Procedure 2: A Structure in Which No One Stops It— What Happens When Legal Evaluation Is Avoided
1. Why does the Japanese government not clearly say, “We will not participate”?
In Procedure 1, I examined how war is pushed forward through its manner of advance itself.
Small deviations, dispersed responsibility, increasingly hardened rhetoric, and the avoidance of legal evaluation. A continuous sequence of such turns creates a point that becomes difficult to reverse before one fully realizes it. Procedure 1 was primarily concerned with that structure of advance, mainly through the case of the United States.
How, then, does that Procedure take shape in the case of the Japanese government?
What I want to examine in this chapter is the question of military involvement in relation to the Strait of Hormuz—that is, the dispatch of vessels or comparable forms of cooperation that the United States expected from its partners—and why the Japanese government did not clearly state that it would not participate.
The important point here is not simply that the Japanese government was being cautious.
What truly needs to be seen is why, in the case of the Japanese government, no words were placed that would clearly say, “This is where we stop.”
That is the source of discomfort taken up in this chapter.
If we compare the responses of other countries, it is not unusual for governments to state clearly that they will not become involved.
France says it will not participate.
Spain also refuses clearly.
Germany, while maintaining a cautious posture, also draws a line against involvement.[5][6][7]
In each case, the point is stated in words: where they stop.
The Japanese government, by contrast, is different.
It repeatedly says that it will act “within the bounds of the law” and that matters will be judged “on a case-by-case basis.”
At first glance, this sounds like a cautious constraint.
But in reality, there is another structure at work here.
What appears here is a different Procedure: one that refrains from placing words that would stop the process, while preserving room for future action.
Prime Minister Takaiti also said that, at the Japan-U.S. summit on March 19, she had “carefully explained in detail” to the U.S. side what Japan could and could not do within the bounds of Japanese law. Yet she did not disclose the substance of that explanation, describing it instead as a “sensitive exchange.”[4]
From here, I want to organize that discomfort as a structure and, with the aid of a four-quadrant map, make visible the distinctive position of the Japanese government.
What emerges is that the Japanese government is not merely ambiguous. Rather, it has institutionalized ambiguity as a mode of operation.
2. Where do other governments place “words that stop the process”?
To clarify this discomfort, it helps first to compare governments side by side.
The issue is not a simple color-coding of which country is pro-American and which is not.
What matters here is where each government places words that stop the process.
France stated clearly that, under the current fighting, it would not participate in a military operation to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.[5]
Spain likewise made clear that it would not join a military operation concerning the Strait.[7]
Germany also maintained a cautious stance while drawing a line against military involvement, at least at the present stage.[6]
The EU as a whole, moreover, has been understood as having no intention of extending Aspides to the Strait of Hormuz.[8]
China, for its part, called for a ceasefire while stopping short of military involvement, and India also prioritized safe passage and diplomacy over military dispatch.[9][10]
The wording differs.
The level of directness differs as well.
But what they have in common is this: words are placed that indicate where they stop.
That matters.
Because before the question of military involvement itself, words such as “we will not participate,” “we will not be involved,” or “we will not dispatch” already narrow the scope of what can follow.
In other words, these governments are not merely refraining from action. They are also blocking, in advance and through language, the space within which later movement might occur.
The Japanese government, by contrast, is different.
It does not say, “We will not participate.”
Instead, it says, “within the bounds of the law,” “there are things we can do and things we cannot do,” and “we will judge on a case-by-case basis.”
That difference may look small.
In reality, it is not.
The reason is simple. Other governments use language to fix the upper limit of action in advance; the Japanese government does not.
In other words, while sounding as though it is saying “we will not act now,” it simultaneously leaves open the possibility that it may be able to act later.
To make that difference visible, I present it here in a supplementary visual form.
What I want to see is not a simple division between countries that are pro-U.S. and those that are anti-U.S. Rather, the question is where each government draws the line of non-participation or non-involvement, and why the Japanese government alone is so difficult to place at a fixed point.
These two figures are supplementary conceptual maps that position governments along two axes: the degree of military involvement, and the manner in which legal judgment is handled.
Again, the point is not to color-code governments according to whether they are pro-American or anti-American. What matters is where each places words that stop the process, and whether legal evaluation is made explicit or held in reserve.
What stands out in the current map is that the Japanese government cannot easily be shown as a single point; it can only be shown as a band moving up and down.
