zijn van verminderde negatieve effecten, die een eenzijdige bevolking met veel armoede met zich mee zou brengen. Deze negatieve effecten kunnen betrekking hebben op zowel volwassenen als kinderen. Hoewel in de laatste categorie school en gezinsomgeving ook van belang zijn.

Zoals gezegd hierboven, sociaal economische programma's zijn bedoeld om veranderingen door te voeren via sociale en economische processen in de buurt, vaak door middel van sociale interactie en arbeid. Deze programma's hebben net als de fysieke interactie meerdere doelen. Het meest voor de hand liggende doel is het tegengaan van sociaal economische achterstanden in de wijken. Dit gebeurt bijvoorbeeld via een bevordering van de arbeidsparticipatie door aan ouderen onderwijs te verlenen (omscholen), stages, en ondernemerschap te stimuleren. Maar

ook opvoedingsbegeleiding, onderwijsverbeteringen voor jongeren, en schuldsanering vallen onder deze achterstandsdoelstelling. Naast de achterstanden, zijn er leefbaarheidprogramma's die zich richten op een verbetering van het beheer, op meer veiligheid en op het verminderen van de anonimiteit in de wijk. Buurtbarbecues, jongerenwerk en de bestrijding van drugsoverlast zijn voorbeelden van dit type van wijkaanpak. Integratieprogramma's hebben soms enige overlap met achterstandsprogramma's, maar hebben als doel om groepen met elkaar in contact te laten komen en deel uit te laten maken van de samenleving in politiek en sociaal opzicht. Ten slotte kunnen de programma's bedoeld zijn om de dienstverlening in de wijk te verbeteren of om de volksgezondheidsredenen. Een voorbeeld van het laatste is seksuele voorlichting onder bepaalde bevolkings- of leeftijdsgroepen.

Tabel 1 hieronder vat de classificatie samen met voorbeelden van activiteiten. De wijken in dit onderzoek verschillen echter in welke doelen prioriteit krijgen en tevens welke activiteiten worden uitgevoerd of *kunnen* worden uitgevoerd. De volgende paragrafen worden de contextuele raamwerken besproken.

Tabel 1. Samenvatting en classificatie van wijkaanpak

		Type interventie	
		Fysiek	Sociaal economische programma's
Doelen	Leefbaarheid	Aanpassingen aan het ontwerp van de publieke binnen- en buitenruimtes om zogenaamde donkere hoekjes te verwijderen. Vernieuwing van vervallen en verkrotte woningen	Verbetering van beheer, veiligheid, reparaties, sociale projecten en activiteiten om anonimiteit te verminderen en sociale controle te vergroten en vandalisme te voorkomen
	Sociaal economische achterstanden	Herstructurering van de woningmarkt; investeringen in de publieke ruimte om de wijk aantrekkelijker te maken; sociale menging; nieuwe of vernieuwde huisvesting voor bedrijvigheid en voorzieningen	Maatschappelijke activering, sociale participatie, onderwijs (voor kinderen en volwassenen), opleidingsstages, arbeidsparticipatie, 'empowerment'
	Integratie	Nieuwe of vernieuwde voorzieningen voor organisaties (zelforganisaties, buurtorganisaties, andere vrijwilligersorganisaties) en kerken	Arbeidsparticipatie projecten, (taal)onderwijs, maatschappelijke stages, gemeenschapswerk, sociale activiteiten
	Anders		Volksgezondheid projecten, verbetering van de (publieke) dienstverlening

De contextuele raamwerken

Zoals hierboven aangegeven onderscheiden we drie niveaus van institutioneel relevante context; macro, meso en lokaal.

Macro

De verzorgingsstaat heeft een indirecte maar belangrijke invloed op de aanpak van wijken. Deze invloed is tweeledig.

Ten eerste, wijkaanpak is een vorm van sociaal en economisch beleid die net als het overige sociaal en economisch beleid beïnvloedt wordt door de heersende ideeën over de taken en verantwoordelijkheden van de staat. In de meeste gevallen komen deze ideeën en filosofieën in het nationaal stedelijk beleid dat het wijkaanpak omlijst en vorm geeft, terug. In de meeste gevallen is er in de verantwoording een sterke nadruk op het problemen die te maken hebben met armoede en werkloosheid. Hoewel armoede en werkloosheid wel voorkomen in de wijken en het bewoners voor grote problemen stelt, is het niet gelijk logisch om deze plaatsgericht te bestrijden. De meeste mensen met armoedeproblemen wonen namelijk buiten de wijken waar gebiedsgericht beleid op wordt uitgevoerd. De reden om het bestrijden van achterstanden te benadrukken heeft te maken met een dominante liberale notie in alle landen waar het uitgangspunt is dat de staat de condities voor zelfontplooiing moet garanderen en zelfs stimuleren. Het verlenen van inkomensgaranties zou bovendien de motivatie bij mensen weg kunnen nemen om zichzelf te verbeteren. Daarom moet de staat gelijke kansen benadrukken en niet streven naar meer sociale gelijkheid (door bijvoorbeeld inkomensgaranties te verlenen). Wijkaanpak past goed in deze filosofie van bevordering van gelijke kansen. De leefomgeving, slechte of arme buurten, zijn dan een oorzaak van achterstand en sociale uitsluiting.

In alle landen is er een nadruk op activering, gemeenschap, en sociale participatie om achterstanden te bestrijden. Maar in het bijzonder in het Verenigd Koninkrijk druppelen in de wijkaanpak beleidsfilosofieën door die de louterende werking van arbeid en gemeenschap op het gedrag van het individu benadrukken. Dit wordt door beleid en beleidsmakers vaak gecontrasteerd met de negatieve, passiefmakende en soms zelfs asociale werking van sociale bijstand of werkloosheidsuitkeringen. Een nadruk op gemeenschap, arbeid en sociale participatie is zeker niet negatief om bijvoorbeeld de leefbaarheid en het sociale leven in de wijk te bevorderen. Maar wanneer het doel sociaal economisch van aard is, is de implicatie dat de oorzaak van armoede aan het gedrag van het individu moet worden toegeschreven, en niet aan bijvoorbeeld structurele onderwijs- en werkgelegenheidsfactoren. Het gevolg kan een stigmatisering van armoede zijn, en ineffectief beleid qua armoedebestrijding aangezien de structurele oorzaken en mechanismen grotendeels onaangeroerd blijven. Kortom de aandacht voor sociaal economische aspecten in een wijkaanpak heeft veel te maken met een dominant discours waar de leefomgeving is geïdentificeerd als grootste obstakel voor ontplooiingskansen in de samenleving en waar structurele mechanismen worden genegeerd en macro-economische oplossingen geschuwd omdat deze oplossingen op dit moment politiek, electoraal en maatschappelijk moeilijk haalbaar zijn. Bovendien speelt mee dat concentraties van armoede of immigranten niet altijd acceptabel zijn voor de buitenwereld met als gevolg politieke druk om beleid tegen concentratie te vormen.

Ten tweede is de verzorgingsstaat belangrijk voor de volkshuisvesting. Hoewel de huidige relatie niet helder is en in de academische literatuur wordt betwist, is in ieder geval ontwikkeling van de sociale huur sector in het verleden verbonden met de ontwikkeling van de verzorgingsstaat. Vooral in Zweden, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Nederland is er door de staat een omvangrijke sociale huursector opgebouwd.

De sociale voorzieningen en publieke dienstverlening in Zweden wordt gekenmerkt door de sociaal democratische traditie, maar deze maakt plaats voor meer liberale invloeden. In de volkshuisvesting is er een grote rol weggelegd voor de publieke huursector. Sinds de jaren 90 hebben privatisering van de publieke woningvoorraad en gemeentelijk woningbouw corporaties en de verkoop van huurwoningen (voornamelijk buiten de probleemwijken) er voor gezorgd dat in Zweedse steden de publieke huurwoningen geconcentreerd zijn geraakt in de minst populaire wijken op de woningmarkt die daarmee structurele 'probleemwijken'

werden. Het gevolg is dat deze wijken meer sociaal zwakkere gezinnen opvangen en blijven opvangen wanneer economisch succesvolle huishoudens wegtrekken. Wijkaanpak moet hier het hoofd aan bieden.

Het Verenigd Koninkrijk kent een langere liberale geschiedenis. In de jaren tachtig is veel van de publieke woningbouw overgedragen aan private instellingen of verkocht. Veel van het volkshuisvestingsbeleid is erop gericht om eigenwoningbezit te bevorderen en de laatste resten sociale huur voorraad over te dragen aan private gemeenschapswoningbouw corporaties. Wijkaanpak is hierbij een belangrijk instrument voor verandering

Spanje kent pas een opbouw van een verzorgingsstaat sinds begin jaren tachtig van de vorige eeuw. Dit betekent dat publieke dienstverlening nog in opbouw is. Het wordt gekenmerkt door liberale en corporatistische elementen. De woningmarkt wordt gedomineerd door eigenwoningbezit. Door de schaarse sociale vangnetten van de staat, is de waarde van eigenwoningbezit een belangrijk element geworden in de familie mechanismen van sociale voorzieningen. Door het probleem van betaalbaarheid van woningen richt het volkshuisvestingsbeleid in de Catalaanse regio zich meer op het langzaam creëren van een publieke of sociale sector om de meest zwakke huishoudens in op te kunnen vangen. Wijkaanpak kan hier een rol bij spelen.

Vanwege de coalitiepolitiek wordt het Nederlandse volkshuisvestingsbeleid door verschillende stromingen beïnvloed. De sociale huursector is tijdens de crisis in de jaren 80 zeer omvangrijk geworden. Maar sinds de jaren 90 is er meer liberalisering en privatisering van de woningmarkt. De laatste Nota Wonen uit 2001 kent een sterke liberale inslag en is erop gericht om het aandeel eigenwoningbezit te verhogen ten koste van sociale huur. Het doel is om de omvang van de sociale huursector beter te laten aanpassen op de omvang van de behoefte. Daarbij is het idee dat eigenaren meer verantwoordelijkheidsgevoel voelen voor hun woning en de buurt. Mede via wijkaanpak wordt de woningmarkt geherstructureerd.

Naast het stedelijke beleid en het volkshuisvesting beleid, wordt de wijkaanpak ook beïnvloed door de publieke en politieke debatten over immigratie en integratie. In Zweden en Nederland is de invloed op het beleid het meest duidelijk, maar ook in het Verenigd Koninkrijk zijn sociaal conflict tussen bevolkingsgroepen en segregatie van immigranten belangrijker geworden in het debat en in het stedelijk beleid. Zelfs in Spanje, een relatief nieuw immigratieland, begint een debat op gang te komen en worden stadswijken geïdentificeerd als loci van immigranten. Catalanen hebben echter al wel ervaring met de aanwezigheid van Roma gemeenschappen in steden. Het gevolg is dat de integratie van immigranten vooral moet plaatsvinden in de stadswijken waar concentraties leven. Wijkaanpak wordt daarom ook aangegrepen om de integratie te bevorderen. Zoals gezegd, varieert de aandacht die integratie krijgt per samenleving. In Zweden en Nederland is de nadruk groter dan in het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Catalonië.

Meso

Een wijk is niet een op zichzelf staande entiteit maar is ingebed in een stad en in een stedelijke regio. De context op meso niveau bestaat uit de regionale woningmarkt, de economie en werkgelegenheidsstructuur en de gemeentelijke politiek. Deze context kan zowel beperkend als bevorderlijk werken op de wijkaanpak.

De regionale woningmarkt is van belang in twee elementen; de bestaande eigendomsverhoudingen (*tenure structure*) en de situatie op de woningmarkt. Om met de eigendomsverhoudingen te beginnen, deze zijn grotendeels afhankelijk van het volkshuisvestingsbeleid op hoger niveau, maar omdat uit de cases blijkt dat er grote regionale verschillen kunnen zijn, wordt het hier besproken. Een

eigendomsstructuur met veel sociale huur woningen in het bezit van enkele actoren geeft meer mogelijkheden voor grootschalige wijkaanpak dan wanneer het aandeel eigenwoningbezit zeer hoog is. Dit is omdat eigenaarschap vaak geconcentreerd is bij één of meerdere organisaties, vaak woningbouw corporaties, wat overleg en samenwerking vergemakkelijkt (zie hieronder). De grootschalige en ingrijpende herstructurering in de Bijlmermeer en de Central Estates zijn bijvoorbeeld niet mogelijk in Barcelona waar het eigenwoningbezit zeer hoog is. Bovendien zouden de kosten en wettelijke hindernissen om individuele eigenaren uit te kopen een dergelijke operatie zeer duur en arbeidsintensief maken. Van extreem hoge kosten is in de vernieuwing van woningen in de Catalaanse wijken geen sprake omdat de woningen nog onder een sociaal regime vielen en nog geen vrije markt woningen waren.

Ten tweede, de vraag op de woningmarkt beïnvloedt zowel de situatie in de wijk als de mogelijkheden van wijkaanpak. Wanneer er sprake is van een hoge vraag naar woningen zoals in Barcelona, Amsterdam, Utrecht, Stockholm en Jönköping, dan hebben zeer zwakke groepen minder mogelijkheden om zich te vestigen en zijn vaak aangewezen op goedkope koopwoningen of sociale huurwoningen in de zwakkere wijken. In Kanaleneiland-Noord bijvoorbeeld trekt de concentratie van grote sociale huurwoningen arme gezinnen die niet elders terecht kunnen. In de wijken in Stockholm en in Sant Roc bestaat het probleem dat sociaal mobiele huishoudens niet in de buurt blijven maar verhuizen waardoor het inkomen en arbeidsniveau in de wijk laag blijft. Dit maakt dat sociaal economisch programma's om achterstand te bestrijden en integratie te bevorderen structureel aanwezig moeten zijn om nieuwkomers te helpen. De herstructurering van de woningvoorraad is manier om een wijk meer stabiel te maken qua bevolkingssamenstelling en verhuisc Bewegingen. Een belangrijke voorwaarde is echter wel dat de vraag naar koopwoningen in de regio groot genoeg is en dat er een woningvoorraad is waar huishoudens uit de wijk terecht kunnen wanneer het aandeel goedkope woningen in de wijk omlaag is gebracht (meestal de sociale huurvoorraad in de regio). In de Zweedse cases is er geen sprake van herstructurering omdat de vraag hoog is en de kwaliteit van de woningen voldoende is. Men richt zich meer op mogelijkheden om zwakkere groepen te huisvesten elders in de regio. In Råslätt wordt de buurt sociaal stabiel gemaakt door voorlopig de toegang van zwakkere huishoudens in de wijk te ontfeggen. Om middenklasse aan te trekken en de wijken te stabiliseren, wordt in Catalonië getracht de marktwaarde van de koopwoningen in de wijk op te vijzelen door investeringen te doen in de kwaliteit van de openbare ruimte en het openbaar vervoer naar Barcelona te verbeteren.

De situatie in Birmingham is wezenlijk anders aangezien het gebrek aan vraag een probleem is. Dit gebrek heeft vooral gevolgen in perifere wijken zoals in Hodge Hill. De perifere locatie en het gebrek aan vraag maakt het plaatsen van koopwoningen risicovol. Door de centrale locatie van de Central Estates was er wel sprake van een marktpotentieel die verzilverd is door te bouwen voor middenklasse professionals die in de stad willen wonen.

Naast de woningmarkt, is ook de economische structuur van belang voor een stad. Barcelona, Amsterdam, Utrecht, Stockholm en Jönköping kennen een werkgelegenheidsstructuur die gebaseerd is op logistiek, handel, professionele dienstverlening, en overheid. De stadseconomie van Birmingham heeft echter pas recent een overgang meegemaakt van fabricage en industrie naar diensten. De herstructurering van de economie maakt dat de werkgelegenheidsstructuur en de arbeidsvraag wezenlijk veranderd zijn. Hoewel er mogelijkheden zijn voor nascholing en herscholing wordt gedaan, is de mismatch tussen vraag en aanbod op de arbeidsmarkt (en de grootte van de vraag) het meest omvangrijk in Birmingham. Dit heeft zijn weerslag op de economie, arbeidsmarkt en woningmarkt van de stad.

Ten slotte, kan de gemeente politiek een effect hebben op wijkaanpak. Het meest in het oog springende voorbeeld is het falen van de overdracht van de sociale huurvoorraad aan nieuwe woningbouw corporaties in Birmingham. Hoewel het door stemming is tegengehouden, had de geplande overdracht de steun verloren van de gemeenteraad. De steun van de gemeente bleek ook van cruciaal belang in de aanpak van Trinitat Nova en Bijlmermeer. Maar politieke overwegingen kunnen ook de aanpak beïnvloeden. Zo is om onduidelijke politieke redenen gekozen voor de renovatie van een aantal gebouwen in Sant Roc hoewel de behoefte elders in de wijk groter was. Ook zijn bepaalde vormen van wijkaanpak niet altijd haalbaar om politieke redenen. In Stockholm heeft bijvoorbeeld de Groene Partij een sleutelrol in de coalitiepolitiek. Deze sleutelpositie wordt onder andere gebruikt om te voorkomen dat de groene velden rondom de wijken niet volgebouwd worden. Het gevolg is dat het enclave karakter behouden blijft en er weinig ruimte is voor nieuwbouw. Een ander voorbeeld is de discussie over luchtkwaliteit in Utrecht. Deze discussie houdt heeft de ontwikkeling van de As Kanaleneiland aanzienlijk vertraagd.

Lokaal

De lokale dimensie is misschien wel het meest belangrijk voor de daadwerkelijke uitvoer en kwaliteit van wijkaanpak. Er zijn drie belangrijke elementen: de eigenschappen van de wijk in fysieke zin, de bewoners, en de aanwezige organisaties en actoren.

Om met de eigenschappen van de wijk te beginnen. De ligging van de wijk is al genoemd bij de woningmarkt eigenschappen. De twee cases in Birmingham laten goed zien dat wanneer er weinig spanning op de markt staat, een gunstige locatie nabij het centrum meer mogelijkheden voor herstructurering oplevert dan een geïsoleerde locatie dicht bij een snelweg.

Maar naast de ligging speelt ook de grootte en schaal van een wijk een rol. De grootte is meestal een gevolg van administratieve indelingen en fysieke barrières. Hoewel de grenzen van een wijk in een aanpak soms onduidelijk aangegeven zijn, blijkt dat onder respondenten er vaak een gemeenschappelijke notie is van de grenzen. Het is logisch dat wanneer een groter gebied met meer mensen onder de aandacht is, dat er ook meer sociale processen aanwezig zijn waarvan een deel als problematisch kan worden beschouwd. Maar wat zijn de gevolgen voor een wijkgerichte aanpak? Een grootschalige herstructurering in een groot gebied, zoals in de Bijlmermeer, kan schaalvoordelen opleveren met betrekking tot kosten van bouwwerkzaamheden. Schaalvoordelen kunnen zich ook voordoen in de levering van publieke en commerciële diensten. Een belangrijk probleem van de geïsoleerde enclave wijken in de periferie van Stockholm is de hoge kosten om elke wijk te voorzien van publieke dienstverlening. Ook is er grote moeite om winkels te behouden voor die wijken.

Een kleine schaal heeft ook aanzienlijke voordelen. De Råslätt case laat zien dat een kleine wijk in een betrekkelijke kleine stad veel aandacht krijgt. Er is sprake van directe uitwisseling en communicatie tussen bewoners, professionals in de wijk en de gemeente en woningbouw corporatie. Dit heeft geleid tot een netwerk van formele en informele contacten. Deze zogenaamde 'Råslätt geest' was deels mogelijk door de overzichtelijkheid en kleine schaal van de wijk. Hetzelfde is in mindere mate waar voor Central Estates en Trinitat Nova. Aan de andere kant, Kanaleneiland-Noord en Sant Roc zijn ook betrekkelijk kleine wijken, maar in deze wijken is er geen sprake van uitwisseling en samenwerking maar van sociaal conflict en wantrouwen tussen groepen en tussen bewoners en de overheid (zie hieronder).

Naast fysieke eigenschappen van de wijk, spelen de bewoners een belangrijke rol. Het is opvallend dat de wijken waar men over het algemeen meer tevreden is over de wijk (Central Estates, Trinitat Nova, Bijlmermeer, Råslätt) sprake is geweest van protest en activisme van bewonersgroepen waarin eisen werden gesteld aan de staat en woningbouw corporaties met betrekking tot de aanpak van de wijk. Deze eisen hebben geleid tot enige vorm van inspraak in de richting en doelen van de aanpak. De bewonersinspraak is het meest ontwikkeld en verregaand in Trinitat Nova waar de bewonersorganisatie professionele ondersteuning heeft en als volwaardig partner opereert. De inspraak is het minst geformaliseerd in Råslätt waar inspraak via informele contacten gaat. Bijlmermeer en Central Estates kennen inspraakorganen en procedures.

De situatie in deze wijken is niet alleen het gevolg van bewonersacties maar ook van de bereidwilligheid van de betrokken organisaties om met de bewoners in gesprek te gaan en aan eisen gehoor te geven. Hoewel dit soms met enige tegenzin was, heeft het wel gezorgd voor een betere uitkomst in het oog van de bewoners. In het geval van de Central Estates was het bijvoorbeeld de Planning Office die mogelijkheden voor wijkaanpak zag en handelde ondanks de terughoudendheid van andere onderdelen van de gemeente.

De vraag is dan waarom het in Kanaleneiland Noord, Sant Roc, Hodge Hill en de Stockholm wijken (nog) niet zo is gelopen. Dit heeft deels te maken met de uitvoerende en beherende actoren, vooral de gemeente, die niet in staat zijn geweest om belofte en goede bedoelingen na te komen. Dit is het geval in Hodge Hill en in mindere mate in Kanaleneiland-Noord en Sant Roc. Wanneer de voorbereidingen van wijkaanpak lang duren of wanneer beloofde ingrepen niet komen, kan het tot frustratie leiden onder bewoners. Dit falen kan niet altijd aan context toegeschreven worden. Deze frustratie had zich overigens ook postgevat in sommige 'tevreden' wijken, wat leidde tot groot protest en meer activisme.

Deze frustratie werd meestal door uiting gebracht door een groep binnen de bewoners. In de genoemde tevreden wijken worden de protesten en onderhandeling vaak geleid door bewonersgroepen die al langer in de wijk aanwezig zijn en vaak enige vorm van organisatie hebben. Deze groepen waren zo in staat om voor de gehele wijk op te komen. Dit is het geval bij de Surinaamse gemeenschap in de Bijlmermeer, de bewoners in de Central Estates van Britse en Caribische afkomst, de middenklasse huishoudens in Råslätt die later als professionals, leerkrachten en ambtenaren in de wijk bleven werken, en de oud-arbeiders in Trinitat Nova die er sinds de jaren zestig wonen. De compositie van de bevolking speelt dus ook een rol, evenals de verblijfsduur. In de vier tevreden wijken waren het de 'oudgedienden' die in opstand kwamen.

In de andere wijken ontbreken dergelijke groepen vooralsnog. In Sant Roc is er juist sprake van sociale conflicten tussen nieuwe immigranten, de Spaanse Roma en Spaanse immigranten uit de jaren zestig. In Kanaleneiland, Tensta en Husby is het merendeel van de bevolking immigrant. Deze bevolking heeft vaak (nog) geen weet van het politieke proces of heeft zich juist er van afgewend. Een belangrijk deel van de wijkaanpak in deze wijken richt zich op het verhogen van sociale participatie en integratie. Dit wordt gedaan door sociaal economische programma's en door de stabiliteit van verhuisbewegingen te verkrijgen door koopwoningen toe te voegen of door meer goedkope (huur-)woningen vrij te maken in de regio. In Hodge Hill ten slotte is getracht om bewonersparticipatie op gang te brengen, inclusief professionele ondersteuning. Maar omdat er uiteindelijk weinig steun was vanuit de gemeente en omdat na het wegvallen van gelden weinig interventies zouden plaatsvinden, had dit project niet de gewenste resultaten. De participatie was relatief laag en door een gebrek aan steun en erkenning is er weinig verandering bereikt.

Het blijkt dus de bewoners een cruciale rol spelen in de vorming van de wijkaanpak en de uiteindelijke uitkomst. Vooral de leefbaarheid is gebaat bij de input van de bewoners.

De institutionele samenstelling en institutionele fitheid van interventies en van het normale beheer van de wijk is uiteindelijk ook van groot belang. Uit alle gevallen blijkt dat de staat de belangrijkste speler is voor de financiering en coördinatie van de wijkaanpak. Dit geldt voor de centrale staat maar nog meer voor de lokale overheden. De enige casus waar de gemeente bijna afwezig is, is Sant Roc waar de gemeente pas sinds kort zich bezig houdt met de wijk. Voor die tijd werd de wijk gezien als onderdeel van Barcelona en de problematiek afgeschoven op de regionale overheid.

Naast de gemeente, zijn woningbouw corporaties van groot belang. Niet alle cases hebben een non-profit organisatie tussen private en publieke sfeer die een deel van de woningen in de wijk bezit en beheert. In de aanpak en beheer van de Bijlmermeer, Kanaleneiland, Central Estates, Råslätt, Husby, en Tensta zijn woningbouw corporaties aanwezig en van belang. In al deze gevallen zijn de organisaties betrokken bij zowel fysieke interventies en in mindere mate ook bij sociaal economische programma's.

Naast de twee belangrijkste spelers, kan de derde sector in de vorm van vrijwilligers-, buurt-, en zelforganisaties een belangrijke rol spelen. De kennis en het initiatief is vaak van groot belang voor sociaal economische programma's die leefbaarheid, integratie en achterstand bestrijden. In elke wijk zijn er voorbeelden van succesvolle initiatieven en projecten die door organisaties zijn opgezet. In de Bijlmermeer maakt de gemeente structureel gebruik van dergelijke organisaties om sociaal economische programma's uit te voeren. In Stockholm bijvoorbeeld probeert de gemeente meer vrijwilligersorganisaties in de wijk te kweken om sociale interactie en sociale participatie te bevorderen, en daarmee de integratie. Maar een potentieel probleem van deze organisaties is dat zij niet altijd het belang van de gehele bevolking in de wijk vertegenwoordigen, maar soms georganiseerd zijn om bepaalde culturele of religieuze groepen te vertegenwoordigen. Wanneer integratie tussen groepen het doel is van de wijkaanpak dan is het niet altijd effectief om samen te werken met organisaties die alleen op de eigen groep gericht zijn.

Ten slotte kunnen private actoren zoals het lokale bedrijfsleven en ontwikkelaars, een stempel drukken op de wijkaanpak. Het lokale bedrijfsleven kan een rol spelen bij het verlenen van de stages zoals in Stockholm. In Central Estates is de ontwikkelaar akkoord gegaan om duurzaam te ontwikkelen, te recycleren, en werkers uit de buurt aan te nemen.

Hoewel de samenstelling van belang is, is het vooral de 'fitheid' van de verschillende instituties die het proces en de uitkomsten van een wijkaanpak positief kunnen beïnvloeden. Met fitheid wordt niet zozeer de hoeveelheid organisaties bedoeld, maar een mate van sociale uitwisseling en contacten die ervoor zorgen dat alle actoren weten wat de agenda is, op de hoogte zijn van elkaars activiteiten en van elkaar leren, met conflict kunnen omgaan en structuren hebben om samen te werken indien nodig. Het blijkt dat de fitheid in de 'tevreden' wijken hoger is dan in de 'ontevreden' wijken. Dit is niet verbazingwekkend aangezien het gebrek aan interventie vaak een oorzaak is voor de lage tevredenheid. Dit gebrek komt of door te weinig instituties zoals in Sant Roc, en Hodge Hill of door een teveel aan organisaties zoals in het geval van het As Kanaleneiland project.

Twee aspecten van de institutionele fitheid zijn in het bijzonder van belang voor de wijkaanpak. Ten eerste, is het van belang dat er één of twee actoren zijn die verantwoordelijkheid nemen voor de uitkomst. Met verantwoordelijkheid wordt bedoeld dat men zich bezig houdt met de gehele wijkaanpak en de zich eigenaar

voelt van de problemen, ook wanneer het om zaken gaat die strikt genomen buiten de eigen werkzaamheden vallen. Invloed uitoefenen kan via hiërarchische relaties, of via afhankelijkheid door subsidies, of door een beroep te doen op de ander zijn of haar morele plicht. Een goed voorbeeld van het laatste is de Optima woningbouw corporatie in Central Estates die het als haar taak ziet om voor de gehele wijk en de aanpak zorg te dragen en andere actoren ter verantwoording te roepen wanneer het niet goed gaat. Deze houding heeft de kwaliteit van wijkaanpak aanzienlijk verhoogd. In het geval van Råslätt, en in mindere mate ook de Bijlmermeer, heeft de gemeente samen met de woningbouw corporatie deze rol opgenomen. In Trinitat Nova zijn het de bewoners zelf die de kwaliteit van de wijkaanpak bewaken.

Het tweede belangrijke punt is de professionele capaciteit van de actoren. Hiermee wordt de opleiding, expertise, ervaring en capaciteiten van de professionals binnen de organisaties van de wijkaanpak. In Zweden en Nederland bestaan geen grote verschillen, maar in Birmingham en Barcelona wel. Hoewel de fysieke vernieuwing in Sant Roc wel door een professioneel team wordt geleid, is de rest van de wijkaanpak (sociaal economische programma's) in de handen van enkele professionals met veel verantwoordelijkheden en weinig ondersteuning. In Trinitat Nova echter hebben de bewoners zelf professionele ondersteuning om te onderhandelen, te plannen en fondsen te werven. Ook is er in Birmingham een verschil te zien tussen de twee wijken. Bij de aanpak van de Central Estates verleende de Planning Office van de gemeente hoogwaardige ondersteuning en was er steun vanuit de Universiteit van Birmingham. Bovendien zijn sommige gemeentelijke ambtenaren uiteindelijk overgestapt naar Optima. In Hodge Hill is de wijk en een deel van de huurwoningen in handen van gemeenteafdelingen die onvoldoende uitgerust zijn qua personeel en middelen om het beheer adequaat uit te voeren. Dit heeft een grote weerslag op een wijk waar bewoners zich in de steek gelaten voelen en waar woningen langzaam verkrotten en het zwerfvuil op straat ligt.

De juiste institutionele inbedding van een wijkaanpak is van cruciaal belang voor de uitkomsten en het beheer van een wijk. Voor een deel is deze inbedding weer afhankelijk van de staat, het volkshuisvesting- en stedelijk beleid, en de lokale politiek. Een goed voorbeeld hiervan is het bestaan, maar ook het mandaat en de activiteiten van woningbouw corporaties. Deze zaken hangen af van het volkshuisvestingsbeleid. In het Nederlandse geval hebben we gezien dat de woningbouw corporatie geacht worden de herstructurering uit te voeren maar ook steeds meer deel te nemen aan het sociaal economisch programma's.

Ter afsluiting

Zowel de situatie in de wijk als de reagerende aanpak is afhankelijk van verschillende processen die zich op verschillende niveaus afspelen en bovendien weer elkaar weer beïnvloeden. Zeer kort samengevat worden de doelen en de uitkomst van wijkaanpak beïnvloedt door strategische keuzes binnen de verzorgingsstaat die zich vertalen in volkshuisvesting en stedelijk beleid, door maatschappelijke debatten over integratie, door de regionale woningmarkt en werkgelegenheidsstructuren, door de lokale politiek, door de fysieke karakteristieken van de wijk, door de bewoners, en door de samenstelling en fitheid van het institutionele kader. Dit maakt dat wijkaanpak een complex fenomeen is, waar de uiteindelijke uitkomsten moeilijk te voorspellen zijn. Toch heeft dit rapport getracht deze processen uit elkaar te trekken en inzichtelijk te maken om het leren van andere voorbeelden te verbeteren. Tabel 2 hieronder vat de verschillende aspecten van de context per wijk samen.

Tabel 2. samenvatting context

	Macro			Meso			Lokaal	
	Nadruk stedelijk beleid	Nadruk Volkshuis- vesting beleid	Invloed debat integratie	Lokale Politiek	Woning- Markt druk	Eigendom (voor aanpak)	Bewoners: In staat tot org. en activisme	Fitheid institutio- -neel kader
<i>Hodge Hill</i>	Achterstand en gemeenschap	Overdracht van sociale huur Eigenwoning- bezit	Gematigd	Tegen- werkend	Laag	Sociale huur	Gefrustreerd/ teruggetrokken	Laag
<i>Central Estates</i>	Achterstand en gemeenschap	Overdracht van sociale huur Eigenwoning- bezit	laag	Accomo- derend	Hoog	Sociale huur	In opstand gekomen	Hoog
<i>Tensta</i>	Achterstand, integratie, leefbaarheid	Privatisering en dereguleren	Zeer hoog	Accomo- derend	Hoog, maar kwetsbaar	Sociale huur	Veelal terug- getrokken immigranten	Gem.
<i>Husby</i>	Achterstand, integratie, leefbaarheid	Privatisering en dereguleren	Zeer hoog	Accomo- derend	Hoog, maar kwetsbaar	Sociale huur	Veelal terug- getrokken immigranten	Gem.
<i>Råslätt</i>	Achterstand, integratie, leefbaarheid	Privatisering en dereguleren	Zeer hoog	Accomo- derend	Hoog, maar kwetsbaar	Sociale huur	Zwakke migranten met oud bewoners	Hoog
<i>Bijlmer- Oost</i>	Vooraf leefbaarheid en woningmarkt	Vooraf eigen- woningbezit en sociale stijging	Hoog	Accomo- derend	Hoog, maar kwetsbaar	Sociale huur	Gemengd met activistische Surinaamse Gemeenschap	Gem./ Hoog
<i>Kanalen- eiland- Noord</i>	Vooraf leefbaarheid en woningmarkt	eigen- woningbezit en sociale stijging	Zeer hoog	Accomo- derend	Hoog, maar kwetsbaar	Sociale huur	Gemengd met teruggetrokken Marokkaanse gemeenschap als grootste groep	Laag
<i>Trinitat Nova</i>	Leefbaarheid	Betaalbaar- heid en opbouw sociale sector	laag	Accomo- derend	Hoog	Koop woningen	Zeer activistisch en georgani- seerd	Hoog
<i>Sant Roc</i>	Leefbaarheid	Betaalbaar- heid Betaalbaar- heid en opbouw sociale sector	Gematigd	Tegen- werkend	Hoog, maar kwetsbaar	Koop woningen	Sociaal conflict	Laag

De vraag is welke contexten doorslaggevend zijn voor welke vormen van wijkaanpak, zoals die zijn geschetst in tabel 1. We kunnen dus een verschil maken tussen stuwende institutionele kaders zoals de verzorgingsstaat, het volkshuisvestings- en stedelijk beleid, regionale economie en arbeidsmarkt, integratie debatten, en de inrichting en het functioneren van woningmarkt, en sturende institutionele kaders zoals lokale politiek, de bewoners, en het lokale institutionele raamwerk. Waar stuwende kaders vooral de richting, strategie en doelen vormen, beïnvloeden de sturende kaders de activiteiten en uiteindelijke kwaliteit van de aanpak.

Wanneer we kijken naar de leefbaarheid, dan blijkt dat het in alle gevallen op nationaal niveau in het stedelijk niveau wordt benadrukt. Het is daarmee een doel dat aan de kern staat van elke wijkaanpak staat. De uitkomsten worden vooral beïnvloed door het institutionele kader. De samenstelling hiervan wordt beïnvloed door de eigendomsverhoudingen en daarmee ook de rol en competenties die het volkshuisvestingsbeleid aan eventuele woningbouw corporaties toeschrijft. De houding van de lokale politiek kan eveneens de fitheid van het institutionele kader ten goede komen. Ten slotte blijkt dat de aanwezigheid van een actieve groep bewoners over het algemeen de leefbaarheid ten goede is gekomen.

Naast leefbaarheid, is integratie van immigrantengroepen een belangrijk doel van wijkaanpak. Zoals hierboven al aangegeven, is het vooral in de Zweedse en Nederlandse wijken een belangrijk punt. Het nationale politieke en publieke debat verbindt integratie van groepen met de zwakkere wijken in grote steden. Hoewel dit in alle cases het geval is, is in Zweden en Nederland het integratiebeleid nauw verweven met het stedelijk beleid. Het gevolg is dat een deel van de wijkaanpak zich op integratie richt via sociaal economische programma's. Maar het blijkt dat ook de regionale woningmarkt en de eigendomsverhoudingen een rol spelen. In Kanaleneiland-Noord en de Zweedse wijken blijkt dat door druk op de markt en de concentratie van sociale huurwoningen arme immigranten gezinnen in de wijk oververtegenwoordigd zijn.

Sociaal economische achterstand is het derde doel waar dit rapport zich op richt. De meest conventionele manier van ingrijpen gaat via sociaal economische programma's. De uitkomsten van deze programma's zijn afhankelijk van de beleidskaders die gevormd worden door de houding van de (verzorgings-)staat, de het daaruit vloeiende stedelijk beleid, en de lokale politiek. De lokale expertise en institutionele fitheid zijn uiteindelijk ook cruciaal in de uitvoer. Een tweede manier om dit doel na te streven is via een andere sociale menging in de wijk door meer middenklasse huishoudens aan te trekken of middenklasse voor de wijk te behouden. Dit kan door middel van interventies die de reputatie en de positie van de wijk op de woningmarkt willen verbeteren en door het aandeel sociale huursector woningen te verminderen ter faveure van koopwoningen en vrije markt huur. We hebben gezien dat het nationale volkshuisvestingsbeleid en stedelijk beleid in een aantal gevallen gericht is op de bevordering van het eigenwoningbezit. Daarnaast zijn er een aantal belangrijk voorwaarden op meso niveau. Ten eerste moet de lagere klasse in sociale huurwoningen wonen. Dit is niet altijd het geval in de Spaanse wijken waar armoede ook in koopwoningen voorkomt. In dit geval is de aanpak beperkt tot het verbeteren van de publieke ruimte, infrastructuur en een aantal gebouwen om de marktpositie te verbeteren. Maar voor het plaatsen van koopwoningen moet er ook voldoende vraag zijn op de woningmarkt. In Hodge Hill is dit bijvoorbeeld niet het geval omdat de fysieke locatie en de bebouwde vorm van de wijk niet overeen komen met de wensen van de middenklasse en omdat er aanbod elders in de regio is. Ten slotte, moet de lokale politiek een grootschalige sloop en bouw van woningen politiek en (eventueel) financieel ondersteunen.

Lessen voor de praktijk

Vanuit de lokale praktijk gezien zijn er zes institutionele elementen van belang voor het ontwerp, onderhandeling, uitvoer en uitkomsten van een wijkaanpak. Deze zijn:

1. De vrijheidsgraden en verwachtingen vanuit nationaal beleid
Vooral het stedelijk en volkshuisvestingsbeleid zijn van belang voor de mogelijkheden en beperkingen voor strategische actie van lokale actoren. Het blijkt dat deze twee vormen van beleid een belangrijke weerslag hebben op de doelen en normen van wijkaanpak, maar ook op de middelen, regels, en geldstromen. Het bestaan van een sociaal huursysteem beheerd door woningcorporaties is een belangrijke uitkomst van het Nederlandse volkshuisvestingsbeleid die weer een eigen institutionele dynamiek genereert. Corporaties zijn belangrijke actoren met eigen prioriteiten en taken.
Daarnaast blijkt dat beleid op het gebied van justitie en politie, onderwijs en gezondheidszorg ook belangrijke randvoorwaarden kunnen geven. De Nederlandse Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning geeft bijvoorbeeld nieuwe mogelijkheden en verplichtingen om zorg op buurtniveau aan te bieden. Dit kan geïntegreerd worden met andere wijkaanpak initiatieven zoals de bouw van faciliteiten, of de subsidiering van bepaalde sociaal economische programma's die sociale isolatie tegen proberen te gaan.
Het beleid zelf is vaak een reactie op maatschappelijke en politieke discussies, zoals over integratie of armoede. Daarmee hebben deze discussies ook hun weerslag op wijkaanpak. In het Nederlandse geval worden woningcorporaties geacht zich bezig te houden met sociaal economische programma's en met het welzijn van de wijk en bewoners.
2. Naast het beleid is de woningmarkt ook van belang voor de mogelijkheden van wijkaanpak. Dit is vooral van belang wanneer de probleemdefinities verder gaan dan leefbaarheidaspecten van de buurt maar ook betrekking hebben op de bewoners. In dat geval kan wijkaanpak er naar streven om meer middenklasse bewoners aan te trekken door aantrekkelijke koop- of huurwoningen aan de woningvoorraad toe te voegen. Dit zal alleen succesvol zijn wanneer de druk op de woningmarkt en de vraag naar dergelijke woningen groot genoeg is. Naast de verandering van bewonerssamenstelling kan de bouw van woningen voor de middenklasse een strategie zijn om vernieuwingen te bekostigen. In dit geval is de druk op de markt eveneens van belang en zal het strategieën mogelijk maken.
3. De woningmarkt is regionaal in haar dynamiek maar drukt zich uit in lokale verschillen. De ligging van een wijk is in dit geval van groot belang zeker wanneer de spanning op de markt niet zeer groot is. De twee wijken in Birmingham laten dit verschil goed zien. Wanneer er een lage spanning is, dan zullen marktpartijen minder geneigd zijn risico's te nemen. Deze risico's zullen dan door de staat of door woningbouw corporaties genomen moeten worden. In het Engelse geval ontbreken verenigingen in sommige gevallen en is de staat terughoudend om te investeren.
4. Naast ligging en woningmarktpositie van de wijk, spelen de eigendomsverhoudingen een rol in de wijk ook een rol. Wanneer er sprake is van sociale huurwoningen, dan zal dit andere mogelijkheden geven voor vernieuwing dan wanneer bewoners eigenaar zijn.
De eigenaar van meerdere sociale huurwoningen, een corporatie of een

vereniging, zal zich eerder verantwoordelijk voelen voor de wijk uit het oogpunt van waardeontwikkeling van het bezit. Het gevolg is dat de eigenaar van meerdere complexen zich anders zal opstellen en andere acties ondernemen dan een eigenaar van één complex.

Individuele woningeigenaren worden over het algemeen door eigendomsrecht meer beschermd dan huurders en kunnen daardoor meer eisen met betrekking tot plaatsing en compensatie in het geval van sloop of grondige renovatie. Bovendien, wanneer er sprake is van koopwoningen, zal het moeilijker zijn om collectieve actie te ondernemen zonder een vorm van bewonersorganisatie.

5. Participatie en organisatie van bewoners blijkt een belangrijk element van de institutionele inbedding te zijn. Wanneer bewoners zich activistisch opstellen en hun de mogelijkheid wordt gegeven om zich te uiten, blijkt dat strategieën en activiteiten van uitvoerende organisaties beïnvloed worden. Dit kan positieve gevolgen hebben voor leefbaarheid, aangezien dit uiteindelijk door de bewoners wordt ervaren.

6. Ten slotte is de institutionele fitheid van belang. Dit heeft te maken met de mate van samenwerking, collectieve actie, communicatie en overeenstemming tussen de betrokken actoren. Daarbij zijn twee aspecten van belang; regie en capaciteit.

De regie over de wijkaanpak is een belangrijk aspect van de institutionele inbedding en de uitkomsten van de wijkaanpak. Wanneer één of twee organisaties in staat zijn de leiding te nemen en met andere actoren strategische acties te ondernemen of andere actoren te nopen tot actie door middel van subsidies of hiërarchische relaties, is er minder kans op een verlamd proces of conflict. Het is echter van belang dat alle betrokkenen het eens zijn over strategieën en acties van de wijkaanpak. Voor een belangrijk deel is dit weer afhankelijk van de bewoners, eigendomsverhoudingen, lokale politiek, en het effect van nationaal beleid op het institutionele raamwerk. Naast een leidende rol, is institutionele capaciteit van belang. Dit heeft betrekking op de aanwezigheid van de juiste expertise en organisaties om gestelde doelen te verwezenlijken. Jeugdbeleid zonder betrokkenheid van scholen zal bijvoorbeeld minder mogelijkheden tot acties en strategieën bieden. Naast de aanwezigheid van de juiste organisaties is het ook van belang dat het betrokken personeel voldoende expertise en ondersteuning heeft.

Deze zes punten geven aan dat de uiteindelijke vorm en strategie van wijkaanpak gevormd wordt door processen en structuren vanuit meerdere niveaus. Beleidsmakers worden geconfronteerd met deze structuren en ondernemen strategische actie (of juist niet) als reactie. Aangezien bij wijkaanpak altijd meerdere actoren betrokken zijn, heeft deze actie per definitie gevolgen voor andere actoren. Collectieve actie kan ontstaan maar is niet een altijd noodzakelijk of logisch. Wanneer een coalitie van organisaties en instituties tot leven komt, zal de wijkaanpak gevormd en gedefinieerd worden door de combinatie van deze instituties (regels, normen, doelen, regimes). Elke wijkaanpak heeft een eigen karakter, of mix aan instituties, die voortkomt uit de geschiedenis en instituties en de strategische acties daarop.

1 Introduction

As William Grigsby and his colleagues (1987) once argued, the quality of any neighbourhood is always in a state of perpetual decline through aging and usage. However, affluent residents are generally apt to stall the decline of their homes perpetually. As a result, affluent neighbourhoods are generally able to maintain the buildings through collective or individual initiatives. However, for many neighbourhoods, intervention in the form of physical redevelopment or subsidies is required whenever an area reaches a point at which it only attracts residents who do not have the means to ensure proper upkeep of the dwellings and the neighbourhood.

In Western Europe, upkeep and liveability of the neighbourhood is ultimately seen as the responsibility of the public sector, and, in the case of social or public housing even the quality of the dwellings are of (semi-) public concern. National and regional urban policies since the 1960s were traditionally employed to frame renewal.

Apart from the physical state of buildings within a neighbourhood, the social aspect has increased in importance. When neighbourhoods are regarded as ripe for intervention, they are commonly labelled as 'concentrated', 'poverty-stricken', 'segregated', or plainly as 'problem areas'. These labels are used in many Western European countries, which face different sorts of socio-economic problems in some of their older urban neighbourhoods. In many cases, the problems of these neighbourhoods are associated with a concentration of a minority group or socio-economic class living within the area.

In this report, neighbourhood regeneration refers to a range of policy responses to changes in European Post WWII housing estates. Like the housing estates themselves, these policy responses are diverse, but do share several similarities.

In the decades after WWII, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, large-scale housing estates were planned and built in and around European Cities. Initially, these housing estates tended to function well on the housing market and were not considered problematic or low in status. However, nowadays, many estates face a variety of difficulties and problems (see Hall et al., 2005a).

There are differences in problems, which are in part related to the position of the estate on the regional housing market. In Western Europe, this position has been in decline mainly due to regional supply of newer and more attractive housing, typically single-family housing. As a result, middle-class households move away and are replaced by residents who have less choice on the housing market, such as low-income households and ethnic minorities (Hall et al., 2005c).

In Central and Eastern Europe the housing estates tend to be more uniform and larger in scale than their West European counterparts. However, their challenges are generally not (yet) related to the housing market because demand remains high due to housing shortages (Hall et al., 2005c). The challenges in these estates relate more to the internal and external physical environment, such as upkeep of the apartment blocks, the living environment, a lack of parking space etc. In addition, after a period of privatization in the 1990s, the new owners have trouble sorting out responsibilities for estate management and upkeep. In Southern Europe, post-war housing estates are also facing problems with public space and the quality of apartment blocks. These estates are also coping with an aging population and an increased demand for services (Hall et al., 2005a; Van Beekhoven, 2006).

As mentioned, addressing the difficulties of these housing estates has become a major policy challenge in European cities. Although regeneration efforts vary depending on local contexts, there has been a shift over time from smaller physical interventions towards increasingly more complex interventions. The

increased complexity is due to the inclusion (and integration) of social and economic objectives in the regeneration and the involvement of local stakeholders and residents in the decision-making process (Hall et al., 2005c). Some of the interventions are aimed at improving the liveability of the environment by improving and renovating public space and apartment blocks, by improving access to services, preventing the senses from drowning in odours, and by dealing with crime, while others aim at fighting social exclusion by tackling unemployment directly or by altering the social mix by trying to raise the share of middle class households.

Despite spill-over effects of neighbourhood regeneration (see, Musterd and Ostendorf, 2005), policy makers are generally concerned with regeneration within a targeted area (Hall et al., 2005c). Hence, most of the interventions are intended to have an impact, either directly or indirectly, on the quality of the estate. Thus, the expectation is that regeneration will have a positive influence on the residents' perception of their neighbourhood.

1.1 Research Objective and Question

A lot of comparative research has been done between cities to understand the urban social problems and practices of neighbourhood regeneration which can be used to facilitate lesson drawing (e.g. Musterd *et al.*, 2006; Van Kempen *et al.*, 2005). Although it is usually recognised that the first step of lesson drawing is scanning for similar problems (Rose, 1991), studies that attempt to do so often do not take into full consideration that the stipulations of an area's main problems are heavily influenced by the institutional framework and the power relations it is associated with, and that for international learning to take place this has to be understood. Thus, it is crucial to realise that every practice is shaped and embedded in an institutional framework, which is a product of actors and conditions on multiple scales: the area itself, the city-region, and the (welfare) state and beyond. In short, context matters (cf. Van Kempen, 2001). A notable exception to the gap in knowledge on international institutional comparisons of urban development programmes is the UGIS study (see De Decker et al., 2003).

The goal of this report is to explore through international comparative research which institutional elements are relevant to the strategies, activities and outcomes of neighbourhood regeneration in Western Europe. In this report, the institutional embeddedness of neighbourhood regeneration is explored by reviewing the practices and actions with wider institutional frameworks (e.g. state, politics, market) in mind. The main research question of this report is: How do institutional frameworks at different levels affect the strategies, activities, and outcomes (practices) of neighbourhood regeneration in Western Europe?

Before discussing the research setup, it is important we pay attention to the notions of institutions and institutional embeddedness. Their definitions have implications for research design and strategy.

1.2 Institutions

Institutions are central concepts to any social enquiry about policy making and action (Rhodes in Lowndes, 2002). Since the 'behavioural revolution' in the 1950s, social and political scientists have been looking to explain why individuals behave in certain manners in certain contexts and environments (Goodin and Klingemann, 1996). However, the formal arrangements and representations that institutionalism was

interested in no longer sufficed. Hence, authors from different backgrounds have theorised that behaviour is shaped by systemic power derived from capital/ labour relations (Marxist), or by politics as the interplay of self-interests (rational choice theorists, neo-classical economics). In the 1980s, a new institutionalism emerged which sought to further 'socialise' the approach and go beyond assertions that institutions are merely aggregations of individual preferences. March and Olsen (1984) have asserted that institutions have a more autonomous role in shaping social and political outcomes. Collective action is embedded in rules and norms which regulate social action. Through the interpretation of actors, these rules and norms form socially constructed and accepted meanings and practices, which become institutions. Actions of individuals and collectivities occur within these institutions (March and Olsen, 1996, quoted in Jessop, 2004).

However, since the so-called institutional turn and the emergence of new institutionalism, the concept of institutions has taken hold in many disciplines. There are different strands, some of which are mutually exclusive, while others may complement each other. The variations are mostly the result of the particular interests of disciplines and previous research habits and traditions, resulting in various categorisations (in e.g. Guy Peters, 1996; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Lowndes, 2002). Most important in these categorisations is the cleavage between rational choice institutional theory, which relates to the economic discipline, and normative institutional theory, which is more sociological.

To begin with the latter, normative institutionalism stresses the effect of institutions on actors' beliefs, identities, norms, and values. Hence, these are the main explanatory variables. Rules and structures embody power relations and values, and as such determine 'appropriate' behaviour and decisions of political actors within given settings (Lowndes, 2002). This strand is also referred to as sociological institutionalism.

Rational choice institutionalism has its roots in studies of the stable majorities in United States congress over time (see Hall and Taylor, 1996; Riker, 1980). In contrast to normative institutionalism, rational choice institutionalists deny that institutions produce behaviour or preferences. These preferences are seen as originating internally and as relatively stable and predictable: favouring utility maximization or self gain. Institutions provide information about the likely behaviour of others, and about the possible incentives and disincentives for every course of action. Based on this information, actors can make strategic (and rational) choices. While normative institutionalists stress the cultural and temporal embeddedness of institutions, rational choice institutionalists regard them as social constructions that serve to solve collective action problems (Lowndes, 2002; Weingast, 1996).

Jessop (2004) points to several methodological advantages of the use of institutions in social inquiry. It allows overcoming several ontological antinomies. Firstly, structural determination and social agency is overcome by the structuration approach which sees institutions as recursively reproduced sets of rules and resources that enable and constrain social actions (Giddens, 1984). In very simple terms: actors affect structures and institutions, and structures and institutions condition the life and behaviour of actors. Secondly, as mesolevel phenomena, institutions may provide a bridge between holism and individualism, or between macro- and microphenomena. Furthermore, it allows accounting for authoritative pressure and steering from above such as national policies, as well as for constraining and reinforcing elements such as social movements or grass-root protests. Institutions may be the site for codification and mediation of power relations. Thirdly, institutions are not static formations, but are interpreted and renegotiated. As such, they are not fully determinative of social action, yet they do not allow any actions that are purely wilful and in sociologically and historically amorphous contingency either.

In addition to these and other methodological advantages, institutions may also be regarded as ontological. This means that institutions and institutionalisations are seen as 'the primary axis of collective life and social order' and they matter because they constrain, steer, and shape social action and relations (Jessop, 2004).

Jessop, within the frame of his strategic relational approach (SRA), particularly stresses the importance of the relation between structures and actors.¹ This relation is two-way. Firstly, institutions do not exist outside the specific action context, but their relevance lies in their structural tendency to reinforce, or to discourage, selectively specific forms of action, tactics, or strategies. In short, structures select behaviours. This means that actors take strategic action, albeit not always totally rational or informed, based on the institutions in place. However, while institutions may steer and select, they do not determine action. There is always some freedom for actors to choose a course of action. Secondly, actors can also reflexively reconstitute institutions and their resulting matrix. The capacity to do so is dependent on the changing selectivities of institutions and on the actors' changing opportunities to engage in strategic action (Jessop, 2004).

