Wisdom as Orchestration of Mind and Virtue

Paul B. Baltes

Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin

Book in preparation, 2004

Contents

Chapter III
From Cultural-Religious Beliefs to a Philosophical (Scientific)
Analysis of Wisdom   **78**

Toward a Developmental Psychology of Wisdom
    186

Paul B. Baltes

WISDOM AS ORCHESTRATION OF MIND AND VIRTUE

Preface

This preface has two parts. The first was written during a period of relative innocence and anticipatory planning, before I embarked on the actual task of writing this book. The second part is more typical: like most prefaces, it was written after the book was completed. Thus it contains a few observations and afterthoughts that evaluate the degree to which the original goal was reached and transformed as the book came to life.

My initial goal was to write a book on the nature of wisdom with several interrelated characteristics. First, I wanted to integrate our emerging psychological knowledge about positive aspects of the aging mind using wisdom as a prototype. Second, I wanted to show that wisdom is worth examining in the larger context of psychology including such fields as personality and industrial psychology. Third, I wanted to present wisdom as a topic at the interface between several disciplines: philosophy, sociology, theology, psychology, political science, and literature, to name a few. Fourth, I intended to place wisdom in the context of human evolution and successful aging. I felt intuitively that understanding the outlines of wisdom could guide us as a society and as individuals to a higher level of maturity, generativity, and mutual enhancement. And fourth, although my own expertise is that of a psychologist, I wanted to write a book that would find a larger audience than those already interested in the topic at hand. Therefore, rather than merely recounting experimental findings and those of my colleagues, I decided to try to move beyond the constraints of my mind as a psychologist committed to empirical inquiry. I was prepared to make an effort at speculation and intuitive thinking, to fill in the niches when data were absent, or even to invent new territories and perspectives as long as solid psychological evidence was not in the way.

As I wrote this early section of my preface, sitting in my study at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Stanford, California, I had a pretty good sense of direction and personal control. Yet, I also felt stirrings of doubt. On the one hand, the Center is a heavenly place that makes an impossible combination possible: working hard and at the

same time feeling relaxed. On the other hand, the quality and disciplinary spectrum of one's colleagues for the year at the Center call forth modesty and despair. One quickly learns, if one is willing to listen, that there is more to know and consider than one may be able to manage.

A lengthy quotation in one of my early readings at the Center (suggested of course by one of my new Center colleagues), Eugene Rice's fine book on the idea of wisdom during the Renaissance, makes the point exceedingly clear. In the 15th century, the German philosopher-theologian Nicholas Cusanus used in his <u>De Sapientia</u> about half a page of examples to show that wisdom is beyond a human's reach: "Of wisdom, therefore, which all men by nature desire to know and seek..., one can know only that it is higher than all knowledge and unknowable, unutterable in any words, unintelligible to any intellect, unmeasurable by any measure, unlimitable by any limit, interminable by any term..., and no opinion can be held about it" (Rice, 1954, pp. 22-23). Cusanus, of course, goes on to argue that as Word of God, as a part of grace rather than nature, wisdom can be approximated in one's continuing search for God. Reading these historical words by Cusanus, which are somewhat sobering for an empirically-minded psychologist, I asked myself: Is it really possible to accomplish what I am about to try?

These were my musings during my 1990-91 fellowship year at the Stanford Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. During that period about half of this book was completed. I had to wait for another fellowship stay (1997-98) to tackle the second half.

Schluss: Its dangerous, of course, to use Kant's writings as a legitimation for one's own limitations. Despite this possibility of indirect self-aggrandizement, I like to conclude with some citations from Kant (1768, p. 964) about the uncertainty and limitations of human reasoning and the validity of intellectual work. As a postlude to his writings on the mind and metaphysics (including his discourse on the concept of "Weltweisheit", that is, world wisdom), he commented in the following manner on the dynamics between the magnitude of a work and one's own intellectual power (own translation): "It is in several ways unproductive to extend the small measure of one's intellectual power to create windproof designs for all issues. Therefore, it is prudent ... to adjust the frame of the work to one's powers, and if one is not

able to reach the magnum opus (das Grosse), to limit oneself to the smaller and solid one (Mittelmaessige)."

Indeed, I feel humbled by the scope and depth of the topic that I attempted to deal with in this book. Kant's conclusion that wisdom, like metaphysics, deals with the limits of human reason and the limits of a given person's intellectual power squares with my own feelings as I complete this book by writing a Preface which places me back into the beginning.

CHAPTER 1

Why Study Wisdom?

Wisdom is generally considered the capstone of knowledge about the human condition and about the means and ends of life. This prized view of wisdom has been with us since antiquity: "Happy is the man who finds wisdom", we read in <u>Proverbs</u> of the Old Testament. Plato called it "the highest of human things." Indeed, the idea of wisdom as one of the highest forms of knowledge--possibly the highest--is evident in the very definition of the historical grand master of all scholarship, philosophy (<u>philosophia</u>): "the love or pursuit of wisdom."

The semantic meaning of wisdom encompasses more than having <u>knowledge,</u> however. For example, as noted in the famed 19th-century German language dictionary of the Grimms (Grimm and Grimm, 1854) as well as the classic 18th-century French Encyclopedia (1765), the meaning of "wisdom" can also include the habits and skills of <u>applying knowledge</u> to develop oneself and others.