That is not because its attitude is simply vague. It is because there is a structure in which legally available room is kept open while the activation of that room is left to government judgment. Put more plainly: the Japanese government is not drawing a clear line in advance by saying “we will not go this far.” Rather, it remains in a position where “if necessary, we may still be able to go there,” depending on circumstances.
The supplementary map is a counterfactual comparison: if the Japanese government had remained under the pre-2015 legal structure, where would it have been placed under the same international conditions?
It is not a historical map of the past in a chronological sense. It is a comparison in which only the way the Japanese government’s position is determined has been changed. What that reveals is that what changed was not simply Japan’s political will, but the very way in which its position is determined.
At that point, the discomfort from the opening begins to come into focus.
The reason the Japanese government does not clearly say “we will not participate” is not merely that such words are diplomatically difficult, nor merely that diplomatic considerations are at work.
Behind it lies a structure that preserves legally available room while allowing movement up or down through political judgment in each situation. As long as that structure exists, it becomes difficult for the Japanese government to place words that clearly say, “This is where we stop.”
What we need to look at next is how that structure is produced.
In particular, why is it that the Japanese government can speak in general terms as though it is bound, while still holding back from a conclusion in any specific case? It is only there that the post-2015 institutional structure and the avoidance of legal evaluation come into view as part of one continuous flow.
3. The Japanese government speaks in principles while withholding conclusions
A defining feature of the Japanese government’s explanations is that it does not deny general principles.
On the contrary, in general terms it says a number of things quite clearly.
One example is the principle that Japan should not support a state that has engaged in an unlawful use of force.
At first glance, that appears to be a fairly strong constraint.
If that principle were applied directly to the present case, one might expect the government to say with relative clarity what Japan can do and where it can no longer go.
But that is not what happens in practice.
After stating the principle in general terms, the Japanese government repeats, when the discussion turns to a concrete situation, that it will judge “in light of the specific circumstances of each individual case.”
In other words, it maintains the principle, but does not produce a conclusion as to how that principle applies to this particular situation.
By “application” here, I mean something simple: taking a general principle and actually applying it to the concrete situation at hand.
The problem is that, at the stage of application, the Japanese government does not fix the conclusion.
Put more plainly, the government takes a two-step position:
It says, as a general principle, that Japan will not assist an unlawful use of force.
But it also says that it will not decide, at this point, whether the present case falls under that principle.
Within this structure, the principle exists.
But the way that principle works in the present situation is not fixed.
As a result, the principle is there, yet it does not immediately stop the process.
That is a crucial feature of the Japanese government’s Procedure.
While other governments fix the upper limit of action in advance through words such as “we will not participate” or “we will not dispatch,” the Japanese government speaks in principles while withholding the judgment that would apply those principles to the concrete situation at hand.
As a result, its language appears restrained, yet at the same time leaves room for later movement.
What we see here is not mere vagueness.
Nor is it merely insufficient explanation.
It is a rather sophisticated form in which general principles are not withdrawn, the rule of law is outwardly preserved, and yet concrete conclusions are still not fixed.
In a sense, the Japanese government says that it will follow the law, while suspending the question of how that law should actually operate in this case.
In that way, law does not come forward as a brake that stops action immediately. Instead, it recedes and functions as a framework supporting future judgment. Law thus comes to resemble not a norm that stops the process at once, but a form that preserves later options.
That is why the Japanese government does not clearly say “we will not participate.” It is not simply blurring its language. It is adopting a two-step Procedure: retaining general constraints in principle while not fixing those constraints in concrete conclusion.
This, in turn, leads to the next question.
Why is the Japanese government able to adopt such a two-step structure as an institutional arrangement?
Following that background leads us to a larger structural change that emerged after the 2015 security legislation.
4. What changed after the 2015 security legislation?
The structure examined so far is not just a matter of wording.
Behind it lies a larger legal and institutional transformation that emerged after the 2015 security legislation. The security-related laws enacted in 2015 put an end to the long-standing prohibition, in practice, on the exercise of collective self-defense, and introduced a framework under which Japan could, under certain conditions, use force in response to attacks on allies or other closely related states.[2][3]
What matters here is not simply that “more things became possible.”