In sum, Jessop's take on institutions heuristically employs elements of rational choice institutionalism (e.g. the emphasis on strategic thinking of actors) and of normative institutionalism (e.g. institutionalisation involving not only the agents and conditions for action but also the very constitution of agents, identities, interests, and strategies). By stressing interplay, he desists from prioritizing either structure or behaviour, which is a source of (perhaps unnecessary) conflict among academics (Goodin and Klingemann, 1996). The SRA approach to institutions can perhaps best be seen as a form of historical institutionalism, which stresses the eclectic relationship between structures and actors over time (see Hall and Taylor, 1996). Indeed, Jessop stresses the importance of time and, particularly, of evolving and reproducing institutions over time. However, the SRA goes beyond the historical institutionalist notion of path dependency by stressing that strategic selectivities of institutions are always temporal and always spatial. With this claim, it is implied that there is a geography of institutions and it is recognized that institutions are, among other things, geographical accomplishments (Philo and Parr, 2000). Both strategy and tactics of actors may focus on the establishment of places or on the utilization of time. Conversely, structural path dependency and path shaping signify the importance of local histories, but also offer freedom for actors to act and reflexively rearticulate institutions at specific junctions in time (Jessop, 2004).

1.2.1 Embeddedness

This work is particularly interested in the embeddedness of neighbourhood regeneration policies and activities. The importance of weak ties in social relations signifies the spatial dimension of institutions (Granovetter, 1973; Granovetter, 1985). The notion of embeddedness refers to spatial differences of social relations and the particularity of institutional constellations and constitutions. This particularity is the result of history, evolving institutions, and (strategic) social action on different scales. As such, neighbourhood regeneration is a dialectic social process which involves the social practice of policy making as well as the local, urban, regional, national, and even global dynamics which shape neighbourhoods. In other words, a study into the institutional embeddedness of neighbourhood regeneration cannot just concern itself with the outcomes of planning and policy-making on a neighbourhood level, but also has to take into account the structures and institutions that select the choices and behaviour of the policy makers. These institutions can play at multiple scales and across time, and have an effect on power relations, capabilities, capacity

¹ by employing Bourdieu's methodological relationalism

and constitutions within the local institutional framework, but also on the strategies and tactics of policy interventions into other social processes (i.e. those within the neighbourhood, the city-region, or even within the state and beyond). In this sense, the aims, activities and outcomes of neighbourhood regeneration can be regarded as the outcome of multiple interrelations between institutions and strategic actions.

1.3 Implications for research strategy

To find out which contextual elements are important in explaining variations in regeneration over the last fifteen years, we have to make two steps. The first step is to locate, define, and thematise the institutions on various scales. The explorative nature of this report means that most of the attention will go to this identification and thematisation of institutions that are relevant.

The question is where to look for institutions. Drawing on Mayntz and Scharpf, Salet (2000) proposes three interdependent levels of institutional thought and action, which are relevant to strategic spatial policy:

- Social rules and belief systems (as reflected in narratives, rationalisations and social constructions)
- Formal rules of regimes (laws, regulations etc.) of the legal and political system, of the economic system (housing market regimes), and relevant policy systems
- Institutional reflection in practice (are actors aware of the norms attached to their position?)

While the first two constitute the structural side of the dichotomy, the reflection within practice represents the action-side. While the first two points may be evident, the last point may need some commenting. Reflexivity within practice is relevant because it allows actors to see beyond result-oriented tasks (problem, goal, and methods) and be able to make strategic actions based on institutions either individually or collectively. Reflexivity may result in a change of institutions.

By considering these three levels, we can map out which institutions are of importance to the actors and their actions within neighbourhood regeneration policy. However, an inventory is insufficient to make any statement about institutional embeddedness.

As a second step, we have to explore how institutions (organisations and norms) govern action and activities, and in our case intervene and regenerate neighbourhoods, and how different institutions are related to each other within specific environments (cf. Jessop 2004, p. 35).

The interrelatedness of institutions and actors is a crucial point in studies which aim to explain differences in economic performance from the viewpoint of social space, i.e. economic geography. The concept of institutional thickness describes and appreciates locally specific agglomerations within a global economy (Amin and Thrift, 1994). Originally, the concept applies to voluntary cooperation in the economic sphere. It refers to several factors:

- the presence of different kinds of organisations and institutions
- a high level of interaction amongst organisations that facilitate knowledge exchange
- the development of structures of domination or patterns of coalition resulting in the collective representation of interests and serving to socialize costs or to control rogue behaviour
- a mutual awareness of a common enterprise or agenda

In most favourable cases institutional thickness will produce different outcomes. These may be institutional persistence, institutional flexibility and innovative capacity, shared knowledge and collective learning, trust and reciprocity, and the consolidation of a sense of inclusiveness.

However valuable this concept may be, neighbourhood regeneration is slightly different in that they are not always voluntary relationships in a market setting. The local institutional ensemble tends to be a mix of hierarchical and voluntary relationships. So to use these four criteria as an analytical framework for our cases, we have to attribute slightly different meanings to them. For neighbourhood regeneration the first of the four points above would mean the presence different organisations that have professional capabilities and capacities to advance the process of neighbourhood regeneration. Thus, it also refers to the availability of professional and expert knowledge. The second point refers to informal and formal contacts and consultation among the actors. The third point refers to the existence of planning, consultation, and policy structures which involve the relevant participants including residents. The fourth point refers to the degree of mutual agreement and shared values and norms among participants on the problems and objectives of the overall neighbourhood regeneration efforts.

In a sense, the term fitness serves us better than thickness, as we are interested in the extent, intensity, and quality of interrelatedness and cooperation among actors within neighbourhood regeneration policies. The question is whether fitness will produce better outcomes. This question requires a normative answer. The expectation is that a certain amount of fitness is more likely to produce some sort of change. Furthermore, this change is likely to be satisfactory to included actors who made strategic decisions based on the institutions and were able to produce the norms of success. If the included actors include residents, then it will more likely that activities were adapted to ensure a degree of neighbourhood satisfaction.

1.4 Comparative case studies

The exploration into the relevant elements is done through comparative case studies of neighbourhood regeneration in post-WWII housing estates. The theoretical discussion above has resulted in two sub-questions for each of the cases:

- Which institutions (formal rules, regimes, norms, and reflections) on multiple scales are relevant to the constitution of the actors and their relations, and on their perceptions, narratives, and rationales?
- In what way does the institutional fitness affect the regeneration process and practices?

The empirical data in this report is based on a set of semi-structured interviews held between April 2006 and February 2008 with professionals, experts, and policy makers who have been involved in the regeneration of the estate. These interviews were focused on uncovering the prevalent norms and values. In general, the questions were related to the problem definitions, priorities, strategies, and desired social change. In addition, questions were asked regarding the cooperation with other actors. The interview data is supplemented with extensive data from the RESTATE research project, and with additional data from policy documents, observations and census data.

This research compares nine post-WWII neighbourhoods, or housing estates, that have been subjected to some form of regeneration. The selection was made out of 29 cases which had been previously studied in the RESTATE research framework.

The chosen estates are located in four different West European states: Sweden, United Kingdom, Spain (Catalonia), and the Netherlands. These states represent different types of welfare states within Western Europe (Becker, 2000; Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999; Moreno, 2001). The expectation is that the welfare state will have an effect on neighbourhood regeneration through social policies and housing policies. Sweden has a strong social-democratic tradition, while the UK has had a comparably liberal signature. The Netherlands have been characterised by a combination of Christian democratic, social democratic and liberal tendencies in social policy. The Spanish welfare state has had a different trajectory of development as its build-up began relatively late. As a result, the welfare state may be characterized by the emphasis on familiar ties, corporatism, third way social democracy, and liberalism.

A second criterion for selection has been to compare cases within the same national context that seem to have different outcomes. This difference is expressed in the average neighbourhood satisfaction and feelings towards the direction of the neighbourhood, measured by a resident survey in 2004 (see Musterd and Van Kempen, 2005). The assumption is that effective neighbourhood regeneration produces satisfied residents who feel positive about the future of the neighbourhood. This assumption is tested and supported, yet it is neither a sufficient nor necessary or universal condition (Van Gent, 2008, forthcoming). Although regeneration policies may have objectives which are not necessarily related to the residents, we can state that liveability-oriented interventions seem to fall short in the case of 'dissatisfied' neighbourhoods. To be sure, satisfaction is used as an entry point for comparison, not as a definitive normative statement on the quality of the regeneration effort.

Sweden

- Råslätt in Jönköping (satisfied)
- Husby and Tensta in Stockholm (dissatisfied)

UK

- Central Estates (Satisfied) and Hodge Hill (dissatisfied) in Birmingham

Catalonia, Spain

- Trinitat Nova (satisfied) and Sant Roc (dissatisfied) in Barcelona region

NL

- Bijlmermeer (East) in Amsterdam (satisfied)
- Kanaleneiland-Noord in Utrecht (dissatisfied)

The ensuing chapters will provide case studies wherein we explore which institutions have presented the actors with choices and constraints, and how strategic action was taken individually and collectively (or not taken at all), resulting in collective strategies of regeneration.

1.5 Which themes?

As mentioned, this report is mainly explorative, but there are some avenues of inquiry that may reveal elements of the institutional framework of neighbourhood regeneration. The starting point for exploring the contextual frameworks that affect neighbourhood regeneration is the welfare state, which is reflected in the case selection above. The institutionalisation of welfare state norms and values may have its effect on the logic of (housing) policies and of policy makers (Bengtsson, 2001; Rothstein, 1998).

Neighbourhood regeneration interventions typically (but not exclusively) take place within an urban policy framework which features integrated, multi-sector measures to address liveability issues as well as social economic deprivation. Urban policies may involve a range of actors, but they are initiated and managed by governmental agencies, albeit local, regional or national. Furthermore, urban policies with neighbourhood, or area-based, focus are executed within the state's wider social and housing policy frameworks. This means that urban social policies, as well as other policies such as housing policies, are embedded in the social welfare state structure. In this research, I interpret this structure as the state's stance towards social justice, the role of the state and the subsequent strategies, values, actions and organisation that result from it.

In addition to welfare state institutions, the actions of the state are also determined by norms and values that originate from public and political debates. Integration of immigrant communities is perhaps the most prominent example of national debates which influence neighbourhood regeneration in Western Europe. These political pressures can materialise in policies that at the very least aim to pay lip service to the issues, but can have an impact on the outcomes (for example see Uitermark and Duyvendak, 2008).

Lastly, while the national state is a very important factor, local governmental agencies also play a role. This role is stimulated by the European Union, which seeks to promote economic growth in weak regions and neighbourhoods and subsidises local governments through programmes like URBAN (Dukes, 2007).

The welfare state, together with public debates and EU funding, may offer direct explanations for regeneration outcomes in terms of the organisation and ideals of housing and urban policies. In addition, welfare state arrangements also offer an indirect explanation for the outcomes of neighbourhood regeneration.

Regeneration interventions are embedded in the regional housing market as well as the labour market. The effects of policy interventions on social mechanisms in the neighbourhood are very much related to the context of those mechanisms. Most social problems that manifest themselves in 'weak' neighbourhoods do not originate in but are part of wider social processes. Examples are integration, poverty and unemployment, vacancies and sometimes even liveability issues (when these are related to visitors). Tenure structure, the regional housing market, and the labour market all determine the possibilities and constraints for social action and change at the neighbourhood level.

Furthermore, housing policies, a pillar of the welfare state, determine the tenure structure of the housing market. Tenure structure may be important to regeneration because it relates to ownership and responsibility. Social rented housing estates may give more opportunities for physical restructuring and changing population structures than owner-occupied blocks. Furthermore, social rented housing typically involves institutions of its own such as housing associations or municipal housing departments which are part of the regeneration process.

In addition, to policies, the functioning of the regional housing market may provide further structural and institutional constraint as well as opportunities for action. Low demand may limit the neighbourhood regeneration strategies that depend on stimulating the influx of more stable and affluent households. When demand gets low, 'vulnerable' neighbourhoods –those on the bottom of the market– will be the first to experience vacancies and low influx of affluent households.

Another regional structure which relates to the housing market is the economic signature of the urban region. While some urban regions have managed to 'professionalise' and successfully convert to a service-oriented economy, other cities are dealing with a spatial mismatch between their labour stock and economic demand (Musterd and Ostendorf, 1998). The latter situation may result in large concentrations of unemployment and/ or low skilled labour in particular

neighbourhoods of the city. Any neighbourhood regeneration intervention that aims to improve socio-economic life conditions will have to recognize this structural process.

In sum, there are multiple possible institutional frameworks which may have their effect on neighbourhood regeneration practices and outcomes. The actors involved are shaped by these institutions and, in addition, choose courses of action within these structures which may originate and play out at various scales. Hence, the next chapters will not be restricted to the regeneration policies and interventions, but will also pay attention to the national and regional-urban context.

2 The Regeneration of Post-WWII Housing Estates in Stockholm and Jönköping

2.1 The rise of the Swedish welfare state model

The Swedish welfare system is renowned and generally characterised as the result of the social democratic welfare regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ginsburg, 1992), or, perhaps more appropriate, as the result of 'labour-led corporatism' (Kemeny, 2001). The roots of the regime lay in the political developments of the twentieth century, which saw the rise and, perhaps, fall of the 'Swedish model', which still impact housing policy today (Boelhouwer and Van der Heijden, 1992; Elander, 1999). In defining this 'Swedish model' at least four elements are commonly regarded as crucial (Johansson in Elander, 1999).

Firstly, the 'Swedish model' is shaped by its historical origins, which lay in the development of poverty laws and the rise of the labour movement and social democratic party in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In the 1930s these developments culminated in a 'historical compromise' between the labour movement on the one hand and the conservative powers and employers' organisations on the other. The compromise held that the labour movement officially recognised the rights of private property while the property owners, employers, and conservatives would respect democratic procedures and accept social-democratic reforms. With respect to labour issues market, the compromise was formalised in the 1938 Saltsjöbaden Agreement between LO (*Landsorganisationen i Sverige*, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation) and SAF (the Swedish Employers' Federation). The Agreement formed between labour and employer organisations a spirit of consultation, negotiation, compromise and willingness to solve labour market disputes without the need for parliamentary or governmental intervention.

Secondly, Swedish politics have been dominated by consensus and low levels of conflict with regard to procedures for decision making. In addition, the party system has been quite stable. Between 1922 and 1988, a mere five parties were represented in the national parliament: Conservatives, Liberals, Agrarian/ Centre Party, Communist, and the Social Democrats. The latter governed Sweden between 1932 and 1976, either alone or as the principal partner in a coalition. Between 1976 and 1982 the Social Democratic Labour Party lost power to a coalition of moderate Conservatives, Liberals and the Center Party, but the Party were back into power during the nineteen eighties and early nineties. The government participation of the Social Democrats led to a remarkable stability during this era. The Party did have to mind their coalition partners and appease the floating voters, which meant that compromise was a political necessity (Boelhouwer and Van der Heijden, 1992).

Thirdly, the model is characterised by a large public sector, which saw rapid expansion during the 1960s and early 1970s, in a time when the Western world saw a political shift to the Left and economic growth allowed welfare expenditures to become the *greater part* of the total public expenditure (Hobsbawn, 1994). The development was characterised by the welfare state principle, which meant that central government provided social welfare reforms in education, health, child allowances, housing, etc. Furthermore, the social reforms were implemented with a universalistic strategy, which meant that they were largely meant for everyone and not dependent on income. Lastly, the rise of the public sector was characterised by

the development of a local welfare state. This meant that the main part of the welfare state was the responsibility of municipalities and county councils.

Fourth, the Swedish model incorporated an active and 'solidaristic' labour policy, which set wages to an agreed level, thereby rewarding industrial productivity. To support policy, selective means were implemented, which were aimed at re-education, relief work projects, relocation of workforce, local job creation, etc. The Swedish full employment strategy meant that the state had the responsibility to release capital during slumps in the economic cycle and withhold it during peaks.


The creation of the Swedish model must also be attributed to the successful industrialisation and subsequent economy performance which has guaranteed almost full employment from the 1940s to the 1970s. The huge economic development was made possible by Sweden's natural resources, notably timber, iron ore, and copper (Elander, 1999; Gould, 1993).

2.2 Decline of the Swedish model

Although Sweden felt the impact from the 1970s crises, the expanding welfare system came to a halt when a complex economic crisis hit in the early 1990s. Almost simultaneously production and employment rates fell, interest rates skyrocketed, and the state budget deficit amounted to one third of total expenditure. In addition, social and regional inequalities were growing. The explanation for the crisis can be found either in the conjuncture of international economic growth and stagnation or in the Swedish model itself and particularly in the supposedly damaging role of a top-heavy public sector, harming the spirit and practice of free enterprise. The latter explanation represents the (neo-) liberal view, which was taken to heart by a neo-liberal coalition, which already came to power in 1991. As we shall see below, the neo-liberal government's policy of cutting back on welfare expenditures, favouring privatisation and abolishing certain regulations and subsidies has had its consequences for housing policies (Andersson, 2006a; Elander, 1999).

The crisis and subsequent political developments have had their impact on the four characteristics of the Swedish model (Elander, 1999). Firstly, the sense of political compromise virtually vanished in the 1990s (Johanson in id. 1999). Ever since the 1980s citizens have expressed a growing sense of distrust towards the traditional parties. This sense is best expressed in the rise of several new political parties, such as the election to parliament of the Christian Democrats and the Green Party, and the stint of the right-wing New Democracy party. As for the public sector, in response to the severe financial problems, neo-liberal policies shifted orientation from state to market, by privatising nationalised companies, the adoption of market-oriented criteria of operation and deregulation of state rules. Finally, the prolonged growth of unemployment during the early 1990s has undermined the Swedish model even further. Even after economic recovery in the late 1990s persistent unemployment remained a political issue and due to increasing figures it played a central role in the 2006 national election (see figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1. Total unemployment rate in % of Sweden and the average of the fifteen EU member states before the 2004 expansion, 1994-2005 (source: Eurostat)



2.3 Housing and regeneration policies in Sweden

By drawing on the work of Elander and Öresjö, Andersson (2006a) discusses the post-war history of housing and regeneration policies in four distinct phases. These are:

- 1940s and 1960s - Politics of inner-city slum clearance
- 1970s and 1980s - From slum clearance to housing renewal, urban renewal and 'cautious regeneration'
- 1990s - Dismantled housing policy
- Late 1990s and ongoing - Selective and integrated urban area-based interventions

Politics of inner-city slum clearance

During this period the Swedish model came to fruition under social democratic influence, and there was a strong belief in the Fordist model of labour- capital – state relations, rational (industrial-like) planning and the benefits of economies of scale. Together with municipal amalgamations, the public sector was growing stronger and more effective to tackle the inner-city problems (Andersson, 2006a).

Because it stayed neutral during WWII, Sweden had no war-related damages to housing and infrastructure to cope with and, furthermore, was experiencing a long period of economic growth. However, because housing production dropped during the war years and the population grew, Swedish cities were facing overcrowding and sanitary problems in their old inner-city neighbourhoods. In addition, streets needed to be widened to accommodate the increasing flows of motorised traffic. The solutions to these problems were first largely found in slum clearances. This meant the total demolition (*totalsanering*) of older structures, usually low wooden structures, in order to make way for new construction. However, because of the housing shortages and the need to supply, the public sector decided that it was much

easier and more efficient to build new than to demolish the old. The clearance of old buildings had reduced the number of inner-city dwellings and displaced many old inhabitants at a time of need. Furthermore, ownership of land was divided in the inner-city, while on the edge it was supposed to be owned by the municipalities, who were given the measures (a planning monopoly) and responsibilities to provide public housing and who could build more easily on a larger scale. The result was that in most Swedish cities inner-cities were renewed and new large housing estates were initiated, planned, and built by strong local coalitions/ partnerships comprising real estate and construction companies and the local authorities (often social democratic) (Andersson, 2006a).

Although slum clearances went on until the 1970s, attention shifted to the construction of large housing estates in the urban periphery. It was during this period that the choice was made to avoid social housing and provide different types of housing for most types of households, in a 'unitary rental market' (Kemeny, 2001). The choice for this type of market fits within the wider development of the Swedish universal welfare system during the post-war decades (Bengtsson, 2001).

From slum clearance to housing renewal, urban renewal, and 'cautious regeneration'

Sweden's continuous economic growth came to a halt during the 1970s economic crises, although full employment was maintained. The country had a supply of the immigration from refugees and labour-immigrants, but in this period it saw the first non-European refugees coming to its shores (Andersson, 2006a). The social democratic party lost power for a four-year period to a green and neo-liberal coalition, but this did not change the further expansion of the public sector.

Furthermore, home ownership was increasing in Western Europe, which caused an increasing emphasis on the rehabilitation of private housing rather than clearance and replacement (Harloe in Elander, 1999). However, the main reason for the shift in focus lay in the fact that the housing shortages had disappeared. The disappearance was mainly due to the implementation of the Million Dwellings Programme (*miljonprogrammet*) between 1965 and 1974, which can be seen as the 'record years' of Swedish housing production (Hall and Vidén, 2005). In an effort to solve the housing shortages, the Swedish government issued the ambitious plan whereby one million homes would be added to existing stock of three million within in a period of ten years. The successful implementation was thanks to generous state loans and the already high levels of construction activity. To increase productivity even further in times of labour-shortages, standardisation, prefabrication, and large scale industrial construction techniques were used. This meant that many of the dwellings and estates were similar in design. However, this did not mean that only rows of apartment blocks were constructed; it also involved 'carpets' of small houses. Nevertheless, the former type of housing construed the lasting image of the Million Homes Programme. This image consists of visual monotony, desolate external environments, lack of service and transport, alienation and isolation (Hall and Vidén, 2005).

Thus, the new era was without worries about a housing shortage and saw the erosion of public and political support for public housing. This was due to the combination of vacancies, design, and lack of services. Furthermore, some sections of the municipal housing tended to become residual housing for marginalised groups, while others were struggling with severe physical deterioration. During the 1970s slum clearance or *sanering*, as the dominant planning concept was replaced by 'urban renewal' and 'housing renewal' and later by 'careful rehabilitation' (*varsam ombyggnad*) (Elander, 1999).

Million Homes Programme renewal

The renewal and improvement of the Million Homes Programme estates already started in 1975 with government grants to improve the outdoor areas and meeting places. Since then further government funding was allocated to the refurbishment and renovation of more than 2000 housing estates during the 1970s and 1980s. These interventions varied per estate but they may include: changes in shape and colour of the structures, changes to the roofs, façades, windows and balconies due to technical defects, the refurbishment of facilities such as laundry and storage rooms, the addition of insulation, and the improvement of the exterior environment. Hall and Vidén (2005) list six patterns of action:

1. Maintenance and conventional daily care
Business as usual; this means keeping the estate as it was built. No extensive changes to colours or materials, and any deficiencies are repaired or replaced.
2. Maintenance with ambitions to change
This strategy may involve changes in colouring, materials and design when normal maintenance such as the later addition of insulation, roof repairs, entrance renewals, façade works, etc., are implemented. The additional changes may be implemented long before strictly necessary.
3. Improvement and renovation according to residents' decisions
This strategy is similar to the second pattern described above, but involves the residents in some of the design and colour choices. The renovations to façades, entrances, roofs, balconies, and/ or bay windows can be quite extensive, yet the original form and design of the structures and the neighbourhood remain visible. This strategy usually involves a more locally based management organisation.
4. Turn-around without demolition
This version of the 'turn-around' concept came into use in the mid-1980s. The concept typically means extensive rebuilding together with a reorganisation of the estate management, with the aim to give a new image to the neighbourhood and make it attractive for middle-class households with social and economic stability. This type of reasoning relates to the social mix rationale, which is not without question marks (see Kleinhans, 2004; Musterd *et al.*, 2003; Ostendorf *et al.*, 2001). The 'turn-around' concept usually involves a rise in housing costs. In practice, the strategy means that the visible structures and forms of the buildings are transformed with new balconies, bay windows, new roofs, and new façade materials such as brick, because of maintenance reasons and appearance. Furthermore, both the outdoor environment and the inside may be extensively renovated; common spaces such as entrances, laundry rooms, and storage areas are made more attractive, while the apartments may be changed from the standard two-bedroom to smaller or larger dwellings in order to meet demand.
5. Large-scale turn-around
The changes in this strategy are more extensive than the turn-around strategy described above. It can involve the change of buildings volumes, demolition of buildings, or the addition of extra storeys to soften the strict profiles. In some larger estates different roof and façade works are done to give structures and streets an individual identity.

6. Demolition to reduce the number of dwellings and/ or change the type of building

Also employed since the mid-1980s, this concept involves the demolition of one or more buildings and/ or the reduction of storeys. In addition, some buildings may be converted to rent or tenant-owned houses.

The concepts and strategies employed since the 1970s seem to be somewhat dependent on the monotony and design of the Million housing estates, but are more closely connected to social problems and vacancies instead of physical problems. Technical problems can usually be dealt with in a more simple fashion than the ones described above (Hall and Vidén, 2005). However, during the 1980s a softer approach became more common, which meant more attention to social and cultural aspects ('careful rehabilitation'). Furthermore, residents were increasingly involved in the renewal (Andersson, 2006a). In general, management and renovations are more carefully implemented and less costly when residents are involved (Hall and Vidén, 2005).

Three of our four estates were built during the Million Homes Programme and were also subject to some form of renewal in the decades afterwards. This will be described below.

Housing Policy Dismantled

The early- 1990s economic crisis together with the rise in housing costs and high interest rates affected Swedish government investments in the construction and renewal of housing. Furthermore, the neo-liberal government reduced subsidies, outsourced some public services and supported privatisation. Although the neo-liberal government was in power for just a three year period, the subsequent social democratic governments kept the reforms in place (Andersson, 2006a).

The changes in housing policy included the deregulation of housing allocation and the abolition of rental subsidies, which lead to a rise of costs in newly constructed housing. Cutting back on state expenditures were mainly in the form of cutbacks on general subsidies because they are viewed as wasteful and so it is a way of reducing expenditures with the least political tensions (Turner and Whitehead, 2002). In addition to the alterations in subsidy provisions, many of the changes in the housing conditions during the 1990s have affected the public housing companies. Privileges have been abolished and the public housing companies are expected to compete in the housing market on the same terms as privately owned housing companies. As a result, many local authorities want to sell their public housing companies, or a part of the housing stock, to private parties (Andersson, 2006a).

Thus, the 1990s economic and welfare crises also featured a major change in the Swedish housing system. The traditional housing policy with its general subsidies in the form of subsidies to housing allowances for all types of households, tenure, and construction, was a case example of the universal welfare state model (see above). The municipal housing sector was meant to be open to all households. However, with the interventions in policy described above, the old housing system has come under pressure. It has faced municipalities with a choice between trying to maintain the universal role for the entire stock, or develop a separate socially oriented stock to accommodate for the 'residualised households' (Turner and Whitehead, 2002). Furthermore, the change in the housing system also included the increasing use of selective area-based interventions.

Selective area-based interventions in Sweden

The late 1990s had the social democrats back in power and the country had a good economic performance, although unemployment rates never went back to the golden

ages of the Swedish model. It was during these years that urban segregation issues emerged on the political agenda. The emergence of a specific policy for metropolitan areas was new in Sweden. Although there is a tradition of regional policies, these have always been focused on the sparsely populated rural areas of the country. The reasons that the policy field came into existence was tied to policy diffusion across European borders², a more positive view on urban areas to accommodate a knowledge-based economy, increasing problems with social polarisation and residential segregation in the big cities, and the influx of several hundred thousand refugees who settled in suburban housing estates and who faced social exclusion (Andersson, 2006a).

In 1997, the bill was passed for a national big cities policy which was focused on economic growth and on social, economic, and ethnic discrimination and segregation issues. The latter aspect received more attention and funding when offspring policies were discussed, funded, and implemented. The Commission on Metropolitan Areas was set-up in 1999 to co-ordinate the new policy. The Commission, which consisted of secretaries of State from seven ministries, had two objectives: to promote economic growth and better planning methods in metropolitan areas; and to represent the state in negotiating local development agreements (LDA's) with seven urban municipalities (five in the Stockholm metropolitan region and Malmö and Gothenburg). The LDA's targeted 24 poor immigrant-dense areas within the three metropolitan regions, which shared a total amount of about 220 million euro in funding. The costs of the projects and programmes were divided between state and municipality. The projects and programmes implemented were aimed at one (or more) of the seven objectives in the Stockholm agreement: competence in the Swedish language, school performance, health, democracy and participation, security and well-being, public and commercial services, and labour market integration (Öresjö *et al.*, 2004). The labour market issues were traditionally solved through supply oriented general approaches complemented with Keynesian monetary and budget policies to keep demand up during economic recessions. However, owing to EU budget regulations this strategy was no longer allowed after Sweden joined the EU in the 1990s. The restrictions contributed to the development of area-based interventions to reverse the growth of 'pockets of poverty' and of place-based social exclusion tendencies (Andersson, 2006a). I will discuss the LDA of Stockholm in the paragraphs below together with more recent initiatives.

2.3.1 Sweden's changing welfare and housing context

Sweden was introduced in this paper as a typical universal welfare state. However, we have seen that in at least one of its pillars there have been huge changes in the last 15 years. Traditionally, different sorts of housing were provided for all households regardless of socio-economic status. In addition, a system of general subsidies, regulations, and favouring of public housing companies ensured the universal character of housing in Sweden. This system proved to be untenable in the early 1990s and the subsequent reforms have left the housing system in a state of transformation, which affects the dominant discourse. The new institutions and policy instruments such as privatisation and selective area-based interventions are largely incompatible with a universal welfare logic (Andersson and Musterd, 2005; Bengtsson, 2001; Rothstein, 1998). However, it remains to be seen whether they have changed the dominant discourse. Bengtsson (2001) believes that this is not the case yet and points to the existence of universalistic institutions such as the municipal housing companies, and the use-value system of rent setting, which have

² Sweden joined the European Union after a close referendum in 1995.

their old roles in the new system. However, Bengtsson also wonders 'how long Swedish housing policy can endure such contradiction between [universalistic] discourse and [selective] outcome' (Id., 2001: 273).

As we shall see below, the changes and contradictions are evident at the neighbourhood level in the attitudes and ideas of policy-makers and neighbourhood managers. They struggle with the transformation of the meaning of housing provision and with the recent integration/ segregation issues. It seems that the universalistic discourse is in an advanced state of decline, even more so after the recent 2006 national and municipal elections, which resulted in a national centre-right government. Moreover, the municipal elections also saw centre-right victories in many municipalities, including Jönköping and Stockholm. The new coalitions often focus on tax reductions, language acquisition, and job creation. The expectation is that the new centre-right coalitions will continue privatisations of the municipal housing companies, sell public housing stock and reduce subsidies.

The cases

In the next paragraphs we will look at the practices and institutional framework in the four post-war housing estates in Stockholm and Jönköping. However, because the metropolitan context matters as much as the welfare state framework, a short general overview of the metropolitan region will be given before proceeding to the estates. The overview is based on the excellent Swedish RESTATE reports (see Andersson *et al.*, 2003; Andersson *et al.*, 2005; Öresjö *et al.*, 2004).

2.4 Stockholm

The capital of Sweden is the centre of a metropolitan area which has a population of approximately 1,8 million people, one-fifth of the country's total population. The metropolitan region also provides one-fifth of total employment and a quarter of the GNP. The tax-base per capita is 22 percent above the Swedish average in Stockholm city (19 percent above average in the Stockholm labour region). Stockholm has a larger share of both high and low income households, which means that the city is more polarised in social composition compared to the rest of the country and compared to the 1970s. It is no surprise that the region is also more densely populated than the rest of the country, which means that real estate prices are significantly higher (19 times higher per m²). The real estate prices in combination with the complexity of the environment and the competition over scarce resources makes that production costs for constructing new multi-family and single-family housing are substantially higher. The price of buying an owner-occupied home is 2,2 times higher in Stockholm than in the rest of Sweden.

Tax on income largely goes to the municipality and the county. Only people who earn more than about 33,000 euro pay state taxes on income. The state does receive property tax each year (1% of value, recalculated annually). For Stockholm, this means that more taxes are paid per property compared to the rest of the country. This causes some discontent among taxpayers. In addition to the property tax, there is some agitation over the fact that Stockholm, as one of the richer regions, has to compensate for poorer municipalities.

The current administrative structure of the city has been in effect since 1997. The city is divided in 18 municipal districts, which all have a district council with political representation identical to city hall. The districts have responsibility for social services, cultural and leisure activities, schools, etc., yet they have limited responsibilities for physical planning and strategic development, for which the responsibility lies with the central city.

The political majority of the city tends to swing each municipal election, with a bourgeois majority in the early-1990s, and a left-green coalition in the mid-1990s. Between 1998 and 2002, a liberal-conservative coalition came to power and, in line with the national liberal-conservative trend, introduced reforms such as selling out municipal housing stock, allowing private alternatives in welfare sectors like private schools and institutions for elderly care. In 2002, city government reverted to a red-green majority, which faced severe budget constraints that restrain all programmes and projects aimed at improving poorer districts. The 2006 elections saw power swing back to the right-wing.

2.4.1 Stockholm economy

The economy of the Stockholm region is traditionally service-based. Although there is some manufacturing (about 10 %), the majority of economic activity is in service production. Furthermore, the economy of Stockholm has grown faster than the rest of the country during the late 1990s, which was mainly thanks to the IT and telecommunications sector. In spite of the economic recession after 2002, this sector still plays an important role next to financial services and public administration employment. The centre point of the ICT sector is in the Kista area in the north of Stockholm (see below), where multinational electronics firm Ericsson has its headquarters. Education and research are also mainly concentrated in the centre and the north, which, together with the industrial development between the city and Arlanda airport further up north, creates an imbalance between north and south of the city in terms of employment and wealth. Our cases, however, are located in the more prosperous north.

2.4.2 Housing market situation in Stockholm

Even more so than in the Stockholm region, the city of Stockholm's housing stock is dominated by multi-dwelling buildings (see table 2.1 and 2.2). What's more is that the share of multi-dwellings buildings has been growing slowly the last 15 years. The share of older buildings is relatively small compared to other European cities due to late urbanisation and extensive restructuring in the old quarters during the post-war period. In this period (1945-1975), the construction of new housing has been high and the Million Programme also contributed a large share of housing to the existing stock (62,000 dwellings for single housing for home-ownership and 182,000 dwellings in multi-dwelling buildings for cooperative or rental tenure). However, the share of people who live in Million Programme housing is less great in the city than in the rest of the county (16% as opposed to 25%). It has to be said that many of the Million Programme housing in the county consist of single housing.

Table 2.1. Type of dwelling in Stockholm housing stock (source: Statistics Sweden)

	multi-dwelling buildings	one- or two- dwelling buildings	Total
1990	89,1	10,9	100
1995	89,3	10,7	100
2000	89,4	10,6	100
2005	89,6	10,4	100

Table 2.2. Stock of dwellings in Stockholm and Greater Stockholm region, Jan 1st, 2003 (Source: Data Guide 2003 and 2006, Statistics Stockholm)

Stock of dwellings	Stockholm	Greater Stockholm
Stock size	409 600*	805 900
Dwellings by size, %		
Dwellings without kitchen	10.2	7.6
1 room and kitchen	15.2	10.7
2 rooms and kitchen	27.1	24.5
3 rooms and kitchen	24.0	24.7
At least 4 rooms and kitchen	21.4	32.3
Dwellings by type of building, %		
Multi-family housing	89.4	74.4
Small houses	10.6	25.6
Room units in all	1,425,600	3,164,100
Residents per 100 room units	54 ⁺	53

* 418 800 on Jan. 1st, 2006

+ 53 on Jan 1st, 2006

Owing to the lack of condominiums in Sweden and historical development, tenure and building type share a pattern: most single housing is owner-occupied, while most public housing is situated in multi-family buildings (see pattern in newly constructed housing in table 2.3 below). Apart from a lack of condominiums, Sweden has a unique system of cooperative housing (tenant-owners' societies), which means that a resident owns the right to live in a dwelling, but all residents as such own the property collectively in a particular housing association. A resident can trade the right to dispose of it, but all transactions need approval from the board of the association. Furthermore, all residents have a vote in the annual meetings, which cover important issues. While the pattern is more diffuse in the rest of the country, in Stockholm most cooperative housing is found in multi-family housing. The 1990s saw an increase in cooperative housing due to new constructions and conversions of public and private rental into cooperatives. This happened almost exclusively in the centre of the city, which contributed to the gentrification of the centre and widened the gap between the centre and peripheral neighbourhoods like the post-war estates in this study.

Since the housing market has been tight for several years now, there are no vacancies in Stockholm. Moreover, housing shortages are a key issue on the political agenda. Housing construction is encouraged within the existing urban fabric, but is still insufficient to fulfil the need. Nevertheless, figure 2.2 shows a surge in housing construction in 2002 with slowly declining levels in the years thereafter in Stockholm proper as well as in the greater metropolitan area. In both the city as well as the immediate surroundings, most new dwellings are built in multi-dwelling buildings. In addition to the construction of new housing, dwellings in multi-family buildings are renovated and converted with the help of government subsidies (table 2.4). The graph in figure XA shows a clear upward trend since 2002 in conversions in the multi-family buildings built during the Million Programme decades.

Because of this situation, newcomers have a hard time to enter the market. When households are less affluent, they naturally have no other choice than the bottom of the market, which are the apartments in the post-war housing estates.


Table 2.3. Completed dwellings in newly constructed dwellings per building type and tenure in Stockholm and Greater Stockholm, 2000-2005 (source: Statistics Sweden)

			2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Stockholm	multi-dwelling buildings	rented dwelling	360	149	1615	839	471	861
		tenant-owned dwelling	680	580	1187	1777	1124	703
		owner-occupied dwelling	0	0	0	0	0	0
	one- or two-dwelling buildings	rented dwelling	0	12	0	0	0	0
		tenant-owned dwelling	38	66	63	41	70	33
		owner-occupied dwelling	48	57	47	54	46	49
	Total		1126	864	2912	2711	1711	1646
	Greater Stockholm							
	multi-dwelling buildings	rented dwelling	624	622	2138	1410	1842	1503
		tenant-owned dwelling	1762	1559	2690	3110	3037	2541
		owner-occupied dwelling	0	0	0	0	0	0
	one- or two-dwelling buildings	rented dwelling	3	51	1	12	6	14
		tenant-owned dwelling	259	329	251	87	117	262
		owner-occupied dwelling	1571	2112	1823	1543	1534	1609
	Total		4219	4673	6903	6162	6536	5929

Table 2.4. Converted dwellings in multi-dwelling buildings with government subsidies (completed) in Stockholm, 2000-2005 (source: Statistics Sweden)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
tenant-owned dwelling	1646	1741	1756	2281	2060	2919
rented dwelling	2477	1299	2697	3872	2453	3263
ownership	40	0	0	0	0	37
Total	4163	3040	4453	6153	4513	6219

Figure 2.2. Converted dwellings in multi-dwelling buildings originally constructed in 1961-1980, in Stockholm 1995-2005 (source: Statistics Sweden)



2.4.3 Distressed neighbourhoods in Stockholm

Despite Stockholm's prosperity, prominence, and good economic performance, there are social problems within the metropolitan area. These are mainly concentrated in the post-war housing estates that were built during the Million Programme period. The estates are regarded by politicians, media and researchers as 'segregated areas', where socio-economic weaker and immigrant households from different ethnicities are concentrated, while in fact the upper and middle-class Swedish residents tend to be more spatially concentrated. This situation may be due to white avoidance, rather than white flight (Bråmås, 2006). In 2000 more than 70 percent of the residents in the distressed areas had a foreign background, compared to 30 percent in the whole of Sweden. The immigrant communities in the housing estates consist of different and rather small ethnic clusters. In other words, the housing estates are characterised by concentrations of different ethnicities and cannot be described as ethnic enclaves. Usually ethnic clusters represent a cohort of newly arrived immigrants. Because foreign-born households also tend to move out of the estates within 10 years, the clusters disperse over time. In addition to the density of immigrant, the distressed areas differ demographically in that they have more children and less elderly.

2.5 The Stockholm estates

As mentioned above, our two Stockholm cases are two post-war housing estates that are considered segregated and/ or distressed. They are Husby in the Kista district and Tensta in the Spånga-Tensta district. Both are located in the north of Stockholm, an area normally considered to be prosperous. For instance, Kista also houses the most prosperous economic zone in Northern Europe with many representatives from knowledge-based industries and a sizeable shopping centre with cinemas and restaurants. Both housing estates were built during the Million Programme (MP) years as self-supporting satellites (Hall, 2002: 334 - 44), although Husby was constructed later and already incorporated some of the criticisms of the scale and

design of earlier MP estates. Husby also started to develop social problems later on, while social problems were present from the start in Tensta.

2.5.1 Tensta

Tensta was constructed ten kilometres northwest of central Stockholm in the southern part of the Järva field between 1966 and 1971 (see photo 2.1). The Järva field was a rural area, which was used for military exercises. In 1964 it was bought from the state by the city to construct a modern suburb with housing for 30.000 people and new workplaces for 4500 people. This plan was part of a bigger plan for a suburb of 150.000 people, of which the construction of the three estates in Kista on the northern edge of the field has been the second phase.

The physical structure is determined by the original plan which aimed to construe large but concentrated housing estates around a centre with a subway connection and services. The estates themselves were built dispersed over the green fields. Within the estates, large housing blocks were placed in a right-angled system and six storey houses were placed along the passing highway. Elsewhere housing was built lower but more densely. Furthermore, a plan of traffic separation placed the cars on the lower level and the pedestrians and bikers on separate paths which crossed the car lanes on raised bridges. The building style did not have a lot of variation.

In total there are 5936 dwellings in Tensta, with two-thirds of them being one or two bedroom apartments. About two-thirds of the dwellings are owned by municipal housing companies, while the rest is mostly cooperative housing. There is some owner-occupied semi-detached housing.

The total population of Tensta in 2005 is 16,834, of which 85 percent are foreign born, have a foreign background (both parents born outside Sweden) or are foreign citizens.³ The most common countries of origin are Iraq, Somalia, Turkey, Syria and Finland. Furthermore, the population is reasonably young; in 2005, almost 30% is younger than 16 years compared to 17% in Stockholm. The educational level is lower than city average and 15.5% of the economic active are unemployed (compared to the 5.1% Stockholm average). Moreover, the welfare dependency is higher than average (about 25% of the total Tensta population receive benefits).

The services in the estate are centred around a small low-profile shopping centre which has been renovated recently. The centre itself features bazaar-like shops, a food store, a restaurant, a café, a post office and two cash dispensers. Elsewhere in the estate, in a former garage, there are some establishments such as a jeweller and a hairdresser. Health care is sufficient and the area has its own schools (lower to high school).

Already from the start, Kista faced many problems and failures such as the slow expansion of public and commercial services and the four-year wait for construction of the subway. This has caused the estate to have a bad reputation from the start, which has been persistent. The estate has a socio-economic weak population and had a rather high turnover rate (2000 people left or arrived each year) before the tight housing market of the late 1990s. Still, Tensta is the main entry point to the Stockholm housing market, in particular for immigrants and less affluent households. The tight housing market stabilised turnover rates and created some stability. However, out-migration is also more difficult, which can make people feel entrapped.

³ Statistics Stockholm website, URL:

<http://www.usk.stockholm.se/internet/omrfakta/omradesviseng.htm> , accessed September 6, 2006

Photo 2.1. MP Housing in Tensta



Photo 2.2 Separation of traffic in Tensta housing estate (picture taken from pedestrian bridge)



2.5.2 Husby

Between 1972 and 1975 Husby was constructed as one of the last MP estates on the Järva field in Stockholm. It is part of a municipal district together with Kista and Akalla neighbourhoods. Public transport such as buses and the subway connect the neighbourhood and district with the centre of Stockholm (11 km.) and other parts of the city.

In 2005 the area featured 4833 dwellings, of which almost three-quarter are two- and three-room apartments. Furthermore, the majority of the dwellings are rental of which 42% is owned by public housing. In terms of planning and design, the estate and its two neighbouring estates, Kista and Alkalla, are characterised by a connecting central pathway with separated traffic. The path functions as an axis

along which services (shops, schools, sport facilities, schools, subway stations, etc.) are concentrated, making it a sort of small town main street. Most buildings are five stories high, although the buildings along the central axis are somewhat higher and more densely placed. Some of the buildings had an extra storey constructed on top to accommodate students, which would benefit the social mix in the neighbourhood.

The total population in 2005 was 11,495 of which 80% is foreign born, have a foreign background (both parents born outside Sweden) or are foreign citizens.⁴ Unlike Tensta, the status of an immigrant dense neighbourhood originated from a period later than its construction, namely during the national immigrant influx of 1980s. The most common countries of birth are Sweden, Iran, Iraq, Ethiopia, and Somalia. In line with the trend in post war estates, the population is fairly young (23% of population is 16 years old or younger) and the general level of education is low. Furthermore, unemployment is higher than city average and social welfare dependency is high.

Most services are located in the estate's centre, where the Social Insurance Office, municipal district offices, and some shops reside. A postal office was closed in 2004. The shopping centre in close-by Kista makes it very difficult to attract and keep high quality commercial services in Husby.

Although it had a better start, Husby resembles Tensta very much in that its problems are related to the weak socio-economic position of its inhabitants. The attractiveness and reputation of the estate are low. As we shall see below, political effort is being put in to revitalize the neighbourhood. The efforts are focused on, among other things, integrating the immigrant population and linking the development of Husby with the dynamic industrial developments in neighbouring Kista.

Photo 2.3. Husby housing estate



⁴ Statistics Stockholm website, URL:

<http://www.usk.stockholm.se/internet/omrfakta/omradesviseng.htm> , accessed September 6, 2006

2.5.3 Perceived Problems in Husby and Tensta

Andersson *et al* (2003) have already done an extensive analysis of the problems in Husby and Tensta. However, this paragraph represents the problems the policy-makers and managers experience as most urgent. The interviews with representatives from municipal districts councils, public housing companies, the planning office, the cultural committee (the former integration office), a local cultural centre, and a municipal area-based intervention programme (see 'City District Regeneration' below), have shown a reasonable degree of consensus over what are the problems in Husby and Tensta.

First and foremost, the problems of the estates are generally perceived to be related to the low socio-economic status and the non-Swedish heritage of many residents. In a pithy remark, a Tensta city district worker compared the estate to a 'refugee camp', referring both to the demographic composition as well as to the geographical and societal isolation of the estate in the city. In addition, the mere fact that some people *have* to live in the estate is seen as a problem as well, because freedom of choice is regarded as important in housing. The estates generally receive a large portion of the newcomers to the metropolitan housing market. Most of these newcomers are immigrants who do not have work, are undereducated and experience language problems. In other words, the estates both have a high concentration of 'problem people' in the area. These 'problem people' are basically unemployed immigrants and underachieving non-Swedish youth. Besides difficulties with finding work, education and language, there are problems regarding domestic violence, psychological problems, drugs, small housing for families, youth gangs, etc. Some of these problems are thought to be symptoms of unemployment among men who are from a different (patriarchal) cultural background. The lack of income means that no larger housing can be afforded, while the frustration of unemployment causes family problems and psychological problems.

In addition to this, the fact that the people who experience these problems are concentrated in the estate is seen as problem as well. The idea is that spatial segregation isolates the residents from the rest of the city and hampers system and social integration. The main concern is that the residents from non-Swedish descent are not integrated in Swedish society and do not have equal opportunities (system integration). In addition, all respondents point to the importance for immigrants of coming into contact with ordinary (middle-class) Swedes to improve language skills and access social networks which can provide them with work and tacit knowledge on Swedish civil society.

The immigrant/ cultural aspect is very dominant in the rationales of the interventions and the solution is to promote integration of the immigrants into Swedish society. The idea is to make the step from high spatial segregation and low system integration to low spatial segregation and high system integration. Social integration is also seen as a goal, but many respondents recognize the difficulties of attracting Native Swedes to the estates. However, opportunities for social integration are seen in the workplace and the commercial centre (in Kista). The question of integration will receive due attention in the paragraphs below.

Besides the composition, the high residential turnover rates also cause concern, although, with the tight housing market, the rates of moving have abated somewhat. Two decades ago, about 25% of the total population moved out of the neighbourhood every year. As we can see in figure 2.3 and 2.4, over the last seven years, the rates have been lower in Husby and Tensta. However, the figures also show that the rate of moving out is much higher in Tensta and even more so in Husby compared to the rest of the Kista district, which includes similar post-war estates, and especially compared to the rest of the Spånga-Tensta district, which has substantially less apartments in multi-dwelling buildings and more single housing.

Furthermore, the rise in emigration since 2001 seems to reflect the loosening of the market due to the construction of new multi-dwelling apartments in the last five years (compare with tables 2.3 and 2.4). The concern relates to the fact that the neighbourhood is unstable, and no community is being built up. Furthermore, from an economical point of view, the movements are costly to the municipal and private housing companies. Moreover, when people move out, they are generally employed and more or less 'integrated'. The newcomers, however, often have a lower socio-economic status and are less 'integrated'. This is conceived to be harmful for both the estate as a whole, as well as the residents (see below).

Figure 2.3. Out-migration in the Tensta estates compared to Spånga-Tensta District municipal districts in %, 1999-2005 (Source: Stockholm Statistics)





Figure 2.4. Out-migration in the Husby estates compared to Kista municipal districts in %, 1999-2005 (Source: Stockholm Statistics)



Thirdly, and related to its residents, the reputation of the estate is very poor. The bad reputation is thought to be perpetuated by extra media attention to crime and negative news from the estates. Almost all respondents indicated that the image of the estates was worse than reality. In a survey, about half to two-thirds of the residents who believe the estate has a bad reputation say that the bad reputation truly reflects reality (Andersson *et al.*, 2005: 61). It is felt that the bad reputation undermines the attractiveness and strong points of the area and stigmatises the inhabitants and civil servants working in the area.⁵

⁵ It is due to this persistent reputation that some of the respondents were a bit hesitant to speak about problems and preferred to speak about opportunities.

Figure 2.5. A Stockholm free newspaper reporting on a youth disturbance in Husby with posters in the public transport network.



Fourthly, apart from the more social difficulties, the physical element is also thought to be part of the problems in the area. The municipal housing companies are concerned with the public spaces as well as with the buildings and dwellings themselves. Originally, the municipal housing companies fulfilled the role of a general caretaker and builder of all sorts of property for all sorts of renters (universal objectives). Their main objective was related to the quality of the buildings and dwellings. However, when the liberal-conservative city government was in power in 1998-2002, right-to-buy legislation meant that the municipal housing companies lost a large share of their housing stock. The political rationale was that people should have a freedom of choice. Most of the dwellings sold were in the central city, while dwellings in less favourable places like the post-war housing estates on the urban fringe did not sell that well. The uneven sales created a socio-spatially imbalanced public housing stock, which in turn resulted in a shift from public housing to social housing. This shift is also evident in the co-funding arrangement of the City District Regeneration programme (see below). In spite of their new social task, physical regeneration and management are the housing companies' main 'business' and field of expertise. The dwellings themselves are in a good state and are not conceived to be a problem, although there have been conversions to diversify the supply in the multi-family dwellings. The public spaces and buildings, on the other hand, are seen as more problematic. Several elements of the modernist urban design, such as stairways, public balconies, traffic separation, public green and multi-storey parking lots, are seen as making the space either too confined or too public. The buildings should have more private entry-points to make them more attractive and safer, while the parking lots and certain dead corners create an unsafe feeling. This reasoning is a combination of demand-oriented reasoning and the arguments surrounding 'defensible space' (see Newman, 1972). Despite their natural orientation on physical redevelopment, the municipal housing companies did learn from previous redevelopment projects in the south of Greater Stockholm (Botkyrka and Huddinge) that good quality of the physical environment is not enough to combat poverty and residential segregation, and that there are limits to what physical redevelopment can achieve.

Figure 2.6. The 2006 Tensta Housing Exhibition is one of the efforts to improve the reputation and esteem of the area and its inhabitants.



From a planning perspective, the housing estates are also seen as problematic. Residential segregation and the image of a separate entity within the city are reinforced by the fact that the estates were built with large patches of green space around them. Furthermore, they are focused on the centre, where the subway provides the lifeline to the city's centre. In addition, the transport network is very much radial in character and offers relatively little opportunities for concentric movement. This makes the estates quite isolated from their neighbours. For instance, despite the relatively close proximity on the opposite sides of the Järva field (approximately 2.3 km.⁶), the fastest subway route from Husby and Tensta goes through the centre and the only bus route which connects the two estates is 7 kilometres long and has 11 stops. Furthermore, the estates are also unconnected for car traffic. Only pedestrians and cyclists have direct access. The post-war housing estates are not unique in this respect; Stockholm has many separate suburbs in different architectural styles since the 1930s. The problem is that each estate has become an island which requires its own services and amenities, which is costly to maintain and may not be commercially viable. The feeling with the City planners is that connecting the 'islands' will improve services as well as improve social integration. Politicians, however, are hesitant to plan development on the green fields because of the Green Party, which holds a strategic position in Stockholm and Swedish politics.

Fifthly, there are concerns surrounding negative neighbourhood effects, which means that the living environment inhibits or damages the residents' living conditions or opportunities. For instance, there are concerns surrounding the schools and their students in the estates. The schools experience the pressure of new immigrants immediately due to the influx of children who need extra lingual attention. This means that schools need extra funding and methods to deal with this. Furthermore, the indicators show that overall results are lower at these schools, which reinforces the bad reputation of the schools. As a result, the schools are avoided by native Swedes, who rather enroll their children in schools elsewhere because they are concerned about negative influences on their children. The bad reputation of the middle schools like Tensta Gymnasium also harms the opportunities for employment, regardless of study results.

The difficulties in finding work are related to issues of labour discrimination. A municipal worker from the Cultural Committee claims that immigrants from Somalia and Eritrea especially suffer from this form of labour market exclusion. In addition to labour discrimination, a governmental committee has found structural discrimination against non-Swedes in housing allocation and public life (restaurants, bars, etc.).⁷ The founders of a cultural centre in Tensta indicated that even higher educated and second-generation immigrants suffer from the stigma of coming out of Tensta. They even refer to the situation in Sweden as a mild form of apartheid, which is a situation they regret as they fear the lack of contact with native Swedes harms the opportunities of their children.

⁶ Distance measured from centre to centre

⁷ The government committee that has investigated structural discrimination in Sweden is named Utredningen om makt, integration och strukturell diskriminering.