Wisdom is also a concept laden with different connotations when used in different disciplines. In religious writings, for instance, wisdom typically is strongly associated with a particular set of values including transcendental ones, whereas more secular treatments of wisdom include the recognition of uncertainty and variation in values. Because wisdom is such a complex concept, scholars occasionally prefer to speak of a collection of wisdoms rather than a singular wisdom (Assmann, 1991).

Because of its rich and varied meanings, defining wisdom as a scientific construct will not be easy. Perhaps, as the definition of philosophy as the love or pursuit of wisdom implies, it will be like other searches for the ideal (Berlin, 1990; Nisbet, 1980). The primary benefits and satisfactions of such searches lie in what we find not at our destination, but along the way. This book, then, is a journey of exploration into a psychological theory of wisdom. It is written in the hope that along the way we will find something worthwhile, although most likely we will not reach a final destination. To paraphrase Thomas Jefferson's observation on the search for happiness: The pursuit of a psychology of wisdom, not its attainment, guides this book.

_____A scholarly book about wisdom could be written from many perspectives: theological, philosophical, historical, sociological, anthropological, or psychological, for instance. Most scholarly work on wisdom can be found in the religious-theological and philosophical traditions. This concentration is probably due to the fact that the essence of wisdom, its concern with the vexing problems of the human condition, its vulnerability, spirituality, morality, and peaks of flourishing, has been at the core of religious and philosophical thinking right from the beginning, when humankind moved toward the creation of an organized form of knowledge.

Only during the last decades have other disciplines, such as psychology, ventured into the territory of wisdom, first as a kind of popular psychology, then, slowly and cautiously, as a serious intellectual enterprise. Embracing the topic of wisdom was not easy for psychologists. As psychology evolved during this century, its primary concern was with empirical measurement and justification. Complex and high-flying topics such as wisdom were not favorite subjects. Meanwhile, psychology having been established more firmly, psychologists have opened their eyes to broader aspects of the human condition and shown more readiness to engage everyday phenomena of high complexity. The present book is such an effort by a psychologist to venture out, to explore what psychology can contribute to the study of wisdom.

Specifically, this book is written to examine the degree to which a psychology of wisdom is possible. In the spirit of psychology as a cross-disciplinary "twin" discipline--at the interface between the humanities and social-behavioral life sciences--I shall report in the main part of the book on psychological theories of wisdom and the empirical evidence that psychologists have generated over the last decades to tie the theories to observable and testable referents. Much of this main part will concentrate on one psychological theory of wisdom that my colleagues and I have attempted to develop over the last 15 years or so at the Berlin Max Planck Institute for Human Development (e.g., Baltes & Smith, 1990; Baltes & Staudinger, 2000; Baltes & Kunzmann, in press; Staudinger & Baltes, 1996).

<u>Wisdom: A Transdisciplinary Concept</u>

Before we reach this main part, we will make several detours. Positively speaking, one might say that these detours, consisting of four chapters, set the stage, historically and philosophically. They pay tribute to past scholarship on wisdom, the work of theologians, cultural historians, and philosophers. In their hands lie the scholarly traditions and foundations of wisdom; they have articulated what wisdom denotes, why understanding the idea of wisdom is important, why wisdom continues to captivate us. These scholars, however, have also shown us what aspects of wisdom may be beyond our reach as natural scientists, where humanist-intuitive (hermeneutic) and not scientific knowledge offers a yardstick that makes the scientific enterprise (in the narrow sense) look misguided and short of the mark.

There is another reason why I engage my readers in such a long introduction to the main objective of this book, a treatise on the psychology of wisdom. Wisdom is a concept that not only is inherently complex and transdisciplinary, and therefore requires a multidisciplinary view, but also denotes a territory in which the work of a psychologist is under suspicion and considered foreign - especially if the psychologist aspires, as I do, to be both experimental and empirical.

Can a data-driven psychologist be sufficiently informed about and committed to the spiritual and humanist qualities of wisdom? Is it not prefigured that he is bound to fail, to engage in research where the subject matter and the methodologies employed pass each other by like ships in the night, to quote Wittgenstein? Indeed, that is possible. What my detours into scholarly quarters such as religious studies, cultural anthropology, and philosophy are intended to accomplish, therefore, is an honest effort to examine whether the psychological conception of wisdom advanced in this book sufficiently matches philosophers and humanists' concept of wisdom.

If, as I shall claim, my psychological conception of wisdom is reasonably close to what more humanist scholars have treated as the essence of wisdom, a new stage of scholarship on wisdom has been reached. In this new stage, wisdom will have been lifted from the hands of philosophers, religious scholars, and humanists to a new plane of collaboration and transdisciplinary discourse. In this vein, two goals are paramount to my own work on wisdom: Bringing it into the home of scientific psychology, and in such a way that philosophers and

humanists can see themselves as part of the journey and collaborate in further scholarly analysis.

