Abstract
This paper argues that Nietzsche develops a novel and compelling account of the distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states: he argues that conscious mental states are those with conceptual content, whereas unconscious mental states are those with nonconceptual content. I show that Nietzscheâs puzzling claim that consciousness is âsuperficialâ and âfalsifyingâ can be given a straightforward explanation if we accept this understanding of the conscious/unconscious distinction. I originally defended this view in my âNietzscheâs Theory of Mind: Consciousness and Conceptualizationâ ; since then, the view has come under criticism on several fronts. Brian Leiter and others suggest that there is not enough textual evidence for the view. In addition, Leiter, Mattia Riccardi and Tsarina Doyle argue that, rather than aligning the conscious/unconscious distinction with the conceptual/nonconceptual distinction, Nietzsche endorses a higher-order tho..