The problems in the estates are mainly tied to spatial concentration of immigrants who are not 'integrated', which is perpetuated by the area's unemployment, poverty, and low levels of education. In Stockholm, these three are highly interrelated because the economy of Stockholm offers most opportunities for higher educated work. What's more is that in Sweden, employment assures an escape from poverty due to reasonable minimum wages. In other words, there are no working poor in Sweden. Next to the three underlying causes, there seems to be a fourth cause which is related to culture. This is most apparent in the use of the concept of integration, which implies a difference between majority and minority culture.

2.5.4 Urban programmes in Stockholm: MDI, OCI and CDR

The two estates are affected by a whole range of policies that are created and implemented on a day-to-day basis. However, next to the 'business as usual' type of policies, there are programmes, policies and interventions which are launched to counter a specific problem or at least to appear to be reacting to the problem. As we shall see, segregation is one of the problems policy-makers and managers are struggling with in Stockholm, as well as in Jönköping. In this study, further attention is given to how the problem is defined by the managers and policymakers who are involved with the estates. To combat the problem of segregation, the two estates in Stockholm have seen three comprehensive programmes since the 1990s.⁸

Firstly, through the local development agreement in Stockholm region (LDA, see above) the big cities policy, or Metropolitan Development Initiative (MDI), MDI addressed social, economic, health, educational, and health related problems in so-called 'exposed residential areas' (utsatta bostadsområden). With the introduction of the new municipal system in 1997, poorer districts received more funding, which was accepted by the state in the LDA as fulfilment of the municipal obligation to provide more resources per inhabitant and to co-fund the MDI. The main objectives of the programme concerned safety, education, health, economy, attractiveness of the neighbourhood, and, most importantly, integration.

Secondly, the Stockholm municipality set up an earlier programme, the 'Outer City Initiative' (OCI), to tackle the problems in the estates. Although it is a separate programme, it largely ran next to the MDI and shared many goals. While the MDI placed a focus on employment and educational efforts, the OCI was more concerned with small scale physical renovations. However, some physical renovations were funded with MDI money.

Thirdly, after the OCI ended in 2002 and just before the end of the MDI in 2004, the municipality launched a new programme, City District Regeneration (CDR, *Stadsdelsförnyelsen*) in 2003. This programme was framed within the city's integration work as it shared the same objectives and may be considered to be in line with the earlier area-based interventions. It employs a similar strategy of using employment and education as means to integration and closing the gap between different parts of the city.

MDI and OCI

The MDI and OCI have already been thoroughly evaluated in the RESTATE reports (especially in Öresjö *et al.*, 2004), so I will restrict myself to a short summary of the activities, organisation, and results. This summary is presented below.

⁸ The two older programmes (MDI and OCI) have been discussed in RESTATE. City district regeneration (CDR) is a newer programme.

Summary of MDI and OCI policy in Stockholm (from Öresjö et al., 2004)

Housing and the built environment

Aims: Make estates more attractive

Organisation: Mostly OCI, some co-funding by MDI, which means municipal offices such as the city planning office in cooperation with the housing companies.

Activities: Work on façades, improve safety through illumination, playground renewal, and improve maintenance of green areas. In addition, some improvement of kitchens and bathrooms, and attempts to bring multi-national firms and attractive retail to the areas.

Evaluation: Quite successful in improving quality of environment.

Employment and economy

Aims: Higher employment rates and a reduction of benefit dependency

Organisation: Mostly within MDI frame: National Labour Market Administration, County Labour Board and Local Labour Offices, Municipal District Council (receives most funding).

Activities: Projects with involvement of local businesses, district administration, and local labour office to provide courses, business advisory service, networking, and enhance cooperation between schools and business community. Some projects are directed at specific groups.

Evaluation: Although unemployment is still high, some success may be claimed. The matching projects were successful. Overall success is dependent on substantial and continuous funding.

Need for structural method.

Safety

Aims: Safe and attractive environments

Organisation: Projects within OCI and MDI frame initiated by district council to improve safety and aid understaffed police

Activities: Crime prevention by building community responsibilities among youths, street service patrols for residents (civil guard)

Evaluation: Problems with funding. Projects were satisfactory but insufficient.

Education and skills

Aims:

- Improve level of Swedish language among adults and children
- Equal opportunities to reach secondary school attainment levels
- Raising educational levels among adults

Organisation: In frame of MDI and city's general development policy as school system is a municipal task which is carried out by the districts.

Activities: Centred on improving Swedish among immigrants: courses, additional training for teachers, and more resources for libraries. To improve level of education: complementary education, on the job training, skills development programmes, contacts of school with industry to combat prejudices and improve career prospects of students.

Evaluation: Target population is reached but developments are slow. Projects are dependent on continuous funding.

Health and well-being

Aims: Improvement of public health, or equal health among social groups

Organisation: Municipality, districts and county council for MDI measures

Activities: MDI measures include efforts to improve collaboration, to supply information for preventive purposes, child birth and upbringing, sex education, preventing and eliminating female genital mutilation, information on food and exercise, establishment of family centres.

Evaluation: Vague policies, therefore largely neglected in the MDI frame. Preventive measures suffered from budget restrictions and were finally cut. However, some successful projects have been implemented.

Social aspects

Aims: Improve integration and with recognition that top-down action is insufficient and, secondly, improve reputation

Organisation: Within OCI and MDI: Municipality, district, immigrant associations, and other actors within estates

Activities: Activities vary but include sports for integration through network building and neighbourhood festivals to uplift civic and neighbourhood pride.

Evaluation: Some projects are successful but no evaluation is possible because of bottom-up nature. Residential segregation has not decreased.

Photo 2.4. Neighbourhood restaurant in Tensta, made possible with municipal subsidies



2.5.5 City District Regeneration

The City District Regeneration programme is the successor to the Outer City Initiative. However, CDR differs somewhat from its predecessor in that the programme aims to involve more municipal organisations (specialist committees). Furthermore, the programme also involves funding from the municipal housing companies.⁹ The changes in set-up are the result of the desire to form broader coalitions and improve the integrated approach. The OCI programme required residents to apply for funding for projects. However, some of these projects faced problems because there was no municipal department available to assist, or because

⁹ Municipal Housing Companies are required to contribute half of the total 600 million SEK budget (600M SEK ≈ 65M Euro), spread over the four year running-period (2003-2006). The municipal housing company Svenska Bostäder is the biggest contributor (approximately a quarter of total budget).

the programme's funding dried up earlier than anticipated. This meant that many projects failed and caused frustration among residents. To prevent this from happening again, the CDR funds the responsible municipal districts, which allocate the funding to projects in the district at their own discretion. The high level of responsibility is new for the city districts which previously acted as an extension of the central municipality.

The objectives of the CDR programme are largely the same as the OCI, although the emphasis has shifted from physical interventions to social projects. As mentioned above, the project shares the objectives of the city's integration work, which means that reducing segregation and promoting integration is the general aim (Stadsdelsförnyelse, 2003). More specifically, the programme aims to reduce the gap between different parts of the city in terms of employment, levels of education, health, safety, and security, as well as access to local services, culture, and recreational infrastructure. The quest for integration is complemented with an economic growth rationale as apparent in the statement that 'the basis for sustainable growth and economic development in the whole city will be created through investment in the outer city neighbourhoods that stimulates the residents, housing provisions, new jobs, and excellent conditions for trade and industry as well as physical and electronic infrastructure' (Id. 2003). In addition to these already very ambitious objectives, the programme aims to detect and eliminate discriminatory structures and racism.

As described above, the method for reaching these goals calls for empowering and funding the city districts, and involving the housing corporations and municipal specialist committees to aid residents in the projects. The involvement of the local residents is considered to be a pivotal element of the programme. The city district councils are to develop methods that stimulate existing business, new associations, and individuals to participate and cooperate, whereby no groups are to be left out. As a result, the CDR has spawned over 500 different projects in the nine participating districts. These projects vary from subsidising boxing clubs for teenagers, supporting cultural activities and venues, setting up 'free to use computers' at Tensta's Citizens' Service Centre, to sponsoring the development of language development methods in schools, and engaging in employment and internship programmes that try to match the skills of the local labour force with local demand.

2.5.6 Area-based interventions in Stockholm: Evaluation and philosophy

The evaluation of area-based interventions and the programme itself is very difficult due to the fact that the 500 projects differ so much. As a consequence, the City District Programme is mainly being evaluated by the municipality on participation and cooperation. After three years, the feeling is that cooperation between the various municipal departments, committees and agencies is still very difficult and not without problem. On the other hand, participation of the residents seems to be good, according to the programme coordinator. However, by taking residential participation as an evaluation criterion, the risk is that participation itself is becoming an objective in itself instead of a means to an end. A district coordinator in the estates indicated that participation has indeed become an objective in the eyes of the central municipality. Moreover, the coordinator expressed doubts whether participation is useful at all, because in many cases newly arrived immigrants do not have time to attend meetings, follow language courses, and work voluntarily in projects, as they often have families and/ or are working. Furthermore, the people who are to participate are often also the people who experience problems, and it may be too

much to ask them to volunteer and solve their own problems. They might not be aware of the possibilities because they are new to Swedish society, or not have the mental or emotional capacity to get involved.

...We put a lot of stress on people to participate, but many are unsure about their future and do not have the time and energy to be active in the community. They might not be able to do it despite our motivations. This is a misconception of (the notion of) participation. The central city always wants it to be very high. All programs always assess participation numbers, but people have to know their way around and know how to participate. The assumption (in policy) is often that people have a holistic perspective when they arrive in Sweden. It is sometimes too much to ask to be so engaged. The City wants to see short term results and does not consider this. This gives people a negative view on politics and the administration. They participate but often don't see any results for themselves; no job. Participation as a goal works frustrating for people and the development process... (Kista District CDR Coordinator, interview 17-05-2006)

Thus, the risk is great that people in need are not being reached by the programme's projects. These considerations are in line with the literature on area-based interventions discussed above.

In spite of the fact that an evaluation of the integration objective is hard to achieve, the respondents vary in their own evaluation whether the situation in the estate has changed in the last ten years. Some say the area-based programmes helped little or not at all. When asked about the usefulness of the programmes and their offspring projects, the experienced district council director answered:

They do little for the development (of the estate). If you want to change the character of the area, you have to take larger steps. You have to (literally) rebuild the area. I think (the programmes) are rather useless. We have had all these projects, and we are more segregated today than 10 years ago; we have lower incomes than 10 years ago, more illiterates and lower voter turn-up each election. (Head of Spånga-Tensta municipal district administration, interview 19-05-2006)

Although individual successes have been made and some projects improved the situation of some residents or a part of the environment, the lack of structural and long-term aid undermines the overall effectiveness of the money spent in the estate. Thus, in the current form, the area-based interventions benefit only a portion of the residents in need for short periods on end. The feeling is that the people who have been helped tend to move out of the estate, and local policymakers are not happy with the role of the estate as a sort of 'emancipation/ integration machine' despite the available expertise. The reason why they are not happy is that they believe that it is not fair for the local residents, because such a role would further stigmatize them, and, furthermore, they feel that other districts should take on some of the burden.¹⁰

Several respondents have indicated that to truly integrate the immigrant residents into the Swedish system, a higher amount of native residents is needed in

¹⁰ On a side note, this feeling among neighbourhood managers is named by Uitermark (2003) as one of the reasons for implementing social mixing policies in the Netherlands (see above).

the estate. The rationale is that they could fulfil a role model function and perhaps become part of integrated social networks. In other words, it would decrease residential segregation and thereby improve system and social integration. To achieve this, student housing has been built in Husby and both estates saw the construction of single housing. However, the single housing did not attract Swedish middle-class, but did attract middle-class families from immigrant descent.¹¹ Thus, the rationale of new construction of single housing and more expensive apartments has changed to keeping the population stable by offering residents who wish to live differently, an alternative within the estate. It is felt that a large addition of owner-occupied high standard housing would achieve the goal of desegregation. The current piecemeal construction of new housing within confines of the estates has to do with the difficulties of building on green fields in Stockholm. Furthermore, the demolition of existing buildings is out of the question because there is a housing shortage and the buildings are still in good shape.

Some of the respondents, who have been working in the estates for over a decade, express some confusion and remorse over the implementation of area-based interventions as opposed to the traditional universal welfare state measure from the past. Most of the respondents indicated that equal opportunities, freedom of choice and political participation are the reasons to strive for integration. This is in line with the Swedish cultural policies since the mid 1970s, when in fact it was decided that cultural and lingual diversity should be promoted (Andersson, 2006b). Freedom of choice, cooperation and equal opportunities are ideas that are highly compatible with the discourse of the universal welfare state (see above). The 1997 Integration Policy stressed the importance of (system) integration without discussing the role of the earlier concepts, which causes conceptual problems and conflict of objectives. The concept of freedom of choice may inherently obstruct the project of (system) integration. When the majority population consistently chooses not to socialise with and live among the minority population, it is then impossible to promote integration without compromising the freedom of choice to some degree (id., 2006a). Respondents are aware of the restrictions of the freedom of choice principle on promoting integration through the area-based programmes, as they indicate that they cannot force people to move in or out of the neighbourhood. They indicate that everyone should have the freedom to choose in what neighbourhood to live. This contradiction in objectives comes forth out of the confrontation between older universal welfare state discourses, originating from a prosperous industrial age, and new developing discourses that are shaped by the arrival of immigrants and the decline of the Swedish Model.

Despite the decline of the Swedish Model, recent interventions in the estates were still all coordinated by public and semi-public organisations and institutions, whereas private involvement was limited to several projects. For instance, companies participate in projects to allow for internships to educate adults and youth and prepare them for the labour market. Furthermore, private municipal housing companies are involved in projects that aim at safety and quality of public space. The area-based programmes have attempted to strengthen public-public partnerships to tackle the problems in a more integrated way.

The 'integrated approach', however, is restricted to the municipal boundaries. Although the MDI was a national programme, the new programmes were initiated, funded and coordinated by the City of Stockholm. It is most striking that regional cooperation is largely absent and even more so that a regional perspective on the problems in the estates is also lacking in the programmes. The reason why this is notable is because similar estates exist in the neighbouring municipalities

¹¹ These developments are still too small in scale to trigger a discussion on the advantages of an (ethnic) middle-class presence.

which are part of the same housing and labour market, and because the administrative infrastructure is present (Greater Stockholm County), yet it restricts itself to health care in tackling the problems in the estate. So, to summarize, the common view is that segregation and poverty are the problem, integration is the goal, employment and education are the answers, short term area-based intervention programmes with the emphases on public-public partnerships and participation are the means. Below we shall see how in contrast to Stockholm a post-war housing estate in Jönköping is able to have a satisfied population.

2.6 Jönköping

The city of Jönköping is the heart of a medium-sized metropolitan region located in the middle of southern Sweden, 330 kilometres southwest of Stockholm, 150 kilometres east of Gothenburg, and 300 kilometres north of Malmö. The total population of the municipality was 119.927 on 31 December, 2004, which makes it one of the larger metropolitan areas in Sweden. Ever since its foundation in the 13th century, the settlement has profited from its strategic location at the junction of the roads between the largest cities in Sweden, and Scandinavia. This is evident in the strong presence of storage, transport, and communication establishments which make the metropolitan region a logistics centre. Jönköping also functions as a governmental centre as it is the provincial capital and hosts the public administration for the region. Furthermore, the Swedish Board of Agriculture, the National Board of Forestry and the National Judiciary Administration are located in the city. Moreover, the city hosts a university college, which has the authority to issue doctoral degrees within the social sciences.

The municipality of Jönköping in its current form is the result of a merger of three cities (Jönköping, Husqvarna, and Gränna) and several nearby villages. Jönköping was the largest of the three cities, which already functioned as a public administration centre then and was internationally known for its manufacturing industries. Husqvarna is a bit smaller and is characterised as a manufacturing centre, which attracted many workers to the region. Gränna is the smallest and is mainly known as a tourist destination. Råslätt, the estate I will discuss in more detail is located in the south of the old Jönköping. Öxnehaga, an estate which I will mention as well, is located in the old Husqvarna.


2.7 The Råslätt Estate

Råslätt is a large housing estate in the south of Jönköping, which was constructed during the Million Programme in the late 1960s and first half of the 1970s. Although the estate is not as large as Tensta or Husby, its size is relatively significant on the local housing market. The area has about 2.200 rental dwellings in multi-dwelling buildings, which corresponds to roughly 10 percent of all multi-dwelling units in Jönköping. Most dwellings are either one- two-bedroom apartments. The estate was built as a separate entity connected only by road with the rest of the city. The urban design is in accordance with modernist MP ideals, i.e. traffic separation (no elevated roads); multi-storey parking lots; a local centre with public transport, services, commerce and amenities; 30 uniformly built 6-8 storey buildings placed in a rectangular fashion with greenery in between.

The total population of Råslätt is 4.636 inhabitants (2005) of which about half are born in another country. The population is relatively young with a large share of children and young adults (see figure 2.7). Employment rates and income levels

are very low compared to the region. Employment rates dropped considerably during the economic crises in the 1990s. The employment rate for men is 54.7% and for women it is 40.5%, while Jönköping figures are 81.6% and 76.5% respectively.

Figure 2.7. Age distribution in Råslätt and Jönköping in 2004
(Source: Jönköping Kommunstatistik)



The residential area of Råslätt is built around a centre where there is a small indoor shopping centre (since 1972, renovated in 2001), a medical and social centre (since 1974), a church (since 1975), and a recreation building (since 1975), which houses a swimming pool, a library, and one of Råslätt's three primary schools. Three to five buses leave each hour from Råslätt to Jönköping's city centre. The travelling time of the bus is approximately 15 minutes.

The municipality and the municipal housing company, Bostads AB VätterHem, who owns the estate, pay a lot of attention to managing Råslätt and tackling the problems in the area. These problems, as we shall see below, are mostly socio-economic in nature and somewhat similar to those in Tensta and Husby. However, the difference in institutional context is apparent in problem conceptions and solutions.

Photo 2.4. Råslätt housing estate



2.7.1 Perceived problems

Råslätt is perceived to be a problematic area ever since it was constructed during the Million Programme period. Its construction was paired with slum clearances in east and central Jönköping, which meant that many residents of the slums moved to Råslätt. These residents, who were relatively poor, took their problems along with them. In addition, already from the start Råslätt attracted foreigners and immigrants (Yugoslavs, Turks, Scandinavians), who came to Jönköping to work in the industries in neighbouring Husqvarna. What is more, services, amenities, schools, shops, community centres, etc. were built much later than the apartment buildings and parks, which made the area quite lifeless for 5-6 years. The civil servants and teachers had to struggle with the municipality and housing company to get some facilities, which formed the basis of the so-called 'Råslätt Spirit' (see below), but also worsened the reputation of the estate. In addition to its inhabitants and lack of amenities, the grey monotonous design of concrete multi-storey apartment buildings in rows reinforced the public image of an unattractive crime-infested problem area.

Despite renovations to improve attractiveness in the 1980s, the estate continued to be problematic in the following decades. The early nineties was a period when Råslätt suffered a bad period when there were high levels of vacancies and much unemployment. The problems aggravated when the decision was made to place newly-arrived immigrants in the vacant flats, resulting in about 800 immigrants coming in each year. The new influx overwhelmed the old population and created the atmosphere of a refugee camp, leading to a further exodus of stable tenants. In the late 1990s Råslätt experienced a recovery phase and the population steadily increased again and vacancies became less common.

Nowadays, the biggest problem in Råslätt, according to the interviewees, is twofold. First, the levels of employment have always been the lowest in Jönköping. Due to the low level of education and immigrant presence, the population of Råslätt is more vulnerable to swings in the job market and thus face a higher risk of lay-offs and prolonged unemployment. The low level of employment is thought to be the foremost problem, because it is reasoned that work is important for self-confidence, social networks, and the children's self-esteem. An immigrant male head of a household from a more patriarchal society, who is without a job, loses respect and authority in the family, which causes frustration and negative effects on the entire family. Furthermore, apart from the income, working provides social network opportunities which may be of use to advance in a career. The second important issue on the political and administrative agenda are the schools in Råslätt, which need extra attention to be able to cope with the immigrant children who do not master the Swedish language.

Like in Stockholm, the most important frame in Jönköping is segregation and integration. However, these issues were far less pronounced and focus was more on the problems that people experience on a more personal level. The reasoning was less abstract, and more from the perspective of those in need. As the coordinator of the municipal Integration Programme put it:

(Segregation) is a problem, but not really. The most segregated areas are Swedish (middle-class) areas and nobody talks about them. Our goal was never to move people out, but the goal was that Råslätt should be a good choice for people to move and (that) residents should be proud. Also the media point out the problems in the area. On the other hand, people should also have the possibility to move out. But when people move out and buy a house when they have found a job, new people with new problems come in. This is the case in Råslätt as well as in Stockholm. The statistics in the area remain the

same, but individuals have improved their situation. (Coordinator Integration Programme, Jönköping, interview, 23-05-2006)

The attitude is understandable because due to the relatively small size of the region the effects of socio-economic segregation dynamics are less pervasive than in, for instance, the Stockholm estates. As a result, the vulnerable areas in Jönköping are relatively 'manageable', and the municipality, housing companies and other actors can afford to focus more practically on the symptoms and less on the causes. Nevertheless, integration is the key objective and rationale behind the interventions and programmes of the last decade.

2.7.2 The actors and their spirit

Before discussing the more recent key interventions and policies, the main actors and the so-called 'Råslätt Spirit' need to be discussed. Much like in Stockholm, the responsibility for liveability lies with the municipality and the municipal housing company, Bostads AB VätterHem. The municipality takes on this responsibility from an integration point of view, while the municipal housing company tends to reason from manageability. Despite this difference in rationales, the two tend to work very well together in the case of Råslätt, which has been well documented by Öresjö (see Andersson *et al.*, 2003; Öresjö *et al.*, 2004).

Cooperation, political support, and allocation of funding are also very much helped and facilitated by the existence of a so-called 'Råslätt Spirit'. This phenomenon has developed over the history of the estate as owing to a sense of solidarity and belligerence among civil servants, health and social workers and teachers in the vulnerable estate. As a result, Råslätt has been able to mobilise and fight for the interests of the estate in various ways, such as applying for funds and projects. This is less the case in other vulnerable areas such as Öxnehaga. Furthermore, several old residents and workers from Råslätt have risen in the ranks of the municipality and housing company, which also helps to get attention for the problems of the estate.¹² The idea of the 'spirit' is strong and even breeds jealousy in other poor estates, which feel that Råslätt is favoured.

2.7.3 Strategic and comprehensive programmes

Because segregation is perceived to be the main problem, the most important programme affecting Råslätt is the municipality's Integration Programme, which is designed to counter the negative effects of segregation. It started in 1997 when the public opinion and welfare indicators showed a dip in the situation. In that year Peter Persson (social democratic politician, chairman of municipal executive board and executive committee) was chairman of the welfare issues in the whole municipality, and he felt very strong about the estates. Hence, he initiated the Integration Programme, which were to cost 10M SEK a year. The money was distributed in a non-bureaucratic fashion as only the coordinator was responsible for applications and was able to steer approval from majority and minority political representatives. In 2006 the programme ended, and it is now up to the culture, school and welfare boards to continue the work by using their own budget. The coordinator remains

¹² For instance, the chairman of VätterHem is an old resident of Råslätt, used to be a member in municipal council, and was active in the estate for the housing company within the framework of the Integration Programme.

active to keep it together and coordinate efforts with a budget of 1M SEK a year. This money is supposed to be used for projects that help newcomers with education and work. Since 1997 there have been 150 different projects in four areas including about 50 projects in Råslätt. The projects had to be proposed by the local residents and workers and were eligible for funding if it focused on:

- labour market and employment,
- education and language skills,
- culture,
- political participation,
- sports and other leisure activities.

The last point was incorporated because it promotes social integration of children and their parents and improves public health. The focal points resemble those found in the programmes in Stockholm.

In addition to the Integration Programme, other comprehensive programmes have been implemented and carried out in Jönköping and Råslätt. Öresjö *et al.* (2004) have described a broad range of activities, which have been summarized below.

Summary of policies and interventions affecting Råslätt in the last decade (from Öresjö et al., 2004)

Housing and the built environment

Aims: An efficient housing market (to promote integration) and make estates more attractive

Organisation: Housing Support Programme (2004-2008) with special municipal committee.

Housing Company on estate level, and Municipality

Activities: Special housing for drug addicted people, student accommodations, physical renewal and renovation, the rebuilding of Råslätt centre.

Evaluation: Municipal Urban Planning Department is not able and equipped to deal with segregation. The greenery and buildings in the estate are well kept.

Employment and economy

Aims: Bring outsiders in the labour market (to promote social and system integration)

Organisation: Municipal Labour Committee in cooperation with the Integration Programme

Activities: Offer work to long-term unemployed for a 12 month period.

Evaluation: Project went well, but does not quite negate the sensitivity of the estate for economic climate.

Safety

Aims: A safer and more secure municipality

Organisation:

- Municipal Comprehensive Plan, Local council of crime prevention, and Police
- Security and Safety Programme from Bostads AB VätterHem

Activities:

Focus on prevention, and optimise police deployment through local police support public groups and 'community reach-out' to improve intelligence and prevention

Secondly, cooperation with local authorities and registration of problems to prevent and address crime early within the dwellings, provide information about security and safety to employees, address traffic and parking problems, break-ins, threats, and violence

Evaluation: People appreciate emphasis on safety and security. Measurements on effectiveness are missing.

Education and skills

Aims: Equal opportunities for all children and help language development among multi-lingual children.

Organisation: Municipal plans: School Plan and Special Working Plans (School and Childcare Committee, schools, libraries, housing company, social services, police, youth recreation centres), Linguistical Project in Integration Programme.

Activities: Developing new teaching methods, strengthening cooperation between organisations and appreciate parent input.

Evaluation: Statistics show children are reading more, there has been some linguistic development and improvements in cooperation. Schools have a better image.

Health and well-being

Aims: Decrease inequality in health

Organisation: Public Health Plan (Municipal Public Health Committee) in cooperation with district health care centres.

Activities: Targeted health work at specific groups, health promotion in schools.

Evaluation: Difficult to assess long-term effects, poor health seems to be connected to employment.

Social aspects

Aims: Sports, elderly care, and social services to promote participation and equality

Organisation: Social services offices, municipality in cooperation with county council. Also in frame of Integration programme.

Activities: Improve home care for elderly and disabled, provide welfare care.

Evaluation: Good sectoral cooperation, sports arena and football club are successful in promoting social contacts and improving living conditions.

2.7.4 Conclusion Råslätt

The programmes described above are obviously not as comprehensive and grand-scale as those in Stockholm, but are quite similar in their rationales and solutions. Also here we see the same three key concepts in the programmes: cooperation, integration, and public participation.

The number of actors and municipal agencies are far less than those in Stockholm, which makes cooperation easier to accomplish. However, we should note that in this respect Råslätt is something of an exception due to its 'spirit' and sympathisers, even in Jönköping, where other estates such as Öxnehaga have more difficulties working together within the estate and receiving support from the City.

As for integration, the 'flag ship' of the efforts to combat segregation is of course the comprehensive municipal Integration Programme. However, during the course of the programme, the focus of the projects slowly shifted away from social integration issues towards employment, or as the coordinator of Integration Programme put it:

Politicians and society make segregation a problem. Of course contacts with Swedes are good, but it is never our intention to mix people. There is more to it than that. In the end, living in these areas is not the problem, but employment is. (Coordinator Integration Programme, Jönköping, interview, 23-05-2006)

System integration is indeed an important goal, but social integration is less of a problem in Jönköping than in the larger and more isolated estates in Stockholm.

As mentioned, the overall situation in Råslätt is positive now; high residential satisfaction, successful projects, well maintained greenery, reasonable participation, quality staff at the schools, etc. However, the estate can hardly be considered a modernist Utopia. The estate's position at the bottom of the local housing market in combination with the buildings, tenure and size of the dwellings (not suitable for families) mean that it will always be a home for socio-economic weaker groups, who tend to be more vulnerable for economic recession. As a consequence, the area will always need to be kept an eye on to ensure a minimum degree of liveability and residential satisfaction.

To ensure liveability and residential satisfaction, the municipal housing company has introduced a renter eligibility policy which states that only people with a steady income from employment, student aid or pension can get a flat in Råslätt. The policy, thus, excludes people on welfare benefits and new immigrants and explicitly gives the municipal housing company the role of a 'social gatekeeper' (see Pahl, 1977). Fearing the 'refugee camp' situation in the 1990s, Bostads AB VätterHem claims that the policy is necessary to protect an already vulnerable estate from becoming even more vulnerable and is able to implement it because of the high demand for housing in the Jönköping region. The policy has led to some friction with the Jönköping municipality, which recently agreed with the National Immigration Board to take in 360 refugees each year. Furthermore, the housing company's decision has put pressure on the other estates and the six other housing companies in the region, which are equally reluctant to take in the poor and vulnerable. Nevertheless, Bostads AB VätterHem claims that they have too many poor people already.

Since the eligibility policy has been introduced, there is no data available on whether this affected the welfare indicators. However, it is most likely that it has had an impact on the estate, and will continue to have it in the coming years. This is because the policy is in essence an exclusionary mechanism that bars out the weakest and thereby slowly relieves the estate and its residents of some of the socio-economic burden.

So the success of Råslätt seems to be the result of a combination of factors. First, there is the so-called 'Råslätt Spirit', or the informal network of civic leaders, municipality, municipal housing company, local civil servants, teachers, associations, which has been successful in drawing attention and funding to the area. Second, the relatively small size of the Jönköping metropolitan area makes that segregation mechanisms manifest themselves spatially in only a few spots. Furthermore, the small size is a condition for the informal ties and practical attitude of the municipality. Third, the economic climate means that there is currently more work in the area. The economic recovery from the 1990s in combination with the growth of Jönköping region has created pressure on the housing market and has done away with vacancies for now. Fourth, because it is the sole owner in the estate, the municipal housing company has more leeway to implement interventions and significant decisions such as the renter eligibility policy.

2.8 Conclusions

In the two cities we have seen that the practices are embedded in an institutional framework that originates from different levels but is mainly from the (semi-) public sphere. The embeddedness is clearly noticeable on the level of the welfare state, the city-region, and the estates themselves.

First, it is evident that the Swedish welfare state and its transformation since the 1990s have a substantial impact on the rationales found in policy and implementation. Typical of this transformation in the last decade is the use of area-based interventions as a way to combat poverty and promote integration. In both

cities these were in the form of programmes which allocated funding physical renewal as well as to small-scale projects with a socio-economic aim (bottom-up approach). In line with discussions in the literature, the respondents are aware that these projects do not reach all those who need assistance, firstly, because the interventions only target an area which houses a concentration but not nearly a majority of poor people, and, secondly, because a lot of projects often work on an unsustainable, voluntary and short-term basis. This does not mean that these projects do not have some value but they are not enough to combat poverty and promote integration.

Integration has been the main theme in Swedish social politics for a decade now and is very much related to the influx of immigrants in the last decades of the 20th century. As we have seen, integration is also one of the main objectives behind all area-based interventions. The question is whether area-based interventions are suitable to achieve integration. Unfortunately, this report does not give an answer to this question in its entirety, since it has not examined the material processes, but it is possible to make assertions on the basis of the political discourse. The respondents, especially those in Stockholm, seem to be aware of the limitations of area-based interventions to promote integration. Some projects are indeed quite suitable to help system integration for a limited amount of people, in particular in projects which involve structural improvements in lingual education. However, their scope and reach are too limited to promote the full system integration of entire groups. This seems to be true for social integration as well. Furthermore, social integration is a complicated issue since it involves the question of social mixing. In the Swedish context it is very important that people have an opportunity to choose their place of residence. This is one of the reasons why the concentration of socio-economic weak people in isolated estates is conceived as a problem. However, the same principle also does not allow any social mixing within the estates by assigning Swedish renters to the area. Neither did it help build a few single-family houses within the estates, since these are hard to sell to Swedish middle-class buyers. In other words, the city of Stockholm and Jönköping have very limited possibilities to encourage social integration through social mixing, which they see as a necessary condition for equal opportunities. However, it should be noted that social mixing is also used as an argument to make the estate more attractive and more manageable, especially in the larger estates in Stockholm, where, more so than in Jönköping, the physical isolation of the estates from the rest of the city amplifies the conception of a problem area as if it were a gated community.

What's more is that the mere fact that these estates are being targeted with special interventions may work counter-productive and even obstruct integration. The logic and rationale of these selective interventions requires a conception of 'the other' who is different and in need of help. Furthermore, the use of area-based interventions to promote integration shifts the focus from general questions of poverty and unemployment to the localised problems of a minority group. It forces policy-makers and civic workers to focus their efforts on specific groups and bypass the notion that the social mechanisms which cause these problems work beyond the estates. It is, indeed, a form of 'blaming the victim' (cf. Andersson, 2003).

As mentioned above, some of the respondents, especially those in Stockholm, are conscious of the limitations of selective approaches and lament the times when general and redistributive policies and rationales were given precedence. The changes after the break-down of the Swedish model is also present in the conceptions and ideals of the older policy-makers and coordinators, which are shaped by the universalistic and redistributive approach to social problems. Moreover, the new role of the municipal housing companies after the right-to-buy legislation and the forced participation in the programmes is shifting from the role of a care-taker and builder of public housing to the role of an interventionist social housing company.

The regional dimension of the problems and actions in the estates is important as well. The material processes which affect the estates are regional in nature because they relate to labour market, transportation, housing market, and identity, which are all aspects of a neighbourhood and its residents that exceed the boundaries of an estate. We have already seen that the state of the housing market and the economic situation very much determine the amount, daily activities, and income levels of the residents. However, it was not within the scope of this report to gain a more detailed insight into these regional dynamics, for which there is obviously a compelling need. The institutional dimension of the region in both cities was mainly dominated by the main municipality and less by any metropolitan or county body. Thus, even though the material processes that are at the basis of the conceived problems are regional, the administrative framework is not, because the problems are framed as very localised.


Lastly, the institutional embeddedness of practices is also evident on the local estate level. All the estates had experienced people working in the estates in the framework of the programmes. Since they have a considerable amount of knowledge on the estate and its residents, they are able to determine whether certain projects or funding is appropriate in the estate. In other words, the selection and emphases of the projects are very much dependent on the discretion and insights of the local workers, who thereby make use of their role as social gatekeeper. The exact impact of experienced policy-makers on projects is beyond the scope of this work, but should be quite elusive. Less subtle is the influence of local actors on the practices in Råslätt, where the municipal housing company is barring out the poor, and the 'Råslätt Spirit', or informal ties in combination with belligerence, has ensured a fair amount of policy action and participation and willingness. The latter element is unfortunately hard to copy top-down, even within the municipality of Jönköping, since the spirit comes forth out of a very particular history. Nevertheless, it is clear that cooperation and coalition building is effective and that civic culture should be fostered whenever present.

3 The Regeneration of Post-WWII Housing Estates in Birmingham

3.1 Third Way Policies

The UK is usually typified as a liberal or liberal-statist welfare state with relatively small social expenditures compared to continental Europe (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Mingione, 2005). Although the welfare state came under pressure under the Conservatives' neoliberalism between 1979 and 1997, it did not vanish. On the contrary, public social expenditure was higher in 1996 compared to 1980, one year after the Conservatives came to power (see concluding chapter for graph). The real changes were in the logic and in the priorities of distribution. As we can see in figure 3.1, public social expenditure has increasingly gone to old age pensions¹³ and health care¹⁴, which reflects the aging populations of Western Europe. Some of the increasing costs of health care and an aging population are compensated by the reduced unemployment benefit costs over the years, a result of good economic performance. Nevertheless, when New Labour came to power in 1997, it did not bring back the old social democratic welfare state ideals it once championed, nor did they increase social expenditures dramatically, but went the 'Third Way' and relied more on communitarianism to achieve social justice in British society.

Figure 3.1. (Source: OECD, 2004)



Between society and individual: community

Communitarianism is a broad stance on citizenship with a strong emphasis on community in reaction to previously prevalent individualist views of neoliberalism. Communitarianism could also be seen as a modification of liberal thinking since there are no major differences except for the stance on the ontological foundations of

¹³ 37% of all social expenditures in 2001 (OECD, 2004)

¹⁴ 28% of all social expenditures in 2001 (OECD, 2004)

society, where communitarianism represents a demand for the recognition of a social ontology to correct for excessive concerns with moral individualism in mainstream liberal political theory. Nevertheless, despite the existence of different strands within the framework, communitarianism is ultimately characterised by the focus on civic community of the polity as opposed to a small-scale traditional community (Delanty, 2003). In one strand of the communitarian debate, the focus on civic community becomes an advocacy of community, and a paradigm for public policy. For instance, Etzioni's promotion of community in society transcends academic debate and approximates the discourse of community in (US) policy making. In his view, communities have a 'moral voice' in society because they provide individuals with "a normative foundation, a starting point, culture and tradition, fellowship, and a place for moral dialogue" (Etzioni, 1997, p. 257). However, communities are not the arbitrators of morality. Individuals bear a voluntary personal responsibility and commitment to moral order. Etzioni's vision of a balanced society (balance between social order and individual autonomy) is very much dependent on the responsibility of the individual, which should be ensured by values and virtues instilled upon by institutions such as family and schools. He advocates a recovery of the small-scale community on the neighbourhood level, the locality, the family, and associations. The view of community here is privatistic, which means that it absolves the state of some of its responsibilities (Delanty, 2003).

Communitarianism in social policy

In the last decade there has been a rise of communitarianism, or the community-based approach, in social policy, at least in the UK, but arguably also in other West European states. The ascent in policy is best explained by the decline of the universal logic of social policy which was related with the West-European social welfare states of the second half of the 20th century (Mishra, 1998). This decline is partially due to the globalising economy after the 1970s crises (Hobsbawm, 1994), but also, in relation to rise of the global capitalism, by the neoliberal discourses which became prevalent at the global and national scales of politics (Jessop, 2002). These discourses usually suppose the prohibitiveness of maintaining universal welfare provisions, advocate workfare instead of welfare, and propose the local level to be responsible for mediating the negative effects of global capitalism (e.g. exclusion, poverty, segregation, etc.) (Jessop, 2002; Peck, 2001, 2002). In 'postsocial politics' since the 1990s, political government is to be relieved of its central powers and obligations in the fields of order, security, health and productivity in favour of social actors such as individuals, firms, organisations, localities, schools, parents, hospitals, and housing estates (Rose, 2000). Thus, it is no wonder that, at least in the UK, we see a rise of community-based approaches that usually centre on employment in neighbourhood regeneration efforts. The different actors bundled together in one neighbourhood, or locality, constitute a community and they are expected to take part of the responsibilities that the social state once took entirely. On the one hand this gives groups of people the responsibility of their destiny and society as a whole, yet on the other hand they are made also responsible for society. This change in the social mentality of government is epitomised in the Third Way movement, which in the UK is synonymous with the rule of New Labour since 1997 (see below).

Etzioni's work fits well within the American tradition to which de Tocqueville and, more recently, Robert Putnam (2000) also belong, where social problems are framed by a crisis of social and moral values (Rose, 2000). Communitarianism, however, is not limited to the US, but Western societies such as Germany and those in Scandinavia also "fall within the communitarian range" (Etzioni, 1997, p 35). Delanty (2003, p90) sums up the main themes of communitarianism compared to older social liberal political thought:

- the shift from social equality to cultural difference;
- social capital as the basis of democracy and citizenship
- the definition of community as one of shared values, solidarity and attachments;
- a conception of social reality in terms of group ties rather than moral individualism;
- a group differentiated conception of citizenship;
- an emphasis on cultural rights as opposed to social rights.

Many of these elements can also be found in modern policies and political thought in Western Europe, where communitarianism has become most pronounced in Britain since New Labour's rise to power in 1997 under the leadership of Tony Blair. New Labour alludes strongly to communitarian themes in their 'Third Way' politics. Third Way is not so much a political programme but a way of seeing political problems, a rationality for making them conceivable and manageable, and a set of moral principles for creating and legitimizing solutions. The term here refers to an alternative between traditional Social Democratic values which lead to bureaucratic and 'big government' and right-wing neoliberalism, which seeks to dismantle government altogether (Giddens, 2000). Many of the ideas as put forward by sociologist Anthony Giddens (2000) and British prime minister Tony Blair are simply a repackaging of well-known social-liberal themes and philosophies such as "...an admixture of democratization, constitutional tinkering, hopes for a vital mixed economy, support for family values, praise for civil society, aspirations to improve effectiveness of welfare provisions, commitment to equality of opportunity, support for religious and value pluralism, plans for better international regulation of trade" (Rose, 2000). The most significant novelty is the renewed focus on community, which is fundamentally different from the old community policy discourse in the UK (Cole and Goodchild, 2001).

Rose (2000) defines the community focus and new government mentality within the Third Way as ethopolitics, which refers to the encouragement of citizens to exercise 'ethical self- governance'. Third Way politics is a unique mixture of ethopolitics elements, which reconfigures the relation between state, society and the individual, which were at the heart of social welfare politics. The difference between Third Way politics and social democratic welfare politics is best understood by starting with the difference in conceptualising social problems. Social ills were traditionally related to material inequalities by the 'old left' since the end of the 19th century. Alternatively, in Third Way politics social problems are related to the existence of a sector of problematic and unemployable persons. These people who are considered to be excluded from society are characterised as failures, lacking personal skills and competencies. To improve these, the Third Way concentrates on the excluded individuals themselves and encourages the development of personal capacities that will help to gain access to the labour market. In this endeavour, work ethic is what is at stake. Everyone who is considered to be excluded, a member of a society's underclass, should be given the opportunity to achieve full membership in a moral community through work and adhere to values of self-reliance, honesty, and concern for others. The willingness of the excluded individual to engage in self-improvement and social behaviour forms the object of scrutiny for new moral authorities in the benefits agencies and elsewhere.¹⁵ The assumption is that old welfare state arrangements through their universal provisioning demoralise recipients, rob them of their pride, self-esteem, and self reliance, create financial and

¹⁵ In other words, benefits depend on receiver's activities and engagement to get back onto the labour market.

psychological dependency, and drive them further into exclusion. Thus the governmental 'technologies of welfare-to-work' entail a mixture of remoralisation, encouraging citizenship competencies, and punitive measures. Threats of withholding benefits and public shame are supposed to drive welfare recipients to work, no matter how menial it is, because of the disciplining and moralising benefits of wage earning. Wage earning appears to be the mechanism for reattaching those excluded to "moral community with its external responsibilities, its norms of comportment, and its psychological concomitants to identity, stability, commitment, and purpose" (Id., 2000, p 1407). Thus, by means of ethical reconstruction, the excluded and 'failing quasicitizens' should be reattached to a civil and moral community. As we shall see below, the change in social policy logic has significant consequences for neighbourhood regeneration efforts in the UK, as it consolidated the social and economic dimension in neighbourhood-related policies.

3.2 Housing in the UK

Housing and neighbourhood regeneration policies in the UK are traditionally designed and implemented at the national level. Therefore, it is important to first discuss the national policy level in order to understand the regeneration efforts. Although the national context is pivotal, we shall see that the regional and local levels also play important roles.

In the period after the WWII, Britain saw a steep increase in investments in social housing, primarily through the local councils. While council housing went back to the 19th century, it did not come to fruition until immediately after WWI, when a new subsidy regime facilitated the construction of high quality stock. After WWII the reconstruction efforts after the Blitz were channelled through the council housing building. By 1970, 30% of the total housing stock was social housing. The housing was modern and consisted predominantly out of single housing with gardens. However, during this period, the status of social housing as good and superior to private rented sector and older owner-occupied housing began to shift. The social housing stock began to age and required some attendance. Furthermore, under the influence of modernism, the newer social housing stock built in the late 1950s and 1960s saw ever more non-traditional housing such as maisonettes and high-rise tower blocks. Although these were received favourably at first, they were soon rejected by the middle-class and, moreover, they began to be associated with all sorts of problems (Hall, 2002; Hall *et al.*, 2004).

As social problems swelled in the social housing sector, its reputation became more mixed. Demographics and economic changes decreased the social base for social housing and sometimes left estates unconnected to places of employment. This, together with the decline of the private rented sector, the increased role of council housing in housing the poorest, and the expansion of owner occupation, led to the residualisation of the council housing sector since the 1970s. Hence, since that period, the regeneration of large-scale housing estates has been on the policy agenda, which resulted in a series of regeneration programmes (see overview below).

In addition to the regeneration programmes, the Council estates and the social housing sector were heavily affected by the neoliberal stance of the Conservatives since 1979. The stance meant that privatisation and home ownership were favoured and encouraged. Furthermore, the government was seen as anti-municipal. Two policies in particular were very influential; Right-to-Buy and Stock Transfer (Hall *et al.*, 2004).

The Right-to-Buy legislation gave council housing tenants the right to buy the property they lived in and also gave them substantial discounts if they chose to

do so. The Right-to-Buy legislation was successful insofar that it resulted in the sale of one third of all Council dwellings in 20 years. However, it has also resulted in the sale of better quality stock in the more attractive estates to more affluent tenants, which contributed to the residualisation. It changed the social composition of the estates as well as the primary location of social housing (Hall *et al.*, 2004). On the other hand, the sale of stock also meant that home-ownership is no longer associated with affluence (Leather, 1999). Moreover, some less affluent and aging buyers now lack the resources to maintain their dwelling.

Stock transfer refers to the transfer of Council stock to new social landlords who are subject to another financial regime enabling them to take out more loans, and who are outside municipal control. Together with an increase in rent, the stock transfers have shifted the policy focus from dwelling to resident subsidies. Furthermore, the capital expenditures during this period were low and did not allow for the construction of new dwellings, which made council housing increasingly associated with older dwellings with a backlog of disrepair. When a programme for construction was launched in the 1980s, it focused on housing associations rather than council housing.

Despite the changes in the status and reputation of council housing, intervention programmes have generally focused on management and local factors, rather than above-lying the factors that affect the tenure as a whole (Hall *et al.*, 2004).

Overview of regeneration and renewal policies in the UK (Source: Hall et al., 2004)

Priority Estates Project (PEP)

Period: 1981- 1985

Character: Housing led

Objectives: To develop good practices in estate regeneration

Description: A series of initiatives that quickly focused on local management. It was followed by Estate Action

Estate Action (EA)

Period: 1985- 1994/1995

Character: Housing led

Objectives: Develop estate-based mgt.; diversify tenure; attract private investments; develop new forms of mgt.; bring empty properties back in use.

Description: Run by the new Urban Housing Renewal Unit (UHRU). Focus on estates with housing mgt. problems. The investments were needs led which means that in some cases unwanted stock was refurbished. Being mainly a brick and mortar programme, local governments were encouraged to invest in social and economic projects but this was less successful. In 1994/1995 the programme was incorporated in Single Regeneration Budget after £1.975 billion was spent on 540.000 social housing units in 170 districts (23% of all local capital investments in housing)

Design Improved Controlled Experiment (DICE)

Period: 1989-1994/1995

Character: Housing Led

Objectives: Improve the social conditions of the residents through restructuring modernist designs

Description: Small scale programme focused on radical design changes in 7 estates, costing £43 million. In 1994/1995 the programme was incorporated in Single Regeneration Budget. A study showed that objectives were not achieved and effects on housing mgt. costs were not significant.

Housing Action Trust (HAT)

Period: 1988-

Character: Transfer Led

Objectives: Regenerate estates that are deemed to be beyond modest local authority resources. Furthermore: repair and improve accommodations; manage stock effectively; encourage a wider range of ownership and greater choice for landlord; improve housing and socio-economic conditions; empower tenants and build communities.

Description: HATs are nondepartmental government bodies (QUANGOs) to whom stock is transferred to regenerate disadvantaged housing estates. Its creation depends on a tenant ballot. It has proved to be an expensive vehicle for regeneration, roughly 6 times more expensive per unit than Estate Renewal Challenge Fund.

City challenge/ single regeneration budget (SRB)

Period: 1990

Character: From Housing led to Area policies (non-housing focused)

Objectives: Make local regeneration more coherent, comprehensive, and inclusive. The 'bricks and mortar' approach to housing renewal diminished in favour of multi-thematic area-based initiatives.

Description: The city challenge programme entailed a competitive process in which 57 disadvantaged urban districts bid for a 5 year package of £37.5 million to encourage comprehensive partnership-based local regeneration strategies. The majority of bids involved small scale new build, selective transfer of local authority stock and rehabilitation of existing stock. After the 1992 election the city challenge programme was replaced by the single

regeneration budget, which was similar yet more flexible in budget and timetable structures, and eligibility to bid was universal, which made that resources were spread thin. Furthermore, the resources and subsequently the housing units refurbished, renovated or built was less than pre-SRB levels. There were only a few large-scale restructuring programmes.

Large Scale Voluntary Transfer (LSVT)

Period: 1988-1997

Character: Transfer led

Objectives: Encourage the transfer of local authority housing stock to housing association sector to secure private investments for physical improvements.

Description: Created, like the HAT programme, by the Conservative government. It was disbanded by the Labour government and responsibility for transfer was transferred to the mainstream Housing Investment Programme.

Estate Renewal Challenge Fund (ERCF)

Period: 1995-

Character: Transfer led

Objectives: Encourage transfer to ultimately ensure a reasonable standard for social housing by 2010.

Description: By 2003, after 15 years of transfer programmes, 143 local authorities had entered into 180 transfer agreements (74,000 dwellings transferred, 18% of total local authority stock (dropping to 70% of total social housing)). However, initially few agreements took place in disadvantaged areas. The poor quality of the stock in many areas would not generate sufficiently large capital receipt to clear debt and fund future investments. The ERCF provides a dowry to cover the negative value of the stock in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Tenants are empowered through a ballot process. After transfer tenant influence tends to be limited.

National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (NSNR)

Period: 1997/ 1998 -

Character: Area-based policy

Objectives: Prevent people from 'losing out' due to where they live (on ward level). Three ways: local interventions to identify linkages between employment, housing, education, crime, and health, rebuilding social capital through capacity building initiatives, and the encouragement of joined working such as better regional cooperation, local strategic partnerships and multi-departmental working structures

Description: The strategy is a reaction to the social and economic polarisation in the UK. The assumption is that previous efforts failed to focus on people, social capital, employment, the inadequacy of public services in some deprived areas, and failed to transfer best practices and look beyond the neighbourhood.

The New Deal for Communities (NDC) is the most important area based intervention, and it is a partnership-based and holistic approach to make up for the oversights of previous efforts. Furthermore, mainstream services are sought to be improved through two mechanisms: Treasury floor targets require departments and local partnerships to be evaluated on performance in most disadvantaged neighbourhoods; and a Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF) provides up to £20 million to 88 most deprived areas for any activity that fits the NSNR objectives.

Housing Market Renewal Fund (HMRF)

Period: 2002

Character: Area-based policy

Objectives: Tackling low demand in North and Midlands and create sustainable communities.

Description: The HMRF established 9 pathfinder areas in North and West Midlands which receive funds (£500 million for '05/'06) to tackle low demand at the housing market level (comprising

multiple neighbourhoods). This is to be done through strategic partnerships. The policy signifies how policies are becoming more regionalised.

3.2.1 Devolvment of power

Another trend in the UK is the devolvment of power from national level to lower levels and from central city to the local level, which slowly changes the institutional framework of neighbourhood regeneration. The government's 2006 local government white paper conveys the need to shift responsibilities and power from central government to local governments and communities:

It is about creating strong, prosperous communities and delivering better public services through a rebalancing of the relationship between central government, local government and local people (DCLG, 2006, p. 4).

The transfer of local authority housing stock to community housing associations is a clear example of devolvment and even absolvment of service delivery. On a higher policy level, the regions have taken over new responsibilities from central government. In the concluding section, the devolvment of power will be discussed in light of the cases.

3.2.2 Respect agenda

The respect agenda is a cross government drive to tackle anti-social behaviour (ASB) and nurture a culture of respect. Although a change of culture seems a universal goal, the policy drive is particularly focused on disadvantaged communities and neighbourhoods. In these areas, ASB is considered to be festering, and, moreover, preventing the regeneration of these neighbourhoods while creating the environment for more serious crime. In other words, the agenda is designed to combat negative neighbourhood effects and level the playing field. It was introduced by Tony Blair during the 2005 elections and since then it has spawned a Respect Task Force, which is responsible for delivering a Respect Action Plan that will help localities implement proper policies and programmes to combat ASB (see Respect Task Force, 2007b). ASB is a concept which covers a range of behaviour which can be considered to be harassing, disorderly, or annoying.

The term anti-social behaviour covers a wide range of selfish and unacceptable activity that can blight the quality of community life. Terms such as 'nuisance', 'disorder' and 'harassment' are also used to describe some of this behaviour (Respect Task Force, 2007b).

This definition is so encompassing that it includes serious crimes such as crack houses and drug dealing, but also fireworks mischief and youths launching around. Other examples of ASB include vandalism, graffiti and fly-posting; littering; people dumping rubbish and abandoned cars; aggressive behaviour of youths in shopping centres; rowdiness; begging and anti-social drinking; and reckless driving of mini-motorbikes. The problems can be subdivided in three categories: street problems, nuisance neighbours, and environmental crime. The reasons why ASB is so rampant in any place, is broken down in four categories:

- Parenting- Poor parenting skills, a weak parent/child relationship and a family history of problem behaviour.

- School- Truancy, exclusion and unchallenged bad behaviour.
- Community life - Living in deprived areas with disorder and neglect, lack of community spirit, living in areas with an already high-level of anti-social behaviour.
- Individual factors - Drug and alcohol abuse, alienation and early involvement in anti-social behaviour (Respect Task Force, 2007b).

In terms of policy the Respect Task Force employs three lines of strategy. Firstly, there is some mention of assisting those who are found guilty of ASB in terms of social assistance ('perpetrators'). The assistance includes support and parenting services for families, and the improvement of public service delivery. Secondly, some policy measures suggested by the Respect Task Force are repressive and enforcing in nature and aim to warn, punish or evict the perpetrators. Thirdly, the Respect programmes aim to "make local government, policing and housing more accountable to empower people to take control over their community" (Respect Task Force, 2007a). The empowerment of communities to tackle ASB even extends into the realm of criminal justice. Next to a range of improvements in policing and making proceedings more transparent, an important role is laid out for community justice, which means more interaction between prosecution and community, extending ASB co-ordinators to civil courts, and delivering community payback. Community payback refers to unpaid work within the community ordered by the court to make offenders visible and to promote "the engagement of local communities in selecting the work to be done by offenders" (Respect Task Force, 2006).