To this end, I hope that behavioral scientists will bear with me as I introduce them to the impressive and wide-ranging scholarship of wisdom in philosophy and the humanities. In the same spirit, I hope that philosophers and humanists will be ready to move beyond the opening chapters and engage themselves with the main objective of this book, the understanding of the structure and function of wisdom from a psychological point of view.

Everyday Beliefs: What Is Wisdom?

When asked to think about wisdom, most people quite readily provide concrete instances of it. Their responses usually fall into three categories: (1) mentions of specific public or historical figures who exemplify wisdom, (2) proverbs or maxims about wisdom, and (3) descriptions of solutions to particular life problems that because of their challenging complexity and uncertainty are assumed to require wisdom.

Wise People

Who are the "wise" people whose names are adduced under the first heading as public prototypes of wisdom? Who is mentioned, of course, depends on the respondent's cultural, ethnic, professional, or religious background, and when the question is asked in a small social gathering, a lively discussion about the relative merits of the proposed wise personages often ensues. In the Western world, the following are often mentioned as prototypes of wise people, and here and there they do survive the test of social discourse: Benjamin Franklin, Buddha, Winston Churchill, Goethe, Gandhi, Confucius, Jesus, Abraham Lincoln, Solomon, and Golda Meir. Americans occasionally nominate one or another of their Supreme Court justices, such as Oliver Wendell Holmes. For Germans, their former president, Richard von Weizsäcker, is in current times a frequent and strongly endorsed candidate.

Why is there usually a lack of robust consensus about such nominations? Perhaps for two reasons. First, as the discussion about the particular nominee proceeds, more and more evidence is generated about vices and weaknesses, calling into question whether the person was "truly" wise (e.g., Confucius's occasional harshness in personal dealings with others, or King Solomon's somewhat ruthless methods of gaining and maintaining political power). And

second, our conception of wisdom seems to include the notion of such a high and "pure" form of an ideal that no flesh-and-blood person lives up to the standards implied; wisdom in its pure form may exist only in our minds. The idea of wisdom as an abstraction is also implied in some historical writings. Confucius, for example, when asked to nominate "true men" (interpreted to be similar to our conception of "wise people"), systematically refused to identify specific individuals (Lin Yutang, 1943). The sociologist Max Weber's notion of an "ideal" type carries similar connotations. For Weber, an ideal type is part of a speculative theory, but not necessarily present in phenotypic reality.

Proverbs and Maxims

The second instantiation of wisdom in everyday conversations deals with <u>proverbs and maxims,</u> or related things such as aphorisms. Proverbs differ from maxims (Nichols, 1996; Perry, 1993). While some proverbs imply instruction for reflexive thinking leading to action, maxims typically offer direct instruction for what should be done; that is, they suggest how to act by "practical" wisdom in specific instances of everyday life. Two well-known wisdom-type maxims known to most of us are "Sleep on it before you act" and "Try again, your luck may change."

The significance of proverbs and maxims for understanding complex and deeply rooted cultural phenomena, such as gender, beauty, or excellence, has long been appreciated. As Francis Bacon put it: "The genius, wit, and spirit of a nation are discovered in its proverbs."

Works by Perry (1993), Mieder (1993, 1997; Mieder & Dundes, 1981), and Rogers (1990) are good entries to the study of proverbs and their role in wisdom-related topics. They include comparative analyses of proverbs in different cultural regions of the world and a reprinted paper by the acknowledged doyen of proverb studies, Charles Taylor (1931), introducing the study of proverbs and illustrating the argument that proverbs are "one man's wit and all men's wisdom." Another short sentence capturing the meaning of such proverbs is the definition of a proverb as "wisdom expressed in a sentence" (Mieder, 1993, p. 24). However, these works also include critical evaluations, for instance, the argument that proverbs and maxims are uncertain or even false regarding their empirical validity. Is it

empirically true, for example, that "a tale never loses in the telling", or that "familiarity breeds contempt"?

It is important to note at the outset (e.g., Perry, 1993) that none of these maxims (or proverbs for that matter) in themselves are wisdom. First, the content of proverbs rarely fits empirical evidence (Rogers, 1990). Second, and more importantly, as individual items these maxims typically highlight one or another of the various facets that make for wisdom. Wisdom, however, as we will see later, is inherently dynamic, uncertain and often suggests oppositional tendencies. Not surprisingly, therefore, the pool of individual maxims offers examples that contradict each other. For instance, the proverb "Clothes make the man" can readily be contradicted by "Don't judge a book by its cover" (Rogers, 1990).

These problems of meaning and empirical validity aside, proverbs can have "rich explanatory power" (Rogers, 1990, P. 195). The essence of proverbs and maxims, for instance, is that they are short and contain a highly condensed kernel of common-sense "truth." They are akin to punch lines with a high degree of common-sense understanding. Another feature of good proverbs is that they are contextually and temporally flexible; they are transported easily, from subject matter to subject matter, from language to language, and from historical period to historical period. For a proverb to be powerful, it must prove a certain historical and contextual generality in meaning and usage, although the specific text and content may vary. Kunstmann (1939) illustrates this point nicely when he shows how one proverb, first recorded about A.D. 1000, "It's an ill bird that fouls its own nest", found its way through practically all major Western languages; it was present in early Graeco-Roman as well as Egyptian-Semitic lore.