More fundamentally, what changed was the way Position itself is determined. Previously, at least at the level of formal doctrine, the legal constraint—“this cannot be done as a matter of law”—stood first. However strongly a government might wish to move politically, the law would first draw a line. After the 2015 security legislation, by contrast, what came to the fore was a different structure: “it may be legally possible, but whether to activate it is left to case-specific recognition and judgment.”[2][3]
Put more plainly: what used to be “impossible from the outset” has become “legally possible, though we may decide not to do it this time.”
Between those two formulations lies a decisive difference from the standpoint of legal restraint.
If something is impossible from the outset, little room remains for carrying the judgment forward into the future. But if something is legally possible, the question shifts to recognition and judgment. In other words, law no longer functions immediately as a brake; instead, it defines a range of possible movement, within which political judgment operates.[2][3]
What changed was not merely the Japanese government’s legal system or interpretation.
What changed was the very way in which its position is determined.
In the past, law fixed the position.
Now, within a legally available range, Procedure determines how far the government moves. In that sense, the Position of the Japanese government has shifted from something fixed at a single point by law to something rendered variable up and down by Procedure. That is why, in the current map, the Japanese government must be shown not as a single point but as a band. It is not shown as a band because its attitude is vague. It is shown that way because a structure that does not fix position in advance has been built into the institutional order itself.
At this point, we can finally begin to see why the Japanese government finds it difficult to say clearly “we will not participate,” and why it continues to avoid a clear evaluation of the actions of the United States or Israel.
If the Japanese government were to state clearly that those actions were unlawful under international law, that judgment would immediately rebound upon the government’s own possible support or room for participation. By contrast, if that evaluation is held in suspension, the government can preserve legally available room while postponing judgment into the future. What the Japanese government is avoiding, in other words, is not merely a verbal commitment. It is the very evaluation that would bind its own future action.
In that sense, the matter cannot be reduced to the reassuring formula that “Japan can only do what is lawful, so there is no problem.”
What is taking place at a deeper level is a structural shift in which law loses its function of stopping action on the spot, while the government’s recognition and judgment move Position instead. Put differently: where law once fixed position, Procedure now moves it. That is part of the reason the Japanese government continues to speak in terms such as “within the bounds of the law” and “we will judge on a case-by-case basis,” without clearly stating that it will not participate.
5. How unusual is the Japanese government’s ambiguity?
At this point, another question naturally arises.
Is this kind of ambiguity—deliberately refraining from fixing legal evaluation, postponing conclusions, and preserving future room—something unique to the Japanese government?
The answer is no, at least not in pattern.
In diplomatic practice, it is not unusual for governments to leave judgments ambiguous or postpone conclusions because of alliance management, energy security, domestic opinion, or the costs of explicitly calling something a violation of international law. The use of strategic ambiguity itself is not rare in international politics.
And yet, the Japanese government still stands out in the present case.
The reason is that, while other governments are stating fairly clearly, “This is where we stop,” the Japanese government alone continues to maintain a structure that preserves room.
France stated clearly that, under the current fighting, it would not participate in a military operation to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.[5]
Germany also stated that it would not participate,[6] and Spain likewise made non-participation in such a military operation clear.[7]
At the level of the EU as a whole, too, there is no intention to extend Aspides to the Strait.[8]
In short, on the European side, differences in phrasing aside, words are being placed that say, “We will not go this far.”
The Japanese government, by contrast, says that it will act “within the bounds of the law” and that it will judge “on a case-by-case basis.”
That does not amount to an immediate affirmation of military involvement. But neither does it fix non-participation.
In that sense, the Japanese government’s ambiguity is not simply cautiousness. It is an ambiguity that operates, institutionally, by suspending legal evaluation and preserving future room.
To put it more plainly, the Japanese government is not saying, “We do not yet know, so we cannot decide.”
Rather, by not deciding, it preserves a range within which it may still move.
That makes this ambiguity less a matter of passivity than of maintaining mobility.
What is distinctive, then, is not ambiguity itself.
What is distinctive is that this ambiguity is supported by the institutional structure that emerged after the security legislation and is preserved as future room for action.
In other words, ambiguity is not functioning merely as diplomatic language. It is functioning as a Procedure for not fixing Position in advance.
Under such a structure, it is not quite accurate to say that the Japanese government “does not stop.”
More precisely, it does not adopt a form that stops the process.
Where other governments fix the upper limit of action in advance by saying “we will not participate” or “we will not dispatch,” the Japanese government leaves that upper limit unfixed and carries evaluation and conclusion forward into the future. As a result, even when it appears cautious on the surface, the room for further movement is not truly closed.
