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Eric Hillebrand Gunther Schnabl Discussion
Paper No.6 October 2003
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çµæžç ç©¶ãVol.54 No.2 Apr. 2003
ãEffects of the Bank of Japanâs intervention on yen/dollar exchange rate volatilityã21 November 2004
Toshiaki Watanabe (a), Kimie Harada (b)
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The Effects of Japanese Foreign Exchange Intervention: GARCH Estimation and Change Point Detection
Eric Hillebrand Department of Economics, Louisiana State University
Gunther Schnabl Department of Economics and Business Administration, Tuebingen
6. Interpretation of Findings
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Very recently, during the first half of the year 2003, Japanese monetary authorities were reported to have stabilized the yen between 115 yen to 122 yen to the dollar.
Press reports give evidence that Japanese foreign exchange intervention credibly set (informal) target zones with respect to the exchange rate level andâas a side effectâreduced exchange rate volatility: âPrevious intervention has not been so effective in keeping the rate in such a tight range.
As a result volume has dropped and currency traders have complained about a lack of volatility.â
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Although this explanation approach seems quite plausible it raises the question as to the impact of systematic (rule-based) foreign exchange intervention on the money supply.
De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2003) have not incorporated a money market into their model.
We would argue however, that establishing a target zone would require subordinating fundamentals (interest rates and monetary base) to the exchange rate target.
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This brings us to Japanâs particular monetary framework after 1999.
As is generally known, Japanese short-term money market interest rates touched the zero bound in early 1999 which is generally perceived as a âliquidity trapâ. The Bank of Japanâs official commitment to zero interest rates is in line with any growth (but not decline) of the monetary base.
Indeed we observe that despite the stagnating economy the monetary base grew rapidly after 1999 reaching yearly growth rates of 20% to 30%.
In short, in the liquidity trap, at zero money market interest rates, the money supply is âinfiniteâ.
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Under these circumstances the borderline between sterilized and unsterilized foreign exchange intervention gets blurred.
Disputes between the Bank of Japan and the Ministry of Finance about the pros and cons of sterilization indicate that even in the liquidity trap the sterilization operations of the Bank of Japan have continued (Bank of Japan 2002: 273).
But even if the monetary effects of foreign exchange intervention are neutralized, sterilization would be irrelevant if it coincided with a simultaneous increase of the monetary base.
In September 2001, the Nikkei Bank of Japan watcher reported that the yen amount released by foreign exchange intervention might not have been absorbed by open market operations in to supply liquidity to the troublesome markets after September 11.35 This could be hint that sterilization is not pursued completely and automatically as in the United States or the Euro Area.
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Thus our estimations might provide evidence that Japanese monetary authorities move slightly towards an exchange rate policy similar to that observed by McKinnon and Schnabl (2003a) for other soft or hard pegs in East Asia, which subordinate interest rate targets to exchange rate targets.
At least the official foreign reserves of the âfree floaterâ Japan and the âhard pegâ China tend to behave more and more similarly.
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All in all, our finding of successful Japanese foreign exchange intervention after 1999 would therefore be in line with the general wisdom on foreign exchange intervention as put forward by Jurgensen (1983) and Dominguez (1998): Foreign exchange intervention can only be successful if it remains unsterilized or coincides with respective changes in the money supplyâa tentative conclusion which needs further research.
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