It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the meaning carried in proverbs is associated with deep levels of knowledge and a special way of accessing and organizing that knowledge toward application to a given situation. At a later point in this book I will return to this special quality of proverbs and link it to wisdom defined as an organizational meta-heuristic dealing with important matters of life and the human condition. In addition, a study will be presented (Freund & Baltes, 2002) where we examined whether people show preferences for proverbs

that are closely linked to the idea that wisdom includes knowledge about effective strategies of life-management.

Considering the heuristic power of proverbs and maxims, it is not surprising, therefore, that proverbs and especially maxims are considered the earliest heralds of the so-called "wisdom literature" (see chapter 2). Over the centuries, beginning about 2500 B.C. (in Egypt and Mesopotamia), many collections of maxims about the conduct and mastery of life have been compiled (Assmann, 1991; Buhr, 1986). Law (1995), for instance, provides an erudite exposition showing how the wisdom literature entered even into book-length treatments of Latin grammar during the 7th century, a topic of learning that would otherwise strike one as dry. In this instance, a 7th-century author, the monk Virgilius, exploited the early wisdom literature to such a degree that Law (1995) argues that his interest in that topic was at least as deep as in the seemingly primary topic of the book, that is, grammar.

Historically, the Seven Sages of Greece, all of whom were philosophers who lived during the 6th century B.C., are another important source of ancient wisdom-type sayings and maxims (Evans, 1989, p. 1182). "Most men are bad", proffered Bias of Priene; "Consider the end" is credited to Chilo of Sparta; "Avoid extremes" and look for "the golden mean" are prescripts by Cleobulus of Lindos. One of Periander of Corinth's statements is "Nothing is impossible to industry." Pittacus of Mitylene said, "Seize time by the forelock", Thales of Miletus offered, "Who hateth suretyship is sure", and finally there is perhaps the best known wisdom-related maxim of Solon of Athens: "Know thyself."

The use of wisdom-related proverbs continues into the present, including a Swiss sugar company that burnishes its image by printing a proverb about wisdom on each sugar packet sold to restaurants. In China, for example, one says: "The current generation builds the road on which the next one travels", or "It takes a long journey to find out which horse is the strongest", or "Let's be round, but your conduct square." Instant proverbs that I have collected by asking colleagues for their quick definition of wisdom are the following: "Everything has two sides", "You can't win them all", "Time is the best healer", "There are always gains and losses."

While the core meaning of proverbs and maxims evinces much transcultural and transhistorical similarity, the specifics and applications do vary. Such comparative analysis is the focus of much linguistic work on the familiarity and frequency of usage of proverbs as

summarized by Mieder (1993). In such research, for instance, people of varying ages, backgrounds, and cultural contexts were asked to identify proverbs and to rate their characteristics along several dimensions such as usage. Two findings are of interest. First there appears to be a sizable decline during the 20th century in the pool of proverbs that people can command, especially on the level of self-generated production. Second, the specific phrasing of the knowledge and advice expressed in proverbs changes. For this reason, I have included in Table XX comparative information on best-known proverbs across recent historical periods. More recently (Peng & Nisbet, 1998, 1999), there is also work to show cultural differences in the preference of proverbs. Chinese, for instance, prefer proverbs that highlight the oppositional, whereas Americans lean more towards proverbs that are directional in the sense of maxims.

In conclusion: In everyday life, proverbs and maxims are often offered as instantiations of wisdom. However, as it is with the mentioning of select individuals as prototypes of wisdom, their power of persuasion wanes as soon as one looks beyond the surface. As soon as one is aware of the larger pool of proverbs and maxims with its contradictory suggestions and prescriptions, it becomes obvious that there are no simple rules to wisdom. Maxims and proverbs, however, open one door to the larger and often uncertain body of knowledge that represents wisdom. Individual proverbs or maxims while not identical to wisdom, are, however, footprints of wisdom meant to give direction for thinking and reflection.

(Table 1 about here)

Wisdom as a Masterful Solution to a Difficult Life Problem

A further and more concrete step in the direction of identifying wisdom in everyday life is the articulation of a life problem and its solution. This instantiation follows from the idea that wisdom-related meaning is inherently tied to difficult matters of life and creative problem-solving behavior.

As an example of this way to refer to wisdom; most of us in Western cultures are familiar with King Solomon's biblical solution to a dispute between two women who both

claimed to be the natural mother of a child (I Kings 4:12). Solomon's suggestion to divide the child by sword and give literally one half to each woman (and one woman's immediate renunciation of her claim in light of this decision) meets little disagreement. It seems to most of us an effective strategy for solving a difficult problem. Solomon did not know who the biological mother was, but he was able to find a strategy for discovering the truth using the notion of true motherhood as sacrifice (Meacham, 1990).

This example of wisdom highlights not only the idea that wisdom deals with difficult problems of the human condition and that it involves a creative way of solving the problem. The Solomon example also makes evident that wisdom is supposed to deal with finding a solution that is in the interest of a "good" life. It was the biological mother for whose welfare a solution needed to be fitted. This commitment of wisdom to the good and the morally legitimated well-being of oneself and others is a critical part of our everyday conceptions of wisdom. If the skills of knowledge were invested to exploit others or to advance one's own cause at the expense of others, we would not invoke wisdom.