3.3 West Midlands region and Birmingham

In the next paragraphs we will look at the practices and institutional framework in the four post-war housing estates in Birmingham. However, because the metropolitan context matters as much as the national context, a short general overview of the metropolitan region will be given before going to the estates. The overview is mainly based on the excellent UK RESTATE reports (Hall et al., 2003; Hall et al., 2004, 2005b).

3.3.1 The Region

Birmingham is located adjacent to the Black Country in the West Midlands region, which has historically been dominated by manufacturing and engineering industries. However, deindustrialisation has had its impact on the region and the city. One impact is the steady decline of the region's population since the early 1970s. In the period 1971- 1991 the conurbations of the region (Birmingham and Sandwell) saw the worst decline (-12%), while some other municipalities saw a slight increase. This difference reflects the suburbanisation and the hollowing out of the old industrial districts of the conurbations.

The regional housing market has been divided in four housing market areas: central, south, north and west: The rural northern area suffers from low demand (particularly in the Stoke area). In the southern area, on the other hand, demand is high and affordability is a problem. The demand is created by people moving away from London and the South East of England. The difference between the northern and southern areas of the West Midlands region typifies the North-South divide within the UK. The western area is a more rural area with high demand, because of the size of the property. This area is not very much affected by the Birmingham market but more so by London, the South East and South West. People from these areas either move towards the area of buy second homes. The central area is more


diverse with affluent areas in Solihull and parts of Birmingham and less affluent areas in parts of the Black Country and East Birmingham and North Solihull. Due to the diversity, the central housing market area has been subdivided into three zones: West Central, East-Central, and North-Central. The East-Central Zone covers Birmingham and Coventry.

3.3.2 The City

Birmingham is the second city of the United Kingdom with a population of about one million. As mentioned, its population has been in decline since the deindustrialisation. However, the 2001 census showed an increase of population in Birmingham of 1%. The prediction is that the population will grow further in the coming years and the estimation is that the population crossed the one million barrier in 2005 (Birmingham City Council, 2006a; Office for National Statistics, 2007). Figure 3.2 shows the development of Birmingham's population. The increase may reflect the transformation of the city's economy and the city's aggressive City Living policy which has resulted in 8.000 extra housing units.

The rise of population can also be attributed to immigration from abroad and generally higher fertility rates among black and minority ethnic (BME) groups. Today, Birmingham is only second to London in terms of ethnic diversity and size of BME population. The 2001 survey indicated that almost 30 percent of the city's total population is non-white. Due to availability in the past and council housing eligibility, BME groups are concentrated in and around the centre of the city. Between the different BME groups, however, there are segregation patterns which mainly reflect economic situation. The Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups are least dispersed, while Afro-Caribbean groups also tend to cluster. The Indian population tends to be more dispersed and there is a greater representation in the more affluent outer areas of the city. The Chinese population is the most dispersed minority group as well as the most economically integrated. The segregation patterns have held up demand for older and obsolete housing. As a result, abandonment and vacancies have not been a problem in Birmingham.

Figure 3.2. The development of Birmingham's population (source: Birmingham City Council, 2006a; Office for National Statistics, 2007)



Economy

As mentioned already, Birmingham and the West Midlands region are characterised by their industrial past. The industrial activities were particularly focused on the automotive and engineering sectors. When deindustrialisation started in the early

1970s, the economy of the city changed drastically and moved away from manufacturing. In 2001, 17,4% of the city's work force was employed within the manufacturing sector (compared to 24.9% in 1991).

In the mid-1980s, the city responded to the negative effects of industrialisation on economic performance and employment by devising strategies to diversify the economy and make Birmingham the service and tourism centre for the region. Despite the efforts, the manufacturing sector remains a significant employer. Furthermore, in an effort to diversify the economy, the service sector has grown significantly in the last decade. The revitalisation of the city centre is part of a city-wide strategy to diversify the economic base of the city (see below).

Housing

Besides the inward migration of asylum seekers and international immigrants mentioned above, there are two other trends that affect the city's social geography: first is the continued outward migration of the economically active and more affluent households with children; second is the development of new housing markets in the city aimed at affluent households without children.

Neighbourhoods in Birmingham

The 2002 housing strategy identified nine housing market areas in Birmingham which fall in three categories:

- Peripheral areas with declining demand (Eastern, Southern, and Northern Peripheries). These areas are isolated in terms of (public) transport and are populated by an aging population. The housing stock is costly to maintain and not popular. The immediate concerns here are employment and transportation.
- Inner core areas in transition with complex and cross-tenure demand issues (East Birmingham and North West Birmingham). These areas suffer from low demand. In East Birmingham there are large concentrations of BME groups. Despite pockets of affluence, overcrowding and obsolescence are the main housing concerns in these areas.
- Sustainable markets with high demand (Northern suburbs, City Centre and Suburban Rings North and South). In these areas affordability is the major issue. The suburban rings are closer to the centre than the suburbs. They are flourishing areas with diverse population in terms of income, household size, ethnic diversity, and age structure. The City Centre is a developing housing market with a relatively young, affluent, and diverse population.

Our cases fall neatly within the categories. The first, Hodge Hill, is a mix of the first and second category, while the second case, the Central Estates, could be placed in the second as well as the third category thanks to recent regeneration efforts.

3.4 Housing market and regeneration policies in the West Midlands and Birmingham

3.4.1 Regional policies

The regeneration of the estates, and Hodge Hill in particular, is not only influenced by policies and measures originating from the local, city and national level, but also by strategising policy-making on the regional level. Regional authorities have become increasingly responsible for a number of policy fields, which include, among others, regional spatial planning and the development of the regional housing market and regional economy. The most important bodies responsible for these fields are the West Midlands Regional Assembly and the regional developmental agency, Advantage West Midlands.

3.4.2 West Midlands Regional Assembly (WMRA)

The WMRA is the result of a process of devolution of power, which was started in 1998. The 2002 government white paper "Your Region, Your Choice" opened up the possibility for fully elected regional assemblies. Currently, the members of the assembly are a combination of local authorities representatives (indirectly elected), business sector representatives, and other stakeholders (special interest groups). The WMRA is responsible for developing strategic visions and setting priorities that will improve the quality of life in the region. It does not develop these strategies alone, but in cooperation with other agencies, governmental bodies, private sector organisations, and interest groups across the region.

The regional housing strategy is developed under the supervision of the West Midlands Housing Board, a body within the WMRA organisation since February 2003, when the central government's plan for sustainable communities was introduced. In addition to setting up the board, a first strategy had to be developed within a short period of time. Due to the time constraints, the first strategy came out in July 2003 under the title 'towards a regional housing strategy'. In this period, the Regional Housing Board (RHB) functioned under the auspices of the Government Office for the West Midlands (GOWM), the primary central government representative body in the regions. The RHB also gave advice to the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG)¹⁶. Since September 2006, the RHB is fully integrated in the WMRA organisation and moreover, has been given full responsibility over the development of regional housing strategy and advice on funding allocations based on 'robust evidence'¹⁷. However, the regional development agency Advantage West Midlands (see below) and the GOWM are still involved in the process.

The most recent housing strategy was issued in 2005. In this strategy, the region was subdivided into four housing market areas: central, south, north, and west, which have been discussed above. The regional housing strategy is drawn up in consultation with the partners within the Regional Housing Partnership, i.e. government bodies, business sector, interest groups, etc., and thus it re-emphasizes the growth agenda of Birmingham. It also reflects the regional spatial planning

¹⁶ Actually back then it still was the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. The DCLG took over many of the responsibilities which fell under the ODPM when it came into being in May 2006.

¹⁷ Re: robust evidence; choice of words by senior regional advisor housing , WMRA

strategy which aims to curb urban sprawl. The strategy identifies the Decent Homes Standard and affordability as the two main challenges for the region. The strategy's title "Pathways of Choice" refers to the monotony in terms of type of tenure in urban areas. The aim it is to make urban areas more attractive for upwardly mobile households to keep them in the city. By building larger houses and more mixed tenure type houses for middle class households, the region hopes to build 'mixed and sustainable communities' in accordance with the city's strategy. The aim for improving social mixing is also present in the regional spatial planning strategy, where a step-by-step change has to make urban areas more attractive to live in and stop the outflow of people. Retaining the affluent within the city is meant to relieve pressure on transport systems (roads and trains) and, more importantly, on the rural areas (in an effort to halt urban sprawl). Another objective is to create sustainable communities in rural areas (i.e. the nurse and fireman can afford houses there). Therefore, the Regional Spatial Strategy (RSS) promotes the development of new housing in the rural areas that focuses on meeting the needs of local people. Thus, while the suburban localities should hold back on new owner-occupied properties to solve the problem of affordability, the aim for areas such as the East of Birmingham should be further diversification and housing regeneration to fight low demand by building for the affluent as well as by meeting the demands of the expanding BME population. Currently, some BME groups are concentrated in certain areas of the region and even the city. This is due to immigration histories and tenure preferences. The strategy aims to broaden the possibilities and choices of these groups. Many of the Eastern Birmingham housing estates do not suit the needs because of tenure or size of the housing. Another reason why certain BME groups do not venture out to the suburban areas is because of the unfriendly attitude of (lower class) white residents (see racial tensions below), and because of the lack of support networks, facilities, and amenities that are present in the inner-city neighbourhoods.

3.4.3 Advantage West Midlands

Apart from the WMRA, the regional development agency Advantage West Midlands (AWM) is also important for the regeneration of Hodge Hill, because it is located in one of their Regeneration Zones. AWM is a non-departmental governmental body, which was created by the central government in 1999. At this time, the belief was that the bulk of economic policy which was coming from Whitehall¹⁸ was insufficiently responsive to local and regional needs. Hence, nine regional development agencies were created across England, which would be more responsive to needs. As a regional development agency, AWM has additional responsibilities such as tourism, business support delivery, and rural development priorities.

AWM basically tries to encourage job creation, economic growth, and increase GDP for the region. AWM has drawn up an economic strategy in consultation with the West Midlands Regional Assembly, the local authorities, Learning and Skills Council, and other partners (see Advantage West Midlands, 2004). With this strategy, AWM seeks to create consensus among its partners in prioritising policies that will respond to economic opportunities and issues within the region. There are three drivers, or delivery mechanisms, for regional economic growth in the strategy in alignment with the regional spatial and housing strategies:

1. Promote economic activities that involve high technology with a geographic focus on main truck routes and the universities (link M5 with innovation from Birmingham University or science parks).

¹⁸ Central government in London

2. Business clusters; with 9 growth sectors identified across region (address issues of skill base, supply chains, business networks)
3. Regeneration zones; with 6 zones identified that are performing less well economically. We talk about deprivation, so we also employ social regeneration. One of those zones covers East Birmingham and North Solihull.

Since 2003, AWM has a rolling budget which increases yearly. Currently, the total budget is £ 300-315M budget per annum of which £18.3M is spent on the East Birmingham Regeneration Zone. Of the £18.3M about £16M is spent on capital funding (physical activities such as the purchase of furniture, buildings, (small-scale) infrastructure), while the remaining funds are spent on revenue funding (paying wages, buying support services).

3.4.4 The Regeneration Zone

The efforts within the Regeneration zone are guided by a three-year plan (total budget £55M). Oddly, the zone implementation programme was written after AWM had already allocated the funds. The plan was written up by a secretariat, which is a non-profit company funded by AWM, called East Birmingham/ North Solihull Regeneration Zone Limited. They coordinate the efforts. The regeneration plan, thus, represents the priorities (issues and opportunities) within the zone and may even be regarded as a sort of consensus document. There is no obligation to follow the plan, however. In addition, another obstacle for successful implementation is that the partners have statutory remit to deliver for different things on different scales. For instance, AWM has a remit to deliver on economic development, while the Council has to focus on housing and services. Also, the regeneration plan is cross-boundary, but Birmingham Council's responsibility stops at the border (no statutory obligation, no necessity). The regeneration plan looks to align those remits, but the issue is that there is no obligation to follow it. As Roger Allonby, partnership manager at AWM puts it:

Advantage West Midlands has never succeeded in completely aligning all the partners. The principle is sound, but the problem is that everyone has their own remit and focus. Everyone works on their own thing (with a common goal; improvement), which brings quite a lot bureaucracy.

If partners buy in, however, AWM has some leverage through funding, in case the plan is not respected in a programme.

With respect to the Regeneration Zones, a mixture of two complementary strategies is adopted: matching skills with demand, and education. The latter excludes post-school education, as the regional Learning and Skills Council (LSC) already handle this. However, AWM does cooperate with the LSC to fund courses that will retrain residents to increase their chances on the labour market. The effort also includes providing courses to get skills of immigrants recognised in the UK. For instance, Polish skills and degrees are often not recognised. The challenge, however, is to get people enrolled in the courses, which means that some of the social barriers have to be broken down. To make people more comfortable and improve attendance, AWM offers the courses within local community facilities. In addition, AWM provides funds to add value to the community, such as nurseries. The philosophy is also that once someone feels that he or she can succeed in education then it is more likely the person will continue in education.

The AWM also puts a lot of effort into the Ventureast project, which is the development of a 'leisure and learning quarter'. The project is still in an early stage, even without a lead private developer. The area would be a further extension of the

city centre into eastward direction. The new commercial quarter is planned next to an already existing business/ science park and Aston University, which will hopefully give some positive cluster effects. Furthermore, the expectation is that it will add 1.000 extra jobs to the city and will function as an economic driver for East Birmingham. However, the distance between the new business park and some of the problem estates in East Birmingham would still be between 2 and 8 kilometres. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the jobs will go to local residents. However, when the Bull Ring shopping centre in the city centre neared completion, AWM and the LSC set up a project to provide appropriate training to work as a shop assistant. The 'Bull Ring Hope' project resulted in that 3000 jobs, of the total of 6000, were filled by people from the Regeneration Zone. The high-skilled jobs in Ventureast are meant to be filled by the next BME generation and middle class newcomers, provided that there is proper housing in the vicinity, which ties in with the regional housing strategy.

The multitude of initiatives concerning training, skills and personal development, community regeneration, and business competitiveness are not led by AWM, but by relevant partnerships with the support of the regional development agency. The partners are typically the LSC, local authorities, Chamber/ Business Link, and voluntary organisations. There is not a spatial focus, but programmes are related as much as possible to major developments throughout East Birmingham.

3.5 City Policies

Birmingham Growth Agenda

The city of Birmingham in their attempt to bring in more (affluent) households has developed a growth agenda which aims to achieve an influx of new residents through:

- Urban Villages (See housing strategy), which refers to connecting the successful expansion of the city centre to neighbourhoods in the periphery, and create safe and sustainable communities,
- 'Urban Living' pathfinder project in the Northwest of Birmingham and Sandwell.
- City centre growth strategy,
- The development of local centres,
- Eastern Regeneration Zone, a project that involves the regional development office (Advantage West Midlands),
- Developments in South West Birmingham (a high tech corridor around the A38 motorway which includes health services and the University of Birmingham) (Birmingham City Council 2005).

City living

Since the early 1990s, the City of Birmingham has pursued a City Centre Strategy as part of the wider economic strategy to diversify and restructure the city's economy. The restructuring is meant to attract more service-based activities and invoke an urban renaissance. Instead of the empty 'concrete jungle' Birmingham has become in the post war decades, the city is to become a lively 24-hour city with amenities, cultural venues, and night life. Efforts included the branding of the city centre neighbourhoods (Jewellery Quarter, Chinese Quarter, Convention Quarter), the construction of the Bull Ring shopping centre, adjusting urban design to make the centre more pedestrian friendly, the construction of an international convention centre/ symphony hall. Furthermore, the housing strategy was adapted to add more

housing units to the centre's stock. In addition, the concept of City Living (housing in the city centre) is a component of the city centre strategy that focuses on the 'safe, attractive and mixed use of the city centre'¹⁹. The housing stock in the city centre used to be dominated by council housing stock. However, because this type of tenure does not appeal to the diverse range of people that are targeted by the strategy (households without children), different types of tenure and housing needed to be added. Hence, affordable policies were waived to encourage developers to construct new residential accommodations. Between 1995, when the first private developments were ready in Convention Quarters, and early 2006, 16,606 units are ready, under construction, or have received planning permission. This number exceeds the Birmingham Unitary Development Plan's (UDP) targets by 6 thousand. The developments are characterised by high density (800 dwellings per hectare) and by a dominance of 1 and 2 room apartments.

3.6 Hodge Hill

Hodge Hill is a ward in a peripheral location of the city. The ward features a local authority housing estate, which is called Bromford. It is located on the Eastern periphery of Birmingham, about 11 kilometres from the city centre. Hodge Hill refers to three entities within the administrative structure: district, ward, and neighbourhood. Firstly, there is the parliamentary district which consists of four wards; Washwood Heath, Bordesley Green, Shard End and Hodge Hill. The Hodge Hill district (also referred to as the Hodge Hill Constituency) used to be merely an electoral district for a member of parliament. However, recent administrative reforms have also made it a local governmental body (district committee). The four wards are the most basic electoral districts in the British system. Each ward contributes three councillors to the Birmingham City Council.

The Hodge Hill Constituency has a diverse signature and its neighbourhoods are characterised by the three stages of the city's outward expansion in the last hundred or so years. The western wards (Washwood Heath and Bordesley Green) belong to the unplanned inner ring, which was constructed during the late 19th and early 20th century. These neighbourhoods are mixed use with industrial developments alongside Victorian terraces. Nowadays, these areas are characterised by high concentrations of ethnic minorities, predominantly of Pakistani descent.²⁰ The average household sizes in these wards are above district and city levels. Furthermore, there is a large young population in these wards²¹. The second ring was developed in the interwar period, when legislative powers, subsidies and a new priority for council housing came together. The developments are characterised by planning, greater separation of industry and residence, and the growth of municipal housing estates. Next to the large share of council housing (approximately 50%), private housing was built for owner occupation. During this period, about 1300 dwellings were built in Hodge Hill in the so-called 'cottage style'. These dwellings were most popular among tenants who exercised their right-to-buy in the 1980s. The Bromford area and some of Hodge Hill, however, were built during a later stage of development, when 1400 dwellings were added to the area in the 1950s and 1500

¹⁹ From brochure 'City Living, Birmingham', date unknown, Birmingham City Council

²⁰ Highest concentration BME is in Saltley (87,2%), a neighbourhood in Washwood Heath (source: census 2001).

²¹ The 0-15 age group rates per neighbourhood range between 30,1% and 36% (in Saltley) in the two western wards (source: census 2001).

dwellings in the 1960s. Due to new construction techniques, the last phase resulted in mainly high-rise towers. The neighbourhoods in the eastern ward (Shard End) were developed after the war and are characterised by a more suburban and low-rise design with a lot of green spaces. In some areas in Shard End, there are considerable concentrations of elderly. Furthermore, the level of BME population is far below the city average. A stereotypical characterisation would be that the district becomes more suburban and more white in the outward eastern direction. As we can see in table 3.1, the Hodge Hill ward is a mixed area because it has diverse neighbourhoods.

The Hodge Hill neighbourhood is a fairly affluent area dominated by semi-detached housing. However, there are two other neighbourhoods in the ward, which are significantly less affluent; 'Ward End' and 'Bromford and Firs'. The latter especially is one of the most deprived areas in the district.²² The Bromford estate is a typical council housing estate built during the early post-war period to accommodate the growing manufacturing sector. In contrast to Hodge Hill, the physical design of Bromford is dominated by several towers which form the backbone of the area around which low-rise housing was built. The area features some modernist design principles ('towers in the park'), but also more traditional design in its terraced housing streets. The estate is built on a slope with a major motorway running past it and cutting it off on one side. The two different neighbourhoods make Hodge Hill ward a diverse area. Furthermore, the affluence of the Hodge Hill neighbourhood masks the deprivation in the Bromford area in the Ward statistics.

²² The RESTATE survey which showed very low resident satisfaction was conducted in this area.

Table 3.1. Assorted statistics on
Hodge Hill (Strategic Partnership
Hodge Hill, 2005)

	Hodge Hill Ward		Hodge Hill District	Birmingham	West Midlands	England & Wales	Source and year
	Bromford and Firs	Hodge Hill N'hood					
Population	7.052	10.365	102.647	977.087	5,3M	52M	2001 Census
% age 0-15	26,4	20,0	29,1	23,4	20,8	20,2	2001 Census
% age 16-64	59,6	61,5	57,5	62,0	63,2	63,9	2001 Census
% age 65+	14,0	18,5	13,3	14,5	16,0	16,0	2001 Census
% BME	13,1	15,8	46,0	29,6	11,3	9,1	2001 Census
Households	3.189	3.979	38.978	390.792	2,2M	21,7M	2001 Census
Average household size	2,21	2,60	2,79	2,50	2,45	2,40	2001 Census
% Owner occupied	44,0	85,2	56,8	60,5	69,6	68,9	2001 Census
% Social Rent	48,7	10,6	32,4	27,7	20,6	19,2	2001 Census
% Private rented	2,9	3,0	10,8	11,8	9,8	11,9	2001 Census
% Unknown Tenure	4,4	1,2	0	0	0	0	2001 Census
% Detached properties	3,2	9,5	6,2	11,0	23,8	22,8	2001 Census
% Semi-detached properties	24,1	75,6	33,5	34,9	37,7	31,6	2001 Census
% Terraced properties	26,1	7,4	41,5	31,3	23,9	26,0	2001 Census
% Flats/ Maisonettes	46,5	7,5	18,8	22,8	14,3	19,2	2001 Census
% council housing not up to DHS standard	59,1	74,0	76,4	67,6	-	-	BCC (2003)
% JSA Claimant *	7,8	2,3	7,1	5,5	3,0	2,3	NOMIS (2005)
% IS Claimant **	19,1	5,4	14,8	10,4	6,5	6,3	DWP (2004)
% IB/ SDA Claimant ***	13,4	13,5	11,3	9,2	7,5	7,3	DWP (2004)
Crime rate per 1000 population	146,1	69,9	111,8	121,7	-	-	BCC (2004/05)
* JSA= Jobseekers Allowance (Unemployment benefit) *** SDA = Severe Disablement Allowance, IB = ** IS = Income Support Incapacity Benefit							

Photo 3.1. The Bromford Estate's high rise blocks and terraced housing (right)



3.6.1 Perceived problems in Bromford/ Hodge Hill

The physical quality of the housing and the environment in the Bromford estate and some parts of Hodge Hill adjacent to it is conceived to be substandard, or 'non-decent'. Firstly, the public space in Bromford may be considered unclean. This is mainly related to the provision of services in the estates (see below). Secondly, the quality of most of the council housing in the ward is substandard according to the Decent Homes Standard (DHS), which was introduced after the 2000 government green paper 'Quality and Choice: A Decent Home for All' (see DHS standard in table 3.1). The council housing in Birmingham is generally in poor state. The prefabricated techniques and construction materials used in the 1950s and 1960s proved to be of low quality and have fallen in disrepair. Hence, major investments are required to get these dwellings up to (DHS) standard. Furthermore, there is a concern for the owner-occupied housing in Bromford which has been bought in the 1980s under the Right-to-Buy legislation by what is now an aging population. The question is who will be willing to buy the homes in spite of the unattractiveness of the area and the disrepair of some houses owing to the fact that not all households were able to afford proper maintenance.

As mentioned above, the wards in the Hodge Hill district bear different ethnic signatures. While the western wards have high concentrations of BME groups, especially Pakistani, the more suburban Shard End is predominantly white. Furthermore, the predominant BME group in Shard End is Black Caribbean. As said, the Hodge Hill ward is mixed. Ward's End resembles the western wards and Bromford is somewhat similar to Shard End. The Hodge Hill neighbourhood is a mix of the two types, yet it is more affluent. The diverse ethnic signatures, or spatial segregation, are generally not seen as a problem in itself. However, some respondents have indicated that there are racial tensions within the city²³ and across the neighbourhoods in the district. For instance, the right-wing British National Party garners a lot of support in Shard End. There have also been incidences of right-wing

²³ Birmingham has a history of racial riots, for instance in the Lozells area in West Birmingham in 2005.

harassments in Bromford. On the other hand, tensions also exist between BME groups. Respondents have also indicated that the cultural differences are becoming more important in policy. Community Cohesion policies are designed to deal with tensions (see below). The main problems associated with the segregation are related to the concentrations of poverty, the possible negative effects on schools and health care services, and the social barriers it may create. The last point is also expressed in housing market terms, in that the social barriers in place now prevent successful BME residents from moving to more suburban settings within the city. This means that, in the long run, the city risks losing affluent residents to the region.

While concentrations of BME groups are not seen as a problem, concentrations of poverty are. These areas are labelled as unsustainable or deprived communities. In urban areas they signify areas where people don't want to live and businesses do not want to locate due to low quality services and transport, crime, unemployment, 'anti-social behaviour', etc. The solution, as we shall see, also includes social mixing, i.e. bringing in more affluent households in the area. "It's about keeping people in and (for them to) spend money in local shops, sending their children to schools, (which is a big pull factor in the UK), and generate money in the community." The role model function of higher income groups is also beneficial for the neighbourhood and all its residents. Otherwise, as one respondent commented you can get situations where people "throw their dirty nappies (diapers) out of the window".

Some policy makers have commented that white low class households have become dependent on *the dole*, i.e. welfare benefits, which has made them and their children less pro-active and reluctant to seize opportunities offered by the public and private sector. This is in contrast to the view on immigrant groups such as the Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and, more recently, the Poles, who are seen as more ambitious and more prone to participate in projects or programmes that will increase their chances on the labour market.

The entire Eastern Birmingham area including Hodge Hill has been severely affected by the demise of manufacturing in the past decades. For instance, the closing of the Rover factory did not only cost the jobs of the 6000 or so factory employees but also affected the jobs of the 15000- 19000 jobs in the supply chains. Table 3.2 shows the change in employment structure between 1991 and 2001. The share of manufacturing jobs is in substantial decline, but nevertheless still significant. The expectation is that the manufacturing industry will continue to decline in the years ahead. The restructuring of Birmingham's economy and the diversification of the employment base is of extra importance in the east of the city, where a large share of the manufacturing activities and employees are located.

Table 3.2. Employment in Eastern Birmingham/ Eastern Corridor in %
(Hall *et al.*, 2003)

	1991	2001
Manufacturing	32,6	23,6
Business Services	11,5	13,4
Public Administration activities	19,8	26,3
Other Services	2,4	5,4
Other	33,7	31,3

Crime or fear thereof is also considered to be a problem in the Hodge Hill neighbourhoods. In additions to robberies, burglary, and car crime, anti-social behaviour (ASB) is also considered to be a blight on the neighbourhoods. The accent on ASB echoes the central government's respect agenda.

The problems are perhaps best characterised by comments made by policy makers at city level, who indicated that the Bromford estate has no place being where it is and no thus no future. The reason why the estate is even an unlikely candidate for large-scale restructuring like in the central estates is due to its

unfavourable location in terms of environmental quality (noise and pollution due to its position on a slope towards a motorway, and near power lines), transportation (far from the centre and far from public transport) and in economic terms (no employment nearby anymore due to deindustrialisation). Furthermore, the lower area is on a flood plane, which makes it hard to build new housing.

Photo 3.2. Housing in Bromford,
Hodge Hill



3.6.2 Policies in Hodge Hill

The Hodge Hill ward has not received any major restructuring funds in its history. However, several policy interventions and programmes have attempted to improve the situation and tackle one or more of the problems described above. The most significant intervention of the last decade was the attempt to transfer stock or management of social housing in the Hodge Hill district from local authorities to housing associations or Community Based Housing Associations (CBHO). Before discussing this process, we will shortly focus on some other activities in the ward based on the interviews (Hall *et al.* 2004) and the District Community Plan 2005/2006 (Hodge Hill District, 2005).

Employment and economic development

The policies that aim to tackle economic problems, such as unemployment, lack of employment opportunities, and the unskilled labour base, are heavily influenced by the regional development agency Advantage West Midlands (AWM). Although the AWM tends not to get involved in the residential areas ("postwar housing estates don't have immediate economic needs"), its East Birmingham North Solihull Regeneration Zone project does operate within the Eastern Corridor housing project. In this cooperation, AWM's interest is in industrial and economic development and

employment creation in the area. The AWM and the Zone strategy have a strong bias towards the physical and economic dimensions of regeneration.

The Hodge Hill District Community Plan cites the Regeneration Zone efforts as the sole source of investment and funding. The plan accordingly shares the goal of reducing unemployment compared to city average through improving physical access to the job markets and improving skills to improve residents' opportunities. However, the District also mentions that it has limited development opportunities. Nevertheless, employment is considered to be of key importance. The expectation is that economic regeneration will also positively improve the physical environment. The plan does not specify how this would come about. Furthermore, increasing employment will not only raise income level, but also improve health as well as the social life of the residents:

Increasing employment levels and access to employment opportunities will contribute to enhanced community cohesion (Hodge Hill District, 2005: p. 45)

The plan does not comment on the nature of the relationship between employment and community cohesion. Interviews suggest that the positive effect of employment on community cohesion relates to the negative effects of long term unemployment on individuals. The argument is similar to the Third Way stance described above, which proposes that through work individuals become moral citizens who take up their responsibilities vis-à-vis their community (see above).

Education and Skills

The Hodge Hill district recognises the level of education is behind on the city average. Therefore it helps schools to apply for central government funds. Furthermore, it is trying to secure funds from the city to build schools in its western wards which are continually over-subscribed.

One of the chief education policies from central government is the Sure Start programme, which provided funding for a Sure Start project at the Mirfield Centre in Lea Village (Shard End). The programme was designed to provide better services for young children and their parents. The main activities at Mirfield Centre are:

- Outreach and home visiting
- Support for families and parents
- Access to good quality play, learning and childcare experiences for children
- Primary care and health, including advice about child health and development
- Support for children and families with special needs, including access to specialised services

The Mirfield centre is also a site for health services, employment training programmes, and administrative offices.

Safety

Promoting Community Safety and addressing anti-social behaviour is one of the priority themes in the Hodge Hill District Community Plan. In the past 5 years a range of activities have been done to reduce crime, combat anti-social behaviour, and promote safety as well as feeling of safety. Most of the activities involved the West Midlands Police (Stechford Operational Command Unit), which has set up a community safety bureau to deal with Neighbourhood Watch schemes, schools, domestic violence, youth, intelligence, and crime.

Neighbourhoods Watch schemes are mainly supported by the police. It is up to local volunteers to manage and run the schemes. The Neighbourhood Watch is designed to encourage neighbourliness, encourage residents to look after each other's homes when they are out or away²⁴, encourage residents to report suspicious incidents to the police, and persuade the public to take security precautions and mark property.

In cooperation with the schools and the local authorities, the police also try to educate the youth about crime in the schools. At Hodge Hill School, officers worked with staff to educate, instruct about personal safety, and create understanding for the work of the police.

The Safer Neighbourhoods Project, which was started in 2002, is another significant initiative in the district. It was originally based on a partnership with City Council, West Midlands Police, and Crime Concern, and now also involves the District. The project covers areas of the Hodge Hill and Shard End wards. It has included several social and physical interventions in and adjustments of public space to make Hodge Hill a safer and more desirable place to live. The interventions are based on recommendations by the Hodge Hill Advisory Board which had consulted residents. They include:

- Improved street lightening,
- Improving youth facilities,
- Reducing crime and ASB,
- Dealing with traffic issues,
- Improving service on streets such as litter, pavement and verges,
- Using CCTV,
- Installing security gates.

The funds came from the government's Neighbourhoods Renewal Fund, which awards funds to projects that make visible improvements to service delivery and the environment. The fund was worth £ 883.000 between 2002 and 2005.

The police also play an important role in the 'fight' against anti-social behaviour together with social housing landlords and the local authorities. Besides sharing information and consultation a number of activities have been designed to tackle ASB at the root. These include:

- installing gates in alleyways,
- warning letters to parents when their children have been caught acting in an anti-social manner,
- joint visits by police and housing officers to anti-social tenants,
- acceptable behaviour contracts where youths undertake to act in a more responsible manner,
- support of projects to encourage use of local youth facilities,
- referrals of offenders to drug and crime rehabilitation projects,
- Anti Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) to reduce incidents and prevent offenders from acting in an anti-social manner.

Furthermore, residents are asked to keep diaries and report any ASB to the police.

For the future, the district in cooperation with the police, fire service, the residents, Housing Department, Street/ Environmental Warden, and the city's Development Directorate, plans to focus even more on ASB. In addition to ASB and improving existing services, the partnership will further focus on a range of new

²⁴ To the extent of taking in milk, pushing mail and papers through letterboxes, opening and drawing curtains.

services such as mobile CCTV, youth outreach workers, lamp-post signage, and home safety initiatives.

Health

To tackle health inequalities, the district has set up an extensive agenda with its partners. These partners include various health services, schools, and general practitioners to increase life expectancy, reduce teenage pregnancies, and improve elderly care. The lead partner is the Birmingham East & North Primary Care Trust, which is a statutory body, part of the National Health Service, responsible for delivering health care and health improvements to their local area.

Another programme is the 'Exercise on Prescription' scheme which started in 1994 and is still in operation with currently 3500 people per year joining in. The scheme is intended to encourage people to take up exercise. The partners are practice nurses of local leisure and health centres as well as general practitioners who can refer patients to the programme. After an introduction to the facilities, a fitting exercise programme is drawn up. Then, for the first 12 weeks, a Health and Fitness consultant is available to help, discuss progress, and compare results, as well as discuss future participation. Furthermore, a report is sent to the general practitioner. The scheme is meant for people aged between 15 and 74 who have got some of the risk factors which can lead to coronary heart disease. The factors include being overweight, high cholesterol, smoking, family history of heart disease, high blood pressure or a very stressful lifestyle (see Birmingham City Council, 2006b).

Partnerships/ residents

Many of the efforts described in these paragraphs involve the Local Strategic Partnership, which is a cooperative structure on district level. The most important partners are the police, the health services, the fire department, and one elected councillor from each of the four wards. The councillors bring in an extra political dimension to the work, because the delegated councillors may not share the affiliation of the city Council. The third sector (NGO's, voluntary work, etc.) is involved as well. Local businesses are involved in the lower scale neighbourhood management projects (shop trade). Big business is not involved, because it is unsure whether they would be committed enough. The option could be explored in the future, nonetheless. The partnership managed to draw up a community plan for 2006-2010, which is being implemented despite some difficulties.

Ideally, the partners should share budgets on certain projects. However, due to different governance arrangements, this has proven to be a challenge. Furthermore, the councillors have their political responsibility/ agenda. Different accountabilities, priorities and budget restrictions have all hindered cooperation. For instance, the Council is worried about ASB such as graffiti, but the police is less dedicated to fighting graffiti because they are not assessed for preventing graffiti. There are similar examples in health care delivery and crime prevention.

Physical environment: CBHO

We have already seen some physical dimension in crime prevention, counter-ASB, and safety efforts. However, these efforts do not tackle the problems with the poor quality of social housing. In the 1980s, most of the available funding for refurbishments and renovation were invested in council housing estates in or around the city centre.

To improve the conditions of the council housing stock in outlying estates, the decision was made to have tenants vote on a proposal to transfer all council

housing property to newly set-up housing associations, which would be owners and would handle management and refurbishment. The stock transfer can result in significant investments because the central government remits some of the debts and housing associations have more options to take out loans. Nine new housing associations were supposed to come into being in nine pre-identified housing market areas. These areas were based on common features, a series of neighbourhoods, and markets. However, in April 2002 the council tenants rejected the largest Large Scale Voluntary Transfer (LSVT) programme ever attempted in the UK. The tenants voted 3 to 1 against the Transfer, which meant that the city had to retain the 90,000 dwellings she owned and remain the largest landlord in England.²⁵ The reasons why the vote rejected the transfer are unclear, but it seems that there was insufficient trust in the new associations, which were not yet established.

Following the vote against LSVT, the Council in its 2002/ 2003 housing strategy redefined the housing market areas into the eleven constituency districts. Consequently, processes such as housing management are focused on a more local level than had previously been the case. This was part of the devolvement of services (see above). Furthermore, after the vote, the Independent Housing Commission was set up in May 2002 to look at the future of Birmingham's council housing and work out how services could be improved. The Commission, headed by Anne Power, produced a report in December 2002, entitled 'one size doesn't fit all' (see Independent Housing Commission, 2002). The report noted the need for custom approaches, outlined the need for reform of the Council's housing services, and, furthermore, recommended the establishment of Community Based Housing Organisations (CBHO) as a means to invest in the physical condition of the homes and improve housing management services. The Commission proposed the formation of 35 CBHOs to take on the landlord function after the small-scale transfer of about thirty percent of the stock. The CBHOs would mean a radical change in housing service delivery and it would be a vehicle for the devolvement of power and local autonomy as it enables housing services to be run at a local neighbourhood level with strong community participation. The CBHO would manage and maintain the housing stock and work with other organisations and departments to tackle wider issues. Furthermore, each CBHO would have a board of management, made up out of council nominees, independent support, and local residents (tenants, homeowners, and leaseholders).²⁶ To ensure community involvement, the recommendation was made that half of the board would consist of local residents.

However, the Commission coined the term CBHO as a generic term to cover many models of organisation that influence and/ or manage and/ or own properties. Furthermore, it failed to provide any specifics on how the CBHOs should be formed, how much power they should have, and the investment potential needed. This meant that the Council, who accepted the principles and outlined future, in many respects had to pave its own way. It had, however, already gained some experience with CBHO forms as they had already been present in the city before the Commission's report. The Optima Community Associations is one example. Furthermore, two pathfinder projects would provide valuable lessons and insights.

Thus, the next step for the Council was to go forward with establishing one or more CBHOs in the two pathfinder areas; Northfield and Hodge Hill. The Hodge Field area meant the constituency district without the Bordesley Green Ward, which at the time of establishment was not part of the district yet. The stock consists of 3000 council properties in Hodge Hill ward, 4400 in Shard End, and 2300 in

²⁵ Meanwhile, the council is losing 10,000 dwellings each year to demolition and transfer. Hardly any new council housing can be added to the stock due to regulations.

²⁶ Very similar to Optima, incidentally a good practice example cited in the Commission's report (Independent Housing Commission, 2002: p. 72-73).

Washwood Heath. The properties are mostly small inter-war terraced housing with some post-war housing in Hodge Hill (mainly Bromford).

The Hodge Hill pathfinder project started April 2003. Anthony Collins Solicitors (ASC) Consulting was chosen to work with the tenants as an Independent Tenants Advisor and set up a framework for the CBHO. There were two important questions which needed answering. These were:

- How many CBHOs would there be and how many would be needed?
- What form of CBHO would be adopted?

In June 2003, a tenant conference was held with all the known active tenants from the three wards. The conference signified the launch of the process. During that conference, four natural areas within Hodge Hill were identified by having tenants draw on a map. In addition, resident steering groups were set up, which were informal and temporary bodies, which would later become the resident boards. In the ensuing months, these resident groups were trained to have the communication and organisation capacity in order to function effectively as a representative body. Furthermore, they were informed about their CBHO options (see below) through workshops, and were helped in the process of receiving information from the council.


Secondly, to answer the two questions, there was a process of consultation. To get the tenants' priorities for their neighbourhood and homes in detail, tenants were asked in what way and how much control residents should have. The consultation process entailed more than 1000 interviews (both face-to-face and per post). This amount constitutes about ten percent of all council tenants. However, although the sample size was statistically valid, the local politicians deemed the percentage as insufficient because it is viewed from an electoral perspective (majority of tenants needed). As a consequence, the CBHO, named Our Hodge Hill, did not receive total support from local politicians (councillors and community leaders) and, moreover, was openly questioned as a legitimate body from the start. The final decision was: 'Let's go with what we got and leave the door open.' One type of CBHO was picked at that point, but the door was left open to progress and change towards another type.

The range options the tenants could choose from can be divided according to three types of management: participative, delegated, and transferred.²⁷ Figure 3.3 displays these types of management.

- *Participative Management*: CBHO would not take any legal responsibility for any housing issue, but rather form a formal participative relationship with the Council which would result in local people and local managers setting the priorities.
- *Delegated Management*: The CBHO would take responsibility for certain aspects of service delivery and management, including housing budget. Overall ownership would remain with Birmingham City Council.
- *Transferred Management*: Full responsibility for the management of Council properties will lie with the newly formed CBHO. Ownership will also be transferred to the resident led organisation.

²⁷ Technically, the tenants also had the option of doing nothing.

Figure 3.3. Options for Community Based Housing Organisations in Birmingham; the arrow signifies which way the Council originally intended to go (source: Birmingham City Council)



The initial decision was made to be a constituency-wide CBHO named 'Our Hodge Hill' with no formal agreements with the Council, which would work together with the Council and the local district housing manager in tackling housing issues. However, the community leaders (plus MP, councillors, key tenants) in Shard End entertained the view that full stock transfer was preferable, although that view didn't match the outcome of the consultation process in that area. As a consequence, Shard End had their own CBHO since 2003 which moved along faster and had more residents involved.

The Our Hodge Hill resident board consisted of nine council tenants but also three non-council residents and two independent members and set out to work in 2004. Since then until end 2006, Our Hodge Hill activities included excursions, debates, community days, a newsletter, and, most importantly, working together with the local housing team to tackle housing issues. Furthermore, there were subgroups that worked on different issues, such as environmental issues and anti-social behaviour.

In 2005, the central Government devised and implemented its Decent Homes Standard to improve the physical standard of housing in the UK. This meant, among other things, that an option appraisal (test of opinion) needed to be carried out among the council tenants about the desired way forward. The central Government under Labour strongly favoured the transfer of management or ownership, i.e. Arms Length Management Organisations, Private Finance Initiatives and partial Stock Transfer (see table 3.3). However, if the council can find sufficient funding from income out of rents, sales of land, and prudential borrowing to bring all its homes up to the Decent Homes Standard, then retention could also be an option in the appraisal. The test of opinion was completed in three stages ending in May 2006 and resulted in retention, which meant that the CHBO trajectory was becoming ever more difficult to maintain because tenants did not want the transfer, ALMOs, or PFI.

Table 3.3. Options for appraisal

1. Participative mgt.	2. MMT / delegated mgt.	3. Own/ transferred management
- Retention	Arms length Mgt. Org. (ALMO) Private Finance Initiative (PFI)	- Partial Stock Transfer (not all stock at once); investment option

The appraisal was treated as if it were a vote, although it was not set up to meet the requirements for a fair election process. Nevertheless, Hodge Hill's results were quite conclusive (+/- 90% of the tenants preferred retention). The Our Hodge Hill board voted for retention as well. However, Transferred Management Organisation (TMO) was not an option in the appraisal. TMO is one of the options in the CBHO model which in 2006 was being considered by the board to progress in partnership with the council (not out of spite towards the council), because it formalises relationships.

However, as of January 2007, the funding for the CBHO pathfinder stopped. The tenants still have the option of initiating a TMO process, but the council has been reluctant to stimulate or even mention this option. This is partly due to the options appraisal. However, already in 2004 after the council elections, the attitude towards CBHO and transfer of council stock changed. The CBHO was originally set up to pave the way towards ownership or management transfer. However, when the political majority in City Council shifted from Labour to a Liberal Democrat/ Conservative coalition, the Council's stance on transfer changed overnight. As a result, the council was already reluctant to facilitate any move towards transfer when the Our Hodge Hill board was fully installed.

Nevertheless, the cooperation with the local housing team went very well. The housing team appreciated their input on the basis of council information.²⁸ Furthermore, the CBHO provided important feedback and a degree of mutual accountability for the council, police, social services, etc.

However, despite the good working relationship, there were some frustrations within the board due to the restriction of content in the cooperation. Although the organisation had been set up for the sake of council property, the board adopted a wider neighbourhood focus from the start and a lot of the drive comes from the non-council tenants. It was their view that housing options alone would not solve many of the problems which came to the fore during the consultation process. Despite their insistence, there was no funding available to set up a neighbourhood forum or neighbourhood trust.

After the option appraisal, the Council definitely decided to go for a different approach. In December 2006, it launched the Constituency Tenants Groups. Eighty-six tenant volunteers met for the first time on 7 December 2006 to discuss how they would work with the council to drive through further improvements to local housing services. Constituency Tenant Groups are made up out of twelve city council tenant members. Members were selected through a large volume recruitment process called Accelerate, hosted by a recruitment company. The Constituency Tenant Group of Hodge Hill replaces the role of Our Hodge Hill. The 5 non-council members can choose to either dissolve Our Hodge Hill, or perhaps merge with the community empowerment network B:CEN, which participates in the strategic partnership. There is also possibility to keep it calling it Our Hodge Hill.

So for all intents and purposes, Our Hodge Hill and the CBHO project in Birmingham have ceased to function. However, the expectation is that the question

²⁸ Council would draw up reports with key statistics of the districts and thereby feed the CHBO information

of transfer will return again in the future, since the current situation is unsustainable as major investments for renewal, regeneration, and refurbishment are required in the outer council estates.

3.6.3 Conclusion Hodge Hill

Despite the richness and amount of projects and cooperative structures, many of the conceived problems in Hodge Hill keep lingering on. The interventions are insufficient to tackle poverty, and to bring the homes back up to standard. These require substantial investments. However, even major investments may not be enough. Some of the estates, like the Bromford estate, have structural problems which can be summarised by a comment made by one of the respondents: "that <estate> has no business being there anymore." Nevertheless, the CBHO in Hodge Hill has not led to the stock or management transfer it was originally set up to facilitate. It lacked both the political and public support at local and, later, at city level. So for all intents and purposes, the CBHO 'experiment' has ceased to exist. The Hodge Hill case will be further discussed in the concluding sections.

3.7 The Central Estates

The Central Estates consist of five post-war estates separated by several major roadways. The estates are:

- Lee Bank - the centrally located estate; before regeneration it featured predominantly high rise development with large unused open spaces.
- Five Ways - a private housing estate purchased by the Council in the late 1970s
- The Sentinels; two 36 storey blocks which are the tallest residential towers in the UK
- Benmore - high rise and maisonette developments surrounded by roadways.
- Woodview - a mix of flats and houses, all constructed according to 'non-traditional' methods.

The estates are located adjacent to the city centre and its recently renewed Convention Quarter, an area with significant city centre living developments, and the newly built shopping centre Bull Ring. Nevertheless, the major roadways which at some points can only be traversed by subways, or underpasses, have isolated the estates from the proximate city centre. Furthermore, while there are similar estates surrounding the centre, the Central Estates were neglected in the renewal efforts in and around the city centre since the 1980s. The neglect and isolation in combination with social problems (see below) culminated in residents' protests, and demands for due investments to be made. In 1998, a transfer of the local authority housing stock to the Optima Housing Association opened up the way for a major renewal programme of the estates.

Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show the housing types seven years before regeneration. As we can see, most of the dwellings within the estates were flats, roughly two thirds of which (63% of total stock) were located in 5 storey or higher blocks. Furthermore, table 6 shows the housing tenure before regeneration. The predominant tenure in the estates was council housing, as not many residents had exercised their Right-to-Buy, probably due to the poor living conditions. The regeneration plans required the demolition of 833 dwellings, which would make room for newly built flats and houses. Furthermore, extensive refurbishments were carried out (see below).

Table 3.4. Housing types in Birmingham and the Central Estates in %, 1991 (Source: Census 2001, Hall *et al.*, 2003)

	Birmingham	Central Estates
House	76,7	8,3
Flat (purpose built)	19,3	90,1
Flat (conversion)	2,9	1,5
Not self contained	1,0	0
Not permanent	0	0

Table 3.5 . Housing tenure in Birmingham and the Central Estates in %, 1991 (Source: Census 2001, Hall *et al.*, 2003)

	Birmingham	Central Estates
Owner Occupied	60,0	5,8
Private Rented	6,6	2,6
Housing Association	5,6	7,5
Local Authority	26,4	82,8
Other	1,3	1,2

The estates have always had a high turnover rate because of their unpopularity. This gave them in effect a transitory function, serving as a stepping stone to accommodation elsewhere in the city or beyond. However, in the first years after regeneration, the turn-over rates have been dropping steadily below city average.

The employment situation in the estates before the regeneration reflected the economic restructuring and deindustrialisation in Birmingham. The shift from manufacturing to services is also visible in the Central Estates. The proximity to the city centre facilitates this shift and offers the residents opportunities to find work near their homes. However, a resident from the estates is more likely to be employed in a lower wage employment compared to the city average. Furthermore, in 2002, the unemployment rate among Optima tenants was still above city average (17% compared to 7,9% Birmingham average).

The population of the estates was approximately 4560 in 2001. However, because the regeneration of the estates required households to leave their homes (with the possibility of returning), the figure today is most likely higher.²⁹ Table 3.6 shows the distribution of age groups in the Central Estate compared to the city average in 2001. Although the share of small children is lower than city average, there is a large share of the 16-24 age group in the estates.

Table 3.7 shows the ethnic composition of the central estates compared to the city average. Of particular note is the high proportion of black Caribbean and black African residents and the low proportion of Indian and Pakistani residents compared to the city average.

Table 3.6. Age groups in Birmingham and Central Estates in %, 2001 (Source: 2001 Census)

	Birmingham	Central Estates
0-15	23,4	15,8
16-24	13,6	18,9
25-44	28,3	31,7
45-59	15,8	14,6
60-74	11,9	12,7
75+	7,0	6,4
Total	100	100,0

²⁹ The figure itself is not entirely accurate either because the census output areas do not neatly cover the estates.

Table 3.7. Ethnicity in Birmingham and Central Estates in %, 1991 and 2001 (Source: 2001 Census, Hall *et al.*, 2003)

	Birmingham		Central Estates	
	1991	2001	1991	2001
White	78,4	72,7	65,9	65,3
Black Carribbean	4,6	4,9	19,1	18,6
Black African	0,3	0,6	0,8	3,1
Other Black	0,9	0,6	4,8	2,4
Indian	5,3	5,7	1,6	2,2
Pakistani	6,9	10,6	2,0	2,8
Bangladeshi	1,3	2,1	0,1	1,0
Other Asian	0,6	1,0	0,5	1,2
Chinese	0,3	0,5	0,7	1,7
Other	1,2	1,1	4,5	1,8

Thus, the Central Estates actually have two stories: pre-regeneration and post-regeneration. While writing this document, the regeneration was not yet complete so only limited claims can be made on the basis of (census) data with regard to the change. However, in the paragraph on policies and interventions the new situation is discussed further.

3.7.1 Perceived Problems

The Central Estates were built during the slum clearances after World War II in the 1950s and 1960s. After the influential Town and Country Planning act passed in 1948, the city designated five comprehensive development areas around the core of city centre, including the Central Estates. These areas were high-density Victorian neighbourhoods, which at the time were felt to be unhealthy and undesirable. Comprehensive clearances and new construction replaced the dense urban form with more open urban design. The Victorian terraces were replaced with residential tower blocks and housing in parkland, built according to 'non-traditional' methods. These methods included the use of prefabricated elements and the use of new materials. Although these methods were considered to be hi-tech then, they have failed to stand the test of time. The poor methods in combination with the lack of planned maintenance and investments meant that the physical quality of most of the stock reached alarmingly low levels in the 1990s. Also the tower-in-the-park layout of the estates posed several problems. The grassed areas were considered to be hazardous, particularly at night, and were not used by the residents. In addition, the ownership of the land and the responsibilities for management were unclear, which led to poor upkeep.

The physical quality of the stock in the estate was considered to be the most significant problem of the estates. To a large degree these have been dealt with in the regeneration effort. However, other types of problems have been present in the estates.

The amount of amenities in the estates has always been very limited. The Five Ways estate is located close to a shopping centre and a supermarket, but the other estates do not have close access. Recent developments, however, indicate that there will be a supermarket either within the Central Estates or very close by.

While unemployment has gone down since the transfer, we have already mentioned that the levels are above city average. In addition, the dependency on welfare is also above city average. These two phenomenons are related to the high share of social housing in the estates. Nevertheless, they are conceived to be problems worthy of Optima's continuing focus.

Crime and fear of crime had been a substantial problem before the regeneration and remains a concern today as well. Also, drug dealing has been a

problem and a cause for constant concern. The major roadways that cross through the estates make it a place for drug dealing as well as a notorious spot for car-jackings.

The lack of a second grade school within the estates is also seen as a problem by Optima. In the UK, schools constitute a major pull factor for neighbourhoods. Furthermore, the management of the Optima housing association believes that schools could be a key partner to tackle social problems in the estates.

Lastly, social isolation, especially among the elderly, is also an issue that Optima, in cooperation with the Council, is trying to deal with. As we shall read in the paragraph below, the Nash House project works to deal with this issue.

3.7.2 Intervention and regeneration

As mentioned, tackling the physical decay of the estates after decades of inactivity was the key driver behind the regeneration efforts. Furthermore, in a way, it was the Central Estates' turn to receive investments after the other inner city neighbourhoods had received investments in the years before. The regeneration effort, thus, focused mostly on the physical dimension. The programme meant a radical change in the appearance and the tenure structure of the area. An extensive programme focused on the demolition of 900 former council flats and the construction of 250 new social rented houses and 200 flats. Furthermore, new private houses and flats are being added to the estates to a total of 1200. A new urban park will form the centrepiece of the development. The new higher density housing replaces both the 1960s tower blocks and some of the parkland that surrounded them. The lay out of the estates has been adapted to enclose remaining parkland and thus designate them as private rather than public space. The regeneration also entailed the creation of a new community housing association, Optima, to deliver the programme and receive ownership of the council housing properties. The housing association is also responsible for implementing a social economic programme.

The regeneration effort is the result of a number of bids for funding. Part of the Benmore estate already benefited from Estate Action funding in the early 1990s. The funding was used for cosmetic physical improvement of some units. However, this was insufficient to address the main housing issues in the estate, or the evident social problems. The Lee Bank estate was expected to be next in line to receive EA funding when the scheme was terminated, which fuelled the residents' outcry. Direct action by the tenants and the continuing loss of face felt by the Council resulted in action in the form of a bid to the Central Government for Estate Renewal Challenge funds. The application was successful and a grant of £47 million over three years was awarded on the condition that ownership would be transferred from Birmingham City Council to a new registered social landlord. Optima Community Housing Association was created for this purpose with a board of 15 members, seven of whom are tenants, which is a larger proportion than what is typical within registered landlord boards. In July 1998, a ballot was held to approve or reject the transfer and the wider regeneration offer. The residents voted in favour and the stock was transferred to Optima in 1999 after a year-long process of consultation and negotiations.