That is the core of the discomfort raised at the outset.
The Japanese government does not fail to say “we will not participate” merely because such words are diplomatically inconvenient.
It already possesses a structure that allows it to avoid saying them.
6. Conclusion — The real question is who gets to determine position
Let me draw the threads together.
What is distinctive about the Japanese government is not ambiguity in itself.
It is the fact that ambiguity is being used institutionally as a way of suspending legal evaluation and preserving future room.
Put more plainly, the Japanese government says, in effect, “We are not doing it now,” while at the same time keeping intact a condition in which “we may still be able to do it.”
That is not mere caution.
It is a rather definite Procedure: one that refrains from placing words that stop the process, while preserving a form in which movement remains possible if needed.
While other governments draw a line and say, “This is where we stop,” the Japanese government does not draw that line.
That is not because judgment does not exist.
On the contrary, it is because a form has been chosen in which judgment is carried forward into the future.
At that point, the issue is no longer simply where the Japanese government stands.
More important is who, by what procedure, and at what moment gets to determine that position.
In the past, at least at the level of formal doctrine, law fixed that position by functioning as a brake.
Today, by contrast, within a range deemed legally possible, it is the government’s recognition and judgment that determine whether action is activated.
Position, in other words, is moving closer to something that is not fixed by law but made variable by Procedure.
What changed was not merely the Japanese government’s legal system or interpretation.
What changed was the very way in which its position is determined.
That is why the real question now is this: if the Japanese government is deliberately leaving unclear where it stands, why is it doing so?
What does it actually mean, in concrete terms, to say, “We will do what is lawful, and we cannot do what is unlawful”?
Put differently: why, in this precise moment, is such an apparently obvious statement being emphasized at all?
What comes into view through that question is not a simple matter of whether the Japanese government is for or against something.
What comes into view is a structure that does not fix position, and the Procedure that moves within that structure.
And it is precisely there that the root of this chapter’s discomfort lies.
Notes
[1]
Title: Joint statement from the leaders of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Japan, Canada and others on the Strait of Hormuz: 19 March 2026
Source / Responsible body: UK Government / Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-from-the-leaders-of-the-united-kingdom-france-germany-italy-the-netherlands-and-japan-on-the-strait-of-hormuz-19-march-2026
[2]
Title: Development of Security Legislation
Source / Responsible body: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
URL: https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000084.html
[3]
Title: Peace and Security Legislation: Development of Legislation for Peace and Security
Source / Responsible body: Prime Minister’s Office of Japan
URL: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/content/peace_security_20151102_1.pdf
[4]
Title: Hormuz cooperation request: Prime Minister Takaiti says, “Within the bounds of the law, there are things we cannot do”
Source / Responsible body: Mainichi Shimbun
URL: https://mainichi.jp/articles/20260320/k00/00m/010/040000c
[5]
Title: Europe forced into defensive action as US-Israeli conflict around Iran escalates
Source / Responsible body: AP News / The Associated Press
URL: https://apnews.com/article/europe-iran-security-citizens-economy-evacuation-military-7ab528a92e969ec65521046f80bd323c
[6]
Title: World hurries to respond to rapidly changing war around Iran
Source / Responsible body: AP News / The Associated Press
URL: https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-israel-international-reaction-03-02-2026-db5128dca1593c0af6c9f89ecbbe57d1
[7]
Title: Trump fumes at NATO for refusing to help secure the Strait of Hormuz, and embraces going it alone
Source / Responsible body: AP News / The Associated Press
URL: https://apnews.com/article/4e0cf38708e9c3ba8ea2a36148620067
[8]
Title: European Council conclusions on Middle East
Source / Responsible body: Council of the European Union / European Council
URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/03/19/european-council-conclusions-on-middle-east/
[9]
Title: World leaders urge peace as Iran trades strikes with US and Israel
Source / Responsible body: AP News / The Associated Press
URL: https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-israel-reactions-03-01-2026-961f288c645f6cbc7fa9d63e0502df36
[10]
Title: As India seeks Hormuz safe passage, Tehran asks for return of seized tankers, sources say
Source / Responsible body: The Business Standard / Reuters
URL: https://www.tbsnews.net/world/india-seeks-hormuz-safe-passage-tehran-asks-return-seized-tankers-sources-say-1388876