In sum: In everyday life, there are many instantiations of the idea of wisdom. We think of wisdom in the context of wise persons, as knowledge that crystallizes deep human insights as proverbs or maxims might do, or as classical cases of wise judgment and advice. Note, however, that none of these everyday examples, offers a complete picture of wisdom: its nature, origins, and processes. In the sense of footprints of wisdom, these phenomena are simply specific instantiations and manifestations of wisdom, "jewels" of a high-level insight into the <u>conditio humana</u>. But because of their collective crystallization and historical survival, they carry more weight than mere personal observations or definitions. This is the reason why research on the meaning-core of culture often involves the study of significant leaders (heroes), proverbs, maxims, or classical cases of conflict and their apparent solution. The twentieth-century emergence of semiotics, the study of signs and symbols, is an example of this scholarly line of reasoning.

<u>Defining Wisdom</u>

What can we learn from these everyday snapshots about the meaning of wisdom? Do they communicate a common set of properties? For openers and adding to everyday beliefs

about wisdom the essence of cultural-historical work, I submit that seven properties are generally, if not universally, accepted as inherent in any definition of wisdom. These properties constitute a first foundation of a conceptual definition of wisdom (see also Assmann, 1991; Baltes & Smith, 1990; Baltes & Staudinger, 2000; Oelmüller, 1989; Staudinger, 2001; Welsch, 2001). I will elaborate on them as the book unfolds.

(1)   Wisdom addresses important and difficult questions and strategies about the conduct and meaning of life.

(2)   Wisdom includes knowledge about the limits of knowledge and the uncertainties of the world.

(3)   Wisdom represents a truly superior level of knowledge, judgment, and advice.

(4)   Wisdom constitutes knowledge with extraordinary scope, depth, and balance.

(5)   Wisdom involves a perfect synergy of mind and character, that is, an orchestration of knowledge and virtues.

(6)   Wisdom represents knowledge used for the good or well-being of oneself and that of others.

(7)   Wisdom, though difficult to achieve and to specify, is easily recognized when manifested.

What is the meaning of these properties of wisdom? The first feature, that wisdom addresses important and difficult questions and strategies about the conduct of life and the human condition sets wisdom apart from other forms of everyday knowledge. Wisdom encompasses but goes beyond common-sense and practical knowledge about how people are expected to function in typical situations and how the physical and social world operates. Such knowledge is part of wisdom. But, wisdom deals predominantly with matters of much significance to the human condition, such as the conduct and meaning of life. Thus, wisdom includes knowledge about existential problems that are at the frontiers of what we are able to understand and master. Building on a concept advanced by Karl Jaspers, several scholars (e.g., Maercker, 1992; Oelmüller, 1989) have used the notion of Grenzsituationen (situations of limits) to locate the meaning of wisdom contextually.

The second feature, that wisdom includes knowledge about the limits of knowledge and the uncertainties of the world, makes clear that wisdom is not identical to scientific and technological knowledge. Wisdom-related knowledge involves insights into the limitations of science, for instance regarding aspects of spirituality and meaning of life. Moreover, wisdom speaks to the frontiers of our insights into the human condition, the unknown and uncertain. In this vein, many writers on wisdom (e.g., Meacham, 1983; Wundt, 1940) have argued that the essence of wisdom is knowledge about the limits of what can be known. Yet, despite the limits and uncertainties, we expect wisdom to guide us in a useful direction. Included in this guidance is wisdom's ability to protect us from the seductiveness of quick answers and ready-made solutions.

The third feature, that wisdom is a truly superior level of knowledge, judgment, and advice, indicates that wisdom is the best that our minds can achieve--even, as I suggested earlier, perhaps better than the best human can achieve and, therefore, often regarded as utopian or divine. Wisdom is akin to an ideal that perhaps we can only strive for, approximate, rather than attain. In any case, the level of excellence attributed to wisdom makes it special, something that is likely to be fully achieved only by very few, if by anyone.

The fourth feature, that wisdom is knowledge with extraordinary scope, depth, and balance, emphasizes that wisdom is integrative, that it focuses on the whole and the weighting and moderation of its parts, that it is more than specialized knowledge in the narrow sense. Aristotle's ancient saying, "the wise organizes" (sapientis est ordinare), is transported into modern views on the holistic and integrative structure and function of wisdom (Geyer, 1989; Hartshorne, 1987; Oelmüller, 1989). Balance, in particular, is in the core of wisdom (Sternberg, 1999); as are related concepts such as maximum tolerance within a system of basic fundamental principles of justice.

Contextual and holistic integration and balance are achieved, however, without losing the specifics of the instance. When wisdom is called upon in a specific situation, it places the specific instance into the perspective of a larger whole and balances the arguments. This particular feature of wisdom is often also identified as knowledge from a distance, as knowledge that moderates (Hartshorne, 1987) or modulates present reality in relation to the

past and the future, as knowledge that moves beyond the emotional and intellectual forces contained in the problem at hand. A critical instance (such as a deviant behavior in school) is seen in the context of the entire life course and the generational nexus, a specific social situation (such as poverty) is placed into the structure and dynamics of social differentiation and cultural evolution.