As mentioned, the regeneration strategy is focused primarily on housing. The strategy has three key points:

- The refurbishment of the stock, limited to dwellings that are assessed to be in demand and that can be brought up to the Government's Decent Homes Standard;
- Rationalisation of the stock and reconfiguration of the estate layout to make the area work better in terms of demand for property and function of the estates;

- Tenure diversification to:
 - provide conditions to attract a wide range of residents to the estate and aid regeneration;
 - ensure that residents who live on the estates have a chance to realise their housing aspirations without moving away.

The strategy meant that residents will experience a considerable amount of disruption either because refurbishments were carried out while the residents remained in their dwelling or because they were expected to 'decant', i.e. move out, to temporary accommodations. Some of the tenants have left the estates but Optima housing association indicated that most have come back. Whether this displacement may be attributed to gentrification will be discussed below.

The regeneration is not only driven by the Birmingham Council and the Housing Associations, but also by private sector developers. Optima and the Council recognised the potential of the location near the city centre and entered into a development agreement with Crest Nicholson plc. to achieve tenure diversification within the estates. However, instead of transferring landownership to the developer, the Council and Optima only provided Crest Nicholson with a license to develop the land and thus retain ownership. Crest Nicholson have been provided with a license to develop property for sale at a guaranteed commercial return, but they are also engaged in constructing new properties for Optima to replace the social rented properties which have been demolished. Special care has been taken to make the different types of tenure indistinguishable from each other.³⁰ Furthermore, the tenure types sit side by side within the same street. The terms of the agreement ensured that profits made by the developer above a certain agreed minimum can be 'taxed' by Optima and the City Council to ensure that there is a useable return for regeneration purposes. The sales revenues were above expectation which created extra funds for the socio-economic programme. The involvement of Crest Nicholson and the City Living strategy are reflected in the rebranding of the Central Estates to Attwood Green. Also the Lee Bank estate has been renamed Park Central. Subdivisions in Park Central carry colourful names such as Manhattan, Tribeca, Midtown and Sunset Park.

Socio-economic Programme

The socio-economic programme was designed to run parallel to the extensive physical programme. The consultation process with the residents before the transfer resulted in a list of problems which were not only physical in nature. Furthermore, the idea is that the socio-economic programme will help to protect the investments. Previous experience in the Central Estates (Estate Action scheme) and elsewhere in the city showed that large-scale investments in the physical environment were practically nullified after several years of inactivity afterwards. Problems such as graffiti, crime, vandalism, and substandard service delivery would resurface. Hence, the strategy had to be more than 'brick and mortar'. The investment protection philosophy was not common among registered landlords or in many regeneration projects in the UK.

When Optima started out, £ 4.5 million were made available for the socio-economic programmes until 2008. After that, the programme will continue thanks to

³⁰ Although this is certainly true for the exteriors, there are subtle differences in the interior designs. Social housing resident committees that have provided input on the interior designs, commenting that the proposed open kitchens were not practical as the design would allow that (deep) frying odours to flood the living room. The design was adapted accordingly.

revenues from the private property sales which have been above expectation. Furthermore, the large sum of money also made it easier to get additional funds to the estates and so, through all sorts of bids, another £ 1.3 million was raised. The funds were allocated by Optima to several projects, some of which were managed by other organisations. Several agencies such as the employment advice centre and the youth centre were allocated funding to continue their work. However, after a review of the service level agreement, this stopped because these agencies became too dependent on Optima and underperformed as well. Some of their functions have now been taken over by Nash House, a community centre housed in an apartment, where people can come for support, education, or social activities. Its attendance is about one hundred visitors per week.

At the start of the socio-economic programme, the broad aims were to: reduce crime and the fear of crime, improve health and family support, combat youth disaffection, improve educational attainment levels, reduce unemployment and provide training opportunities, increase residents' capacity to have a say in their neighbourhood (capacity building), and use the arts as a tool for community development.

Crime and vandalism

As mentioned previously, crime was a major problem in the area. However, since the regeneration it has turned around. Several measures were taken to increase public surveillance and safety in the estates, such as demarcating the private space from the public and increase visibility. Furthermore, Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) surveillance was installed. For a term of five years, a dedicated police officer was assigned to the estates to increase safety.

Furthermore, Optima acts against vandalism and maintains standards of grounds maintenance. The philosophy is also referred to as the broken windows theory, which holds that when vandalism is left unattended, it will attract more vandalism, because poor environmental quality negatively impacts the attitudes and behaviour of the residents.

Another noteworthy scheme is the commissioning of the four neighbourhoods wardens who patrol the estates, do small chores such as cleaning up, and engage with the residents and schools. These wardens have been a success in creating awareness of problems. The funding for the wardens came from the neighbourhood renewal fund.

The change in crime is certainly also a result of the efforts described above. However, the head of regeneration admits that the change is also related to the change in tenure and demographic composition, and the relocation of some troublesome residents.

Health

The responsibility of a housing association to improve public health may be limited. Nevertheless, Optima have engaged in some projects such as a programme to prevent the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases (particularly among black African and Caribbean residents), which was a successful programme. Furthermore, one of the blocks has been furnished for elderly people to receive extra attention and have a common room (not sheltered living). A more indirect contribution is the reduction of dampness by improving the quality of housing.

Employment and education

The socio-economic programme has worked to get people employed but has only met with limited success. Crest Nicholson, the developer, for instance, was held to take

on several construction trainees. However, due to difficulties with subcontractors, five trainees from outside the estates work in construction. Optima itself, however, did hire several local people. In addition, there have been programmes to educate and teach new skills to workers in order to get employed (again). However, the head of regeneration comments that it takes time and confidence to get people working again, or having them increase their skill level. Results tend to come slow. Participation in the programme is generally not high. The assumption with Optima is that some people may have become too dependent on welfare and this dependency inhibits their motivations and willpower. It is through capacity building that Optima hopes to achieve success.

An additional difficulty is that there are no clear targets which can be measured. However, Margaret Weeks, who is employed by Birmingham City Council but whose time in the Estates is paid by Optima, does produce measurable results: through counselling residents, she brought in a total of £0.5M in unclaimed benefit to the estates. Furthermore, she gives an overview of debt in the estates through a credit union, which helps Optima's arrears department.

Youth

As mentioned above, the ER Mason youth centre was deemed ineffective and its funding was terminated. Furthermore, there are no secondary schools in the estates, which limits possibilities. There has been a reach-out to a secondary school close by to improve it, but cooperation has proved to be difficult because schools tend to work with longer timetables. Furthermore, before the regeneration, the high turnover rate also affected the schools. As they saw a lot of turnover as well, it was not a stable situation and frustrated long-term learning processes. The lower turnover rate today has solved this problem. Lastly, Optima organises activities in the park to entertain the children in the summer.

Art

Optima has engaged the Council and received subsidies to place art in the park. The art will add to the middle class aesthetics of the Park area, in line with the image of 'city living'.

Capacity building and governance

In the first years, six resident associations with about 10 members each were set up to engage Optima and other service providers to improve service delivery in the estates. Nowadays, most associations do not exist anymore after interest dwindled. The belief is that this is because people are more satisfied and there is not much to struggle for. Furthermore, Optima are looking for different ways to get resident input because the feeling is that these associations tend to get dominated by two or three individual residents. A resident research group is being trained now with the help of the University of Birmingham. These residents are unemployed and they receive their training without cost instead of payment, which would create benefit complications.

Photo 2.3. New housing in Park Central



3.7.3 Conclusion Central Estates

To a large degree the regeneration of the Central Estates may be considered to be a 'success story'. It has been successful in turning around several estates which faced serious problems. The physical regeneration has not only improved the buildings and dwellings but also changed the layout and tenure structure of the estates. The new layout is perceived to be friendlier and safer than the modernist blocks and parkland. A more important change is that the estates no longer have a transitory function but have become a place for homeowners and young professionals. The regeneration has not only improved conditions but has restructured the housing market, resulting in a different type of neighbourhood in terms of function as well as demographic composition. While more affluent households and home-owners have moved to the area, the social housing stock has decreased, which means that the area can accommodate less lower class households than before. Furthermore, the regeneration forced some people to move away. The question, then, is whether the regeneration has only displaced people and whether it resulted in a form of gentrification. The Optima chief executive argues:

Frankly, I do not see what is wrong with moving people and creating a mix to raise aspirations. Providing lower income households with high quality surroundings is a good thing. (...) it's quality for all.

Murie and Rowlands (2006) argue that while there may have been some form of gentrification as middle class households have had the opportunity to move in, there are winners in the working class as well, because the quality of housing has improved tremendously for social housing tenants.

Nevertheless, the success of the Central Estates should be mainly regarded as a physical success. The results of the regeneration are hard to determine when it comes to the socio-economic situation of its original residents. Only the residents that were able to remain or return may enjoy the benefits of the socio-economic programme and the improved services.

The improvement of service delivery and upkeep of the area may also be attributed to the work of Optima. The community housing association has taken up the responsibility over the area and has not been afraid to engage actors to improve the estates and hold them to account if necessary. Furthermore, Optima have been

keen on establishing partnerships with other organisations, developers, the council and, the residents. Besides the agreement with the private developers, relationships were formed to handle day-to-day repairs, cleaning & ground maintenance (excepting the park, but Optima believes that they can perform better than the Council), security, and the refurbishment programme. Furthermore, there is a clear working relationship with the police. The proactive attitude of the Optima management in combination with the available funds has helped them to 'protect the investments' and achieve a sustainable redevelopment of the estates.

The regeneration of the Central Estates cannot be seen without taking into account other initiatives in the city. Especially the expansion of the city centre and the City Living initiative indicate that the regeneration of the Central Estates falls within the City's agenda. Even though the Convention Quarter may not offer the lower skilled residents many opportunities, the proximity to these areas has resulted in private interest from Crest Nicholson and others. One respondent actually pointed to this market advantage and indicated that in combination with the funds and substantial commitment from the Council it is the pivotal factor of success: '...anyone who couldn't make <the regeneration of Central Estates> work, should be shot.'

Photo 2.4. The two Sentinel Tower blocks, which, according to anecdotal evidence, have attracted many of the Gay community because of their close proximity to the city centre.



Photo 2.5. The refurbished entrance of Clydesdale, one of the Sentinel Towers; after refurbishment the area around the towers has been fenced and a doorman was introduced to improve safety and services.



Photo 2.6. A refurbished social housing block in Lee Bank/ Park Central; notice the fences that enclose the grass surrounding the block, designating it as private space.



3.8 Regeneration in the UK

At the start of this work, the Third Way and its communitarian tendencies in social policy were discussed. These central government tendencies are also evident in the regeneration efforts, either in policies which mostly originate from central government, or in some of the attitudes of the respondents.

It is no surprise that the most apparent evidence for communitarianism is the community discourse, which is not being used uniformly, but always seems to tie in with the communitarian ideals. The importance of community is emphasised by the names of policies and policy documents such as New Deal for Communities, Community Cohesion Strategy, Safer and Stronger Community Fund, etc. It is also reflected in the names of involved organisations such as Optima Community Housing Association, Community Based Housing Organisation, and the central government's Department for Communities and Local Government. In addition to local and national policies, the regional strategies on housing and spatial planning also devote chapters to community issues.

However, a discourse is not only the use of words, but also the meaning behind the words. This meaning of the concept of community is diffuse, as it can also merely refer to the residents in a particular local administrative area. Nevertheless, there is certainly an element of morality involved when it is employed in relation to social mixing and anti-social behaviour.

A prominent social problem that has been reiterated by multiple respondents is the supposed negative influence of long-term welfare dependency. These people are not only conceived to be victims of macro-economic processes, but also conceived to be part of the problem. Their dependency is viewed as a pathological type of behaviour that is being enforced by their immediate environment (family and neighbourhood). 'Some people could work if they would put their minds to it.' Hence, concentrations of poverty are seen as undesirable, because they are not conceived to be 'strong communities'.

Social mixing is seen as a way to improve and balance communities. With social mixing policies the idea is to have different groups of residents within a neighbourhood through allocation or diversification of the housing stock in terms of type and tenure. The focus of policy is mainly on attracting or retaining middle class families in working class neighbourhoods. In the UK, the attraction of middle class households involves the construction of owner-occupied housing. The actual influx of middle class residents depends on housing market dynamics, i.e. whether the housing suits their needs and the investment is deemed to be safe.

Since the goal of social mixing is related to building communities, the presumption seems to be that the middle class and working class would have some sort of social contact. The presence of a middle class in a working class area would raise the spending power in an area and thus attract businesses and improve local economy. In addition, social mix strategies would avoid stigmatisation. Most importantly, the middle class can function as a role model and take leadership. This would benefit lower class residents as they have something to aspire to and are discouraged from pathological behaviour, such as welfare dependency and anti-social behaviour (ASB). As described above, anti-social behaviour is also targeted by the policy in the Respect agenda. The concern for ASB is often cited as a problem of an area and is targeted by local community cohesion strategies.

Within the community discourse there is a strong plea for empowerment of communities. The Department for Communities and Local Government has been active through its policies and its 2006 'Strong and Prosperous Communities' white

paper to achieve this through devolvement of power and service delivery. As mentioned, in 2002 the Labour city council initiated a city strategy for devolvement and localisation, which meant that political power and service delivery were going to be transferred to the city's constituency districts over a number of years. However, when the liberal conservative council came to power in 2004, the process was put on hold (under review) when the constituency committees had only undergone their initial first year devolution. Nevertheless, with the committees the devolution of decision making and service delivery is slowly progressing. Hence, we see a reterritorialisation of service delivery towards lower scales. This has also been evident in the transfer of local authority housing to local housing associations or individuals. Even though it has been pursued by central government since the Conservative government, first through the right-to-buy legislation and later through Large Scale Voluntary Transfer (LSVT) policies, the Labour government continued to pursue transfer. However, this government chose not to force the issue without tenant consent. Hence, it has been supporting the creation of Community Based Housing Organisations. In this case it seems that the community discourse has been added to and subsequently changed the process of stock transfer.

However, in spite of policy discourses, respondents admit that resident participation is often difficult and not easy to achieve. Even the resident boards of Optima were harder to fill after most of the important decisions were taken. The participation in Hodge Hill has been even more problematic, because even though frameworks were constructed, there are no funds available for major projects. As one respondent puts it:

Residents have seen a lot of initiatives, plans, programmes, etc. pass by but (in Bromford) they often do not materialize or take too long.

Compared to other European cases, the question of segregation and integration in the UK has been mostly absent in most policy documents. Even though the UK has had a long history of immigration, it was only recently that integration and segregation entered the public debate. This debate was more or less ignited with an editorial in the Times in September 2005 by Trevor Philips, the chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality. Philips' editorial, titled 'sleepwalking into segregation', postulated that ethnic ghettos were slowly developing in British Cities. Furthermore, he advocates integration of immigrants in terms of social interaction, equality, and participation (see Philips, 2005). However, despite the recent public debate, integration has not been mentioned by any of the respondents or in any policy document as a goal in neighbourhood regeneration. The district committee of Hodge Hill, which features some wards with high concentrations of BME groups, only mentions peaceful coexistence as a goal in relation to racial tensions. Segregation mainly refers to spatial segregation of socio-economic groups, which leads to weak communities.

Furthermore, in regional and city strategic policy in Birmingham, BME groups are catered for in terms of housing and considered to be the future of the city's labour supply base. East Birmingham in particular is seen as an area where there are opportunities to reverse suburbanisation of the middle class by making it attractive for the next generation of BME households, which are expected to be more successful and have climbed the social ladder and will be looking for housing close to their old neighbourhoods.

Finally, it has to be mentioned that regeneration in the UK is shifting more from public sector driven affair with a 'bricks and mortar' mentality to a multi-actor process with wider socio-economic considerations. Both in Hodge Hill and Central Estates as well as on the regional level we have seen the tendency to involve volunteer organisations, residents, private developers, small businesses, etc. to

regenerate an area in an integrated fashion. In some cases these partnerships are formalised in contracts or service agreements. Respondents have indicated that these are preferable because they reduce the risk of unclearness over responsibilities and ineffectiveness due to different remits.

3.9 Conclusion

Two cases in the same institutional context, yet their outcomes differ in terms of residential satisfaction, service delivery, and environmental quality. This difference can thus not be explained by the comments made in the preceding paragraph.

The most obvious difference is the absence of any large-scale restructuring in Hodge Hill. Nevertheless, it was attempted through creating CBHOs, which has met only with limited success. The Hodge Hill CBHO has succeeded in engaging the Council and providing input for service delivery improvement. Yet, its original purpose was not fulfilled after a two-year run. It seems that its consulting function will be continued in the new Constituency Tenants Groups, but the transfer of stock is no longer encouraged by the Birmingham City Council due to the political shift in 2004 and lack of popular support.

The regeneration of the Central Estates on the other hand had some advantages. The most important advantage is undoubtedly the extensive funding for regeneration, which has created possibilities. However, it is too simple to state that the availability of funds is sufficient to explain the success of Central Estates and the situation in Hodge Hill. Nor does it explain why the Hodge Hill administration did not file a bid for government funds like Central Estates has done. Their issues were quite similar. Thus, there are other factors in the context that have to be mentioned to get a complete picture.

First, even though Birmingham City Council is the responsible for many services in Hodge Hill as well as the Central Estates, there is a difference in delivery and delivery mechanisms. Birmingham City Council is a large and heterogeneous governmental entity, which can be described as top heavy. Furthermore, one Council respondent commented that while on a higher level the Council employs skilled and creative professionals, some of the lower level administrators and policy makers are not equipped and prepared for radical change; "they are more concerned why things can't be changed instead how they *can* be changed." Furthermore, some departments within the Council have been known to pass the buck on issues like failing services, cleaning, repairs, etc. This organisational framework does not only result in ineffective service delivery, but also impedes the materialisation of regeneration efforts. The local strategic partnership in Hodge Hill are a way to coordinate service delivery and small-scale regeneration better and to agree upon which organisation should be held responsible. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the differences in remits, target areas, and objectives among the different actors sometimes hinder successful cooperation.

The situation in Central Estates is different both in regeneration and in service delivery. The regeneration of the Central Estates enjoyed the full support of the City Planning office and had several employees working on it. The Planning Office agreed that such a focused effort on their part cannot be replicated for every problem area in Birmingham. However, it has to be mentioned that, thanks to the lessons learned in the Central Estates, a similar regeneration effort may not need the same amount of work. After the successful bid, responsibility for service delivery has been largely transferred to Optima while a good working relationship was maintained with the City Council. Optima has proven to take their responsibility and, furthermore, it does not shy away from addressing issues outside their sphere nor to engage other

actors to find solutions. This could be described as a holistic approach. For instance, Optima has taken steps to prevent and remove graffiti in the park, even though it falls outside their official responsibility since the park is owned and maintained by the Council. In addition to the Council, Optima have good working relationships with the health services, private developers, and the police.

The Hodge Hill area lacks a leading entity that is willing and able to take responsibility and venture outside its own remits and responsibilities. The district committee is the prime local actor there. Despite its hard work, it has two disadvantages compared to Optima: the funds, autonomy, and mandate to maneuver as freely as Optima; and the ground it has to cover is significantly greater than in Optima's case. The latter point relates to the scale of regeneration and service delivery. Optima manages less properties and takes responsibility over a smaller geographical area. This means that they can be more observant and responsive to problems, and run a lower risk of resources being spread too thin.

A second point that has already been hinted at above is the difference in personnel. While the City Council's lower level administrators and policy makers may not be prepared and trained for complex regeneration efforts or even changes in service delivery, the management of Optima is composed of dedicated professionals. For instance, its chief executive came over from the Council after working on the original bid. The professional and dedicated managerial staff has certainly contributed to the drive and success of the regeneration and the continued protection of the investments. However, it has to be mentioned that multiple professionals were involved in the CBHO project, albeit in a supportive role.

The third difference between Hodge Hill and Central Estates is the difference in market potential, which in the UK has become a pivotal condition for sustainability in housing and neighbourhood quality. The Central Estates' regeneration and continued ability to 'protect the investments' is thanks to the role of private developers and the sales of new owner-occupied dwellings, which went above expectations.³¹ Furthermore, the influx of middle class households into the private rented and owner-occupied dwellings is likely to change the demographic and socio-economic indicators of the area. The question however is whether, in addition to their improved living environment, the new mix will also improve the socio-economic situation of the lower class residents. Although the regeneration is too recent to answer this question, at least we can state that the stigma of living in the Central Estates is most likely less than before regeneration. On the other hand, in Bromford, the most deprived area in Hodge Hill, the market potential is very low. Its distance from the city centre and the proximity to the motorway renders it unsuitable for either 'city living' or suburban housing, like the Hodge Hill neighbourhood. Any large scale regeneration would probably have to be sustained by more public funds or loans than Central Estates' regeneration.

In addition to the differences between the two estates, the regional strategies to deal with neighbourhood regeneration and housing have to be mentioned here. The regional strategies for housing and regeneration have only been in use since a couple of years. Nevertheless, the regional housing, spatial and economic strategies show a lot of potential to guide and coordinate future development and regeneration of neighbourhoods in the Birmingham conurbations and beyond. The analyses of the regional housing markets show two problems which are the result of the same phenomenon: the out migration of affluent in the city towards the suburbs. The outward migration reduces demand and housing market potentials and furthermore results in economically and perhaps socially deprived areas. Alternatively, the outward migration has resulted in suburbanisation, which

³¹ In March 2007, 11 of the 12 furnished 1 and 2 bedroom apartments in unfinished blocks were still available while the remaining 13 had already been reserved.

threatens both the countryside landscape (urban sprawl) as well as the affordability of housing for local residents. To solve both these problems, the strategies envision the gradual regeneration of former working class neighbourhoods and brownfields such as those in East Birmingham to provide suitable housing for middle class households. A successful tuning of policies and strategies may well balance migration and create 'healthy' markets for the next generation.

4 The Regeneration of Post-WWII Housing Estates in Barcelona

4.1 National context: Spanish welfare state

Spain has experienced a very different twentieth century than other Western European countries. Spain was governed by an authoritarian and conservative patriarchal regime established by General Franco after the Civil War in the 1930s. Although close to the Axis powers, Franco kept Spain out of the fighting in the Second World War. During the regime, economic growth was low and welfare was largely distributed among a ruling coalition which consisted of the military, the church, and conservative groups (Moreno, 2001). The country saw a transitional period towards a more open and liberal democratic form of government after the General's death in 1975. The transition was completed with the new constitution of 1978 and exemplified by the electoral victory of the socialist PSOE party in 1982. Furthermore, Spain renewed and strengthened the ties with the rest of Europe when it joined the European Community in 1986 together with Portugal.³²

Spain's historical background along with its value-systems and institutional peculiarities have produced a different type of social welfare state than its counterparts in North West Europe. Spain did not experience the golden age of economic growth along with social democratic welfare in the pre 1970s crises decades. While North West European countries were forced to reform and review their welfare state systems after the 1970s, Spain was able to increase its social expenditures and expand its welfare system. The result is a welfare system that incorporates elements from corporatist and social democratic 'continental' models as well as 'liberal' models (Moreno, 2000).

Moreno (2001) provides a concise historical account of the development of Spanish social policy from Francoism to democracy. The account will serve as the basis of the paragraphs below.

As mentioned above, the Franco regime was established after the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and consisted of a heterogeneous alliance of conservatives and fascist groups supported by the Catholic Church and the army. The 'social losers' of the Civil War were the working class, the peasantry in southern Spain, the republican and liberal middle-class factions, and some important political and cultural groups in Madrid as well as in Catalonia, the Basque country, and Galicia.

Francoism could best be described as a form of reactionary despotisms that deployed a selective political repression and violence to guarantee the process of capitalist accumulation (Flaquer, Giner and Moreno in Moreno, 2001). The ruling classes which drew closer to each other over time functioned as a distributional coalition, engaged in rent-seeking 'rather than in the general well-being of society and in the increase of collective welfare and prosperity.' Nevertheless, Francoism did engage in *obras sociales* (social works) in order to keep up the appearance of being concerned with social issues. The regime's social policy can be divided in three distinct periods:

1940 -1959

The first two decades of the regime was characterised by an attempt to achieve total autarchy. Social policy was largely neglected and oriented towards charity and

³² In 1970 a preferential treaty had already been signed between Spain and the European Economic Community (EEC).

beneficence, adhering to Catholic values. Catholic paternalism held that the worker was regarded as a unit of economic production and thus should receive social protection against risk. In turn, the worker should be diligent and obedient. Furthermore, the *obras sociales* were set up to "bring joy and bread to the Spanish families", and subsidies were introduced within social security to encourage women to remain at home and perform household and family duties. Further policies included the 1939 introduction of a Compulsory Insurance for Retirement and Invalidity (SOVI), a statutory sickness insurance in 1942, which was limited in duration regardless of the claimants health situation in order to 'encourage' the employee to go back to work. The health services were delivered by both the public and the private sector and generally very poor.

1959 -1967

In 1959 the Stabilisation Plan initiated the *desarrollismo* (economic 'developmentalism'), which marked a turning point in the progressive liberalisation of the economy. The plan cut public expenditures, permitted more foreign business involvement and resulted in economic growth. Under the influence of the *Opus Dei*³³ technocrats in Franco's government, French models of 'indicative planning' were adopted and labour regulations were relaxed somewhat.

In this period, the Catholics aimed to develop their own labour union movement to support a dominant Christian Democratic party after the demise of Franco. However, some Catholic youth organisations radicalised and cooperated with Marxist groups in opposing the Franco regime. Radical Catholics reinterpreted the social doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church according to egalitarian principles, and opposed the huge class disparities. Many Catholic activists would later continue their opposition in left-wing groups.

In 1967, the universalistic Basic Law of Social Security came into effect along with timid fiscal reform. Furthermore, a neo-Keynesian transition (within the bounds of authoritarianism) from an agrarian society to a fully industrialised one met with some success and consequently modified the occupational structure of the country. The industrialisation process, which came relatively late, initiated a process of modernisation and, more important, urbanisation. The rapid influx of workers from the countryside resulted in a construction boom of new high rise apartment blocks on the periphery of Spanish cities (Gormsen and Klein, 1986).

1967- 1975

From the late 1960s until Franco's death in 1975, opposition to the regime became very active and a period of social turmoil paved the way for the transition to democracy. However, other events in this decade contributed to a climate of social consensus for peaceful transition. These were the implementation of the General Education Law in 1970 and the General Law of Social Security in 1974, which increased public expenditure significantly. In addition to these laws, wage levels increased substantially between 1974 and 1976. After the 1970s, most of the social expenditure was devoted to retirement pensions and unemployment benefits.

Transition to democracy and beyond

In the transitional period after the death of Franco (1975-1978), a series of agreements among the social and economic stakeholders inaugurated a mode of democratic corporatism that contrasted with the previous non-democratic despotic

³³ Organisation within the Roman Catholic Church that propagates that work, family life, and other ordinary activities are occasions for spiritual union with Jesus Christ (Opus Dei website). It was founded in Spain in 1928 by the Roman Catholic priest Josemaría Escrivá, and grew into an international organisation under the Franco regime.

mode of corporatism. After the democratic elections of 1977, the main political parties agreed to establish a policy of mutual restraint between employers, labour unions, and governments to consolidate democracy. The actors involved accepted to avoid strikes and restrain wages to achieve social peace. These agreements and pacts were crucial in avoiding a successful military *coup d'état* and in establishing democratic government in Spain.

The years after the establishment of democratic government were marked by the steady expansion of the welfare state system. The first government established the General Directorate for Social Action and Social Services within the Ministry of Health and Social Security. This body took over the responsibilities of social assistance and public charities from other ministries. It ran social assistance programmes with benefits that covered old age and disability pensions. In parallel, municipal and regional authorities continued running their own social assistance programmes, which were often the inheritors of traditional public charities and beneficence. Furthermore, private institutions, often Roman Catholic Church organisations, also continued to provide charitable donations and some services. However, Spanish worker organisations began to call for a reform of the social services delivery framework.

Between 1980-82 the centre-right government initiated a process of economic rationalisation. This meant a moderation in wage increases, the start of restructuring unproductive industries, and a containment of the level of social spending. However, the next government in power was formed by the socialist PSOE party, which remained in power until 1996. The PSOE expanded the welfare system while modernising the Spanish economy. The PSOE, however, did not implement policies according to typical neo-keynesian social democratic principles. The shortcomings of demand-side policies of the French Socialists were recognised by the 'social liberals', who took the initiative in economic policy-making. Hence, they initiated a tough policy of restructuring and liberalisation of the unproductive industries from the Franco years.

From 1988, social spending was increased and social services were expanded when the Ministry of Social Affairs was established to develop social policies and public welfare intervention. The new ministry aimed to work with the regional meso-governments (Comunidades Autónomas), which through decentralisation held a great deal of governmental capacity and power in the field of social policy. The ministry developed General Plans with the regional authorities, which were basically agreements to improve welfare provision. Previous attempts by the PSOE government to pass a National Social Services Act, which would have integrated social service provision into a centrally managed framework, failed because regions were reluctant to give up their role as within the welfare system. The most important agreement was the 'Concerted Plan for the Development of the Basic Provision of Social Services by the Local Authorities'. The agreement was intended to establish administrative cooperation between the municipal, regional and central governments to effectively provide information and counselling, social and day care services for the disabled and elderly, refuges for abused women, single mothers, orphans or mistreated minors, sheltered housing for the homeless, and services to prevent unemployment and aid labour market re-entry. A network of centres constitutes the basic level of primary provision in Spain. Furthermore, the agreement is supported and funded by all three layers of government in Spain (except Basque Country) and thus serves as a model of intergovernmental relations in the federalised politics in Spain.

After the 1996 general elections, the centre right Popular Party (PP) came to power with the support of regional nationalist parties in parliament. However, during their first term in power (1996-2000), attempts to cut social expenditure advocated by neo-liberals were blocked by a parliamentary coalition of interests. Furthermore,

the more centrist members of the PP cabinet were placed at the helm of social policy and welfare ministries. This ensured a continuation of the attitude of cooperation and negotiation between the social partners ('social dialogue') to preserve the social peace, which led to several agreements.

In 2000 the PP gained an absolute majority in the house of parliament. Nevertheless, the new Cabinet was inclined towards the political centre and favoured Third Way style social politics. Yet, liberalisation, deregularisation, and privatisation were advocated in economic policy.

Until 2002, economic performance was well above EU average. However, the 2002 global economic downturn also affected the Spain. Growth diminished and inflation and unemployment increased. In addition, crime rates increased and housing became increasingly unaffordable. An attempt to reform and restrict the unemployment benefit system failed due to a general strike.

In 2004, shortly after a major terrorist attack in Madrid, the socialist PSOE won the general elections and formed a new government. The government established a new Ministry of Housing to increase accessibility and affordability of housing after a period rising housing prices. Furthermore, the government implemented the legalisation of same-sex marriage, the revision of religion in the education system, and a modification of the financing scheme of the Roman Catholic Church. These recent legislations represent a significant break with the traditionally strong position of the Roman Catholic Church and traditional values in Spanish politics.

It is important to note that the Spanish welfare state is still building up. Traditionally, there is a strong emphasis on the role of families within a predominantly liberal framework. As we shall see, welfare provisions such as education, housing, and health care are not only the responsibility of the central state but also of the Autonomous Communities (regional governments) after decentralisation according to the 1978 constitution and subsequent reforms took place.

4.2 Housing Policy in Spain

In 1985 much of the housing policy has been decentralised and many responsibilities were transferred to the autonomous communities (regions) and local municipalities. This has left the central government with several responsibilities (Pareja Eastaway & San Martín in Pareja Eastaway *et al.*, 2004):

- Coordination of housing as an economic sector subject to general economic planning ;
- Planning and distribution through credit;
- Housing taxation through income taxes;
- Preparation and approval of financial framework for housing policies.

However, the central level still has an impact on social housing with its subsidised housing legislation. This will be discussed below.

Social housing: VPO

The Spanish tenure structure is dominated by owner occupied housing (81% in 2001). While 11% of the housing stock is rented, this is mainly private sector rental. The remaining 8% is classified as 'other' (Van Boxmeer and Van Beckhoven, 2005). Thus, the public or social rented sector is virtually non-existent. However, to aid weaker households in their housing needs, Spanish housing policy has developed an

instrument within the owner-occupied sector. This instrument is the Officially Protected Dwellings (VPO, *Vivienda de Protección Oficial*).

The VPO has become an important element of Spanish housing policy which traditionally encourages ownership. The VPO features subsidies for demand (households) as well as supply (developers, in the form of 'bricks and mortar' subsidies). The dwellings under the VPO regime are publicly owned dwellings with a postponed ownership. For about 25 or 30 years the occupants pay a relatively small amount of money each month. After this period, ownership is transferred to the owner and the dwelling itself is free market. Strictly speaking VPO is not confined to owner-occupied dwellings, but in practice most are. To obtain VPO housing, a household's income must be below 5.5 times the inter-professional minimum wage. This means that also middle income households are eligible for VPO. Large families can even earn more. The housing programme of 2002-2005 also provided financial support for households earning less than 1.5 times the minimum wage.

The prices of the VPO are determined by the central government (€ 629.77 per m² in 2004), but regional governments can determine a higher price at a maximum of 1.54 the standard price. This may be even higher in Madrid and Barcelona (Pareja Eastaway and San Martín, 1999; Pareja Eastaway *et al.*, 2004).

In the Catalan case, VPO dwellings play an important role in the physical regeneration of housing estates. In our two cases, many dwellings that are being replaced by new structures fall under the VPO regime. Their occupants can obtain new dwellings in new VPO arrangement. These arrangements will be described in more detail in our two case descriptions.

4.2.1 Regional housing and neighbourhood policies

Thus, for over two decades, the autonomous regions of Spain have received most of the responsibilities for housing as well as for urban and neighbourhood policies. In Catalonia this means that the *Generalitat de Catalunya*, the Catalan regional government, is a leading actor. The *Generalitat* consists of a President, a parliament and an executive body consisting of multiple departments. The Catalan Autonomous Community is responsible for (Castells in Pareja Eastaway *et al.*, 2004):

- Forestry, agriculture, livestock, and fishery in international waters
- Channels
- Environment and pollution
- Monumental patrimony within the region
- Organisation of institutions of self-government
- Internal commercial fairs, sports promotion and tourism
- Ports and airports
- Roads
- Urbanism and housing
- Education, management on all levels
- Health, management on all levels

In terms of housing and urbanism, the Catalan regional government's responsibilities cover (Pareja Eastaway & San Martín in Pareja Eastaway *et al.*, 2004):

- regional planning, control and pursuit of housing policy
- setting and controlling rules and regulations at the regional level
- management of housing policy programme
- public development of housing, acquisition and management of public land
- signing agreements to develop public housing

The municipalities are charged with land planning, permission allowances, development of local housing, and management and control of municipal patrimonies of housing and land. This will be elaborated further in the next paragraph.

4.2.2 Physical Regeneration of 1960s housing estates

In the early 1990s, a fatal accident in a private development in El Turó de la Peira provoked a public outcry over the years of uncontrolled construction and poor quality housing. Especially the peripheral neighbourhoods built during the Franco dictatorship in the Fifties and Sixties lacked sufficient quality and solidity and thus began to reach the end of their lifespan. The need for large-scale interventions became apparent when 'concrete disease' was found in many of the buildings in the housing estates. In addition, the accident also sparked social protests about the status and living conditions in the peripheral neighbourhoods.

The Catalan regional government responded by setting up a Neighbourhood Remodelling Programme in the 1990s. While the previous philosophy was characterised by the term rehabilitation, meaning the renovation of buildings, the new programme sought to 'remodel' neighbourhoods. Remodelling means reshaping an urban area's buildings and public space following a predetermined model. In other words, remodelling entails the complete renovation of a neighbourhood whereby the existing buildings are demolished and replaced. During this process, special care is taken to maintain the social and economic fabric of the population. Residents remain in the neighbourhood during the remodelling process, which adds an extra layer of complexity to the process (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2006b). The emphasis on maintaining the social fabric is done to keep an area's identity and prevent residents from spreading out and losing their social contacts. The philosophy is that the loss of social contacts may lead to social disintegration, while neighbourhood regeneration that seeks to preserve the social fabric, while improving a neighbourhood, may also enhance integration within the neighbourhood and within the city.

The Neighbourhood Remodelling Programme also gave the opportunity to tackle other issues of the peripheral estates. Firstly, compared to current standards, the dwellings were very small (30 m²), and thus failed to comply with demand. In addition, many multi-storey buildings lack lifts and feature communal galleries, which are poorly maintained. Furthermore, the *Generalitat* considers the position and location of the estates within the conurbation to be a problem as well. The estates were constructed outside the existing built environment up against the mountains or faraway along the coast. This meant that the estates were isolated from the rest of the city. Apart from the physical isolation, the estates differed from the rest of the city in terms of architecture and urban design and their lack of amenities. The remodelling programme seeks to integrate the peripheral neighbourhoods with the rest of the city by improving infrastructure and public transport between the neighbourhoods and the rest of the city. In addition, integration must come from the provision of social services and amenities, as well as altering the urban landscape in order to make the peripheral areas resemble the rest of the city. The alterations often entail the improvement of infrastructure which was originally laid out unplanned.

The remodelling of estates is thought to have positive external effects as well. The expectation is that the renewal of urban space and buildings reinvigorates the interest and pride of residents in their own house as well as in their own neighbourhood. This will result in residents taking better care of their gardens, the communal spaces, and their property.³⁴


The Programme is implemented within a framework of dual agreements. Firstly, there is an overall agreement with the between the *Generalitat* and the

³⁴ This reasoning is reminiscent of the 'broken windows' theory.

Spanish Ministry of Public Works, later with the new Ministry of Housing. The *Generalitat* takes responsibility for 50% or 60%, depending on the case, of the investments in land and construction, while the Ministry takes the remaining 50% or 40%. In addition, the *Generalitat* takes the financial risk and has the responsibility over the management. It is, however, possible for the regional government to delegate management to another organisation. Secondly, there is a range of agreements between the *Generalitat* and the local municipalities. These agreements vary, but the municipality has the responsibility for planning and investment in urban development, and it has to provide the land and housing which it owns, for remodelling (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2006b).

Figure 4.1 represents the typical organisational structure of a remodelling project under the auspices of the *Generalitat*, which involves the development of social housing. The Secretariat for Housing is the responsible department for social housing. This department oversees two important semi-public organisations that play a crucial role in all developments. First is the Catalan Land Institute, INCASOL, which receives the public land from the municipality and develops it according to an urban plan which typically involves the municipality and some degree of residential input. INCASOL is also responsible for designating and altering zoning plans. ADIGSA typically manages the transfer of ownerships, the VPO arrangements, and social housing in general. After the developments are completed, INCASOL transfers the VPO dwellings to ADIGSA which handles the allocation and administration during their lifetime as VPO dwellings.

Figure 4.1. Regional organisational structure of development of social housing



Finally, as mentioned previously, the framework also includes residents, which are involved and consulted in various ways. An important method to involve residents has been the Community Development Plan (see below). Our two cases are both subject of the programme, albeit in different ways. The precise organisational structure of the regeneration in the two cases will be discussed in greater detail below.

4.2.3 Pla de Desenvolupament Comunitari

Community Development Plans (CDP, *Pla de Desenvolupament Comunitari*) are an instrument established by the department of Welfare and Family of the Catalan government and form an important aspect of the philosophy and strategy of neighbourhood regeneration in Catalonia. Implementation of programmes is done at

the neighbourhood level because it offers the best possibilities for organised and individual participation. In short, the CDP aims to transform the social, physical, and economic structure with the community as the leading actor (Pareja Eastaway *et al.*, 2004).

The policy came forth out of the Integral Policy against Poverty and Social Exclusion, which was approved by the regional government in 1995. Based on this integral policy, and in cooperation with the department of plans and programmes, the regional government developed a philosophy and courses of action. The philosophy is based on these elements:

- The need to respond to perceived problems of social exclusion and improve coordination of interventions;
- The level of intervention should be the neighbourhood to create opportunities and relationships between residents;
- An analysis of the social and economic problems, strengths and weaknesses, should be carried out to create a consensus between all social agents in the neighbourhood;
- Interventions should include integrated action from various policy fields; such as planning, economic development, cultural policies, and amenities;
- Public-private partnerships are an important instrument to facilitate participation of institutions and residents and to manage the regeneration efforts.

During the first years, many neighbourhood organisations applied for a CDP. The only criterion for acceptance is that the neighbourhood should make the need for it apparent. Nowadays, the use of Community Development Plans has lessened somewhat. As we shall see, Sant Roc's plan has been absorbed into a new framework whereby local and regional governments take the lead again. It is, however, still very relevant for Trinitat Nova.

The CDP is preferably led by locally rooted organisations such as neighbourhood associations, public services (health and education), and/ or local politicians. Partnerships between these actors are seen as the tool for management of the regeneration process. The neighbourhood organisations decide on the activities in the plan. The only activity which is imposed by the *Generalitat* is a neighbourhood diagnosis. The diagnosis is a way to map strengths and weaknesses and a vehicle for constructing a global vision and consensus to facilitate a cooperative and integrated regeneration effort (Marchioni in Pareja Eastaway *et al.* 2004).

4.2.4 Other regional urban and housing policies

After the instalment of the socialist Catalan government in 2004, affordable housing has been made a priority. Since 1980, 80.000 dwellings were built in Catalonia, of which 72.000 have been sold again. However, there are hardly any opportunities to build new social housing due to scarcity of land. Hence, the regional government was forced to think of new ways to provide housing for those in need. Several new policies were implemented:

Xarxa de Mediació Lloguer Social

The Network for Social Rent Mediation (*Xarxa de Mediació Lloguer Social*) was a policy instrument that was set up in 2005 to introduce some fair play in the rental market. The Network is set up to bring owners into contact with potential social renters. Furthermore, the Network acts as a surety for the renter for a period of 2 years. To reduce the risk of defaults on rent, the Network also ensures that the rent does not exceed 30% of the renter's income (in some cases 40%). To further entice owners,

there is a fund of € 6,000 available that owners can apply to in order to convert their property to make it suitable for rental. The Network is set up to function parallel to the regular rental market, which, since 2001, has become increasingly unaffordable for many. 6,400 dwellings have been offered for rent through the Network in Catalonia between 2005 and early 2007.

Ajut per Lloguer

Rental Assistance (*Ajut per Lloguer*) is a subsidy for households who experience difficulties in meeting rent. The subsidy covers the difference between the rent and 30% of the renter's income. The maximum allowance is € 240.- per month. 11,000 subsidies are issued in total. However, applications for subsidies exceed the limit.

Xarxa d'Habitatge d'Inclusió

The Network for Included Housing (*Xarxa d'Habitatge d'Inclusió*) is initiated by the *Generalitat de Catalunya*, but it is the responsibility of the *Fundació un Sol Mon*, a social fund from the *Caixa Catalunya* bank. The Network donates funds to encourage the establishment of supervised housing. The dwellings are meant to (temporarily) house a wide range of socially excluded groups that run the risk of finding no housing or of getting concentrated in the areas at the lower end of the housing market. These groups include troubled youth, families in distress, immigrants, homeless people, women suffering from domestic violence, single parent families, drug users, and people with psychological disorders.

The project has only recently started, yet 400 dwellings that can house 1,600 individuals have been made available for 80 social organisations to rent or purchase. About 75% of these dwellings are scattered in the metropolitan region of Barcelona. The *Generalitat* and the *Fundació un Sol Mon* each contribute €1200 per dwelling to these organisations. In addition, the organisations are eligible to apply for the € 6000 from the renovation fund (see *Xarxa de Mediaco Lloguer Social* paragraph) and *Caixa Catalunya* can also choose to add € 10,000 to each project.

In 2005, the *Generalitat* decided that with each new project under their supervision³⁵, five or six social dwellings are donated to the municipality. These dwellings are then meant to be sold or rented to the vulnerable groups. Only a limited number of dwellings have been transferred.

Projecte de Llei del Dret a l'Habitatge

At the time of data collection, the Law for Right to Housing (*Llei del Dret a l'Habitatge*, drafted in 2006) was in parliament for approval. If passed, the Law would be a milestone in the development of social housing in Catalonia. The law would entail new regulations that guarantee good quality housing and environmentally friendly construction. Furthermore, the Law prescribes that a share of new VPO housing will go to municipalities who have to rent them out to socially excluded groups in order to avoid concentrations of these groups. The exact share depends on negotiations between the *Generalitat* and the municipalities. This will not impact the housing market immediately but will have an effect in a decade when municipalities will have obtained a substantial stock. The stock will increase because the new law also prescribes that 30% of the dwellings in all new public developments must fall under the VPO regulation. Private developments are obliged to offer 30% of the new dwellings for rent at reasonable prices. These dwellings will be distributed by lottery. Another measure would be the institutionalisation of subsidies as they are changed from limited short-term projects to universal welfare services.

Furthermore, alongside the Law, there is an attempt to come to a wide social pact that also includes large-scale renovation works. These are necessary because

³⁵ Through INCASOL and ADIGSA.

many buildings are of low quality and land is scarce in the region's main metropolitan area, Barcelona.

Llei de Barris

The Neighbourhoods Law (*Llei de Barris*) has been one of the first laws issued when the social democratic Catalan party was elected to government in 2004 (see Generalitat de Catalunya, 2006a). The law is based on the European Union URBAN project and the French Loi Solidarité et Renouvellement Urban (Loi SRV). It involved the creation of a fund for neighbourhood regeneration in Catalonia. The €800 Million fund is intended to encourage and drive local integrated programmes aimed at renovating and promoting urban areas that require particular attention. The issues it focuses on are poor quality of housing, lack of public (green) space, overrepresentation of immigrants, demographic decline, and social and economic problems such as unemployment and low education. The Neighbourhood Law is targeted at three types of neighbourhoods.

- Old Town Centres
- Housing Estates planned in the 1960s
- Unplanned-housing marginal districts (former slums)

The funding is allocated based on bids made by municipalities. The bid has to present a need as well as a programme. The programme has to fulfil several demands made by the regional government.³⁶ The municipalities are obliged to take action in 8 fields of action (see table 4.1):

- Improving public areas and providing green zones
- Communal areas in buildings, renovation and facilities
- Providing amenities for collective use
- Introducing information technologies to the buildings
- Encouraging sustainability in urban development
- Gender equality
- Programmes for social, town planning and economic improvement
- Accessibility

Furthermore, the regional authorities have provided a manual with tools and methods for policy actions. Municipalities are expected to adapt these manuals to the local situation. Municipalities have some discretion in laying emphases and can expand the fields of action. In addition, municipalities have to commit to funding their programme for 50% of the costs. Thus, the programmes are funded equally by the regional government and the municipality in question for a period of 4 years. Likewise, one of the objectives of the fund is to stimulate cooperation between local and regional governments as well stimulate municipal action in deprived areas. Bidding was done in four rounds and about seventy projects were awarded funding throughout Catalonia.

The programmes are mainly focused on the neighbourhoods and less on their residents. The majority of the funds are spent on physical interventions. Furthermore, the philosophy of regeneration is strongly tied to the housing market. The funds are regarded by the policymakers as investments to improve market conditions. The expected outcome is that after four years of investment in public spaces, civic centres, amenities, buildings, etc., the prices will have risen sufficiently and the neighbourhood will attract new, more affluent, residents. This also implies the displacement of poor (immigrant) households. To take care of this group in terms of housing, the fund relies on the further development of social housing policies.

³⁶ The Department of Political Territory and Public Works is responsible for allocating the funds and overseeing the programmes.

Nevertheless, the inclusion of a social agenda within the programme is relatively novel for the Catalan and Spanish urban regeneration policies³⁷.

Table 4.1. Llei de Barris

Field of action	Investment after 3 allocation rounds	% of total investment (after 3 rounds)	Objectives	Examples
Improving public areas and providing green zones	€ 191M	48.4%	To improve collective-use areas and to extend facilities in order to enhance mobility and good relations within the community	- Resurfacing the streets - Planting trees - More street lighting
Communal areas in buildings. renovation and facilities	€ 39.3M	9.9%	To enhance the state of housing and collective facilities by improving the parts of the buildings used by all	- Roof repairs - Improving common facilities
Providing amenities for collective use	€ 80.7M	20.4%	To diminish the lack of amenities in order to provide adequate access to various needs (education, athletics, culture, etc.), thereby encouraging social interrelation and cohesion	- Renovating homes for the elderly - Creating Civic Centres
Introducing information technologies to the buildings	€ 3.3M	0.8%	To encourage the incorporation of new technologies for the purpose of enhancing the potential for communication, improving information and providing services	- Installing cabling in buildings to enable Internet access
Encouraging sustainability in urban development	€16.92M	4.3%	To reduce environmental impact and service costs by providing incentives for measures boosting energy efficiency, savings in water consumption and the recycling of waste	- Installing water-saving devices - Setting up recycling centres
Gender equality	€8.6M	2.2%	To improve living conditions for women and to encourage their participation in and integration into the social fabric	- Premises equipped with house services aimed at reconciling family life and working life - Premises for providing training activities
Programmes for social, town-planning and economic improvement	€33.7M	8.5%	To revitalise economic and social activity. To enhance living conditions for people at risk of social exclusion and the most deprived social groups	- Programmes aimed at revitalising commerce - Town-promotion programmes
Accessibility	€21.8M	5.5%	To ensure better mobility and the chance to use public amenities and zones in which the entire community can enjoy, eliminate any obstacles.	- Broadening the pavements, and providing no-parking areas and pedestrian crossings - Building street ramps

³⁷ Basque Country should be mentioned as well with regards to the development of neighbourhood policies in Spain.

4.3 Barcelona & Badalona

Barcelona is the second largest city in Spain and the capital of Catalonia. For decades, the city was the most industrialised urban metropolis in the country until Madrid took the lead recently. Its population is 1.5 million. The metropolitan area (*Area Metropolitana*), which consists of city and 26 other municipalities, has a population of 2.8 million. Finally, the metropolitan region (*Regió Metropolitana*) of Barcelona which constitutes the city and 162 surrounding municipalities has a population of about 4.2 million (70% of Catalonia's 6 million inhabitants) (Garcia, 2003). As the city is built between the mountains and the sea, land is scarce and density is high (14,910 inhabitants/ km² in 2001).

During the Franco Regime the city's development was characterised by free market and speculation. As mentioned above, during the 1950s and 1960s, a lot of development sprang up at the periphery of the city where new housing estates arose to accommodate the Spanish (internal) immigrant workers. The housing estates were often unplanned and poorly built but did provide the workers and their families with housing.

By the end of the 1980s, Barcelona underwent economic expansion which was particularly located outside the city limits within the metropolitan region. This reinforced the connections between city and surroundings and forged the region. Furthermore, the economic expansion resulted in a property boom.

The expansion of Barcelona was carried into the 1990s and further, with major events like the 1992 Olympics and the International Forum in 2004 acting as a catalyst for major development projects. Neighbourhoods were transformed from industrial to residential and new motorway ring roads were developed around the city. Furthermore, the city, helped by clever marketing and cultural projects, became a popular international travellers' destination. Meanwhile, the city's population has started growing again after years of decline.


The industrialisation of Barcelona in the early twentieth century and later in the 1950s and 1960s has made the Metropolitan Region the largest industrial conglomeration in Spain, despite the loss of jobs during the 1970s crises. After these crises, the service sector slowly became the predominant economic sector in the city (74.5% of total employment in 2000), while industrial activities moved out into the region. Table 4.2 shows the city's employment rates.

Badalona, a municipality adjacent to Barcelona, is one of the industrial sites. It also has some of the peripheral housing estates that circle Barcelona within its municipal borders. These housing estates, however, are more focused on Barcelona in terms of economic function and labour market. Most of Badalona consists of affluent neighbourhoods that function as a suburban landscape. Figure 4.2 shows the unemployment in Badalona compared to Barcelona city.

Table 4.2. Employment in Barcelona
(Census Data)

		1991	1996	2001
Barcelona	Population	1,643,542	1,508,805	1,491,609
	Working population	722,870	667,332	724,246
	Unemployment in %	13.7	20.6	10.8
Metropolitan Region	Population	4,264,422	4,228,048	4,364,089
	Working population	1,867,123	1,920,176	2,189,879
	Unemployment in %	15.4	21.4	10.8
Catalonia	Population	6,059,494	6,090,040	6,304,366
	Working population	2,628,387	2,731,672	3,135,423
	Unemployment in %	14.2	19.3	10.2

Figure 4.2. Amount of Registered unemployment on total population in Badalona and Barcelona



The Estates

The next paragraphs will go further into to the recent interventions in two 1960s housing estates that have shared some superficial similarities from the onset, such as era of construction, peripheral location, high-rise, unplanned, sites of physical regeneration, and original Spanish working-class population. However, as we shall see, their trajectories and current situation differ substantially. As noted before, the estates have also been subject to the RESTATE research project (RESTATE, 2005), and this account draws on these results as well as on other data sources.

4.4 Trinitat Nova

Trinitat Nova is a neighbourhood that was built in the beginning of the 1950s to house the newly arrived rural immigrants. It is located against the hills on the north-western fringe of Barcelona.

Like so many of the peripheral neighbourhoods built during this period, Trinitat Nova shares a similar history to that of Sant Roc. Before the 1950s, the area was mainly farmland with some water works passing through. It was constructed by three different public developers in three different parts of the neighbourhood. Nevertheless, the design of the multi-family blocks that make up nearly the entire stock and the urban landscape look quite homogeneous throughout the area. After construction, technical problems were soon manifesting themselves (leakage and water supply problems). Furthermore, the neighbourhood was constructed without any plan to steer development. As a result, the placement of the building seems random and chaotic. In addition, the area lacked amenities and has suffered ever since from 'indefensible' public space (see Newman, 1972). In the 1970s, the situation was improved when streets were paved and a health centre, a library, more schools and a market hall opened. Nowadays, the neighbourhood boasts a pedagogue centre, a social centre and seven schools including a secondary school that caters for surrounding neighbourhoods as well, and a school for conservation and restoration of cultural artefacts. In addition to the market, which also serves an

important social purpose in neighbourhood life, there are some commercial facilities scattered over the neighbourhood.