The fifth feature, that wisdom represents a perfect synergy between mind and character, a perfect orchestration of knowledge and virtues, reflects the view that wisdom is more than "cognitive" knowledge. For wisdom to emerge, cognitive, social, and motivational attributes need to converge and form a whole of extraordinary excellence. This view of wisdom as the highest form of integration of mind and soul dates back to the religious origins of the wisdom concept. Thus the strength of the connection between mind and behavior is much influenced by the impact of religion on the definition of wisdom. In Asian conceptions of wisdom, for instance, we find a symbiosis between "scientific" (philosophical) and religious forms of wisdom (Waldenfels, 1989). In Western Europe, on the other hand, the historical struggle for a separation of philosophy (science) and religion has spawned conceptions of wisdom that include the kind where wisdom is reserved for the theoretical aspects of the mind rather than wisdom as an integrated whole of mind and behavior.

The sixth feature, that wisdom is knowledge developed and used for the well-being of oneself and others, like the fourth feature, points to the intimate connection between the mind of wisdom and the motivational goal of wisdom. Wisdom is not knowledge used for the benefit of a single person alone. Rather, it indicates of a high level of functioning in the interest of one's own development and that of others. Wisdom, then, considers not only the personal, but also the collective good (e.g., Baltes & Kunzmann, in press; Baltes & Freund, 2002).

This feature highlights what is often called the moral dimension of wisdom (Kekes, 1995). To put it simply, and with due attention to historical evolution, we consider wisdom a property of God and not the devil, an attribute of kings interested in the best for their people and not of dictators interested in Machiavellian strategies of human exploitation, a property of a well-meaning counselor giving good advice to someone in a difficult situation and not of someone whose advice serves his or her own needs more than those of the advisee. In short,

knowledge in the hand of "evil" or "ego" minded people, despite their expert understanding of how and why humans function, is not considered wisdom. For wisdom as a body of knowledge to be realized, it needs to be in the hands of a well-meaning and not a crooked or ill-tempered person.

The seventh feature, that <u>wisdom is difficult to achieve but more easily recognized when it is manifested</u>, means that wisdom, despite its extraordinary level of excellence, is part of our everyday lives and our personal experiences. It means that wisdom is not completely outside our lives and our minds; it rests firmly in the core of our cultural mentalities and selves.

As we know from psychological research on learning and memory, it is easier to recognize than to recall a given memory event. The same is true for wisdom. Although we may not be able to produce wisdom ourselves, our minds are prepared to look for it and to recognize its products. Therefore, despite its rarity and profundity, wisdom is not completely hidden, or something that can be "contacted" only by an elite few. On the contrary, we all are somewhat connected to wisdom; we recognize, though in varying degrees, its challenge and see its footprints. Most of us probably have demonstrated some wisdom in our own lives, small and private as this demonstration may have been. Wisdom, therefore, is a phenomenon of public and social construction and discourse.

<u>Additional Properties of Wisdom</u>

Beyond these seemingly agreed upon universal views on wisdom, other properties could be considered. For instance, there is the question of <u>types</u> of wisdom. Because wisdom is so complex and multifaceted, it is argued that not all aspects of wisdom cannot be located in any single person, that there is a need for specialization with different people holding the key to different aspects of wisdom. Imagine the requirements one would need to display the full range of theoretical and practical skills involved in the conduct of life or the full spectrum of relevant emotions, including melancholy and optimism. Aleida Assmann (1991), on the basis of her historical analyses, distinguishes, for instance, between <u>parental-authoritative</u> wisdom, <u>judicial</u> or kingly wisdom, <u>magical</u> wisdom, and <u>skeptical</u> wisdom. This differentiation is exemplified in Table 2. As we will see later, the wisdom literature of the Old Testament, with its distinct

books of wisdom, represents another example of types of wisdom, a collection of distinct ways to think and feel "wisely" about important matters of life.

Another feature of wisdom that could be considered for inclusion in the category of universals is that wisdom has a strong foundation in the social and the collective, that wisdom is collective knowledge. Thus one could make the point that wisdom is the hallmark of cultural evolution and collaborative production associated with cooperation and discourse. Furthermore, one can extract from historical work the argument that wisdom is a body of knowledge that is not located in individuals (Baltes & Smith, 1990; Staudinger, 1996). On the contrary, one could argue that individuals are but weak carriers of wisdom. Rather, wisdom is collective knowledge about the conduct and meaning of life; and as a body of collective knowledge it includes multiple facets and styles of knowing and acting. Yet to include this view of wisdom in the category of universals would violate another part of the wisdom literature, namely the strong emphasis placed on the existence of so-called sages or wise persons such as Solomon.

(Table 2 about here)

Other candidates for a universal characterization of wisdom are certain personality attributes and ways to think. Some argue, for example, that reflectivity and skepticism are essential to wisdom. In another context, I invoked the concept of "constructive melancholy" to make a similar point (Baltes, EDELSTEIN LAUDATIO9: In a similar vein, it is said that wisdom is meant to overcome extremes and to represent modulation at its best (Hartshorne, 1987), and this would include an extreme regarding reflectivity itself. Another candidate for a general wisdom conception may be the requirement that metaphysical topics, such as the question of the existence of god, are the essence of wisdom. Indeed, especially in the tradition of religious and philosophical studies (see chapter 3), some scholars want to reserve the term wisdom for the metaphysical "philosophical" aspects of life rather than the everyday "practical" ones. Historically, this is similar to the distinction between theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom.

As I mentioned earlier, we may also debate whether our everyday and scholarly conceptions of wisdom need to include further specifications of the intersection between knowledge and behavior. Must the wise, for instance, merely demonstrate superior knowledge, or must they also be seen to apply it in giving advice, and especially in the conduct of their own lives? In historical discussions of wisdom, this distinction between wisdom as knowledge and wisdom as a facet of personality is sometimes manifest in a relative emphasis on contemplative forms of wisdom as opposed to active ones. And certainly, there are historical variations of wisdom and cultural regions in the world in which wisdom-related knowledge and behavior form an integrated fabric (Grimm & Grimm, 1854; Rice, 1958; Schwartz, 1954).

These additional features of wisdom, then, are likely to be relevant for a considered analysis of wisdom, and they will need more discussion. But, I view them at the outset as less consensual than the seven properties advanced, namely that wisdom deals with difficult problems of the conduct and interpretation of life, includes knowledge about the limits of knowledge and uncertainty, reflects a truly superior level of knowledge and advice, is knowledge that is at the same time deep, broad, and balanced as well as flexibly applied to specific life situations, requires a perfect synergy between mind and character, is knowledge applied for the well-being of oneself and others, and finally, that, although very difficult to achieve, wisdom is easily recognized when present.

Practical Wisdom in Everyday Life: More Than a Narrow Professional Expertise

At this point, some readers may wonder whether the framework of wisdom I have advanced excludes phenomena they would see as part of wisdom. Is the conception of wisdom I have described too restrictive and elitist; is it, for instance, a reflection of an upper-class establishment-type mentality? Note that I restricted wisdom not only to a very high level of performance (excellence) but also to situations dealing with important matters of the human condition such as the meaning and right conduct of life.

Surely, wisdom in everyday life is construed in a broader and looser way than my first definitional frame of wisdom. In everyday language, wisdom also denotes more specialized expertise: the wisdom of the racehorse trainer, the football coach, the winemaker, the card player, or the drug smuggler. Indeed, we hear about the wise and about wisdom in most walks

of life, and in each case our judgment reflects a positive evaluation, in the sense of a special expertise, the kind of expertise that in a given domain reflects the distillation of a lifetime of experience.

I do believe that "wisdom-like" phenomena of everyday practical life, such as the wisdom of the winemaker or the racehorse trainer, may fit under a larger umbrella, in a "fuzzy zone" of wisdom. Experts, therefore, are likely to possess some features of wisdom. Nevertheless, I believe that the "wise" winemaker or the "wise" race horse trainer only borders on wisdom. For the wise winemakers or the wise racehorse trainers (or any other professional specialization) to be truly lifted on the shield of wisdom, they need to demonstrate their special talents and skills in a wider context than their "narrow" professional expertise. Otherwise, and because of their closer ties to the conduct and meaning of individual lives, the "wise" grandmother may be closer to wisdom than the wise racehorse trainer. Expertise in a professional trade in itself is not enough.

For expert winemakers or horse trainers to be at the core of wisdom, they need to demonstrate their special skills and knowledge in a context that is close to important and difficult matters of the human condition. This certainly is possible. For example, some expert winemakers may deal effectively with such issues as the social and historical institution of winemaking, the role of winemaking in the lives not only of personnel in the winemaking industry but also of consumers, the question of how the wine industry intersects with social change, and how exquisite winemaking requires a nexus between the generations involved in winemaking, and so on. In other words, true wisdom enters the picture when a specific form of professional expertise is combined with global knowledge linking that field of specialization to larger questions of the human condition. The borderlines between expertise and wisdom are not precise, but the directional signals should point in the direction I have outlined.

In June 1991, the San Francisco Chronicle carried a biographical story on a 90-year-old "master vintner" of Napa Valley, Andre Tchelistcheff, who seems to qualify in this wider sense as a truly "wise" winemaker. Tchelistcheff, who died in 1994 at 92, displayed not only expert knowledge about the specifics and variations of winemaking, but also about historical changes in vinification and taste preferences. And not least because of his generative and enthusiastic

personality, young winemakers in the Napa Valley continued to flock to Andre Tchelistcheff for criticism, guidance, and support. Tchelistcheff confirmed this view in his own commentaries. "The man who attains 65 years matures intellectually completely, and has attained the wisdom of living", "My principal purpose of living is to train the young people in my progressive ideas", says he. Despite his age of 90, Tchelistcheff seemed to be able to balance tradition with change. What he didn't like was hype, glamour, and too much emphasis on money.