The area has been fairly isolated from the rest of the city until the 1990s, when a newly constructed motorway passed the neighbourhood. Connectivity and accessibility improved even more with the construction of a metro station in 1999. Connectivity has increased even more with the addition of a new metro line which runs to the neighbourhoods in the north.

There are about 3200 dwellings in the area, about two thirds of these are managed by ADIGSA. The 1000 dwellings which it does not manage are built by the developer *el Patronato* Municipal. These dwellings show a high rate of deterioration. 800 of these dwellings are targeted for demolition and replacement.

The neighbourhood held 7686 inhabitants in 2001. The number of residents has been cut in half compared to the 1960s as it has experienced a steady population decline until the 1990s. The trend is also reflected in the decreasing average household size (1 person households increased from 19.9% to 26.3% between 1991 and 1996).

The neighbourhood has always remained a working class neighbourhood with many residents employed in the factories and iron industry. Nowadays, a large share of the residents lives in retirement as the average age is increasing. Those who are employed mostly work outside the neighbourhood as it lacks economic opportunities, companies, and thus jobs. The history of an immigrant working class neighbourhood is also reflected in the overall level of education. The level is low in Trinitat Nova although it has improved over the years. In 1996 around 30% of the inhabitants had not finished school (Barcelona average: 15.8%).

Furthermore, a significant share of the residents is unemployed. The most recent data from 1991, indicated that 21.6% of the population was unemployed (compared to 13.7% average). Anecdotal evidence suggests that unemployment is still above average.

As mentioned, the residents of Trinitat Nova are ageing. Many of the original inhabitants still occupy their owned houses. This makes the housing market fairly closed. Some foreign immigrants have moved in, but in 2001 they only made up 2% of the population. This figure is below city average at that time (4.9%).

Photo 4.1 Trinitat Nova housing estate



4.4.1 Problems and status

The neighbourhood has its share of social and economic problems. Furthermore, the condition of the built environment has required attention. However, compared to the rest of the city-region the neighbourhood is not considered to be a problem estate by the respondents. The respondents point to the steady population, a shared history and solidarity (particularly among older inhabitants), the high satisfaction rates (see Musterd and Van Kempen, 2005; Pareja Eastaway *et al.*, 2005), and the perceived success of the community development plan (see next paragraph).


4.4.2 Policies and interventions in Trinitat Nova

The transformation and improvement of the neighbourhood is done through the Trinitat Nova Community Development Plan (CDP). The setup of a community plan was already in progress in Trinitat Nova when the regional government introduced the CDP in 1996. The plan was initiated by the Neighbourhood Association. The overall objective of the plan was to improve liveability and quality of life in the neighbourhood. To achieve this, four areas of focus were identified in the diagnosis: urbanism, education, economy, and social activities. Education and especially the urbanism projects carried the most weight within the plan. These will be discussed below.

The organisational structure of the CDP is displayed in figure 4.3. The political responsibility of the plan lies with the Neighbourhood Association (*Associació de Veïns Trinitat Nova*, AAVV) which supervises the day-to-day management of the Community Team. The Community Team consists of outside experts and technical personnel that have been hired by the neighbourhood through the association. The team's technical committee coordinates all contacts with the *Generalitat* and the municipality, as well as with the health and education services in the area. Thus, the Team plays a pivotal role in the project. There have been good experiences with the plan and its organisation. As we shall see, it has proved to be possible to regenerate and change the neighbourhood in a participative and coordinated way. However, it should be noted that the relationship between the Community Team and the Neighbourhood Association has been strenuous at times. In 2003, a conflict between the staff of the Community Team and the Neighbourhood Association led to the replacement of the Team's coordinator, even though the Team consisted of highly qualified personnel and had been very successful in terms of raising funds and planning new projects. However, members of the Neighbourhood Association felt that the staff of the Team, in their ambitions, started to neglect the wishes and needs of the residents. In other words, the Neighbourhood Association felt that the Team had hijacked the CDP project. This was felt to be in violation of the spirit of the CDP. Since then, the relationship between the Neighbourhood and the Team has been restored to normal. The team's task has shifted its emphasis from planning on their own to educating the residents so they are able to plan and negotiate themselves.

Funding comes from the *Generalitat* and municipality (30%), the residents themselves (30%), and private donations from banks and charity funds (40%). The impact of the project and its fame led to even more donations from private funds.

Figure 4.3. Organisational structure of the Trinitat Nova CDP (Pareja Eastaway *et al.*, 2004)



Physical regeneration

As mentioned, the biggest policy challenge in Trinitat Nova is dealing with the issue of the structural integrity of the buildings. In the late 1990s, the municipality presented a plan to the neighbourhood, which proved to be unsatisfactory to residents. The residents demanded more influence participation in the planning process. This initiated the participative process which became the norm for planning in Trinitat Nova. The neighbourhood association formed a working group, or 'Remodelling Group', which consists of a group of residents directly involved by the regeneration supported by the Community Team (see above). The residents held weekly meetings and were educated in the field of regeneration and trained to deal with the authorities. The group played an important role in the dealings with the *Generalitat* and the municipality. As such they were able to negotiate and push their demands, which were:

- To not lose the mountain; no construction further up the mountain
- To not lose the view of the Mediterranean Sea
- No large-scale addition of housing
- Sustainable and quality building

The last point emerged after the 1999 European Awareness Scenario Workshop which was organised by the Neighbourhood Association. This workshop attracted experts, politicians, civic groups and associations, business sector representatives, and residents. The workshop produced several projects such as the construction of a *Casa d'Agua* (Waterhouse), and the ideal of an *eco barri* (sustainable neighbourhood). Henceforth, activities were planned within the remodelling project that would be environmentally friendly, such as rest-water recycling and energy saving. The residents together with academics advocated the construction of solar panels, the use of insulation building materials and a smart orientation of the buildings that will all yield 30% to 40% in energy savings compared to regular construction techniques.

After a period of negotiation, a plan was put forward to 'remodel' a section of the neighbourhood in 2001. A total amount of 892 dwellings will be demolished and

replaced with 1,040 new units, built in a sustainable fashion. The Remodelling project will cost about € 90M and will end in 2015. The funding comes from the municipality, the regional government and the Spanish central government. In 2002, an agreement was formed between the three parties on a plan of execution (according to PERI guidelines, now PEMU). The plan foresees a piecemeal development to keep the residents on site. After the agreement was signed, progress has been slower than expected. 250 new dwellings were constructed on undeveloped land and these are now occupied by the old residents. However, the new developments that are planned on occupied land have been slow to materialise and a more detailed plan of phased execution has been drawn up in 2007. The delays were due to bureaucratic sluggishness in the municipal and regional governments and due to families who hold out because they refuse to sell their houses for the agreed price.

Normally, residents receive € 8,000 for their old dwelling from the municipality and also get the new apartment worth € 36,000 in a special category of VPO (*Public Promoción*). The difference (€ 28,000) is paid by the resident over a 25 year period. If the resident is 65+ the municipality pays € 30,000 and a new flat is put at this person's disposal at a rent of € 20/40 per month.³⁸ The VPO framework prevents the residents from selling their dwellings on the free market for a thirty-year period and it obliges residents to live in them.

When a new building is ready, the residents are transferred per building. While preferences are taken into account, a lottery system determines the final arrangement. However, some types dwellings are reserved for types of households:

- 2 room: 65+
- 3 room: young singles (who in theory still have to start a family), or 2-4 person households
- 4 room: households with more than three children.

³⁸ People who moved to the neighbourhood after 2001 will receive € 60,000. These residents have succeeded to get a higher amount through the tribunals, as the amount was insufficient to purchase a new dwelling.

Photo 4.2 Physical regeneration in
Trinitat Nova




The new dwellings are substantially larger than the old ones. While the old dwellings were about 35-50 m², the size of the new dwellings vary from 62 m² to 90 m².

As more dwellings are constructed and there will be some deaths, the expectation is that about 200 dwellings will not go to residents who transfer from demolished buildings. According to the agreement, a quarter of these dwellings are reserved for the 'children of the neighbourhood', i.e. people who originate from the neighbourhood. The remaining 75% will be assigned to people in need according to the VPO regime.

The management of the physical regeneration is transferred by the Municipality to REGESA, a semi-public organisation owned by the Consell Comarcal del Barcelonès, a city-regional governmental body. The Catalan Land Institute (INCASOL), an autonomous organisation owned by the *Generalitat*, develops the land and the dwellings. ADIGSA officially manages the transfer of the VPO housing, but in this case supervises REGESA which has been commissioned to oversee this as well. The municipality of Barcelona is responsible for public space and making the land available for INCASOL (Catalan Land Institute) (see figure 4.4). The progress of the regeneration is monitored and discussed by a commission which consists of the three parties. This commission meets twice a year.

Figure 4.4. Organisational structure for Trinitat Nova



In addition to the remodelling of a quarter of the neighbourhood, several other construction projects are undertaken in Trinitat Nova. The 'Waterhouse' is an old water refining station that is to be renovated into an ecological centre that will attract visitors from outside the neighbourhood. Another project is the construction of a *Casal de Barri* (Neighbourhood House). The residents felt that they missed a proper civic centre to hold meetings and organise leisure and educational activities. The Neighbourhood House under negotiation is meant to have a small theatre, a day care centre, a place for teenagers, a kindergarten, and a centre for the elderly. The preferred design of the centre is characterised by open spaces instead of 'compartmentalised' spaces. The openness forces residents to move through other spaces thereby increasing the chance of interaction. To make the centre financially sustainable for the authorities, an underneath parking garage is planned.

4.4.3 Evaluation Trinitat Nova

The regeneration efforts in Trinitat Nova are overwhelmingly physical in nature. This is related to the absence of any urgent socio-economic or health issues. Both policy-makers and residents agree that the neighbourhood has its share of residents that require attention, but the problems of the neighbourhood as a whole fade in comparison with for instance Sant Roc, the next case.

The most interesting point in the Trinitat Nova case has been the strong involvement of the residents. While certainly not all residents were actively participating, an estimated number of 500 people (out of about 7,600) moved towards a consensus on a range of topics, not least of which the remodelling of the neighbourhood. The involvement of the residents and the Neighbourhood Association has had a significant impact on the organisation and direction of the regeneration. According to REGESA, the changes that were advocated by the residents did not lead to substantially bigger construction costs.

There are several factors that have contributed to the level of participation in Trinitat Nova. Firstly, the Neighbourhood Association has been instrumental in the organisation of the participative process. This is due to the consensus-seeking attitude of its members and notably of its chairman, D. Rebollo, who has been described as open, tolerant and as a builder of bridges. In addition, there is only one Neighbourhood Association in Trinitat Nova, which prevented any power struggles observed elsewhere. Also, the attitude of the local health centre and schools helped push the process forward.

Secondly, the participative project drew quite a number of people because the stakes were high in case of the remodelling project. As one respondent remarks:

'it is easier to rally people when it concerns their own dwelling, their own private living environment, than it is when it concerns health care services or education.'

Thirdly, the population of Trinitat Nova has been reasonably stable for decades. The VPO system favours staying put until the dwelling becomes free market. This population was originally a working class neighbourhood. However, the workers were fairly skilled as they worked in the steel and automotive industry. They constituted a working middle class. The workers of Trinitat Nova were thus able to steadfastly improve the neighbourhood as well as improve the situation for their children, many of whom were able to get a better education. The relatively homogeneity and steadfast determination to improve the living conditions of the neighbourhood helped to stand firm against the authorities and draft a Community Plan.

Fourthly, the determination of some of the residents to actively improve their living conditions is historically rooted in the neighbourhood. Fighting for amenities, street lighting, pavements, education, public transport etc. has been a recurring theme in the neighbourhood's forty-year history. In the 1970s, the authorities proposed to tear down Trinitat Nova and 8 other estates. This led to protests and to the establishment of the neighbourhood council, the predecessors of the associations. During Franco's reign, this was not without danger as assemblies were forbidden. Eventually, the demolishment never materialised, and the protests resulted in the establishment of the Nou Barris district within Barcelona. At the time, the estates of Nou Barris were sites of political protests against the dictatorial regime. The protests manifested themselves in illegal activities such as 1 May celebrations of memberships of the PSUC (Catalan Socialist Communist Party) and publishing protest literature. Thus, the neighbourhood has been a site of political activism from the 1970s through the 1980s and the 1990s until now.

Finally, the relative success of the community development plan can in a large part be attributed to the community team and their methods for involving people. The Community Team has had well-educated professionals that have been able to draw attention and gather resources from outside. Furthermore, in 1996, the Community Team was aware that, to get the neighbourhood mobilised and involved, a degree of organisation, education, and information was necessary (see Pindado *et al.*, 2002). The organisation was necessary to channel the efforts and deal with potential conflicts. Information and education was necessary to make residents realise that they had a stake in the outcome and that it was worthwhile to get involved. One of the methods to achieve this was to instruct a handful of residents to do interviews with their neighbours in order to gather information for the strengths and weaknesses analysis. While the interviews were held, new contacts were made and awareness was raised. Another method the Team used has been to identify stakeholders and approach these individuals to get them involved. In a later stage, education is required for a selection of residents to have the knowledge to be able to negotiate with authorities themselves. As mentioned, this is one of the main tasks of the Community Team today.

While the experiences with the participative process in Trinitat Nova earned the neighbourhood some fame in academic and professional circles, some respondents tend to put the success in perspective. As mentioned, while 500 people participated, about 1500 did not. Another respondent points to residents undoing their own achievements when they park their cars on the pavements which they fought over, or when they build doors and walls in the apartments that were designed to maximise energy savings. Nevertheless, the results of the participative process in Trinitat Nova are notable. The residents have been able to alter the original plans, be part of the planning process and voice their ideals and opinions. As a result, a new way of policy making and planning has been introduced with regards

to the neighbourhood and the CDP has proven to be a good vehicle to attract amenities and services to Trinitat Nova.

4.5 Sant Roc

Like so many of the peripheral housing estates in Spanish cities, the Sant Roc neighbourhood came into existence during the rural immigration during the period of industrialisation and urbanisation in the 1950s and 1960s. Before this time, the area was agricultural land. The construction of a factory brought workers and slums to the area. Housing was constructed by a public developer to house (among others) the workers in the slums.

Even though in terms of function and connectiveness Sant Roc can be considered to be a neighbourhood of Barcelona, it is actually part of the municipality of Badalona. It is located across the river Besós, north-east of Barcelona proper.

There are approximately 3400 dwellings in 154 blocks with an average of 6.7 floors per block. Despite different types of blocks, the bland design of buildings gives the neighbourhood a homogeneous look. The physical structure of the estate is shaped by the original construction period. Corruption during the Franco regime led to poor design and quality, quickly resulting in accidents, dampness, technical failure, etc. Furthermore, when construction was finished in 1965, the urban environment lacked amenities and traffic was unsafe. As a result of protests and media attention, the neighbourhood's public space was improved (paving, trees, etc.). The interventions normalised the urban design in the neighbourhood, yet the elevated motorway is a barrier and has created some deterioration below it. More recently, concrete disease in 918 dwellings (56 blocks) forced a process of regeneration, whereby these dwellings will be demolished and substituted with new housing (see below).

The dwellings in Sant Roc are public houses (*propiedad diferida*), which are owned by the occupant when about 70% is paid off. Thus, the residents pay a monthly amount to the state for a number of years. Since 1985, the dwellings are managed by ADIGSA, a public company affiliated with the Generalitat. The housing market in Sant Roc is very open outside the regeneration zone (see below), with prices below the Barcelona average.

The population of Sant Roc consisted of different groups ever since the 1960s. A part of the residents (8000) came from the slums in Sant Roc as well as from slums elsewhere in the periphery of Barcelona. These were mainly internal immigrants from the countryside. Furthermore, Sant Roc also housed people who lost their houses due to river flooding and the highway construction. Between the 1980s and 2001 Sant Roc was losing population at a substantially faster rate than city average (about 10% more in 5 year period). However, the latest data indicates a rise in population (pop. 15,404), which is consistent with the regional trend. Furthermore, the demographic composition of Sant Roc differs in more respects; its population is younger and is on average less educated (in 1996 about 40% was illiterate or did not receive any education at all).

In 1966, 10% of the population consisted of *Gitanos* (Iberian Roma groups). This percentage increased to 40% in 2001. There is a high degree of segregation on the micro level as the 5000 Roma tend to live in different apartment blocks from the other groups. In addition to the *Gitanos*, 36.2% of the population are immigrants (see Table 3). The share of Pakistani in Sant Roc is particularly striking. In the last years, Sant Roc has gradually become the second largest Pakistan neighbourhood in the Barcelona region.

Table 4.3. Immigrant groups in Sant Roc (Source: Consorci/ Municipality Badalona, 2006)

Descent	Percentage
Spain	63.8
Pakistan	17.8
Latin America	7.1
Eastern Europe	3.1
Morocco	3.0
Other	6.2

Lastly, the income level of the neighbourhood is generally very low, and income and expenditure capacity are decreasing. A reason for this is the ageing population. Since the 1960s Sant Roc served as an entry point for immigrant workers into the Barcelonese housing market. People move out once they have met some economic, cultural, and social success. As a result, unemployment has always been above average in the area.

4.5.1 Perceived problems in Sant Roc

Nearly all respondents indicate that Sant Roc is one of the 'most deprived' neighbourhoods in the Barcelona region. Also Pareja *et al.* (2003) state that "Sant Roc is a clear example of a neighbourhood which replaced horizontal slums for vertical slums" (p.108). The inhabitants overwhelmingly consist of marginalised groups. Furthermore, the situation is worsened by the fact that those who achieve some socio-economic success tend to move away and are replaced by new poor or troublesome households. Sant Roc's position at the bottom of the regional housing market is clear. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the low cost of housing has attracted workers from Pakistan who plan to start a family in Sant Roc. Some respondents have expressed concerns over the concentration of Pakistani and are worried that their increasing presence represents the first step towards ghettoisation.

Moreover, there are indications that the low cost has also attracted rack-renters who rent the dwellings to newly-arrived workers from Pakistan or Latin America or to Eastern-European Roma. This has led to overcrowding of the apartments. When the Sant Roc was founded in the 1960s, immigrant workers from Southern Spain and their families overcrowded the apartments as well. However, the situation today is different, because there are already residents in the neighbourhood who are affected by the overpopulation.³⁹ A more important difference is that in the 1960s there were no social and political conflicts in the neighbourhood, because the relatively homogeneous population was already employed at arrival, and the dictatorial regime suppressed many social processes. Currently, one of the major social problems in Sant Roc is the emergence of conflicts between different groups within the neighbourhood. Although the exact nature of these conflicts remains elusive, respondents point to the fact that the *Gitanos*, who have lived in the neighbourhood for decades, feel threatened by the arrival of new marginalised groups who they believe seize welfare provision and encroach on their territory.⁴⁰ Indeed, many welfare provisions are not universal but have a cap on the amount of subsidies, meaning that in some cases welfare is rightly regarded as a zero-sum game.

³⁹ While the official figures state that there are 15,000 residents, it is estimated that there are another 2,000 unregistered residents in Sant Roc.

⁴⁰ This last point should be taken literally; the *Gitanos* feel that other groups are trying to take over public spaces where they have traditionally resided.

Apart from the perceived lack of social harmony, the more fundamental problem seems to be poverty and social exclusion. The inadequacy of services, the marginalisation, and above all the social climate impedes newly arrived immigrants in their progress into society. For instance, adult education to retrain or learn the language is difficult to obtain. Unemployment is a problem as well. The perception is that these new families are sucked into a system of social exclusion. These inhibitions brought upon by the neighbourhood particularly relate to children. It is estimated that 6 out of 10 children do not attend school. While those who do attend achieve significantly lower scores than city averages. Many of the teenagers who do not attend school get involved in criminal or drug-related activities, adding to the drug addiction problems in the area. Apart from youth and crime, there is a concern among the authorities for domestic violence and dysfunctional families.

Finally, as mentioned above, the decline of the housing stock and public space has haunted families for many years now. Bad standards of construction and minimal investments over the years have left the buildings in a dismal state. Management of the dwellings and public space is officially the responsibility of ADIGSA since 1985, but it has failed to manage the estate properly. Also, the Badalona Municipality has neglected the area for a long time. When ADIGSA announced redevelopment in 1992, any upkeep by ADIGSA and the residents ceased altogether. Furthermore, the area has long lacked commercial services and shops.


In sum, the problems in Sant Roc are numerous. In contrast to Trinitat Nova, they extend beyond the concrete disease problems into the social sphere. Many point to marginalisation, social conflict, youth problems and new immigration as the main issues to tackle. Most of these issues are addressed by different projects.

4.5.2 Policies and Interventions in Sant Roc

Regeneration, or 'remodelling', in Sant Roc was prompted by the poor technical quality of the buildings. While normally the process of regeneration begins with some form of bottom-up social participation or initiative, in this case it was initiated top-down by the regional authorities in the form of ADIGSA, who manages the estate. Like the regeneration in Trinitat Nova, the Catalan Land Institute, INCASOL, demolishes and develops the new buildings. The management of the process and the legal and administrative affairs have been transferred to REURSA, a private company. The regeneration has begun in 2001 and is expected to finish in 2010, but completion may be delayed due to some disagreements among the residents. Total costs are estimated at € 60M.

Unlike other remodelling projects, the municipality is not involved in the management of the project, nor is it involved in the urban plan, which was done under regional auspices. Furthermore, after the remodelling process the dwellings will be managed by ADIGSA instead of the municipality. This unusual situation is a result of the unique position of Sant Roc within Badalona. The municipality has traditionally shied away from any involvement and left the area to ADIGSA. This is beginning to change, as we shall see below. The straightforward organisational structure is shown in Figure 4.5. REURSA set up a Regeneration Office within the neighbourhood where residents can go for information, questions or issues. In order to be able to manage the process and to be of help, the Regeneration Office employs architects, planners, but also social workers.

Figure 4.5. The organisational structure of the remodelling process in Sant Roc



When the project started, three neighbourhood associations and the municipal *Gitanos* association participated in the planning process. An agreement was signed between these four parties, ADIGSA and the Regeneration Office, in 2003. This agreement forms the guidelines of the process. While the influence of the residents has been considerable, the residential involvement has been less extensive or dominant than in Trinitat Nova. This is in part because the remodelling process in Trinitat Nova involves more actors and thus tends to be more contested. Sant Roc's organisation is more straightforward and, as a result, individual residents could focus on other issues such as ownership and responsibility for future management. This latter issue has led to the establishment of Owner Associations.

The remodelling process affects roughly one quarter of the neighbourhood, as 918 out of 3395 dwellings will be demolished. About 1,000 new dwellings will be constructed.⁴¹ The rest of the dwellings in the neighbourhood are expected to be refurbished in the near future. Residents do not have to be relocated as the new dwellings are built close to the existing buildings, which will be demolished after the residents have moved to their new apartments. The new apartments will be substantially bigger than the old dwellings. While the old dwellings have a surface measure of 40 m², the new apartments have 70m². Furthermore, the interior public spaces of the new buildings will make use of materials that are easier to maintain, such as stone rather than woodwork or ceramics. Parking spaces underneath the new buildings are private to prevent any abuse of the space.

About 95% of the residents involved lived under the VPO regime and had not yet obtained full ownership. These residents receive almost € 9,000 for their old dwelling and have to pay € 33,000 for their new apartments. The € 24,000 is paid under a new VPO arrangement over a period of 30 years.⁴² The owners cannot sell their dwellings for 5 years and after that there are restrictions on the asking price and the municipality has the right to buy it before anyone else. Residents also have the option of renting their new apartment for € 60-80 a month, but this option is rarely chosen (0.4% of the households in 2007). 65+ owners can make use of the new apartments for a very modest rent to ADIGSA.

In addition, the remodelling project in Sant Roc is focused on restructuring public space and altering the neighbourhood's infrastructure. The latter point is done to increase the accessibility of the neighbourhood. Sant Roc is strategically located between Badalona and Barcelona and the idea is to open up the area and exploit its location in order to raise attractiveness and market values. Furthermore, the neighbourhood plan is also altered to reduce indefensible space, open up some narrow streets, and create more traffic through the neighbourhood in order to increase social control and reduce 'marginal activities'. Hence, cul-de-sacs are removed and the connection between the neighbourhood and the tram/ metro stop will be improved. To accomplish this, three residential buildings (144 dwellings) and one fire station that do not suffer from concrete disease will be demolished. Furthermore, space will be reserved for shops and commercial activities.

⁴¹ 551 were completed in June 2007

⁴² 35% of the 24,000 has an interest rate of 5%; the remaining 65% is without interest. Monthly contribution is roughly € 100. The old VPO arrangement were as low as €3 a month.

Photo 4.4. Regeneration in Sant Roc. Left, the newly developed apartment buildings and, right, the apartment blocks to be demolished



4.5.3 Integration programme

The remodelling project is complemented by an Integration Programme. The most notable element of this programme is to take advantage of the reallocations and disperse Iberian Roma concentration in several buildings. Although the share of *Gitanos* in the neighbourhood will not change, the assumption was that these concentrations fed stigmatisation and had negative effects for the *Gitanos* themselves as well, as there were no collective norms for maintenance and respect for the communal areas within the building. The expectation is that mixing the *Gitano* population with the Spanish households will ameliorate their behaviour by good example and change the image of Sant Roc as a *Gitano* neighbourhood. The mixing scheme has been approved by all residents in the 2003 agreement. The non-*Gitano* households are transferred per stairwell as much as possible and are complemented by two to four 'integration families'. When there is no consensus, a lottery will determine the exact placement of the non- *Gitano* families. It is too early to evaluate the mixing strategy, but *Gitano* families have indicated that they feel a bit like cattle that are to be bargained over. Also, some Spanish households feel it's unfair when a particular infamous *Gitano* family is placed next door. These households prefer a lottery that includes the *Gitano* families.

The Integration Programme features other activities that focus on the reallocated residents and in particular the elderly and the *Gitano* households. Activities include workshops on maintenance of the flats and communal areas, safety in the house, and domestic economics (i.e. paying bills). The elderly residents are given assistance with the paper work and movement. Moreover, the social team aim to improve co-existence between *Gitanos* and the Spanish residents. The immigrant residents are not involved because they are concentrated outside the regeneration zone. The activities are handled by a social team from VINCLE, an organisation which was subcontracted by REURSA to handle resident affairs from the Regeneration Office.

4.5.4 Consorci Badalona Sud

In the last 15 years, several programmes have been implemented to improve the living conditions of the residents of Sant Roc. A community development plan (PLADICO) was started in 1998, but was not successful in creating a working relationship between Neighbourhood Associations and the authorities. Its successor, PLADECO, was initiated in 2003 as a new CDP. As such, it attempted to analyse the neighbourhood's problems and needs, mobilise the residents, coordinate the efforts of public services and social organisations, and set up an integral plan for Sant Roc. However, although some activities were employed, the Plan was weakened by a lack of certainty, confidence among the residents, and the inability of the weak Neighbourhood Association to play a leading role.

The PLADECO was replaced with a new programme in 2006. The South Badalona Consortium (*Consorci Badalona Sud*) is a joint effort of the Municipality of Badalona and the *Generalitat* to improve the sixth municipal district of Badalona, which includes Sant Roc. The neighbourhood comprises nearly 60% of the district in terms of inhabitants. The Consortium includes the last remaining Neighbourhood Association of Sant Roc, but is not a CDP. Rather than with the residents, the initiative and leadership lies with the authorities. The aim of the Consortium is, again, to improve and streamline coordination between the social actors within the district to create integrated solutions to different problems. The Consortium was set up by the Municipality because it felt that it could not handle the accumulation of social problems without support from the regional government.

The programme is funded by equally the two governments for € 2M. However, in June 2007, the project received additional regional funds from the *Llei de Barris* which means that the municipality and the *Generalitat* each contribute an additional € 9M. The project will run for 12 years, but the *Llei de Barris* funds need to be allocated within 4 years. The competency areas are:

- Health Care
- Education
- Welfare benefits
- Physical regeneration
- Safety
- Sports

The consortium is an organisation with a board of directors that is comprised of representatives from the *Generalitat* and the Municipality, with alternating chairmanships. The board of directors decides on strategy and budget allocations for one year.

The executive agency (*Gerència Consorci*) employs nine individuals, five of whom are technical assistants that specialise in five areas (housing & public space, culture, social work, health care, business & employment), yet all specialists are involved in all projects. With the recent acquisition of the *Llei de Barris* funds, it is still unclear whether the Consortium will expand and implement projects themselves or whether they will distribute the funds to other social organisations. In the short period of operation before the acquisition, the Consortium travelled both roads. However, the *Consorci* have had difficulties establishing a strategy for 2007. Due to local elections the 2007 strategy was approved in May 2007 (6 months later than planned). Nevertheless, the strategy identified ten priority points for their programmes that relate to their competency areas. The four points that receive most of the budget are:

- Dealing with problems with the neighbourhoods' children and teenagers, integral actions are set up to stimulate or force children to go to school. These actions are focused on the children's families;

- The emancipation of women and helping pregnant teenagers;
- Fighting unemployment through actions directed at the families (instead of the breadwinner), and through education and retraining to work in tourism or renovation work;
- Promote tolerance between cultural groups through health care and sports projects.

4.5.5 Other activities and organisations

To fight unemployment, the *Generalitat* designed the 'Learning to Learn' programme, which has also been implemented in Trinitat Nova. The Learning to Learn programme has four groups of activities (Pareja Eastaway *et al.*, 2004):

- Provision of information on job availability and opportunities;
- Guided orientation on the labour market, in some cases with special care for non-Spanish speaking immigrants;
- Training and workshops to help acquire and apply for work;
- Integration through traineeships, such as the Get Ready Programme, whereby construction firms involved in the remodelling hire local residents.

In Sant Roc, the programme is implemented through the *Casal Cívic* (Civic House), which is part of the Department of Public Administration within the regional government. In Sant Roc the *Casal Cívic* is located in the neighbourhood's social centre (*Equipament Cívic*) together with the Office for Municipal Actions (*Oficina d'Acció Ciutadana*), which is also a regional body. The social centre offers different courses ranging from yoga for the elderly to the Learning to Learn application courses. It also features a library and study halls for local students. The main purpose of the social centre is to involve and mobilise residents.

The services and amenities offered by the *Equipament Cívic* are complemented by the activities of the *Fundació Ateneu Sant Roc* organisation, which has been active in Sant Roc for decades. It organises different projects that focus on education for children that do not attend regular school and adults, social well-being, activities for the elderly, the emancipation of women, understanding and social cohesion between the cultural groups, tackle social exclusion, and to mobilise and involve residents with the wellbeing of Sant Roc. The organisation has a wide scope and is only constrained by its funding which comes from private donations and public funding (24% of the budget comes from the *Generalitat* and 1% from Municipality of Badalona). It is a partner of the Consortium, yet the direction of *Ateneu* remains sceptical.

4.5.6 Evaluation Sant Roc

As we have seen, the situation in Sant Roc is more worrisome than it is in Trinitat Nova. Over the years, there have been several initiatives to tackle the social issues of the area, with the Consortium being the latest effort. The Consortium has only recently started its activities, but it has already received criticisms for its indecisiveness and political dependencies. Furthermore, the Consortium has to allocate its funds per year which means that there are many ad hoc projects that do not always contribute to the existing activities and services in the area. Nevertheless, the project is unique in the Catalan context in terms of its scope, the amount of allocated funds, and its long-term focus.

However, respondents have indicated that the social situation in Sant Roc have deteriorated rather than improved in the last 5 years. Some argue that the visibility of social problems has increased due to the arrival of new immigrants from Eastern Europe, Latin America, Northern Africa and Asia. As a result, the public

perception is increasingly relating the problems to immigration, which had been a hotly debated topic during the political campaigns for the municipal elections in May 2007. However, some respondents argue that the problems of poverty and social exclusion have always been present in Sant Roc and that those issues should be on the political agenda still.

The remodelling project in part of the neighbourhood will most likely not directly change the socio-economic conditions of the residents. However, the remodelling project is a unique effort by ADIGSA and the *Generalitat* to improve living conditions in Sant Roc. Better dwellings will be available and improvements to public space are expected to help solve some social nuisances (crime, drug dealing, garbage disposal, etc.) The remodelling project will do little in terms of demography as it brings only a few new people to the neighbourhood. Residents whose dwelling is demolished are entitled to be relocated in a new dwelling. Thus, most new dwellings will not be available on market immediately. While the housing market in the regeneration zone is more or less closed, the market outside the regeneration zone is very dynamic. With the recent allocation of *Llei de Barris* funding (see above), the Consortium is obliged to focus on improving the physical environment of the rest of the neighbourhood in order to make the neighbourhood more attractive on the housing market.

In every project the level of participation is not as organised as it is in Trinitat Nova. While there were recently three neighbourhood associations, there is currently only one. Nevertheless, this association does not have the same institutional capacity as its counterpart in Trinitat Nova. This is most likely due to the absence of the tradition of activism, the marginal population, conflicts between groups, and the scope of the problems.

4.6 Conclusion

As we have seen, a broad range of problems affects the two cases. The most important of which is the physical regeneration of the estates. As the estates were often poorly built and neglected for more than three decades, there is a real danger of collapsing buildings. It is no surprise that these issues take up most of the resources and attention. This leads to straightforward projects which either refurbish or completely replace the concrete disease affected buildings. The remodelling schemes of the *Generalitat* and different municipalities also involve improvements to public space and tweaking of the urban plan.

In addition to the physical state of the buildings and public space, a range of social and economic problems have been mentioned as well. This is particularly the case in Sant Roc and less so in Trinitat Nova. Trinitat Nova has always had a relatively stable population of skilled workers that migrated from other parts of Spain to work in Barcelona. Hence, Trinitat Nova was more of a 'sleeping neighbourhood' than it was a problem estate. In contrast, the residents of Sant Roc were originally predominantly shanty-town dwellers and unskilled workers and fishermen. Poverty has always reigned in Sant Roc. Today, the social problems seem to have intensified since the neighbourhood has become an overpopulated entry point for immigrants to the Barcelonese labour and housing market. Social conflict, exclusion, insufficient welfare services, crime, school problems, and poverty are problems that affect the original Spanish and *Gitano* dwellers and even more so the immigrant from abroad. The area is stigmatised as an immigrant and *Gitano* problem area. While there are brave initiatives to turn the tide, the real problem is the inequality in society as a whole in combination with a lack of social housing and an overheated housing market which constrains the options for movement. The regional strategy is to provide more

social housing on scattered sites on the one hand, and to upgrade the market in the 'problem areas' on the other. This upgrading is done through investments in public space, infrastructure, and the buildings.

Overall, the social problems and nuisances have been left to local charity-sponsored organisations such as *Ateneu Sant Roc* and local services which were not equipped to handle the magnitude of the problem. Still, charity donations play an important role in the capacity to tackle social problems in Sant Roc and in Trinitat Nova. The regional government was minimally involved. Only when the Catalan Socialist Party came to power in 2004 did the attitude of the *Generalitat* change towards a more interventionist stance. This is particularly exemplified by the Consortium, Llei de Barris, and the new social housing laws and propositions. However, it should be mentioned that previous governments did kick-start the policy attention for peripheral neighbourhoods, but only after public outcry and sheer necessity. The remodelling projects were perhaps an important first step for the future ahead.

This change in direction is interesting in light of the welfare state context. The situation in Southern Europe, and more specifically in Spain, is different due to different institutional histories from those in Northwest Europe. The growth of the socialist or Christian-democrat welfare state in Northwest European countries show some similarities, like the golden decades after WWII which were interrupted by the 1970s crises. While Spain endured those crises as well, it experienced a different twentieth century under the authoritarian regime of General Francisco Franco. The regime permitted limited democratic liberties and favoured liberal policies. As a result, the welfare provisions were long based on charity, the church and family support. This changed after the late 1970s, when Spain reformed and adopted a liberal-democratic constitution. Ever since, Spain has been in the process of expanding its welfare provisions while building up its economy. As a result, it has only recently started to receive flows of economic immigrants.

Returning to our main question of embeddedness of neighbourhood regeneration, the question why Trinitat Nova residents are more satisfied than the inhabitants of Sant Roc, can be answered by pointing to the difference in social situation and status of the neighbourhoods. Their trajectories from the 1960s to today have differed very much. On the one hand, the original residents of Trinitat Nova were triumphant in their activism, which eventually led to its institutionalisation in the Community Development Plan. On the other hand, the original residents of Sant Roc were less able to sustain their activism and this led to out-migration, mistrust in the authorities, and, in some cases, defeatism. These characterisations are based on the interviews and may oversimplify social reality and history, but serve well to draw the distinction between the two neighbourhoods. In reality, Sant Roc residents have at times been successful in obtaining their demands and not even a majority of Trinitat Nova residents are involved in the decision-making process that is led by the Neighbourhood Association.

5 The Regeneration of Post-WWII Housing Estates in Amsterdam and Utrecht

5.1 National context: Dutch Welfare State

Expansion (1970s)

Like other countries in Western Europe, the introduction of social security laws was quite successful in the Netherlands between 1948 and 1970. Although social democratic parties were involved, the welfare system was built up under the aegis of Christian unions and parties (De Swaan, 1988). Their not too revolutionary goal was to 'civilize' capitalism through corporatism and welfare regulations. As a result, the welfare system was very paternalistic, where social inequalities are seen as 'natural', and the strong are expected to care for the weak by charity or state action. Paternalism is much like corporatism, yet not necessarily conservative. Furthermore, markets have to be regulated in order to keep poverty and social inequalities as low as possible in the general interest of a harmonious society (Becker, 2000). However, the 1960s saw radical cultural political changes in Dutch society. As society was increasingly secularising and the foundation of pillarisation 'withered away', leftist ideas became more prominent with new social movements and organizations. As a result, 'natural' hierarchies were questioned, and citizenship and social equality were stressed (Becker, 2000).

The political cultural changes in society led to the first leftist coalition coming to power in 1972. During these years, the central tasks of welfare policy was expanded from social security to the redistribution of income and life chances. In 1974, the lowest social benefits were linked to the net minimum wage (80% of minimum wage). Furthermore, the social ideology was not only made up of social democratic and emancipatory values, but also contained elements of excessive and even unrealistic welfare expectations, which were expressed by claims made by groups for assistance or subsidies.

'Though dressed in the vocabulary of citizenship, the stress on the right to be cared for or assisted by an imaginary democratic state was more a leftist variety of paternalism than genuinely social democratic' (Becker, 2000: 224)

Nevertheless, the social welfare system, or 'caring state', inspired an unprecedented trust in the state and confidence and in the future (De Swaan, 1988). However, the economic crises of the 1970s put a severe strain on the welfare state system in the second half of the 1970s and ultimately led to reform.

Crises, Reform and Change (1980s- early 1990s)

Even during the social democratic government and despite the critical attitude towards the market, the Dutch welfare system always remained passive (Becker, 2000) and even resulted in the reduction of labour supply (Kloosterman and Lambooy, 1992). While Scandinavian welfare systems actively promoted the creation of employment in the public sector, the passiveness of the Dutch system resulted in the 'dumping' of unemployed in the disability scheme (WAO).

Already in the 1970s, the 'generosity' of the Dutch welfare system led to budget deficits. Problems increased as the global economic recession took further hold and unemployment increased as well as the amount of welfare beneficiaries. Critics of the social democratic government coined the term 'Dutch Disease' to refer to the generous welfare benefits system combined with high unemployment in an economy that had lost its competitiveness (Becker, 2000).

After an unsuccessful attempt to manage the crisis with Keynesian interventions by a centre- left coalition, the Christian-Liberal coalition of 1982 set out to reform the welfare system itself. All 'nonsense' welfare expenditures, such as artist subsidies, were stopped. Budget deficits were brought down by tightening eligibility rules for benefits and raising social security contributions. Furthermore, top marginal income taxes were cut to increase economic competitiveness. These interventions signified a move to the right which was evident elsewhere as well, notably with the Thatcher government in the UK and the Christian Democrats in Germany. This meant that direct state interventions and Keynesian economics were out of favour, and, in order to liberalise the welfare system, individual responsibilities and duties outweighed social rights. However, the Dutch reform was slightly different. Firstly, along with the liberal and Christian Democratic values of individual initiative and self-responsibility, the Christian Democrats also emphasised the notion of subsidiarity (Van Staveren, 2007).⁴³ Secondly, austerity arguments perhaps carried more weight than any ideological discourse (Becker, 2000). The politics of austerity were continued by two Christian- Labour coalitions which ruled from 1986 until 1994. In this period, the budget deficit was further reduced. Gross replacement rates were brought down, the disability scheme (WAO) was drastically reformed, and general child and student allowances were frozen.

Third Way and Political Crises (mid 1990s- 2002)

In 1994, the WAO reform led to an electoral defeat for the Christian Democratic party and a Labour- Liberal coalition was formed. This was made possible by the dominance of the liberal wing of the social democrats over the 'traditionalists'. The 'purple' coalition did not add many retrenchment measures and focused on eligibility rules, reintegration into labour force (in some cases by force), and privatisation of social security. By this time the traditional paternalism had vanished as individualisation and depillarisation were complete. The welfare discourse of strong and weak became less dominant and restricted to the 'really weak'. For a majority, the idea of individual responsibility is seen as an untenable concept for the weakest in society. There is a belief that risks are spread unevenly throughout the population and, furthermore, further individual responsibility would increase the financial burden for social security for the weakest. The change in welfare discourse is also reflected by the diminishing importance of traditional Social Democratic objectives such as reducing income inequality by redistribution and educational chances for everyone (Becker, 2000).

This change in thinking has been referred to Third Way politics. Third Way is not so much a political programme but a way of seeing political problems, a rationality for making them conceivable and manageable, and a set of moral principles for creating and legitimising solutions. The term here refers to an alternative for traditional Social Democratic values which lead to bureaucratic and 'big government' and for right-wing neo-liberalism which seeks to curb government involvement as much as possible (Giddens, 2000).

Despite economic growth and reduction in unemployment compared to the early 1990s, the Purple coalition lost the 2002 elections amidst political and cultural

⁴³ Subsidiarity implies social and political responsibility for lower societal units such as family, neighbourhood and companies.

turmoil. The List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) became the second party a week after its charismatic leader, and *raison d'être*, Pim Fortuyn had been shot. Before his murder, Fortuyn had garnered a lot of support with his focus on the number of immigrants and their supposed lack of respect for Dutch way of life. Furthermore, his stance was very much anti-establishment and against Third Way politics (see Bruff, 2003).

Christian Democracy revisited (2002-)

After the 2002 elections, a governing coalition of Christian Democratic, Liberals, and LPF was formed. However, this coalition collapsed due to internal disagreements in the LPF within several months. After elections, a Christian Democratic- Liberal government came to power. When this coalition collapsed as well, the Christian-Democratic leader Balkenende formed his third cabinet in five years with the Labour Party and a small Christian Party in 2007.

During the last three consecutive Christian Democratic governments, austerity, self-responsibility, and subsidiarity were again propagated to legitimise a new round of welfare reforms. The WAO was supplanted by the Work, Income, and Disability Law (*Wet Werk en Inkomen naar Arbeidsvermogen, WIA*) in 2005. While the WIA still fully provides social security for fully and long-term disabled persons, those who are partially disabled have to work in order to receive additional benefits. In addition, employers receive a premium when reintegrating disabled persons into the workforce. The financing of health care insurance was reformed with the Law on Health Care Insurance in 2006 (*Zorgverzekeringswet*), which fully privatised health care insurance. The Law on Social Support (*Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning*) came into effect in 2007. The philosophy is that an individual is responsible for her own life and should always explore self-care and family care first when care is needed. The next step would be to look for options within civil society (neighbours, volunteers, citizen initiatives etc.). Housing associations and other social entrepreneurs are also expected to play their role. The municipality is tasked with the construction of a safety net for those who cannot manage by themselves (Vos, 2005). In addition, the increasing financial burden of an ageing population has led to discussions on the reform of the Pension provisions. In 2005, new regulations have already severely restricted early-retirement options.

After 25 years of reforms, leftist Paternalism has been washed down. However, the Dutch Welfare System can not be labeled as (neo-) liberal. While the system has been liberalised, it is still characterized by 'institutional inertia' of social democratic and paternalist, or corporatist, assumptions that were dominant in the past (cf. Becker, 2000). In addition, the notion of subsidiarity has introduced some communitarian elements into the system. This is evident in the urban social policies, which were introduced during the Third Way purple coalition (see below), but also in the Law on Social Support (*Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning*). As we shall see below, the changes in the welfare system in the 1980s and 1990s have had repercussions for the social composition of cities. Consequently, they also affect the policies and philosophies employed to tackle social problems. However, before discussing these points, we have to complete this picture of the welfare system with an overview of the housing system.

5.2 Dutch Housing System

Like the welfare system, the Dutch housing system is a mix of corporatist, social democratic, and liberal regulations and measures (see Hoekstra, 2003). The eye-catching, and unique, feature of the Dutch housing system is the substantial social rented sector. In the early 1990s the social rented sector represented 41% of the

Dutch housing stock. This was the result of the development of the welfare state after the WWII, in which housing was an important element.

Until the 1970s, housing policy was elaborate and the instruments were effective. Extensive state interventions in the market were warranted because it was paternalistically argued that citizens might undervalue the importance of good housing and spend their income on income goods. Secondly, it was argued that good quality housing and a good physical environment had positive external effects on individual development (Boelhouwer, 2002). The last argument is still in use today in housing restructuring and urban renewal (see below).

When the 1970s recession resulted in welfare reforms, housing policy changed as well. Home-ownership was promoted, yet the homeowner market headed for collapse in the early 1980s, which rendered the promotion elusive. Instead, new social rented dwellings were constructed in the 1980s contrary to government ideology.⁴⁴ In 1989, the government started its withdrawal in favour of the market. Financial support was more closely targeted on specific groups in order to make budget cuts. The share of social rented dwellings in new construction programmes was cut back. Furthermore, the sale of social rented dwellings was promoted in order to increase individual choice and homeownership. Notably, building subsidies were curtailed, which led to increases in social rents and the substantial social-rented sector was privatised (Boelhouwer, 2002).

In sum, during the 1990s the government distanced itself from the task of public service with respect to housing (Boelhouwer, 2002). While the welfare state arrangement had been characterised by a long-term fixed interdependence between government and private actors on the supply side of the market, the adjustments towards a market-orientated policy implied that the social sector has to be self-regulating (Salet, 1999). Furthermore, the prime institutional actors within the social sector, the social housing associations, are expected to be entrepreneurial in the social market. Yet, there is no structural incentive for the associations to make socially acceptable investments. In practice, housing associations do make these 'social investments', but the amount and direction of these are not steered or controlled by the state. Nevertheless, central government and municipalities are asking housing associations to be involved in urban restructuring, building of hospitals and schools, and participation in welfare and employment projects. While the social rented sector is increasingly under pressure, the role of housing associations in society is being expanded. This is due to their financial reserves, which are in part stored in their housing stock (Boelhouwer, 2007). The sale of this housing stock may serve to finance restructuring programmes and social programmes (see below).

5.3 Policy framework: Urban Restructuring and Urban Social Policy

The preceding paragraphs have provided us with the background story for neighbourhood regeneration in the Netherlands. In short, regeneration efforts are a mix of ad hoc welfare, social, and employment programmes on the one hand, and physical restructuring of the housing stock on the other. In other words, social welfare and labour policies are combined with housing and restructuring policies in a geographically limited (urban) area for a limited amount of time. Broadly speaking, the aim is to integrate the social-economic and physical approach in order to holistically improve an area and the social economic position of its residents. The conversion of these policies in an area-based fashion is unprecedented in Dutch

⁴⁴ This had been the case in the 1970s as well when rhetoric was anti-market but homeownership grew.

history. However, the Dutch case is not singular, as other Western European countries developed urban social policies from the late 1990s on as well.

The 'discovery' of poverty in urban areas the 1990s has been framed by a discourse of social exclusion. Contrary to the prevalent social democratic ideology of the 1970s, social inequality is no longer the issue at hand. Instead, government attention turned to the inequality of opportunities of certain groups in deprived urban areas. To be clear, urban social issues were on the political agenda for a longer time, but the attention for deprived neighbourhoods since the 1990s has several interrelated causes.

Firstly, the increase in income differences became apparent and acknowledged in the 1990s (Boelhouwer, 2002). 'Pockets of poverty' manifested themselves spatially in weaker neighbourhoods in the larger cities.

Secondly, in addition to the increase in income differences, the austere cutbacks in the 1980s reduced social and welfare work on a neighbourhood level substantially, leaving many to fend for themselves. As a result, social problems in weak neighbourhoods were allowed to simmer.

Thirdly, in the big cities, ethnic minorities were overrepresented in low-income groups. Initially, the cultural aspect gave the neighbourhood problem a politically uneasy dimension. In the 1990s, the presence of ethnic minorities in deprived neighbourhood was treated with caution for fear of being accused of racism. However, in the 2002 elections, the 'integration question' arrived on the political agenda together with the state of urban neighbourhoods.⁴⁵ This intensified the attention for neighbourhoods as they are seen as the battlegrounds for cultural and social integration. The intertwining of deprived neighbourhoods, ethnic minorities, and poverty is characterised by the current Ministerial post for Employment, Housing and Integration.

Fourthly, the Commission of the European Union launched the Urban Pilot Programme in 1990 and its URBAN programme in 1994. This signalled the start of a modest European urban area-based policy. What's more is that it also initiated the establishment of a European urban policy network, which stimulated knowledge exchange among professionals and policy dissemination (see Dukes, 2007).

Lastly, the global shift in economic policy ideology from the Keynesian to (neo-) liberal during the 1980s meant that the Social Democratic government of the 1990s could not revert to macro-economic demand-side policies. Instead, the Third Way government favoured addressing social exclusion through area-based interventions, which implied that the problem of poverty would be fixable by removing some localised obstacles such as demographic composition, bad living environment, inadequate services, etc. While these efforts may have their merits and pragmatic charm, the strategy tends to deny or bypass the structural problem of growing income differences.

5.3.1 Dutch Urban Policies

The Netherlands is a 'policy-dense' country. This is certainly true in the realm of urban and regional social and economic issues. Urban problems have received ample policy attention for more than half a century. From the 1970s onwards, various social issues have taken centre stage. At times, a stronger urban economy was favoured to help the poor; either directly by offering new jobs, or indirectly by a considerable economic growth that would also be beneficial to the poor. But in other periods, the dominant notion was that physical decline caused social exclusion, that concentrated

⁴⁵ Central government politicians were criticised for losing touch with the people because of their supposed reluctance to visit deprived urban neighbourhoods

poverty would intensify social exclusion, and that specific programmes of physical renewal would result in decreasing social exclusion.

In the past ten to fifteen years, Dutch urban policy, in various editions of the Big City Policy (BCP), combines expertise with financial and human resources in dealing with the economic, social, and physical aspects of cities in an integrated and area-based way. Simultaneously, the policy aims to bring resources and responsibilities to decentralised levels of government. The initial underlying objective was to create 'the comprehensive city', which later transformed to ambitions of creating the 'powerful city' or the 'safe' and 'liveable' city; these cities have neighbourhoods where everyone feels at home, they have thriving economies, jobs for job seekers, pleasant living conditions, liveable neighbourhoods, safe streets, and communities that include everyone and exclude no-one.

All BCP policies (table 5.1) were aimed at reducing the number of persons with inadequate educational skills. This was meant to reduce integration problems, diminish criminality and unsafe environments, tackle high unemployment rates, reduce out migration of the dwindling middle class, and support economic vitality. Moreover, the policies intended to remove dilapidated housing and commercial buildings, to overcome inadequate infrastructures and the resulting poor accessibility, which create obstacles to progress. Often, the problems accumulate and become concentrated in specific districts and the issues are clearly associated with each other. In fact, the persisting problems and the interconnectedness of several urban issues were the main drivers behind the launching of large-scale, integrated area-based approaches to urban problems (see Musterd and Ostendorf, 2007, forthcoming).

In these respects, Dutch urban policies connect to common policy discourses in Western-Europe. However, it should be noted that the Dutch policy measures can be distinguished from most other urban policies in Europe by its use of large scale restructuring at the neighbourhood level (see below).

Table 5.1. Summary of Urban Policies in The Netherlands

Name of policy	Period	Main goal	Definition of social issues	Slogan	Typical policy actions
Big City Policy I	'94-'98	Mixed neighbourhoods	Homogeneous poor n'hoods (segregation.)	Immigration of high incomes	Neighbourhood restructuring, attract better-off
Big City Policy II	'98-'04	Stable neighbourhoods	Housing career within n'hood	Prevent leaving n'hood	Creating opportunities in the neighbourhood
Big City Policy III	'04-'09	Stronger neighbourhoods	Ethnic concentrations/integration	Powerful cities	Neighbourhood restructuring, social mix
Big City Policy III+ /40 n'hoods programme	'07-	Integrated neighbourhoods	Ethnic and social integration	Prevent parallel societies	Neighbourhood restructuring, social mix, housing association involvement

Source: (Musterd and Ostendorf, 2007, forthcoming)

Big City Policy III+ / 40 Neighbourhoods programme

The Big City Policy III+ is an additional programme in addition to the running BCP III, which was conceived by the newly established government in February 2007. The centre-left coalition government created a new ministerial post within the ministry of

Housing and Spatial Planning to oversee the political project to transform 'problem neighbourhoods' into 'vigorous neighbourhoods'. The new Minister of Housing, Neighbourhoods, and Integration is responsible for designing and implementing the BCP III+ programme.

The programme is labelled the 40 'vigorous' neighbourhoods approach, because it distinguished itself by its policy strategy to exclusively target 40 of the worst problem neighbourhoods.⁴⁶ These neighbourhoods will be targeted by integrated policies involving the state, municipalities, social welfare organisations, and local housing corporations. The housing corporations are a relatively new actor in Dutch national urban social policies. However, they have been active in urban renewal and restructuring for a long period of time. Nevertheless, they contribute to a fund of € 250M, in addition to the €250-350M government budget. Furthermore, they play a leading role in the physical restructuring and other construction work.

The 40NP and BCP III, which are running simultaneously in 2008 and 2009, share similar aims and have a similar project-based integrated approach. Yet, there are differences in scope and scale. The BCP subsidies are distributed to municipalities and are meant to improve the region as a whole. While subsidies have been used for urban restructuring, especially in previous editions of the BCP, this is done through projects that strengthen the urban regional economy. On the other hand, the 40NP is conceived to improve individual life chances at the neighbourhood level.

In addition to the difference in scale, the integration of multi-sector interventions within the BCP framework has proved to be a difficult task. The 40NP is seen as an opportunity to achieve integration by transferring some decision-making and negotiating down to municipal and district (operational) levels. The aim is to construct an effective 'frontline' in the struggle against social exclusion and problem accumulation at the neighbourhood level.

5.3.2 Urban restructuring

Ever since the Housing Law of 1901, Dutch government has had instruments to clear individual buildings for traffic expansions and slum clearances. After WWII a large-scale approach was needed to clear the damages and reduce the massive housing shortages. Hence, the ensuing decades saw the development of various policy instruments to clear slums, upgrade housing, improve neighbourhoods, and create balanced and economically viable cities. The urban renewal of Dutch cities moved from the centre to the nineteenth century ring to the pre-war ring in a period until the mid-1990s. Up until then, the objectives of the renewal effort were characterised by polishing away arrears in maintenance and quality and urban renewal was triggered in most cases by concentrations of poor and dilapidated housing. However, already in the 1980s, policy makers began to grow concerned that physical renewal alone was insufficient to tackle the urban problems, especially the substantial urban unemployment. Furthermore, during this decade, central government grew more reluctant to finance the urban renewal. However, as no private parties were found that would invest in 'problem areas', the government financed 35% of the urban renewal in the 1980s. Because significant progress was made in tackling the physical deficiencies, the share of central government contribution was lowered to 25% in the early 1990s and to 10% in the late 1990s (Schuiling, 2007).

The urban renewal had been successful in reducing the amount of 'bad' quality housing in the total stock from 19% in 1985 to only 2% in 2000 (Van der Schaar, 2006). Hence, in the late 1990s, the aim of urban renewal policy was definitely shifted from 'curing' dilapidated housing to creating or preserving 'vital'

⁴⁶ The programme will be referred to as 40 Neighbourhoods Programme

cities and neighbourhoods. The new objectives are related to liveability, housing market quality, creating a 'better' social mix of residents, stimulating social cohesion, and fighting segregation. As such, the urban renewal, or restructuring, became a social policy instrument, which predominantly targeted the post-war housing estates, which were just put on the renewal agenda. The post-war housing estates were deemed too monotonous in terms of function, design, and (social) housing, which meant that the composition of the population was too one-sided as well. Furthermore, the housing estates were perceived to be the next problem areas. The restructuring strategy initially aimed at demolition to make room for the construction of new housing to attract a middle class from outside. However, the influx of middle class households proved to be insufficient. The new consensus was that the new construction was meant to keep the upwardly mobile in the neighbourhood. This group already know the estate and are not afraid to stay. The expectation is that this new local middle class will draw more middle class households from outside. Social economic renewal was seen as an integral part of the urban renewal effort (Schuiling, 2007). The 'social rise' of residents was seen as the objective. This rise would come about through education, labour market, housing market, and leisure time. To make this happen, the middle class will have to come from the estates themselves. To retain their social capital, physical quality has to be added to the neighbourhood. (see VROM Raad, 2006). With this rationale, the well-developed urban renewal instruments can be used to meet social needs.

The Estates

The next paragraphs will discuss the 2 cases; the regeneration of the Bijlmermeer in Amsterdam and Kanaleneiland in Utrecht. Both cases are subject of the RESTATE project and are discussed in three excellent reports (Aalbers et al., 2003, 2004; Van Beckhoven and Kempen, 2005). The descriptions below rely on these reports as they do on data from additional interviews and (policy) document study.

5.4 Amsterdam

Amsterdam is the largest city of the Netherlands with a population of 743,104 (see table 5.2). The Amsterdam metropolitan region has approximately 1.3M inhabitants. Even though it is the official capital, parliament and government are located in The Hague. Amsterdam is, however, the financial, commercial, and cultural centre of the Netherlands.

Its economy is based on business services, tourism, commercial banking, and trade and distribution (Schiphol Airport is near Amsterdam and the city has a seaport). Furthermore, the city has two universities and various polytechnics colleges whose presence is reflected in the city's relatively highly educated workforce. In sum, the city has a strong post-industrial economic and employment structure.

The population is relatively young which is partly due to many 18-29 year old persons coming to the city for work or education. As a result, the share of 1 person households is relatively large compared to households with children (see table 5.3). Furthermore, Amsterdam houses 175 different nationalities (2007 figure), including some larger ethnic minority groups. Of the total urban population, 51.4% is native Dutch, 14.1% of Western foreign descent, and 34.5% of non-Western foreign descent⁴⁷ (see table 5.4). The last group consists of relatively disadvantaged groups in Amsterdam. These ethnic groups, however, are not extremely segregated. The segregation index only increased slightly in the recent years. Yet, there are segregation patterns and ethnic concentrations. It appears that the share of non-Western non-natives (especially Turks and Moroccans) is increasing in the post-war areas at the fringes of the city, while their share is decreasing in the central areas of the city (O+S, 2007: 47- 48). Again, the concentrations of ethnic groups are not overwhelming, as no group exceeds 50%. Different ethnic groups display some spatial patterns. While Moroccans and Turks are overrepresented in the Western Garden Cities, Surinamese, Ghanaian, and Caribbean groups are overrepresented in the Southeast (where our Amsterdam case is situated).

Amsterdam's population is affected by external (foreign) migration and internal migration dynamics. Since the city was at a low of 675,570 inhabitants in 1985, the population has been steadily increasing. Because the average household size decreased over the years, the increase in population can be attributed to housing construction within the city limits, most notably new construction in IJburg (a group of artificial islands in the IJ lake), and in urban renewal areas such as the Bijlmer.

Table 5.2 – Amsterdam Population Development (source: Amsterdam Bureau for Research and Statistics)

Year	1970	1980	1990	2000	2007
Population	831,463	716,967	695,221	718,000	743,104

⁴⁷ A person is considered to be of foreign descent when at least one parent is born abroad.

Table 5.3. Household types in Amsterdam in %, 2007 (source: Amsterdam Bureau for Research and Statistics)

Household Type	2007
One person household	54.6
Multi-person household, no children	19.6
Multi-person household with children	15.2
Single parent family	9.5
Other	1.1
Total	100

Table 5.4. Ethnic groups in Amsterdam in %, 2007 (source: Amsterdam Bureau for Research and Statistics)

Descent	2007
Netherlands	51.4
Suriname	9.3
Morocco	8.9
Turkey	5.2
Indonesia	3.6
Germany	2.3
Dutch Antilles	1.5
Ghana	1.4
Other	16.4

5.5 The Bijlmer

In the early years after WWII, the Amsterdam Extension Plan was completed on the city's western edges. However, in the 1960s, it became apparent that more space was needed for housing and work. Hence, the Bijlmer was constructed as part of an extension plan southeast of the city in the 1960s. In the extension plan, presented in 1965, the Bijlmer would make up about half of the new Southeast district.

The Bijlmer was designed to be 'the city of the future' according to the functional and modernist principles of CIAM. This meant that business and work areas were separated from residential areas. In addition, public transport and car traffic were separated from pedestrian and bicycle lanes by the construction of elevated roads and subway lines. While roads were built on embankments and viaducts, a separate traffic network for pedestrians and cyclists was laid out on the ground level.

The Bijlmer was intended for lower- and, especially, middle-class households who wanted to flee the overpopulated inner city or had to do so because of urban renewal. The area had about 23,000 almost identical apartments in identical high-rise slab block buildings which snaked through green and lush public space in honeycomb patterns (see photo 5.1). Apartments were relatively large (100 to 125 square metres) and had relatively high rents for the social rented sector.

Photo 5.1. The Bijlmer high-rises in their honeycomb urban design



Soon after construction, in the 1970s, it already became clear that the Bijlmer would not be the envisioned middle class utopia. Turnover rates were exceptionally high because of competition from the construction of new single-family dwellings in the region. Furthermore, the housing needs of people from the (former) Dutch colonies meant an influx of Surinamese and Antilleans. Also, there was uneasiness about the social conditions and facilities of the Bijlmer. Slowly, social, economic, and maintenance problems mounted until the mid-1980s, when the Bijlmer was the most distressed and most deprived area of Amsterdam. During this period the Bijlmer became a refuge for all sorts of fringe groups such as illegal immigrants, drug addicts, etc. The dire situation was reflected in the rise in vacancy rates, which reached a maximum of 18% in 1983. From the mid-1980s, the tide was slowly being turned through a range of interventions. The most notable of these is the large-scale restructuring of the housing supply since the early 1990s. As a result, the Bijlmer is going through a long period of transformation, which means that statistics on demographics and housing below already reflect the changes.

The renewal project affects the amount of inhabitants in the Bijlmer (see table 5.5). Presently, little over 43,000 people live in the Bijlmer area, which is more than half of the Southeast district. From the early 1970s until the late 1980s, when many mid- and low-rise neighbourhoods were completed in adjacent neighbourhoods, the population was steadily increasing. However, from the early 1990s, the amount of inhabitants is in decline due to the urban renewal project. In the last decade and a half, the total amount of inhabitants in Southeast dropped by about 13,000 (a 14% drop). It is expected that the population figure will rise again after the completion of new housing.

The population of the Bijlmer is characterised by a large share of ethnic minority people since the 1970s. However, during the 1990s the proportion of ethnic minority groups in Amsterdam increased, which meant an increase in the Bijlmer as well (see tables 5.6 and 5.7). Two large groups stand out; the Surinamese and Antillean group and a heterogeneous group made up of other non-Western groups, most notably Ghanaians.

In terms of age structure, the population of the Bijlmer has an overrepresentation of 5-19 year olds (see table 5.8). In general, there are more children in low-rise buildings and newly built dwellings.

Table 5.5. Inhabitants of Southeast, 1976- 2007 (source: Amsterdam Bureau for Research and Statistics)

	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2003	2007
Bijlmer Centre	-	-	-	-	-	22,790	20,933	-	20,406
Bijlmer East	-	-	-	-	-	26,862	27,635	-	22,970
Southeast	38,000	39,500	39,500	55,000	91,084	86,002	84,609	84,811	77,917

Table 5.6. Ethnic groups in Bijlmer and Southeast District in %, 2007 (source: Amsterdam Bureau for Research and Statistics)

Descent	Bijlmer Centre	Bijlmer East	Southeast District
Netherlands	13.8	22.3	28.9
Surinam	40.1	34.0	32.9
Dutch Antilles	7.1	7.3	5.9
Turkey	2.0	0.6	1.0
Morocco	2.8	1.9	1.9
Other non-Western	27.7	26.3	21.4
Western	6.6	7.5	8.1

Table 5.7. Ethnic Minorities in Bijlmer and Southeast, Amsterdam in % in 1993, 2000 and 2007 (source: Amsterdam Bureau for Research and Statistics)

	1993	2000	2007
Bijlmer Centre	72	81	80
Bijlmer East	63	72	70
Southeast	53	62	63
Amsterdam	30	36	35

Table 5.8. Age structure of population of Bijlmer and Southeast in 2007 (in %) (source: Amsterdam Bureau for Research and Statistics)

	Bijlmer Centre	Bijlmer East	Southeast District	Amsterdam
<i>Population</i>	20406	22970	77917	743104
<i>Age structure</i>				
0- 4 years	7.8	7.0	6.6	6.1
5-19 years	20.0	20.7	20.1	14.8
20-34 years	25.8	20.9	21.9	26.1
35-49 years	27.4	25.1	24.9	25.2
50-64 years	13.6	17.1	17.8	16.6
≥ 65 years	5.4	9.2	8.7	11.2

The Bijlmer offers many local services, but originally there were no leisure activities (bars, cinemas, restaurants, etc.), as the area was conceived to be a satellite city dependent on Amsterdam's city centre. However, since the 1970s, the level of shops and entertainment has increased considerably. The first shopping centre, Ganzenhoef, was opened in 1976, but was hardly sufficient to cater to the 30,000 inhabitants. Consequently, a large retail centre was constructed in the Bijlmer, which would serve the residents as well as the visitors from nearby villages and the nearby business park. The hope was that the retail centre would provide an economic impulse to the area by providing jobs and opportunities for local entrepreneurs. Furthermore, providing leisure opportunities was expected to help assuage fears of visiting non-residents and to help improve the image of the Bijlmer. The Amsterdamse Poort, completed in 1987, attracted shopkeepers from the smaller shopping centres in Southeast, which subsequently fell into decay and vanished over

time. A second leisure and business centre was developed next to the Amsterdamse Poort on the other side of the elevated railway tracks. The ArenA area followed the construction of the Amsterdam ArenA stadium and features large chain stores, a theatre, and a multiplex cinema. Furthermore, the Bijlmer train station was renewed and expanded to serve as a transport hub. Overall, the area is well serviced by public transport with 2 subway tracks and local and regional bus lines. Furthermore, the area was built between the first and second city ring roads, making the area accessible by car. But because the area was originally set up to park in garages and attract no car traffic on the ground level, some buildings are hard to park close by to by car. In terms of health care, services in the Bijlmer have always been problematic. However, this is not considered a problem. Furthermore, the city's prestigious Academic Medical Centre is located in Southeast district.

5.5.1 Perceived Problems

Most respondents agree that the intervention in the Bijlmer was caused by the failing spatial concept of the Bijlmer. While the dwellings were spacious, comfortable and satisfactory, the buildings and the urban design were not. Massive and monotonous identical apartment blocks of 400 or 500 flats which were all connected by balconies and long indoor passageways, created an oppressive and anonymous environment beyond the individual scale. Many 'blind spots' such as parking garages, storage rooms (boxrooms/ sheds) on the ground floor level, the passageways inside and between buildings, and the lush greenery gave an excess of indefensible space which would often be polluted and gave an eerie and unsafe impression. Furthermore, the many (semi-) public spaces were hard and costly to maintain. Costs were further increased because residents often did not feel attached to the neighbourhood, which resulted in low levels of resident responsibility. This translated into high levels of graffiti, vandalism, and garbage dumping. According to surveys in the 1980s and 1990s, the maintenance of public space has been the prime concern of the residents.

Although the building form in the Bijlmer had its faults, the social economic problems of many of its inhabitants aggravated the negative image and low demand, which in turn saw the arrival of new weak individuals and groups, who had nowhere else to go. The undesirability and problems of the area led to a ghetto image among the public, which is still present today. The term ghetto may be an overstatement, but it was clear that the area bore a stigma and most residents were eager to move out of the area whenever they had the chance. This often meant that stronger households left and were replaced by new problem households.

Even today, the Bijlmer is characterised by a large share of unemployed job seekers (see table 5.9), which in Bijlmer Centre is almost twice as high as the city average. Like in the rest of the city, the unemployed group has an overrepresentation of ethnic minority groups. Furthermore, these unemployed job seekers are relatively poorly educated and have been unemployed for a long time. Youth unemployment is slightly higher in the Bijlmer as well. In addition, a considerable proportion of the potential labour force relies on welfare benefits. Furthermore, the average disposable income is below the city's average: in 2004, the average income per household in Bijlmer Centre was 20% below the city average. While there are many jobs in the Southeast district, especially in the ArenA business centre, these are filled by non-residents who commute to and from the area. Hence, there is a mismatch between the office jobs and the low educated unemployed in the Bijlmer.

Furthermore, there is a large group of 'illegal' immigrants, or *sans-papier*, living in the Bijlmer. This group do not have a legal residence in the Netherlands and

therefore do not exist in the housing and employment statistics. It was estimated in 2004 that between 2050 and 4100 people live in the Bijlmer without legal residence.

In sum, poverty and social exclusion are major problems in the Bijlmer. Respondents are especially concerned with the sustained poverty and the social exclusion of children. This is specially true for children in low-income single-parent households.

Table 5.9. Job seeking

unemployment in Bijlmer 1993-2007 (%) (source: Amsterdam Bureau for Research and Statistics)

	1993	2000	2007
Bijlmer Centre	22	19	13
Bijlmer East	20	18	11
Southeast	16	14	10
Amsterdam	16	11	7

As mentioned above, feelings of unsafety have always been high in the Bijlmer. This is partly due to the built environment. To be sure, crime rates in the Bijlmer have been above city average. Robbery, shoplifting, murder, and manslaughter have been relatively more frequent in the Bijlmer than in the rest of the city. Feelings of unsafety in the high-rise blocks have also increased in the late 1990s. National controversy arose in 2000, when companies threatened to vacate the area due to robbery of employees. For the same reason telecom companies and taxi drivers announced that they refused to enter the area at night. In the last few years, crime rates and feelings of unsafety among residents have been dropping steadily. Nevertheless, the image of crime and unsafety remains.

The Bijlmer has its problems with groups of youngsters hanging around in public spaces and causing nuisances, feelings of unsafety, violence, gang formations and/ or vandalism. In contrast to other parts of the city, experts insist this problem is more structural and more serious in the Bijlmer. Sustained poverty and socialisation make that youngsters sustain the negative behaviour at a later age.

Drugs have been a problem for years. Drug dealing, drug abuse and drug-related crimes are all serious issues. Some drug addicts live in the Bijlmer high-rises, but there are also homeless addicts who are often dislodged from the Utrecht and Amsterdam city centres. Furthermore, rough sleeping homeless, whether addicted to drugs or not, are also considered a problem.

Finally, the Bijlmer is known for its ethnic minority population dominated by African, Antillean and Surinamese groups. Some of these groups have managed to organise themselves quite well through church, civic, and voluntary organisations, usually along ethnic lines. However, some respondents have indicated that these formal and informal organisations tend to be very much inwardly focused. As a result, the Bijlmer has lacked a social structure or social cohesion between groups.

In sum, the Bijlmer has suffered from a wide range of serious problems. As one respondent put it colourfully, the Bijlmer was a repository for losers. As we shall see below, many intervention programmes have been launched, which have slowly changed the face and nature of the area.

5.5.2 Interventions in the Bijlmer

Urban renewal

Even before the last buildings were completed, there were already plans for demolition in the 1970s. It was not until the 1990s that these plans were put into action. However, already in the 1980s serious rescue attempts were undertaken. The creation of the Patrimonium/ Nieuw Amsterdam housing association in 1983 was an

important step to stop degeneration. The new housing association took over almost all of the housing from the housing associations that had originally built the Bijlmer. In addition, it received financial support from the housing associations and government. The new housing association together with the *Hoogbouw Bijlmer* (High-rise Bijlmer) project coordination office attempted to turn the tide by making adaptations to the apartment blocks and by intensifying management and supervision. However, while these interventions had some effect, the costs of management remained too high and threatened to ultimately bankrupt the housing association. At this point, the city council was unable to cover the management costs, or, in the case of the central government, refused to be committed to an unsustainable solution. Slowly the idea became prevalent that any new intervention would have to involve the demolition of relatively new housing. In addition to a change in the built environment, most actors understood that any physical intervention would have to be accompanied by a social economic renewal. After a heated political and social debate, the Southeast District Council, the Nieuw Amsterdam housing association, and the Amsterdam municipality decided to start a large-scale integral renewal of the Bijlmer in 1992. The goal was to create a neighbourhood with a favourable living climate (Dukes, 2007). In addition to liveability and safety, the objectives are to have a financially sound housing association, and to have a socially varied population living in an attractive and varied housing stock.

The renewal plans called for the renovation of about half of the 12,500 high-rise dwellings in the renewal zone but also for the demolition of the other half. The demolition will be completed in 2008. The new housing replacing the demolished blocks (and their surrounding green fields) is either owner-occupied terraced housing or, along the main traffic arteries and around the urban centres, mid-rise apartment blocks.

The addition of owner occupied dwellings to the Bijlmer housing stock is a striking feature. Originally, housing in the Bijlmer high-rises had almost exclusively been in the social rented sector (92.6% in 1992). The second phase plan of 2001 aims for 45% owner occupied housing in the Bijlmer by 2010.⁴⁸ Table 5.10 shows the already impressive change in tenure between 2000 and 2007. Furthermore, the number of new (terraced) housing will be 10% higher than the number of demolished flats.

The owner occupied housing will accommodate and provide for middle class households, preferably from the social mobile group within the neighbourhood who normally move on. Respondents indicate that about 50% of the finished dwellings are sold to Southeast inhabitants. An intended side effect is to slow down and stabilise the influx of marginal groups and 'social starters into the Bijlmer. Moreover, the demolition of an apartment block means the resettlement of its residents. These residents find new social housing elsewhere in the Amsterdam region. Table 5.5 above reflects the demolition by a dramatic decline in population in the last 7 years. While provisions have been taken for those who want to return to the area, the decline in social rented dwellings means that not all the old residents will be able to return. The movement of people is in line with the aim of creating a new social mix. Furthermore, one respondent admitted that renovation methods which required resettlement were favoured in particularly infamous blocks.

The renovation of flats involves the removal of public corridors on the first floor and the original entrances. Lifts and entrances are transferred to the ground floor, where new closable entrances are placed. On the ground floor, sheds/ box rooms and blank walls are replaced by apartments and workspaces. The public balconies which run along the length of the blocks are compartmentalised to increase

⁴⁸ Interviewees indicate that the renewal is delayed for several years.

social control and safety. The interior of the apartments is left untouched as it is sufficiently spacious and comfortable.

Table 5.10. Housing tenure in the Bijlmer (%) in 2000 and 2007
(source: Amsterdam Bureau for Research and Statistics)

	Owner occupied		Social Rent		Private Rent		Other / Unknown	
	2000	2007	2000	2007	2000	2007	2000	2007
Bijlmer Centre	3	14	97	83	0	3	0	0
Bijlmer East	13	26	85	64	2	10	0	0
Southeast	13	23	73	67	14	9	3	0

In addition to housing, the renewal programme also affects the infrastructure of the area. The main arteries are lowered to ground level as much possible and will have bike lanes and pavement, thereby 'unseparating' traffic. The parking garages are being demolished and parking is made possible on the ground level in front of apartment blocks.⁴⁹ The new areas with single-family housing have parking spots as well. Furthermore, shopping centre Ganzenhoef was demolished in 1999-2000 and replaced by a brand new shopping centre. The new train station, mentioned above, will contribute to the improvement of the public transport system.

The renewal of the Bijlmer is a large-scale project, which is funded by the Central Fund for Social Housing⁵⁰, the Municipality of Amsterdam, and the Nieuw Amsterdam/ Patrimonium housing association (now merged with the Rochdale housing association). The restructuring investments total to about €2,000,000,000. More than three fourths of these investments are cost-effective based on the future revenues of rents and sales. However, about 450,000,000 is not cost effective. About 90% will be covered by the Municipality and the Central Fund for Social Housing.

The Municipality, Housing association and Southeast District set up the Bijlmer Renewal Project Bureau to handle the coordination and management of the renewal. The Bureau is currently implementing the 2001 second-phase plan (Project Bureau Bijlmermeer, 2002), which is an expansion of the early 1990s renewal plan.

Resident involvement caught on later in the process. Traditional consultation and communication proved to be too limited in reach and too much step-by-step. After some residents' protest and experience, opportunities for the residents' involvement were expanded through the activation of residents by means of community work, multi-lingual consultation and information, informal networking, consumer panels, and through local media.

⁴⁹ This caused problems in the 'Bijlmer museum', an area which still has high-rises, where parking on the ground level was against the 'Bijlmer concept'. To solve this problem an embankment was made to conceal the parked cars.

⁵⁰ As a re-allocation fund paid by contributions of all housing associations in the Netherlands, the Fund monitors housing associations but is not an actor in the renewal.

Photo 5.2. Renewal in Bijlmer East.
Note the difference in housing and urban design between new construction in the foreground and the old honeycomb high rises.



Photo 5.3. Renewal in the Bijlmer



Social economic intervention

While initially the emphasis has been on the physical renewal, when the renewed areas began to show signs of 'old Bijlmer' it soon became clear that social economic intervention was needed as well. As multiple respondents wisely remark, a renewed or new dwelling does not seem to change a person's behaviour or social economic situation.

After the renewal started in the early 1990s, there have been many projects and initiatives to increase employment and economic activity in the Bijlmer. These

projects are usually carried out by voluntary and civic organisations and are subsidised by Big City Policy funds, EU funds (Objective 2, URBAN, URBACT, Equal), and municipal funds. The Southeast Districts allocates the funds and monitors the activities.

While there have been all sorts of projects, one of the main philosophies has been to make use of the potency of the Bijlmer by socially and economically activating and empowering the residents. For example, subsidies went to the Women Empowerment Centre and the Entrepreneur House to cover start up costs. The former works to increase the labour market possibilities of women through personal support, while the latter supports and promotes individuals who sometimes have already been active from home, to start small businesses.

These efforts are supported by the physical renewal which offers opportunities for new (and cheap) workspaces, as well as new accommodations for the many civic, voluntary and self-organisations that play a role in activating residents and increasing social cohesion. For instance, the Culture and Education Centre 'Ganzenhoef' houses eleven organisations that support empowerment, training for immigrants and the unemployed, and improve labour market access. A similar building is the Kandelaar, which houses several self- and several church organisations.

A large part of the social economic interventions are directed at children. As noted above, there is a concern for sustained poverty and social exclusion of young children. These interventions focus on raising the level of education, reducing the amount of drop-outs and getting children into contact with positive role models and activities, like sports. Furthermore, investments are made in improving schools and providing them with better equipment and facilities.

Liveability, safety, and management

One of the prime objectives of the transformation of the Bijlmer is the creation of a liveable residential environment. A liveable neighbourhood is defined by the interviewees as a neighbourhood which is safe and clean, but also has a degree of social interaction between neighbours. This social interaction is valued very highly by policy makers because a neighbourhood community will be more successful in managing its own neighbourhood and solving its own conflicts and nuisances.

New residents of new housing are visited by the housing association representatives before and after moving into their new dwelling. These meetings serve to inform new residents of the rules and norms of living in a single-family house or renewed apartment, and of the opportunities to participate in voluntary and neighbourhood organisations. Furthermore, the meetings also serve to monitor residents' situations. These meetings have been introduced to set up a social infrastructure, a community, but also to prevent earlier incidents concerning households displaying negative behaviour after moving into renewed dwellings.

During the renewal programme, extra funds were made available to increase the quality and amount of management in order to combat nuisances in unrenovated areas, guarantee liveability around the building sites, and develop more efficient management in renewed areas. The slogan Clean, Functioning, and Safe was adopted for the strategy, which involved all the parties in the Bijlmer (mainly the Rochdale housing association and the Southeast district). The strategy resulted in a surge of cleaning efforts and repairs. Furthermore, preventive measures were taken such as the instalment of cameras in apartment blocks and public spaces, extra pollution squads, two extra reception centres for drug addicts as well as a shelter, wardens in blocks and public areas, closing off box rooms and other 'vulnerable' and 'indefensible' spaces before renewal, and the trimming of the lush greenery to increase sight.

As mentioned, drug abuse and drug addictions remain important threats to the goal of creating a liveable neighbourhood. Extra attention for drug addicts as well as extra facilities are intended for 'Bijlmer Junkies', addicts who have been in the area for so long that they are seen as residents. In addition to the extra help and care, police and justice department are using a harder and more repressive strategy for drug-related offences. Furthermore, some vulnerable areas have been made off-limits to drug addicts (and youngsters). Both the repressive, health care, and support measures have successfully lowered the drug-related problems in the Bijlmer.

The preceding paragraph has only very summarily reviewed the extensive range of measures and interventions to increase safety and liveability in the Bijlmer. Furthermore, respondents indicate that the new social mix and built form have a positive impact on liveability as well. Firstly, the new middle class is thought to act as a role model and give the right example to others. Second, the smaller scale of the urban design invites more social interaction and thereby more social control.

5.5.3 Conclusion Bijlmer

The interviewees generally evaluate the renewal of the Bijlmer as positive. Especially the physical change is seen as successful even though many of the social rented dwellings still have to be built. However, many interviewees note that poverty and social exclusion continue to be a major problem which has to be dealt with more extensively in order to truly transform the Bijlmer into a normal neighbourhood. Hence, the 40 Neighbourhood Programme initiatives keep focusing on the social economic situation of residents.

A particularly interesting aspect of the restructuring intervention in the Bijlmer is the objective of social mixing and the high costs the actors were willing to pay to accomplish it, in financial, social, and political terms. Even though the restructuring programme in the Bijlmer was not connected to any running municipal policy, today the approach is in line with the municipal housing strategy to increase the share of owner occupied housing in the city through construction and promotion of the sale of social rented dwellings outside of the centre (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2007). This strategy caters to the growing demand of middle class households. However, municipal policy makers note that the renewal of the Bijlmer may have been too drastic at times.

While some interviewees evaluate the social mixing strategy as very positive, others point to some disadvantages or side effects. Firstly, there is some evidence that the large-scale movement of people has created some 'waterbed' effects elsewhere in the region. Weak households and problematic individuals ended up in other neighbourhoods, which then suffered from some decline. Secondly, some interviewees maintain that the renewal of the Bijlmer and the movement of people have severely damaged the social infrastructure of the Bijlmer. This infrastructure is seen as important for support networks and social cohesion. The social, civic, and immigrant organisations are seen as instrumental in (re-)building social networks and providing social cohesion. However, these networks are also seen as an obstacle because they often focus their attention inward and fail to reach out to other groups.

It should be noted though that the poverty-stricken residents remain concentrated in the old and renovated high-rises. The new low-rise areas, on the other hand, have become (lower) middle class neighbourhoods that resemble suburban-like neighbourhoods elsewhere in Amsterdam. One interviewee characterised these renewal areas as bourgeois prudish (*truttig*).

Photo 5.4 Refurbished elevated train station




5.6 Utrecht

Being the smallest of 'the big four' cities in the Netherlands, Utrecht has a population of 289,000. Thanks to its central location in the country, it is a major rail- and highway traffic hub. Consequently, these conditions have favoured the economic profile of the city. Since the early 1970s, manufacturing is slowly being replaced by service sector, which employs about 90 percent of the workforce. The sector mainly consists of commercial, insurance, ICT, and business services. The amount of jobs exceeds the population. With half the population working outside the city, this creates a huge daily commuter flow.

Utrecht's population has been growing in the last decade (12.5% increase in period 2001-2007). This is thanks to the construction of the Leidsche Rijn area and the increase in students (total of 65,000 students). Utrecht has a relatively young population compared to the rest of the country and other big cities (22% of population is aged 20-29 year). In addition, more than half of the households are one-person households (52.5%). Family households are mainly concentrated in the new suburban neighbourhoods of Leidsche Rijn and Vleuten, where 44% of the households are families with children.

Like Amsterdam, Utrecht has a positive internal immigration and attracts international immigrants as well. 69% of the total urban population is native Dutch, 10% is of Western foreign descent, and 21% is of non-Western foreign descent. Two groups make up three quarters of the non-Western group. These are Moroccans who account for 8.8% of the total population and Turks who account for 4%.

Figure 5.1. The Neighbourhood Districts of Utrecht with the selected districts in the 40 Neighbourhood Programme highlighted. No. 23 is Kanaleiland.



5.7 Kanaleneiland

Kanaleneiland is located in the South-west (*Zuidwest*) district of Utrecht (see figure 5.1). It is part of the post-war housing estates that were built to cope with housing shortages. Typically, these estates were built on the edge of the city and consisted of multi-family slab blocks. Between 1945 and 1970, 31,000 dwellings were built (23,000 in multi family blocks). Because of the demand and need, the housing was built efficiently, which meant similar sober designs with a minimum amount of physical quality. Most of the complexes were built in the social rented sector. Initially, many blocks featured 4 bedroom apartments to house families with children. Furthermore, key words in the urban design and planning were 'light', 'air', and 'green' in order to create neighbourhoods with tight communities. In addition, services were provided for the residents. As a result, the housing stock of the post-war housing estates, like Kanaleneiland, is characterised by large apartments with cheap rents in comparable concrete 4-storey slab blocks. As we shall see, this has had its consequences for the residents and the neighbourhoods today.


Kanaleneiland was finished in 1965 when the last of the 7,500 dwellings were finished. Kanaleneiland-North (KE-N) was finished first. This area was planned for middle-class families with children. As a result, this area boasts many 4-bedroom dwellings in predominantly multi-family complexes. These complexes do not have elevators. The majority of the dwellings are in the social rented sector and these are owned by two housing associations, Mitros and Portaal. The construction of Kanaleneiland-South (KE-S) started in 1961. It is similar in design and dwelling-type to KE-N. However, there are less 4-bedroom apartments and some single family housing in the owner-occupied sector. Transwijk is the third housing estate within the Kanaleneiland area. It features some 4-storey blocks in the privately owned sector, but it is dominated by social-rented single-family housing (see table 5.11).

The services of the area are well appreciated by the residents (Gemeente Utrecht, 2007b). The area has a large shopping centre and several smaller shopping centres scattered around the area. However, medical services are scarce within the neighbourhood. Kanaleneiland Noord has a regional professional education centre and one primary school with an overwhelming majority of non-native children. Furthermore, the area is serviced by a tramline and regional busses. It is located near the city centre (2 km from KE-N) and the motorway. While many residents value the connectivity of the area (Gemeente Utrecht, 2007b), the 2 main traffic arteries that cross the area, isolate the neighbourhood from the rest of the city.

Table 5.11. Housing stock in Kanaleneiland and Utrecht in 2007 (source: Gemeente Utrecht, 2007a)

	Kanaleneiland	Utrecht
No. of dwellings	5,939	152,941
Type		
% single family	13	40
% multi-family	84	52
Other	3	8
Tenure		
% Owner-occupied	23	48
% Private rent	11	14
% Social-rented sector	66	38
Rooms		
% 1-3 room	32	31
% ≥4 room	68	69

Figure 5.2. The original lay-out of Kanaleneiland with the 'stamp' urban design of buildings



5.7.1 Perceived Problems

Since the 1980s, Kanaleneiland, Noord in particular, has gained national notoriety through a series of incidents which received ample media attention. The neighbourhood is infamous for its youth gangs, crime and safety issues, physical deterioration, and large immigrant population. Almost 60% of the residents does not want to live in Kanaleneiland and the residents grade the neighbourhood with a 4 out of 10 in 2006 (5.4 in 2004, Gemeente Utrecht, 2007b). Respondents stress that the image of the neighbourhood is worse than the actual situation, and blame journalists for selective reporting and stereotyping. There is a shared belief in that the negative image, which is continuously perpetuated by new incidents, stigmatises the residents. Some respondents feel that stigmatisation is being reinforced by the extra policy attention in the area.⁵¹ Nevertheless, all respondents acknowledge the existence of serious social economic and physical problems.

The physical quality of the housing stock in Kanaleneiland is generally perceived to be adequate. Recent renovation projects have improved the quality of some blocks. However, several complexes in KE-N, especially those owned by Mitros housing association,⁵² show signs of physical deterioration (draught, noise pollution, moisture). What's more, the buildings are not equipped to meet today's housing standards. The dwellings are rather simple and austere compared to modern buildings. There are no elevators, no central heating systems, no proper insulation and ventilation, and no drain junctions for washing machines. Furthermore, many residents complain about the pollution and deterioration of public space.

While the physical state of the blocks will need attention in due time, the social and economic problems of the residents of Kanaleneiland are seen as more pressing. The foremost problem is connected to the youth in Kanaleneiland. Kanaleneiland has a relatively young population (see table 5.12), especially for a non-suburban environment. The Utrecht Neighbourhood Monitor reveals that 64.6% of the residents indicate that they have experienced negative behaviour or nuisance

⁵¹ Stigmatisation is already evident in the labelling of certain projects such as 'Give a Kanaleneilander an Internship/ Job'. This slogan implies that all Kanaleneilanders need help (or a little charity) to get work. Another example is that immigrant organisations are labelled self-organisations (*zelforganisaties*) while similar native organisations are labelled resident organisations (*bewonersorganisaties*).

⁵² Mitros' housing stock in Kanaleneiland used to be the municipal housing stock's, which received less attention in terms of maintenance and upkeep due to the need for funds for the renewal of pre-war neighbourhoods (Interview, Assistant Neighbourhood Manager).

from youths (a rise of almost 30 percentiles from 2004, Gemeente Utrecht, 2007b). It is estimated that about fifty to sixty youngsters engage in criminal and anti-social behaviour. This group is feared to function as a negative role model for a bigger group of youths who follow by example. These youngsters are seen as a serious threat to the liveability of the neighbourhood.

Table 5.12. Demographic development of age composition and ethnicity (Source: Wijkenmonitor 2007, Gemeente Utrecht)

	Utrecht		Kanaleneiland	
	2004	2007	2004	2007
Age composition				
% 0-17 year old	18.6	18.8	28.5	28.1
% 18-26 year old	17.5	18.8	18.3	19.4
% 27-34 year old	18.2	16.8	16.6	15.4
% 35-44 year old	15.7	16.2	12.8	13.8
% 45-54 year old	10.8	10.9	7.5	8.1
% >54 year old	19.1	18.5	16.4	15.2
Ethnicity				
% Native Dutch	69.7	69	24.4	22.9
% Turkish	4.5	4.5	17.5	18
% Moroccan	8.6	8.8	39.5	40.2
% Surinamese/ Antillean	3.4	3.4	4.1	4.1
% other non-Western	3.9	4.3	7.7	8.5
% Western	9.8	10	6.5	6.3

In addition and related to the youth problem, is the weak economic position of the residents of Kanaleneiland. Table 5.12 shows that unemployment, low-income households, welfare dependency, and low-educated persons are overrepresented in Kanaleneiland. While the economic situation has improved in the last two to three years, the improvement is generally below city average. The increase in jobs is partly thanks to a new corporate headquarters in the area.

The youth and socio-economic problems have a strong cultural component as well. Table 5.13 shows that non-native Dutch are overrepresented in Kanaleneiland. This is especially true for Moroccans, who make up the majority of the area. Many respondents point to this fact and indicate that language barriers, distrust towards the state, in-group mentalities, and cultural differences perpetuate the problems and obstruct effective solutions. Furthermore, cultural differences are seen as creating their own problems. This is especially the case for newly arrived immigrant women who are confined to their homes. In addition, the cultural component attributes to the stigmatisation of the neighbourhood and its residents, especially in the labour market where young Moroccans experience discrimination. A larger degree of social and cultural integration is seen as part of the solution. However, most respondents admit that the socio-economic factor (poverty) takes precedence over cultural factors and integration, when it comes to improving the neighbourhood. This is evident in the housing career strategy, which aims to keep the successful non-native middle class within the neighbourhood (see below).

Table 5.13. Income and employment in Utrecht and Kanaleneiland in 2004 and 2006/07
(Source: Wijkenmonitor 2007, Gemeente Utrecht)

	Utrecht		Kanaleneiland	
	2004	2006/ 2007	2004	2006/ 2007
% unemployed	6.9	5.1	13.4	11.7
% unemployed 15-26 year old	4.2	1.8	8.8	4.4
% households on welfare benefits	6.4	6.3	15.7	16.1
% disability benefits	8	7.2	8.5	8.1
% on benefits	15.3	14.3	24.2	23.6
Amount of Businesses	15,721	17,189	378	408
Amount of Jobs	203,469	199,936	4,497	4,913
Jobs per 100 inhabitants	75.3	71.1	29.3	32.2
% households on a social minimum income	11	-	18	-
Average income per household (x1000 euro)	27.8	-	22.6	-
% low education	30.7	22.4	45.4	37.7

Lastly, many of the social and economic problems can be found in the same households. As we shall see below, these so-called multi-problem households require an extra well-concerted effort, because these households risk social exclusion. An element of the problem addition is thought to be related to the state and status of the neighbourhood. Stigmatisation and negative socialisation effects are thought to contribute to the accumulation of individual household problems.

The negative neighbourhood effects are connected to the high concentration of social economic weak households. Especially in KE-N, there are thought to be too many large poor immigrant families (with disaffected youth) within a small and somewhat isolated area. This situation is the result of the structure of housing within the Utrecht housing market. Like Amsterdam, the Utrecht housing market has been under high pressure and affordable large housing is scarce both within the owner-occupied and social rented sector. Kanaleneiland, especially Noord, has a concentration of large dwellings with relatively low rents. Because the allocation of social housing is non-arbitrary and based on time on a waiting list, large families choose Kanaleneiland because of the lack of these types of households in other neighbourhoods. Thus, there is a process of self-selection. On the other hand, respondents have expressed some frustration over their observation that families who have some economic success, move out of the neighbourhood. They move away to more comfortable housing unavailable in Kanaleneiland. The frustration is that once a family moves out, a positive role model is lost and replaced by a new 'multi-problem family'. In other words, the structure of the housing market perpetuates the concentration of weak groups and thereby the social problems.

Photo 5.5. Slab block in Kanaleneiland



5.7.2 Policies and interventions in Kanaleneiland

For many years Kanaleneiland has been subject to a range of social-economic, safety, and physical interventions. The Municipality of Utrecht is a prominent actor in these interventions. Various policy programmes and interventions originate from and are implemented by its departments and its Southwest Neighbourhood Office. The neighbourhood manager receives a 'liveability budget' from the GSB to fund small interventions together with residents and local entrepreneurs. The local municipality is supported by a resident council, which is an advisory organ whose members are not elected but picked by cooptation.

Apart from the municipality, other institutional actors are welfare organisations, private actors, self-organisations, and housing associations. Housing associations have always been involved with the neighbourhood because of the large share of social rented dwellings (66% in KE in 2007). Three housing associations own housing in Kanaleneiland. Two housing associations operate in the entire area (Mitros and Portaal) and one only in Kanaleneiland-South (Bo-Ex). As mentioned above, the role of the housing associations is expanding from housing management to the social welfare sphere. In the local 40 Neighbourhood Programme agreement they will contribute to new physical and social economic projects. Their involvement will consist of providing space for social initiatives at relatively low rents, something which some associations are already doing. In the future, they will perhaps develop new spaces. This is termed social real estate (*sociaal maatschappelijk vastgoed*).

Kanaleneiland boasts many so-called self-organisations and resident organisations. About 30% of the residents is active in the neighbourhood (Gemeente Utrecht, 2007b). These organisations are seen as instrumental in the multitude of social-economic, welfare, health, and emancipation projects. However, there is some concern that these organisations are too much focused on bonding within their own community or cultural group, and do not 'bridge' towards other groups within and outside Kanaleneiland.

Physical interventions

While there have been several renovation projects, there have been no large-scale restructuring projects in Kanaleneiland. The renovation of the Rijnbaan shopping

centre and the development of the 'Heart of (Kanaleneiland) North' have been the most notable developments in recent years. The Rijnbaan shopping centre was one of the first indoor shopping centres in Utrecht. However, the shopping centre suffered from serious deterioration and its depressing exterior became a mediatised symbol for Kanaleneiland's decline. After the shopping centre changed ownership, the new owner was persuaded to renovate it in 2006. The renovation will be completed in 2008 with the addition of several owner-occupied apartments. The choice to invest in the shopping centre was partly induced by municipal lobbying and carrots, but mostly by the success of the Heart of North project.

The Heart of North project started in 1999 and entailed the demolition of three primary schools in Kanaleneiland North in 2004 and re-housing them as one school in a new Forum building on the same location. The Forum building also serves as a local civic centre. In addition to the Forum building, 79 owner-occupied single family houses and 24 apartments were developed. These dwellings were quickly sold to middle-class households. This demonstrated that development of new housing in Kanaleneiland could be made cost-effective through the sale of dwellings and land. The profits from the sale of municipal land were reinvested in construction of the Forum building and the funding of welfare organisations. The development was done by a private developer in cooperation with the municipality.

For several years, a planning process is in progress for an extensive restructuring programme. This restructuring effort is part of the 'Utrecht Renews' programme. This programme started in 2001 as the DUO programme and went into a second phase in 2005, which will last until 2009. The programme is an agreement between housing associations and the municipality to renew, renovate and restructure a large share of the Utrecht housing stock. In total, about 9,500 social rental dwellings should be demolished by 2015 and replaced by 9,000 new dwellings of which 3,000 will be social rental. Furthermore, about 2,000 social rental dwellings will be sold to present tenants and 3,000 dwellings will be renovated.

The first step in Kanaleneiland is yet to be taken. The Kanaleneiland Axis project aims to renew and expand the centre of Kanaleneiland. The plan involves the extension of the main shopping centre, the expansion of the Regional Education Centre, and new housing. About 550 dwellings (mostly in the social rented sector) are to be demolished and replaced by 1,300-1,800 new dwellings in high-rise blocks. The objective is to construct an attractive urban centre that will bring more activity to the area and that will house more middle-class families in the neighbourhood (about 70% of the new development will be owner occupied housing).

The plans for Kanaleneiland Axis were presented in 2003, but, by the end of 2007, only a school was demolished. The project was delayed due to the multitude of actors slowing down the decision-making process. The actors are two housing associations, two private parties, the municipality, the shopping centre, and the Regional Education Centre, which dropped out of the project in 2007. In addition, the residents still have to be consulted and involved. Lastly, the project faces further delays due to air quality procedures. Optimist estimations are that construction will start on green fields in 2008.

After Kanaleneiland Axis, the expectation is that large parts of Kanaleneiland North will face restructuring (demolishing and new construction) as well. Kanaleneiland South on the other hand will probably be subject to a renovation programme. The plans for these programmes are in development and will be presented in 2008 or 2009.

Liveability and Youth

As mentioned above, the liveability of Kanaleneiland is severely compromised by the behaviour of a group of youngsters. Furthermore, the presence of groups of

youngsters (and their behaviour) negatively influences the feelings of safety among residents and outsiders. To counter this, the police, justice department, municipality, social welfare organisations, and housing associations are cooperating within the framework of the municipal safety programme (*Veiligheidsprogramma Utrecht Veilig*). The projects within this framework are preventive and repressive in nature. The identification of the criminal 'hard core' of youngsters will be prosecuted more vigorously. For example, following an incident involving youth, a general prohibition to congregate was proclaimed and enforced in the area in 2007. This seemingly draconian measure was taken to get the 'hard core' of the streets. Furthermore, CCTV cameras were installed to increase safety and prevent vandalism. The preventive projects include the promotion of sports and the organisation of all sorts of activities to prevent boredom and stimulate physical development. Furthermore, support is given to immigrant parents to help them spot and prevent negative behaviour of their children.

In addition to the safety programme, children are also involved in other liveability projects. Young children especially are targeted to prevent them from 'derailing' and engaging in criminal activities. Furthermore, these projects aim to create awareness about the neighbourhood and of the importance of a clean living environment. Also, a small youth centre (*Chill Eiland*) was opened in 2006 to monitor and protect the youngsters from aggression, crime, and drugs.

The pollution of public space is being tackled through extra wardens, increased cleaning and a 'cleaning police'. The assumption is that by cleaning the neighbourhood more often and simultaneously, public space will look nicer and people will be less inclined to vandalise it or litter.

Photo 5.6. Kanaleneiland



Employment, emancipation, and poverty

Under the Cooperating Social Partners programme (*Samenwerkende maatschappelijke Partners, SMP*) a range of projects have been launched that seek to improve the labour market position of unemployed immigrants and bring business activity to the area. The SMP is a network of private companies, housing associations, municipality and social welfare organisations coordinated by 2 individuals, which help to facilitate and launch private initiatives that create jobs or employment. In 2008 this loose network, will be supplanted by a national network

(*Slinger*) which originates from the business community. The bottom-up projects include job application training, internship creation programmes, education and training for immigrants to work in health care or day care, and facilitate start-up businesses.

In 2006/ 2007 the SMP helped twenty women from nine different cultures to found the Three Generation Centre. The Centre is meant for native and immigrant women who need help or advice in taking care of their children or parents. Furthermore, the Centre will function as a meeting place and as a place from where to start new initiatives in Kanaleneiland in order to increase liveability and social cohesion.

Lastly, like in the Amsterdam Bijlmer, Kanaleneiland has 'Behind the Front Door' initiatives (*Achter de Voordeur*) to deal with 'multi-problem' families more holistically and better coordinated. This means that one person, a social worker, assembles a file on a household's situation from the housing association, the various social welfare organisations, and the municipal files. Next, this person represents all these organisations when approaching a multi-problem household to look for solutions to the problems. The advantage is that the household has to communicate with only one person with whom a confidential relationship may develop. The expectation is that solutions will come more quickly and will be more effective,

5.7.3 Conclusion Kanaleneiland

Kanaleneiland has been rife with social, economic, and liveability projects. The efforts seem to cover most issues. One omission seems to be language. Even though many respondents point to the insufficient faculty of the Dutch language, interventions do not address this point directly. To be sure, education programmes in schools, which have not been discussed above, do focus attention on the development of language skills. However, for adults no effort is made.

Despite this multitude of other efforts, the situation within the neighbourhood has only marginally improved. Some respondents point to the housing market structure which perpetuates the influx of weak households and departure of successful households. However, other respondents indicate that institutional and operational sluggishness has contributed to the slow materialisation of interventions, especially that of physical restructuring. The Acceleration Plan of early 2008 is meant to speed up the latter process. In the concluding chapter, Kanaleneiland will be discussed further together with the Bijlmer.

5.8 Conclusion

This chapter started with an extensive overview of the Dutch welfare state and policy context. In this paragraph, I will shortly reflect on how these social and policy contexts have had their impact on the social economic approach and physical renewal. The former will be discussed in terms of the subsidy programmes that fund and implement individual projects, and the latter will be discussed in terms of social mixing.

5.8.1 Social economic interventions

As discussed above, paternalistic and social democratic ideologies no longer rely on macro-economic and sector-based interventions to address social dislocation. Instead of focusing on welfare services and support involving the redistribution of wealth, the emphasis of the social policy is on activating and stimulating people to find work. This is evident in the objectives and projects of, for instance, the GSB and the Objective 2 programmes, which have run in both estates. In addition to empowerment and activation, the social economic interventions emphasise neighbourhood community building and resident participation. This is in line with the notion of subsidiarity, which is being advocated by the Christian Democrats. Central government policy such as the WMO unmistakably has its effects on the new localised organisation of social welfare.

Both empowerment and community-building philosophies have their advantages and merits. However, there is also a risk of pathologisation of the poverty problem when over-relying on employment and the community for social and cultural integration. This risk may be crudely summed up accordingly: helping the residents of deprived neighbourhood help themselves. Or, in other words, policies that focus its interventions too much on a deprived group and ignore the causes, may run the risk of blaming the victim.

5.8.2 Physical intervention: Social Mixing

The introduction of more middle class households and the consequent lowering of the amount of lower class households through the sale of owner occupied housing is a strategy which suits financial, social, and managerial needs. Firstly, the sale of owner occupied housing serves to finance the construction of new social rented dwellings and social and civic services and/ or facilities. It depends on building costs and housing market prices whether the proceeds of the sale will cover the expenses. Until recently, the sale of one dwelling could cover the construction of two new dwellings in the Netherlands. However, a recent rise in construction material costs changed.

Secondly, respondents indicate that the introduction of owner occupied dwellings will either bring in a new middle class or will help to retain the economically successful households in the area. In other words, the area will get a new and presumably better-attuned social mix. The expectation is that the presence of a middle class will provide a positive role model for the weaker groups in the neighbourhood. The expectation is that this will help individuals to be more pro-active and ambitious than they normally are with all their neighbours in a dire social economic state. Furthermore, while politicians sometimes allude to the possible benefits of social mixing through interactions between classes, most policymakers do not believe that more affluent residents will help their less well-off neighbours.

Nevertheless, some interviewees feel that this phenomenon should not be ruled out as a positive effect of social mixing.

Thirdly, there are several managerial reasons for changing the social mix of an area through housing strategies. The expectation is that the middle class will be able to fulfil a leadership role and form an acceptable interlocutor for the neighbourhood. This may bring benefits to the weaker individuals as the bargaining position and resources of the neighbourhood representatives improve. In other words, when the middle class assumes leadership weak individuals will reap the benefits as (acceptable) free riders. The municipality has an interest in creating a representative bargaining partner for policy legitimisation purposes. To illustrate this need for legitimatisation, the neighbourhood resident council members in the Gemeente Utrecht are overrepresented by native elder men, and underrepresented by non-native Dutch. This illustrates the need to find acceptable ethnic representation, especially when a neighbourhood has a large ethnic population. Another managerial reason for social mixing is the spreading of (multi-)problem households over the city. Some respondents acknowledge that it is better to have two problem households per stairwell than eight. The running costs to manage the social problems in the neighbourhood are lower and stigmatisation will be less likely. As mentioned above, respondents have expressed their frustration over the continuous influx of problematic households, which they see as an unfair burden on their organisation and the residents. A social mixing strategy spreads the financial and social burden over the city.

When considering the alternative to deal with social problems and liveability issues within the neighbourhood (direct social, economic and welfare interventions, and a great deal of management and upkeep of public space), a housing and population strategy seems indirect and costly. This rings even more true when considering that the assumed effects of social mixing have an extremely narrow empirical base (Galster, 2007). The choice of restructuring instead of direct intervention and assistance has a financial underpinning as well. The two cases are slightly different, however. In the case of the Bijlmer, the built form (large apartment blocks, extensive public space, and a weak population) meant that the housing association would have to take a loss due to the high costs in upkeep and management. Although much of these costs were related to the built form, they were also associated with the concentration of problem households. The municipality and central state were not willing to cover these costs in the 1980s and hence the alternative became large-scale restructuring to change the demographic structure of the area.

In the case of Utrecht, some respondents within the municipality have suggested that the use of housing restructuring is also due to the lack of effective ideas and solutions in the social welfare sector, despite substantial funding streams. Restructuring offers a long-term solution. Following this rationale is risky because it ignores the so-called waterbed effects. There have already been reports of social problems and liveability issues in the newly built Leidsche Rijn neighbourhoods in Utrecht, especially in streets with concentrations of large dwellings in the social-rented sector.

Lastly, restructuring has an economic rationale for housing associations, which is perhaps best illustrated by the difference in terminology used by housing associations: social economic welfare projects are referred to as expenses, while construction projects are investments. Thus, for them, housing restructuring is a solid investment.

Photo 5.7 New single-family housing in Kanaleneiland-Noord



6 Conclusions

The preceding chapters made clear that neighbourhood regeneration in Western Europe is multifaceted and diverse. Nevertheless, a number of institutional frameworks that embed social action within neighbourhood regeneration at various scales can be distinguished. This concluding chapter will order and discuss these by making a distinction between the macro, meso and local levels. However, before doing this, the strategies and actions of regeneration efforts which have been discussed in the previous chapters will be summarised briefly.

6.1 Characterisation of Neighbourhood Regeneration

The objectives of neighbourhood regeneration are essentially related to liveability of the estate and the quality of housing, the social economic status of the residents, and the social and cultural integration of groups into mainstream society. To accomplish these objectives, interventions come in different forms. We can make a distinction between physical interventions, such as renovations of public space, refurbishments of housing, and urban renewal, and social economic interventions in various forms. However, these interventions can have multiple objectives.

The most straightforward objective of physical interventions relate to the decay of housing, infrastructure, and public spaces. Traditionally, this is the main rationale for neighbourhood regeneration and in some of our cases it still is. The regeneration of Catalan post-WWII housing estates is mainly concerned with renewal because of problems with the structural integrity of apartment buildings. Indeed, most renewal efforts in our cases target housing units with some sort of quality issue. However, the decision to demolish is not always based on cost and benefits analyses of renewal versus refurbishment. Even in Catalonia, some housing is demolished to serve purposes other than providing residents with shelter that will keep them safe, healthy and satisfied.

One other purpose of physical interventions in neighbourhood regeneration is to improve the urban design of public spaces in and around the apartment buildings to make for safer and more pleasing places. In some cases, this means creating more public space, while in others it means reducing it. The modernist design of the British, Dutch and Swedish is often tackled by compartmentalising public balconies and entries in multi-family blocks, reintegrating traffic, and creating more 'defensible' spaces, where there is a higher degree of social presence and monitoring to prevent unsafety and vandalism and promote social interaction. In other words, the liveability of the estate is improved by improving not only the quality of the housing but also of the living environment.

Furthermore, physical interventions are often made to add amenities and commercial activities to the area. This can mean new or renewed accommodations for voluntary and third sector organisations and businesses. In some cases, it also entails renovating or building shopping centres in the area. These interventions are often made to attract more people to the area, improve the reputation, and promote economic activity and employment opportunities. However, the demand in labour does not always fit the supply in the estate. Especially (planned) business parks for high tech and commercial service companies like those in the Bijlmermeer, Husby, Tensta, and near Central Estates and Hodge Hill require high skilled labour. The goal of these interventions is to improve the social economic conditions of the residents by accommodating third sector organisations and by introducing economic opportunities.

Besides physical decay and adaptations in design and amenities, physical interventions may also have the purpose of restructuring the tenure in the estate. In the Swedish and Catalan cases this is done on a very small scale, but in the Central

Estates and Dutch cases tenure restructuring is more extensive. In most cases the restructuring means reducing the share of social rental units in favour of owner occupied dwellings. Only in the Catalan case there is a tendency towards more affordable rental units. In the other cases the preference for more owner occupied dwellings is the result of the type of development, attitudes about the housing market and the assumed social benefits. Firstly, in some cases, the profits of housing sales are meant to cover the costs of development of social rental units. This property-led development is evident in the Central Estates and to some degree in the Netherlands. Secondly, home ownership among lower income households is actively pursued by Dutch, British, and Spanish governments for various reasons. These are related to the individual accumulation of wealth and the assumed sense of responsibility of homeowners towards their dwelling and neighbourhood. Hence, the construction of owner occupied dwellings fits this policy objective. Third, tenure restructuring is done to improve the social mix by introducing more middle class households to the neighbourhood for various reasons mentioned in the introduction chapter. Besides tenure restructuring, other strategies are also followed. In the estates in Eastern Birmingham and Catalonia, where the share of owner occupancy is already relatively high, policy makers resort to the upgrading of amenities, infrastructure and public space in order to create higher market values in order to attract more middle class households. In other words, authorities are trying to kick-start a process of gentrification.

Social economic interventions aim to achieve their goals through social and economic mechanisms; mostly through the (new) social interaction and economic benefits. The social economic interventions tend to differ from the physical interventions in terms of scope and scale. The funds for various programmes are typically lower than investments in real estate (re-) development. In addition, the time scale of social economic programmes is generally much shorter. While a large-scale restructuring process may take up to twenty years, social economic programmes usually run for shorter (consecutive) periods.

The array of programmes and initiatives in the cases is immense and cover various fields such as health, safety, drug abuse, crime, youth, employment, social and civic participation, education, childcare, senior citizens, cultural integration and diversity, entrepreneurship, and community. Broadly speaking, the objectives of these programmes are to improve the social economic position and opportunities of the residents, improve liveability in the neighbourhood, and the social and cultural integration of first and second-generation immigrant groups and poverty-stricken households within mainstream society.

Firstly, the improvement of the social economic position of residents is often sought in the activation, participation, and capacity building programmes. These programmes may be beneficial for some, but there is risk involved in these strategies. Essentially, the rationale for these policies may be a version of 'helping the poor help themselves'. A number of interviewees, especially from Britain, Catalonia, and the Netherlands, have alluded to this rationale and have expressed a preference for activation policies above income guarantees. The danger lies in that the causes of poverty and social exclusion often lie outside the individual and are related to macro economic trends. By placing the responsibility for poverty with individuals, one risks ignoring structural factors and 'pathologising' the problem. A similar risk exists in relying on residents to form communities which are able to exercise moral power (see chapter 3). In addition to activation policies, education policies, programmes for children and young adults are also part of efforts to prevent generational poverty. These programmes often include and target schools, and thereby transcend the typical neighbourhood focus of the social economic programmes.

Secondly, improving liveability through social economic programmes takes many forms. Some are aimed at safety aspects such as anti-drug and drug abuse initiatives, programmes to prevent criminalisation of youths, increased police and camera surveillance, curfews, and even legislation against the assembly of youths in public areas. In addition, intensified maintenance and cleaning programmes are implemented to improve public space and the perception of the neighbourhood of residents and outsiders. Besides cleaning and repairing, the programmes are often related to safety with anti-vandalism or countering anti-social behaviour programmes that aim to change the behaviour and attitudes of residents with regard to the public environment and their own front gardens and shared hallways. Furthermore, liveability programmes include initiatives that aim to promote social cohesion in order to create less anonymous environments but neighbourhoods with a degree of neighbour supervision and sociable interaction.

Thirdly, social and cultural integration are important themes in the social economic regeneration programmes. The presumption is that social and cultural integration of immigrant groups should also take place through social contacts in the neighbourhood. However, in some cases, the initiatives include language courses and labour market entry courses. The estates vary per country in their emphases of this aspect. Generally, integration of immigrant minorities is a bigger issue in Sweden and the Netherlands than it is in Catalonia and the UK (see below). Besides integration, the local state seeks to establish ties with immigrant groups that are disconnected from the political process, for manageability, democratic legitimatisation and negotiation purposes.

Thus, the objectives of different types of intervention may vary. Table 6.1 below summarises the activities and initiatives per type of intervention and objective. As mentioned, some activities have multiple objectives.

Table 6.1. Summary and classification of neighbourhood regeneration

		Type of intervention	
		Physical	Social economic programmes
Objectives	Social Economic Conditions	Tenure restructuring; market upgrading; social mixing; new or renewed accommodations for amenities and commerce	Activation, participation, capacity building, education, employment, community empowerment
	Liveability	Improvements to urban design of public space and the design of buildings to avoid 'dark corners', renewal due to housing decay	Maintenance and cleaning, safety and anti crime initiatives, social and sociability projects to prevent vandalism and anonymity
	Integration	accommodations for third sector organisations and places of worship	Employment, education (language), internships, community empowerment, social activities
	Other		Public health campaigns, service delivery improvements

6.2 Levels of Context

The main question of this report has been: How do institutional frameworks at different levels affect the strategies, activities and outcomes (practices) of neighbourhood regeneration in Western Europe? To answer this all-encompassing question, comparisons are made at different levels of context.

The macro level is the most distant framework, as the institutions play out on the national and supranational level, but is perhaps the most important because it sets the scene for many elements on the other levels. In the preceding chapters, we have tried to highlight the way in which these rather abstract social processes resonate in the practices of neighbourhood regeneration. The direction of the welfare state, housing policies that aim for owner occupancy, urban policies that aim to remedy uneven development of areas and individuals, and societal debates on integration of immigrant groups in urban areas all impact the emphases and choices made in neighbourhood regeneration objectives and instruments.

The intermediate, or meso, level relates to the urban region a neighbourhood is an integral part of. The regional housing market, economic profile and employment structure, and local politics all provide restraint, direction, and opportunities for neighbourhood regeneration.

The local level is the most proximate level and relates to the estate, its inhabitants, and the neighbourhood actors. These actors may be part of municipal or even regional organisations, but the frameworks they operate in are usually locally specific. Hence, they are described in this category. However, the distinction between the local and meso level can be diffuse at times. Nevertheless, the comparison at the local level is per estate, while it is per city region at the meso level.

The remainder of this chapter will examine differences in outcomes in terms of neighbourhood satisfaction, the scale and scope of physical interventions and social economic programmes, and their objectives and relate them to contextual frameworks and elements that play out at different levels.

6.2.1 Macro Level


As mentioned, the macro level relates to the direction of welfare state, housing policies, urban policies and public and political debates.

New Welfare State

The case studies have paid ample attention to the welfare state context as the main framework for cross-national comparison. For neighbourhood regeneration and the policies that frame them at a national level, the influence of the welfare state context becomes most apparent when considering the slow change in attitudes towards the condition under which the state provides services for its citizens. In the northwestern European countries, these attitudes have shifted from universal and comprehensive towards more selective and lean. Figure 6.1 shows the social expenditure in our four countries as percentage of the Gross Domestic Product between 1980 and 2002. Only the Netherlands and Sweden have made significant decreases in spending. However, while the UK, Spain, and the Netherlands have comparable rates, Sweden's levels of spending are about fifty per cent higher. As health care costs and pension costs are expected to rise with the ageing populations, the process of retrenchment does not involve cuts in overall social spending, but the retrenchment has played out in higher eligibility rules, abolishment of particular services that affect small groups (like neighbourhood services), and small cutbacks. Universal welfare services like social

insurance schemes, pensions, and health care tend to have high support among the electorate (Pierson, 2006).

Figure 6.1. (Source: OECD, 2006)



Urban policies differ from universal social insurance schemes because they tend to be selective in nature. The area-based focus on poor or deprived neighbourhoods excludes poor households from other neighbourhoods. As such, they follow a different approach to urban poverty than the Keynesian demand-side politics in combination with universal benefit schemes, which were favoured in the UK and the Netherlands before the 1980s. In Sweden, these politics were in vogue until the early 1990s, when sustained crises, EU membership regulations against demand-side policies, and a liberal government forced a change of course. In Spain, we have seen that the welfare state does not follow the rise, crises, and retrenchment course, but has been in a period of build up since the 1980s, following a liberal corporatist course (see Moreno, 2001). So while (new) structural demand-side policies have fallen out of favour, the use of selective (short-term) policies to tackle urban problems related to social economic deprivation have become more appropriate and normal. Even though benefit schemes still exist and dwarf urban policy budgets, it is a tell tale sign that the existence of urban poverty is no longer framed in terms of structural poverty, but that public debates focus almost exclusively on the conditions in the neighbourhoods themselves. In this respect, urban policies fit in the rationales of a retrenching Welfare State, which shies away from schemes that involve the redistribution of wealth to fight social inequalities. Instead, the problem is regarded to be one of unequal opportunities through the neighbourhood and the solution is activation of the poor and excluded. This objective of opportunities was found in all four cases, but to varying extents

The British regeneration policies are clear examples of this shift in focus, which is apparent in the emphases on aspiration, community, and welfare dependency. The Third Way politics of the New Labour government continue the roll-out neoliberalisation politics under Thatcher, where state reforms are geared towards governance as the mode of intervention. Social policy and labour policies are focused on full employability and, conversely, social policies on workfare. The development ethos is based on notions of social capital and social mixing (Peck and Tickell, 2007). These trends are all reflected in the neighbourhood regeneration efforts.

In the other three countries, these trends are more diffuse and (neo) liberal pressures, while present, produce different outcomes. Third Way politics have been present in the Netherlands since the mid 1990s (in the form of a social democratic-liberal coalition government), but after protests in the 2002 elections and the subsequent restoration of power to the Christian Democratic party, Dutch politics returned to its traditional coalition politics. The outcomes of these can best be described as a mix of paternalism, (Third Way) social democracy, and/ or liberalism. Nevertheless, the heyday Keynesian policies have been sworn off and the principles of subsidiarity and social and labour activation are important themes in Dutch neighbourhood regeneration. For instance, social mixing policies are justified with social capital rationales. However, some elements of the harsh rhetoric of the British politics are lacking in the Dutch case, such as poverty of aspiration (see Raco, 2008).

The Swedish cases have shown similar trends. Integration of immigrant groups is expected to happen through social interactions within the neighbourhood but also during working hours. Hence, supply side policies such as labour market activation schemes and education are employed through neighbourhood regeneration and urban policies. However, as for poverty, the Swedish welfare state still guarantees a relatively high level of income. This means that neighbourhood regeneration is more concerned with labour market participation than poverty. Furthermore, some Swedish policy makers, who have witnessed the shift towards more liberalism in the early 1990s, have expressed their discomfort with the new trend of area-based policies and social economic programmes. It is their perception that the responsibility for these urban problems is placed on the shoulders of the neighbourhood itself and they feel abandoned.

As mentioned, the Spanish welfare state has been in a state of build up. However, it cannot be characterised as a welfare state based on universal social rights and social equality. Instead, a mix of liberal and corporatist regulations emphasize the role of the traditional family and community in providing assets. Urban policies have been mainly focusing on housing deterioration, but social programmes do focus on the emancipation of women and poor to educate and activate them for the labour market. However, also some Catalan respondents have expressed their frustration over their new welfare state, which has been unable to solve the poverty problem in Sant Roc. In addition to activation policies, Catalan government has been experimenting with new governance structures that involve community and private sector actors. In this respect, it is similar to the other cases.

Thus, the changes in the welfare state context are decisive for the direction and emphases of urban policies and neighbourhood regeneration. New forms of governance, community building, supply-side labour initiatives, social mixing, and social capital are all relatively new elements in neighbourhood regeneration and urban policies. Before discussing urban policies further, we have to pay attention to national housing systems and housing policies.

Housing

Some authors have argued that the continuous privatisation of public and social housing can be viewed as part of a modernisation process befitting late twentieth and early twenty-first century capitalism. However, the process of tenure modernisation can also be regarded as a process favoured by states to stimulate the accumulation of (housing) wealth which in turn may clear the way towards further welfare state reforms (Malpass, 2008). Assets in unmortgaged equity may serve as a reserve for a 'rainy day'.

Regardless whether it is related to welfare state reform or economic restructuring, neighbourhood regeneration efforts in the Netherlands and the UK involve tenure restructuring in favour of home ownership. The assumption is that housing market dynamics will bring in more affluent households. Whether this is a

feasible and sustainable strategy depends on the regional housing market (see below). Nevertheless, the favouring of home ownership has facilitated tenure restructuring in neighbourhood regeneration in housing policies and memoranda. The share of owner occupancy has remained relatively stable in Sweden (Kemeny, 2005), which may also help to explain why large scale tenure restructuring is absent in these cases. However, this is not the only explanation; regional local factors weigh in as well (housing market demand, housing associations, and local politics). The share of home ownership is already high in Spain. However, problems with access and affordability in the housing market have led housing policies in Catalonia towards more public involvement in the private market. Conversely, housing policies have introduced new subsidies, and favour social owner occupancy and social rental units in new developments. In this respect, Spain serves as a counterpoint in tenure restructuring.

Other elements of national housing system reflect the practices of neighbourhood regeneration as well. The existence and position of housing associations is an important example. Their role in the institutional framework will be further discussed below. The situation on regional housing markets has called for specific housing policies as well. Policies in the UK, for instance, attempt to fight low demand in certain areas of the country. Other examples are the housing and urban policies in Catalonia which are related to problems with structural integrity of post WWII housing.

Urban Policies

Neighbourhood regeneration in almost every case is at least partly framed by urban policies from a national or regional level. In addition to policies from these levels of government, many initiatives and programmes are sponsored by the European Union. These subsidy programmes tend to have moderate budgets, though. However, the EU plays an active role in lesson-learning and knowledge exchange among policy makers.

Urban policies share some striking similarities, which imply a high degree of policy dissemination. The similarity could be the result of European Union encouragements or perhaps because all policies were initialized by centre-left parties. The policies tend to come from a physical interventionist policy or fall under the responsibility of housing, public works or planning departments, i.e. the 'city builders'. It seems that the history and institutional framework is reflected in the focus on housing and place-based aspects. Indeed, despite propagating a strong social exclusion agenda, policymakers are in fact more concerned with place-based liveability and housing issues than with people-based social economic progress. Table 6.2 summarises the problem definitions of the four national and regional policies in our four countries. While the Dutch 40 Neighbourhoods Programme mentions social divides and people-based social economic deprivation in its policy documentation, its selection is heavily based on place-based characteristics. The place-based problem definition is even more outspoken in the Catalan Llei de Barris policy, which aims to influence the housing market and create benefits for poor inhabitants because the investments will make the neighbourhood attractive for a new group of middle class inhabitants. The assumption is that long-term homeowners are able to leave the area with the benefit of increased value of their property. However, the problem definition in the English Multiple Deprivation Index has the most emphasis on social economic deprivation. This implies a great deal of faith in its area-based strategy which also focuses on place-based issues. It is doubtful whether this has led to the desired social change. An evaluation of the effect of New Deal for Communities has shown that place-based change was more evident than people-based outcomes such as improved health and more jobs (Lawless, 2007).

The discrepancy between the problem definition and object of policy is often justified by the implication that liveability and housing are connected to deprivation by arguing that problems in these domains are responsible for social exclusion. This may be true in cases when crime, decay, and nuisances threaten personal safety, health, or mobility. In these cases, there might be a neighbourhood effect that inhibits people's life chances. However, there is only limited evidence that this was in fact the case (see Galster, 2007; Van Gent et al., forthcoming).

In sum, urban policies create constraints, pressures and opportunities for neighbourhood regeneration. However, the policies themselves are also embedded within the frame of their own history, the direction of the welfare state, the housing system and political and public debates about integration of ethnic minorities.

Table 6.2. Neighbourhood problems in urban policies

	Metropolitan Development Initiative (Sweden)	National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (UK)	40 Neighbourhood Programme (NL)	Llei de Barris (Catalonia)
People-based				
Social economic deprivation	●●●	●●●●●	●●	●
Health deprivation and disability	●●	●●	-	-
Place-based				
Crime, traffic, public space, and liveability issues	●●●	●●	●●●●●●	●●●●●
Adequate provision of services	●●	●	-	●
Housing and housing market issues	●●	●	●●●	●●●●

The table is based on problem emphases in policy documents (CMA, 2006), the Multiple Deprivation Index (see Neighbourhood Renewal Unit, 2004, for exact domain weights), on the indicator weights in the 40 Neighbourhood selection in Brouwer and Willems (2007), and on expenditures after three bidding rounds for *Llei de Barris* funds, reflecting the discretion of the *Generalitat*. For the last three cases, a black circle (●) represents 10% and half a circle (◐) 5% of total domain weight or total expenditure. For the Swedish case ten ● were distributed based on policy documents and mentioned secondary literature.

Integration debates

The social and cultural integration of an immigrant or minority population into mainstream society has been important in triggering area-based urban policies in both the US and in several Western European Countries (see De Decker *et al.*, 2003). Although only the Swedish policy mentions this explicitly, all policies can be seen as part of wider integration debates. This is even true for Catalonia, where Spain's new status as an immigrant-receiving country has resulted in some spatial concentrations of non-Western immigrant communities in poor urban neighbourhoods (Fullaondo, 2003). Despite the long history of immigration, the English have recently been warned of their 'sleepwalking to segregation' (Philips, 2005). The synthesis of integration debates and neighbourhood regeneration is perhaps best illustrated by the new Dutch ministerial post of Housing, Neighbourhoods, and Integration. The rationale for urban policies could then also be the mere existence of deprived and/ or

immigrant neighbourhoods (cf. Andersson and Musterd, 2005). High concentrations make poverty more visible and concentrations of immigrants are seen by some as a result of failing integration policies. We have seen many instances of neighbourhood regeneration initiatives that aim to increase civic and labour participation of immigrant communities and individuals in poor neighbourhoods, either directly through social participatory activities, or by exposing them to a middle class presence within the neighbourhood. Thus, the assumption is that integration will come through employment and positive role models. Hence, poor urban neighbourhoods have become 'battlegrounds' of integration.

6.2.2 Meso Level

The regional housing market

The situation on the regional market has also proven to be an important factor in the direction and outcomes of neighbourhood regeneration efforts. Two elements are important: tenure structure and demand.

First, tenure structure was already mentioned above, but some of our cases constitute particular situations. For instance, Amsterdam and, to a lesser degree, Utrecht have a relatively high share of social rental units compared to the rest of the Netherlands. The share of municipal owned housing stock in Birmingham is unique in the UK, where most municipalities have either transferred or sold their stock since the 1980s. In both of these cases, policies are geared towards increasing the share of home ownership or privately owned rent (sometimes under a social regime) at the expense of social rental units.

More generally, it can be said that in case of tenure restructuring the outcomes of neighbourhood regeneration tend to be more dramatic. In the Bijlmermeer and Central Estates, it seems that the old neighbourhood has been completely replaced by a new one. This does not only relate to the built environment but also to the social composition, the reputation of the area and the neighbourhood's function on the regional housing market. In both of these cases, the displacement of people is an issue under debate (see Musterd and Ostendorf, 2005). The neighbourhood regeneration in Catalonia does not involve the movement of people because there is no system that can absorb the old residents. More importantly, residents of renewed buildings have ownership rights, which make it more difficult to move residents without consultation and moving options within the estate. Furthermore, when residents have to be bought out, regeneration can become more costly than renewing buildings owned by the municipality or housing associations. In the Catalan cases these expenses could be averted and the dwellings were not free market, because the VPO regime had not ended yet.

Secondly, demand on the regional housing market influences neighbourhood regeneration as well. It affects both the 'problem' situation and the regeneration. As for the situations in Barcelona, Amsterdam, Utrecht, Stockholm, and, to a lesser degree, in Jönköping, all have high demand markets, which affects the movement of groups as well as the possibilities for neighbourhood restructuring. High demand markets mean that poor groups have fewer options to move elsewhere in the region and may be trapped in certain neighbourhoods. This is the case in the Stockholm estates and Sant Roc, where poor immigrant groups remain behind while socially mobile families tend to move out. A similar situation exists in Kanaleneiland Noord, where a large amount of large social rental dwellings has produced a self-selecting mechanism where poor large immigrant households concentrate. Utrecht's housing market offers little alternatives for this group.

Regeneration efforts in these estates address the position on the housing market situation either by physical interventions that involve renewal and, when possible, tenure restructuring. In the Bijlmermeer, it was feared that the area's homogeneous housing stock would always be vulnerable to shifts in demand. Furthermore, the reputation of the area aggravated the vulnerability. The decision to diversify the housing stock was meant to stabilise its position on the housing market and accommodate for a more diverse population. Tenure restructuring in the Bijlmermeer resulted in it becoming a major site of construction of new owner occupied dwellings in the Amsterdam region. As such, the regeneration serves a purpose which transcends the neighbourhood. A similar plan is made for Kanaleneiland Noord, albeit smaller in scope and scale. Private redevelopment involving the construction of owner occupied dwellings in Kanaleneiland Noord has shown that the high pressure on the regional housing market also ensured sufficient demand for owner occupied dwellings. In the Bijlmermeer and Kanaleneiland as well as the Central Estates, the poor residents who can no longer be housed after the reduction of social rental dwellings are expected to disperse in the (remaining) social rental system if they are unable to rent or purchase a new dwelling in the neighbourhood.

Comprehensive tenure restructuring did not take place in the Swedish cases. Some owner occupied and private rental dwellings were constructed in Stockholm to attract more middle class families and make the neighbourhood more stable. The high demand for public rental units in Jönköping and Stockholm has resulted in municipalities and housing associations not focusing on restructuring in the problem areas but in focusing on creating new possibilities to house weak immigrant households elsewhere in the region and, in the case of Råslätt, to stop the influx of unemployed or immigrant households altogether. Furthermore, in Sweden there is confidence in the urban policies and welfare state system to mediate any area effects that may exist. In addition, local politics in Stockholm curb the possibilities for new construction (see below).

In the case of Catalonia, we have already mentioned that the immense pressure on the Barcelona housing market has resulted in problems of affordability. Especially for young people, it has become difficult to enter the housing market. As a result, developments in Trinitat Nova favour young people from the neighbourhood. Furthermore, the pressure also results in multiple (illegal) immigrant workers living together in overcrowded conditions. This typically happens in, but is not confined to, the least popular neighbourhood on the market. Overcrowding thus becomes a problem for neighbourhoods such as Sant Roc. Regional housing policies are increasingly trying to relieve this pressure and create housing opportunities for young couples and disadvantaged individuals. Meanwhile the attractiveness of low demand areas such as Sant Roc is increased by urban renewal to increase housing prices and attract more middle class households. The regional government relies on the incremental development of a social sector and subsidies to house its less affluent population.

The Birmingham cases stand out because demand in the region is not as high as it is in our other cases. The centrally located Central Estates did have market potential for tenure restructuring. A process similar to gentrification took place after the housing and public spaces were renovated and adapted to meet the standards of 'city living'. Hodge Hill on the other hand lies in a low demand area, where there is less demand for new owner occupied dwellings. In addition, many of the low-income households who have purchased their social rental unit in the 1980s and 1990s under the Right to Buy legislation have difficulties selling their dwelling. Some of these households also have difficulties doing proper maintenance work, resulting in advanced deterioration. Any comprehensive neighbourhood regeneration effort in the future that involves renewal will be more complex due to the ownership structure.

Regional Economic Profile

We have seen that Stockholm, Jönköping, Amsterdam, Utrecht and Barcelona have thriving service economies in tourism, governmental services, trade and infrastructure, finance, insurance, commerce, and education. These sectors require a professional and skilled labour force, which is often lacking in the neighbourhoods described. This means that there are opportunities for educating and re-educating adults and children in those neighbourhoods. The economy of Birmingham has only recently made the transition from manufacturing to services and still has to deal with a substantial amount of (now) unemployed manufacturing workers. In other words, in almost all cases there is a certain mismatch between labour supply and demand. Some of this mismatch is related to language problems among immigrants. However, the mismatch is more substantial in Birmingham where economic restructuring has been more persuasive and recent than the other cities. As a result, the scale of unemployment and unskilled labour is relatively high and the demand on the local housing market relatively low. This means that Hodge Hill's situation is part of a wider economic and labour situation which will require more effort than the regeneration of neighbourhoods. Consequently, Birmingham City Council has launched ambitious plans for the future restructuring of East Birmingham's economic and housing profile.

Local Politics

The case studies show that the context of local politics impinge upon the direction and outcomes of regeneration efforts in multiple ways. Political actors and political processes may help regeneration efforts forwards, but they can also steer to different directions and even hinder them.

Local politics do not only influence regeneration, but also the problem definitions. Along with media attention and national priorities, the language and priorities of local politicians help to shape the discourse of policy makers and documents. This is most clear in the Popular Party's election campaign in Barcelona for the 2007 municipal elections. The campaign links the situation in post-WWII housing estates to the (negative) impact of immigration on traditional Spanish family life. While the Popular Party lost the elections in Barcelona, it did publicly identify the housing estates as sites of immigration and (failing) integration. In Sweden and the Netherlands, the association between problem neighbourhoods and integration is already very much the case. In addition to integration, politicians can stress the importance of concepts such as low market demand, social exclusion, economic activation, empowerment, social participation, economic development, youth problems, etc.

Besides the political agenda and policy, the context of local politics can also directly affect the process of neighbourhood regeneration. In the regeneration of Trinitat Nova, the cooperation between the city and the autonomous region greatly improved when the regional government also became social democratic. More trust and cooperation between region and city meant that the negotiations with the community organisation, which also had some social democratic members, were more accommodating. It can be said that the willingness of local politicians to invest and take risks is decisive for the scale and scope of any regeneration.

Local politics may also influence the direction and focus of the regeneration efforts. For instance, the regeneration of apartment buildings in the heart of Sant Roc excluded a large number of deteriorated apartment buildings in another area within the neighbourhood for political reasons which remained obscure to this research.

As mentioned, local politics may also block options and hinder regeneration efforts. The stock transfer in Birmingham, which was so beneficial for starting the

process of regeneration of the Central Estates, proved to be less successful for Hodge Hill. After residents rejected the transfer of municipal stock to housing associations, the large-scale regeneration process, as originally envisioned, never took off. The regeneration was further undermined by the political antagonism between a new conservative city government and the New Labour government in London. As a result, the estates no longer have access to the financial benefits associated with the transfer.

In Sweden, political changes in local and national government between labour and liberal result in switching urban policy programmes, inhibiting continuity of social economic regeneration. Furthermore, coalition politics give the Green Party in Stockholm a relatively good bargaining position. Consequently, any new construction on the green fields around the estates is hard to achieve due to the party's opposition. This means that a plan like in the Bijlmermeer, where the open green fields in and around the estates are developed, is not possible in Stockholm.

Another example of politics hindering regeneration is the debate about air pollution in Utrecht, which is blocking the first regeneration with municipal involvement in Kanaleneiland. However, it has to be mentioned that the regeneration effort in this case is also slowed by the extensive bargaining process between multiple actors.

In sum, local politics like the wider societal developments and debates, may direct the shape, direction, and outcome of the regeneration efforts. Ideas and strategies from one context may not be feasible in others when there is no political support. It is therefore important to understand the impact and attitudes of local politicians and political parties towards 'problem neighbourhoods' and how these have to be tackled.

6.2.3 Local level

The comparisons between estates resulted in three contextual elements that are important to the practice and outcomes of neighbourhood regeneration. Firstly, some physical aspects of the area under regeneration determine the scale and scope of social phenomena as well as the regeneration efforts. Secondly, the role of the residents seems to be of decisive importance to the outcomes of regeneration efforts. Thirdly, the local institutional framework in terms of professional capacity and objectives has a lasting impact on the process and priorities of the regeneration process. The framework consists of the actors, their interrelations, and their 'fitness'.

Area, Isolation and Scale

In terms of surface area and population the cases were quite diverse. Consequently, the scale of interventions differed as well. Table 6.3 shows the differences in population, housing units, and size of the estates. Please note that the Bijlmermeer-East, already the largest estate, will actually increase further in population size and amount of dwellings during the coming years. The planned demolition of apartment buildings has nearly been completed and, after the construction of owner occupied dwellings, the population will increase with the addition of larger multi-family housing. The table also shows the relative overcrowding, which are notably high in Tensta and Sant Roc and least in the Central Estates and Råslätt. Overcrowding in Sant Roc is probably higher due to the large presence of unregistered immigrants. The latter estate houses a small student population which may explain the low rate to some degree.

Table 6.3. Size and scale of the estates

	Population	Number of dwellings	Inhabitants/dwelling	Size of the estate
Hodge Hill ¹	9,015	3,937	2,29	126.7 ha
Central Estates ¹	6,582	3,298	2,00	93.5 ha
Tensta ²	17,463	5,931	2,94	196 ha
Husby ²	11,657	4,727	2,47	183 ha
Råslätt ³	4,571	2,657	1,72	120 ha
Bijlmer-East ⁴	22,970	10,247	2,24	407.5 ha
Kanaleneiland-Noord ⁵	7,819	2,674	2,92	66 ha
Trinitat Nova ⁶	7,686	3,215	2,39	55 ha
Sant Roc ⁶	12,476	3,395	3,67	46.2 ha

Source: 1: Census 2001, 2: 2003 data, 3: 2002 census, 4: 2007 census, 5: 2002 census, 6: 2001 census.(see also, Musterd and Van Kempen, 2005)

What can be said about regeneration and the size of an area? When larger areas are taken into consideration, the amount and size of the problems tend to increase as well. This is logical as more built territory is covered; more social and physical phenomena will be present. The question is whether there are advantages or disadvantages attached to size and scale of neighbourhoods and interventions.

Before discussing this point, we have to look at how the territories are constituted. However, policy makers follow some sort of practical historical geographical logic when they choose territories. In case of the post-WWII housing estates, these were typically constructed as part of an extension plan in a short period. In some cases, this has resulted in clearly identifiable areas. In many cases, the neighbourhoods were physically demarcated by green fields and highways. Indeed, this isolation and the scale of the estates are often mentioned as a weakness or problem in the Swedish estates, where the isolation is seen to be reinforcing stigmatisation. Also, the first Catalan urban policies focused on integrating the estates within the older 'urban fabric'. However, sometimes the demarcation between intervention area and non-intervention area is more of a political nature. For

instance, Kanaleneiland in Utrecht originally constituted a larger area, but residents in neighbouring neighbourhoods distanced themselves from Kanaleneiland and started to refer to their neighbourhood as Transwijk. In addition, there is also a distinction between the northern and southern parts, which is based on the type of housing, the population, and concentration of youth problems.

So what are the advantages of different scales for regeneration? A large area with similar problems may offer some advantages in terms of economies of scale. Construction costs may be lower per newly built housing unit in the case of large-scale restructuring. In fact, economies of scale resulted in most of the estates being 'system built' on a large scale with similar slab blocks in fixed positions. Also some costs in social economic interventions may be fixed. A community or welfare organisations may be able to serve more people with little additional costs in housing and facilities.

However, the case studies show that smaller scale neighbourhoods offer advantages as well. The ease of social interaction between residents and between residents and policy makers is most noteworthy in this respect. The Råslätt case is a clear illustration of the advantages of a relatively small estate in a medium-sized town. Multiple ties between actors in local politics, municipal administrators, housing association management, and residents (the 'Råslätt spirit') were made easier by the small scale of the neighbourhood and the city. Also, the Trinitat Nova and Central Estates cases show that a small scale makes it easier for residents to organise themselves and function as an actor in the regeneration process. However, a small area alone is not sufficient. Sant Roc and Kanaleneiland-Noord are also relatively small, but residential organisation failed to materialise in the same way. In both cases, this may explained by the lack of leading figures and the existence of heterogeneous populations with different marginal groups.

In sum, the physical features of an estate and its surroundings may affect costs but may also benefit social interaction and participation of residents. Especially, the good experiences of Råslätt are made possible by its small size and scale.

Local residents and community leadership

The importance of the residents of a regeneration area cannot be overstated. In the end, the residents have the highest stakes in the outcomes, as they concern the daily realities of the living environment, social world, the homes, and wellbeing of themselves and their children and families. Nevertheless, the degree of resident involvement tends to differ per estate. The importance of scale and size of an area has already been mentioned above. However, this is far from enough to explain differences. The case studies showed us several factors that influence participation positively or negatively.

It appears that in Trinitat Nova, Råslätt, the Bijlmermeer, and the Central Estates - the 'satisfied estates' - residential participation in the regeneration efforts was generally high and the outcomes satisfactory. In these cases, residents have played a decisive role at one or more points in the processes of decision-making, planning and implementation. The involvement has varied though; while in the Bijlmermeer residents were just heard and their needs and wishes only taken more actively into account after protests, residents in Trinitat Nova have been active and organised participants and equal partners in the regeneration. In general, it has to be said that the satisfactory outcomes can be attributed to the residential input and to the attitude of local governmental organisations, which chose to engage, albeit sometimes reluctantly, with the residents and work with them in the regeneration effort. More than just willingness of government, the quality of resident input in the regeneration also depends on the availability of professional support in the form of a technical staff or consultants who are made available by the state, but can operate

independently and in the interest of the residents. This support will make residents more informed about the possibilities and stakes, making them stronger at the bargaining table. We have seen this in Trinitat Nova, but also to some degree in the Central Estates, Råslätt and Bijlmermeer. However, the Sant Roc, Hodge Hill, and Stockholm cases showed that the availability of residential support alone is not enough to invoke sustained and active participation.

One other important aspect of the residents is the presence of leadership within the neighbourhood. The Trinitat Nova case highlights the importance and advantages of having a consensus-building person among the active residents, who can help to shape and negotiate the regeneration efforts. Unfortunately, there is an element of randomness to this. Governments, housing associations and other actors cannot 'create' leadership. However, what they can do is prevent residents from becoming frustrated with the process or make them feel disenfranchised by only consulting them in a later stage. Although in Trinitat Nova this feeling of disenfranchisement actually triggered the activism of the community association, it is better to involve residents in an early stage. This happened in the Central Estates regeneration, where some residents are still active in the Optima associations after being consulted and heard in the earliest stages of regeneration. The regeneration of the Bijlmermeer also changed direction after protests from Surinamese residents that the policy was too 'white'. In fact, in contrast to the less successful estates, all of the 'satisfied' estates saw residents' protests against the negligence or inactivity of the (local) state. These protests triggered regeneration efforts and renewed communications.

Why then, did the residents in Kanaleneiland, Sant Roc, Hodge Hill and the Stockholm estates - the 'dissatisfied estates' - not protest and engage the municipality to demand change? This question is difficult to answer with absolute certainty. In fact, residents or resident groups may have protested in the past, and municipalities may have even showed their willingness to act. However, residents can feel frustrated or disappointed with regeneration programmes. Consequently, they may shy away from engaging the municipality when they feel there are no sustainable gains to be made. For instance, in Stockholm, social economic programmes run for a three-year period before ending abruptly to be followed by a new programme a year later. This inhibits sustainable relations between residents and the (local) state. Even more frustrating for residents is the failure of regeneration initiatives to materialise due to political or regulatory factors. This failure has heavily demoralised residents in Hodge Hill and, to an extent, the residents in Kanaleneiland and Sant Roc. On a side note, the demoralisation is not limited to the residents but also affect the attitudes of professionals, welfare workers, and administrators who work in the neighbourhood on a daily basis.

Apart from the workings of local politics or regulatory and institutional chaos resulting in the ineptitudes and paralysis of the municipal government, the composition of the residents may also be a factor. The Råslätt Spirit, stories of Trinitat Nova as a socialist hotbed resisting the Franco regime, and the importance of the Bijlmermeer for the Surinamese-Dutch identity all indicate the history of these neighbourhoods. These histories are important to the residents as they form a part of the identity of active groups in the estates (respectively, Swedish middle class, senior Spanish residents, Surinamese), who can engage the state for their own sake and that of their neighbours. On a side note, the residents of the Central Estates do not have such stories although their insular location and shared misfortunes may have provided some sense of shared identity.

In the 'dissatisfied estates' the residents are typically first or second generation immigrants who have been either unable or unwilling to engage the municipality for various reasons. While some reasons may be related to a difference in culture, language problems, and unfamiliarity with the rules and regulations of

(local) politics, the Stockholm cases showed that many newly arrived immigrants are more concerned and occupied with settling, finding employment, and staving off poverty. Indeed, even in the Bijlmermeer, policy makers acknowledge that participation in regeneration projects cannot be expected when dealing with single parents trying to feed their children. This highlights the importance of personal social economic deprivation over liveability issues in the neighbourhood for individuals.

In sum, we have seen that the residents in Sant Roc, Hodge Hill, Kanaleneiland, and Stockholm have not risen in protest, while those in Råslätt, Bijlmermeer, Trinitat Nova, and Central Estates have. Early residential involvement in a regeneration effort that people feel there is a genuine need for, will always breed more local support and will lead to interventions that will effectively address liveability problems. Having said this, residents may not always know best or may not agree on what to do and sometimes regeneration is also intended to serve the interests of those not residing in the area. Nevertheless, the cases in the report have shown the importance of their involvement. However, it is unclear what causes a high degree of sustained resident activism and why residents in some estates do not engage the state. It may have something to do with the local state or with a planning process that is either too slow or is excluding residential input, or with the residents who are not (yet) able to function as bargaining partners. There have been attempts to correct this. The social mixing policies in the Kanaleneiland and the Bijlmermeer are partly meant to introduce a middle class to the neighbourhood, which is able to act as a bargaining partner that represents the interest of the entire neighbourhood. In addition, empowerment and activation policies in the Netherlands, Catalonia, England, and Sweden are also attempts to increase civic and social participation among immigrants and weaker groups in order to create the right circumstances for legitimising policies with community consent.

The actors

The state and especially the local state have received a lot of attention in this report. Indeed, most regeneration efforts would not have been possible without the state. However, they are usually not the only actors involved. We have already mentioned the residents above. In addition, depending on the policies and regulations, there are private actors, housing associations and the so-called third sector (i.e. voluntary, charity, or non-profit organisations). These actors have their own constitutions which inform their strategic choices and action within the structures described above.

Third sector organisations have been important, especially in estates where civic and social participation of isolated or marginalised groups or individuals is an important objective. Regeneration in the Swedish cases has been focused on the participation and integration of first generation immigrant groups. One of the strategies has been to promote and accommodate third sector organisation which can mobilise and organise the groups. Similarly, in Hodge Hill and Kanaleneiland several third sector organisations have been incorporated in the local development and social economic and housing partnerships. In Kanaleneiland, third sector organisations have been responsible for initialising small projects that promote social participation, education, liveability, or sociability in the neighbourhood.

In the Bijlmermeer, the third sector plays an even more important role in the social economic programmes. By subsidising third sector organisations that are culture- or faith-based, the local state aims to 'empower' and help the optimum amount of individuals. The philosophy is that, through their cultural and familiar ties, the organisations are able to reach those residents whom the local district is unable to reach. While this may indeed be the case in some instances, some interviewees have expressed concerns about the accountability of funds and results. Furthermore,

this strategy reiterates cultural lines and there does not seem to be any bridging between cultural groups, such as Hindustan Surinamese, Creole Surinamese, Ghanaians, etc. Thus, it does not guarantee social and cultural integration.

In sum, third sector organisations can make many contributions to regeneration efforts. Besides advantage of enthusiasm, they often have knowledge of the estate and its residents, which can be advantageous for social economic programmes. However, third sector organisations do not necessarily always work alongside and in the interest of the local state or developers. Mutual mistrust in Sant Roc between the third sector and the municipality has led to similar social initiatives competing with each other.

Although private actors are often very important in the physical regeneration process, they seldom play a front-runner's role in the decision making process. Construction sector organisations may seek to push housing policies that involve new construction or restructuring at a national level, but at individual regeneration projects construction companies usually implement the refurbishments, demolition, and new developments, which were thought out by other actors. However, the Central Estates case shows that a developer can contribute to the regeneration efforts by making jobs open to local workforce and by employing sustainable techniques and recycling of materials.

Other private companies usually include commercial businesses that have a stake in safe and clean shopping and commercial centres with a good reputation. Furthermore, local companies have been found willing and in some cases eager to accept interns and skilled workers from the neighbourhood. The type of demand depends on the economic signature of the region. While Amsterdam employers yearn for skilled workers with knowledge of mechanics and electrics, Birmingham employers are looking for low-wage service workers in the commercial and health sector.

Finally, financial institutions are important as real estate investors, but they sometimes are not willing to take the risk. In the Bijlmermeer some of the concessions for development have been transferred to real estate departments of banks after they were convinced the regeneration was going well and demand in the Amsterdam region would remain sufficient. In most cases the risk and costs of regeneration were carried by the state and/ or by housing associations.

Housing associations

In Råslätt, Tensta, Husby, Bijlmermeer, Kanaleneiland, and the Central Estates, housing associations have proven to be of significant importance to the physical (re)development, social economic programmes, and to the maintenance of the estates. Although the exact organisation and regulations differ, these housing associations are very much alike in a few aspects.

In terms of purpose and position, they fall between the public and private spheres. Most of them have a history as local (quasi) governmental organisations, but due to privatisations they have moved towards financial independence and towards the market sphere. Nevertheless, in all cases legislation bounds them to the state, especially in their rights and obligations concerning their role as property owners of (subsidised) social rent stock. Furthermore, in redevelopment projects, housing associations are often treated as most favoured partners by the state and are often exempt from taxation and land use costs. However, in the last decade or so, these benefits have been slowly diminishing in the Netherlands and Sweden with the passing of new privatisation and taxation laws.

As mentioned earlier, the housing associations fulfil an important role in physical redevelopment projects. In most cases, the dwellings that are renovated or

replaced are buildings with social rental units. As proprietors of these buildings and managers of the new developments, they have a stake in the renewal. It is no surprise that the associations are equal partners with local government. In the Central Estates, we have even seen that Optima have taken the leading role. In other cases, there is usually a framework where housing associations and local state share responsibility and coordination.

Financial considerations of housing associations concerning maintenance costs and rents affect the outcomes of physical regeneration in terms of the quality and design of new buildings and public spaces. For example, the cost of maintaining the green public spaces in the Bijlmermeer and Central Estates was one of the reasons why park lands were developed. Furthermore, the development of owner occupied dwellings, besides the social arguments surrounding social mixing, is also a way to cover some of the costs of rebuilding social rental units. This applies to the Central Estates and the Dutch cases.

Besides quality and design of the buildings, housing associations are also important in the social economic programmes in regeneration. Especially the Råslätt and Central Estates cases show the added value of a housing association that is willing to extend itself beyond its 'core business' of housing by providing active support to initiatives coming from residents, the state, or third sector. Housing associations can provide financial support and offer cheap facilities for activities. While the costs are often seen as expenditures by the associations, Optima in Central Estates and some housing associations in the Netherlands have taken a different view. Their philosophy is that these costs are in fact investments that help to protect physical investments. The practice of selling owner occupied housing on the market means that housing associations have a higher stake in the property values. Consequently, compared to the days of managing publicly owned rental stocks, housing associations have a higher stake and increased interest in the quality, reputation and the liveability of an estate. While there are many instances in the past where housing associations were active partners in regeneration efforts, the difference is that housing associations in property-led projects like those in the Dutch cases and Central Estates cannot afford *not* to concern themselves with all aspects of the regeneration and the subsequent management.

With respect to management, some housing associations have taken on the role of social gatekeeper, controlling and monitoring the residents. We have seen this in the Råslätt estate, where poor and weak households are refused entry because the estate was deemed to weak to receive them. In Kanaleneiland and Bijlmermeer, housing associations together with municipality, police, and welfare organisations have been experimenting with cross-referencing their files on residents in order to identify 'multi-problem' families more quickly and streamline the array of welfare services for each family. Optima in the Central Estates have similar contacts with welfare and municipal services and have employed neighbourhood wardens to establish a presence in the streets and engage residents. This attitude does not apply to all housing associations. Some housing associations in Stockholm and Kanaleneiland take a different view and see their responsibilities and concerns confined to the state of their units and their buildings.

Housing associations are absent in Hodge Hill and the Catalan estates. In these cases, redevelopment and management are performed by governmental organisations which have similar objectives as housing associations, but tend to act less independently, do not have decision-making powers, and act and function more as an extension of the local state. In Trinitat Nova, the community association has taken some of the roles and activities of housing associations. However, in Sant Roc the regional government's ADIGSA have been responsible for maintenance of some of the housing under the VPO regime, but have done so unsatisfactory according to the residents. Likewise, the housing department of the Birmingham City Council has

been unable to take on a leading or gatekeeper role in Hodge Hill. This is partly because it lacks the institutional and professional capacity and political support to do so.

6.3 Institutional Fitness

Some essential elements of the institutional framework affect the regeneration process and outcomes. To illustrate these elements we will use the term institutional fitness (see introduction). Table 6.4 below summarises our cases on the four criteria mentioned in the introductory chapter, and, consequently, the fitness of the institutional framework.

Table 6.4. Summary of the institutional framework

	Different kinds of institutions with sufficient professional capacities	Interaction between actors	Encompassing structures of collective interest	Common awareness and agenda	Fitness
Hodge Hill	Low	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Low
Central Estates	High	Moderate	High	High	High
Tensta	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Moderate
Husby	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Moderate
Råslätt	High	High	Moderate	High	High
Bijlmer-East	High	Moderate	High	Moderate	Moderate/High
Kanaleneiland-Noord	High	Moderate	High	Low	Moderate
Trinitat Nova	Moderate	High	High	Moderate	High
Sant Roc	Low	Low	Moderate	Low	Low

It seems that institutional fitness is highest in the 'most satisfied' estates. The institutional framework in place has been able to create liveable estates. On the other hand, in the estates where residents are dissatisfied, actors in the neighbourhood regeneration efforts have not been able to form coalitions and share visions and objectives. This may be a result of power relations, conflict or mistrust between actors, or insufficient means and capacity to perform complex interventions.

To be sure, the success or failure of an institutional framework to cooperate and agree is largely dependent on the conditions created on the national, regional, and local levels. These frameworks create the social and economic conditions in the neighbourhood, as well as conditions of cooperation. Land use regulations, urban and housing policies, politics, local history, revenue ownership structures, and tenure all shape the constellation, direction, and power relations of an institutional framework. A well funded regeneration project with excellent prospects and favourable market conditions may be better for the spirit of cooperation than scarce resources, low demand, and social conflict.

Nevertheless, two elements of the institutional framework that attribute to the 'fitness' and the outcomes have to be highlighted. Firstly, in most of these cases, one or two actors take responsibility and have the ability to deal with conflict situations and hold other actors accountable. This can be done either through financial dependency, hierarchical relationships, or through bargaining and activism. This last strategy applicable to the community association in Trinitat Nova. In Råslätt, the municipal housing association and the municipality fulfil this role. In Bijlmermeer, it are the district administrations and, to a lesser degree, the housing association that take responsibility and coordinate the efforts. In the Central Estates, the Birmingham City Council, and especially the planning department, has been important in the earliest stages, while the Optima housing association took over the leading role in a later stage and has been especially adamant to hold other actors accountable. Alternatively, in Stockholm, as policy makers and administrators see their estates declining rather than improving, there is frustration over the lack of instruments, cooperation, political will, and capacity to institute comprehensive change. Moreover, any vigorous actors that feel responsibility for the entire estate are largely absent in Sant Roc and Hodge Hill. However, genuine efforts have been made to produce such an actor in both cases. In Sant Roc, after the failure to establish a community association like that in Trinitat Nova, a municipal-regional partnership has been installed. In Hodge Hill, the housing associations that were to be established after stock transfer were to follow the example of Optima housing association albeit with fewer funds. Lastly, in Kanaleneiland Noord, the problem is that there are perhaps too many (leading) actors; three housing associations, a municipality, a school, a shopping centre, resident groups, and a private developer are involved in the Axis project. The framework seems to paralyse the process and hold back physical regeneration. Similarly, the social economic programmes involve numerous third sector organisations and the municipality. However, there has been successful cooperation on projects within the social economic programme with satisfactory outcomes in the area.

Secondly, the actors in the regeneration have the professional capacity to undertake a comprehensive regeneration process together with residents. In Trinitat Nova, the residents themselves have professional staff and education to help them in their negotiations, planning and process monitoring. The municipal departments and housing associations in Bijlmermeer and Råslätt, and Optima housing association in Central Estates generally make professionally trained personnel available to plan, implement, and monitor neighbourhood regeneration projects and subsequent management. On the other hand, in Hodge Hill we have seen that the Council departments that work in the area are not sufficiently equipped in terms of funding, cooperation, and personnel to handle the necessary management and regeneration tasks. In the Catalan cases, the amount of professional capacity is generally lower than the other cases, but the Trinitat Nova residents have introduced a level of expertise and funding themselves. The Sant Roc case is perhaps more typical of the scarcity of resources, expertise, and personnel in (social economic) regeneration and management activities in Catalonia. However, the Stockholm estates and Kanaleneiland proof that a level of professional expertise is not always a guarantee for the desired outcome.

6.4 To conclude

The discussion of the institutional framework that ended the previous chapter shows that fitness can be beneficial to the process and outcomes of comprehensive regeneration projects and the subsequent management. There is no doubt that the actors are largely responsible for these outcomes. However, it should not be forgotten that these actors operate in conditions that are shaped by multiple institutional frameworks at different scales. These frameworks have already been discussed extensively above. Nevertheless, the question remains: how should any practitioner deal with these contexts? Of what use are they?

The practice of neighbourhood regeneration (objectives, activities, and organisation) is a result of multiple strategic actions which were informed by institutional frameworks, most notably by market, state, and politics. From the viewpoint of one practically oriented, there are several immediate concerns:

- *The expectations, obligations, and opportunities offered by national policy framework like urban and housing policy.* These policies are themselves the result of their history, and political and public debates, such as integration. The impact of national policies varies per actors, but usually aims to coordinate and integrate efforts around central themes and objectives. These include the integration of immigrant communities, fighting (concentrations of) poverty, promotion of homeownership, social inclusion, housing renewal, stimulating the engagement of local communities, dispelling social conflict, solving youth problems, and tackling anti-social behaviour in society.
- *The condition of the regional housing market and its effect on housing and population in the estate.* The tenure in an estate is relevant in this respect as well. Using housing for non-housing purposes may cause opportunities as well as constraints. Housing market and tenure are especially relevant in case of tenure restructuring and housing market renewal.
- *Residential involvement.* As liveability of the estate is defined by residential perception, the involvement of residents can be beneficial to the outcomes. The bottom-up pressure should be taken seriously and integrated into practices. The absence of residential activism and involvement is a threat rather than a blessing.
- *Finally, the fitness of local institutional and organisational frameworks to cooperate is dependent, partly at least, on institutions affected by state, market, and politics.* Nevertheless, in spite of institutional constrictions, there is a degree of freedom among actors to take action in favour of more interventionism and release (additional) resources and expert personnel in support of regeneration. Furthermore, in some cases there is room for actors to assume leadership and responsibility when resources are committed and investments are being made. This is especially true for municipalities and housing associations. Obviously, some barriers such as financial constraints require willingness, but also strategic action that will enable actors to overcome constraints. The planning office of Birmingham City Council is a good example of an actor which acted against the institutional framework, took leadership, committed personnel and resources, and acquired funds by

strategically acting upon housing market opportunities and central state housing policies. This kick-started the regeneration.

So what constitutes success? This is a normative question and thus dependent on the objectives that are shaped by institutions. Nevertheless, those regeneration efforts which have found a way to integrate the institutional logics of state policy and politics, the housing market, and residential pressures, and managed a degree of institutional fitness as well, are more successful in carrying out the activities to the satisfaction of the residents and the actors. However, this does not mean that all activities are effective or that the outcomes are inclusionary and positive for all residents. The perception of displaced residents was not taken into consideration when the (satisfaction) survey was held. Furthermore, problems such as cultural integration, housing market failure, and poverty may not be resolvable on the neighbourhood level. The failure of actors to notice these aspects is as much attributable to institutional frameworks as the success in creating liveable and safe environments.

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Inhoud

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