Surely, Andre Tchelistcheff comes close to the core of wisdom, and his life and public standing illustrate the fuzzy zone of wisdom defined narrowly. Although his special knowledge and skills are tied to a profession that is not saturated with knowledge about "important matters of the human condition and the conduct of life", he has been able to forge a successful marriage between his professional expertise and the larger context surrounding the making of wine and its changing place in society. Andre Tchelistcheff, if one believes the published report, had a mind and a personality that make the next generation of winemakers consider him a master vintner with special insights that go beyond winemaking itself. Because wisdom in general carries an image of the ideal, I would also predict that, not unlike King Solomon, the image of Andre Tchelistcheff and memories about him will undergo further changes in the direction of wisdom beyond the art of winemaking. Often, with age and historical time, wise people become more than they were when alive. Wisdom is not only a statement about reality, it is also a symbol of our dreams.

Some Personal Observations: Why Write a Book on Wisdom?

Why have I attempted to write a book on the psychology of wisdom? The origins of my scientific interest in the subject can be traced back a couple of decades (Baltes, Reese, & Lipsitt, 1980; Baltes & Dittmann-Kohli, 1982; Clayton & Birren, 1980; Dixon & Baltes, 1986), and there are several twentieth-century developments in the field of life-span human development and aging that can be seen as a scientific frame for tackling this topic (Baltes & Smith, 1990; E. Erikson, 1959; J. Erikson, 1988; Hall, 1922; Sternberg, 1990). But I must confess, my everyday experiences have been equally powerful in nurturing my interest in the study of wisdom.

When friends and colleagues have asked me the "Why a Book on Wisdom" question, they often volunteered the answer: Because I was in midlife, and most likely beginning to respond to "images of aging well" and to reach for the Eriksonian adulthood stages of generativity and wisdom (McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1998; Erikson, 1959; Ryff, 1982). Erik Erikson has proposed that during adulthood much of our attention and interest turns to being productive on behalf of others (generativity) and to reaching an integrative solution to the meaning of life and death (wisdom). And indeed, people in general do believe that it is during the sixth decade of life that attributes such as wisdom have a chance to emerge (Heckhausen, Dixon, & Baltes, 1989). Plenty of proverbs and jokes support the view that as we move toward old age we may gain in wisdom or something similar, to wit: "Thirty years ago I was a fool, but I had an excellent memory."

Acknowledging the strong influence of everyday beliefs on my decision to study wisdom, however, immediately makes me feel uneasy. Science is meant to be objective, to build on a foundation that is tested by criteria of scientific evidence, not personal intuitions. Thus behavioral scientists tend to downplay the contribution of everyday beliefs to their scientific engagement. In recent decades, however, we have been much influenced by work of social philosophers such as Jürgen Habermas, so that we increasingly recognize the intimate connection between who we are, what we want to study, and how we interpret the evidence. Science is revealed as less objective than we originally believed, and our everyday beliefs often harbor personal knowledge that is worth taking seriously and is made explicit as we design and pursue our scientific agendas.

Therefore I will attempt to sketch out my blueprint of everyday adult life before summarizing the scientific scenario that has stimulated psychological research on wisdom. For a psychologist interested in life-span development (that is, human development over the whole life course), many everyday experiences and beliefs about life are closely intertwined with one's work as a scholar. It is not easy, therefore, for me to sort out which is which, and much is in between, in the grey zone between serious scholarship and subjective "naive" theory.

Everyday Adult Life and Wisdom

Pondering casual conversations with colleagues and friends, I have become increasingly convinced that adulthood brings with it a new set of life problems, the kind of problems vis à vis which the need for wisdom or wise counsel often arises. It certainly is true that earlier phases of life require wise counsel too, but during adulthood the intensity and frequency seems amplified. To give one example, from a recent conversation with a 60-year-old woman and clinical-psychologist friend: "You know", she said, "as more and more of us live longer and into old age, the psychological world becomes more complex. Just last week, my 31-year-old son's life became more complicated as he lost his job, and at the same time I had to deal with the welfare of three old parents in their nineties, mine and those of my husband. How does one do this? Who is more important, my son or my parents?"

As we move through adulthood, we seem to feel that wisdom is of particular importance when we reflect on the meaning of life, deal with the dynamics and conflicts associated with parenting and mentoring, begin to experience our own biological finitude, evaluate issues of generational constancy and change, or anticipate our own approach to "successful aging" despite increasing biological vulnerability. When I put these personal experiences in the context of contemporary scholarship about adult development and aging, I concluded that these are the kinds of questions that call for a high level of knowledge about the human condition--that is, wisdom.

During midlife, then, the fabric of our day-to-day experiences takes on some new qualities and complexities. And as I organized my thoughts, in the light of scientific evidence and benefitting from the work of close colleagues (e.g., Brim, 1992; Clayton, 1975; Dittmann-Kohli & Baltes, 1990; Featherman, Smith, & Peterson, 1990; Ryff, 1982; Staudinger & Dittmann-Kohli, 1992; Smith & Baltes, 1990), my sense of certainty about this conclusion increased. I began to speak about a number of topics or challenges that make the second half of life conducive to the search for wisdom:

1. The legacy of adulthood and living long

2. The multi-generational dynamics

3. The shift from distance-from-birth to distance-from-death

4. The accumulation of unfinished business

5. Unexpected life circumstances and social change

6. Balancing the gains and losses of life

7. The search for the meaning of life.

What do I mean with these topics or scripts of everyday life, and why do we become more aware of them at midlife? The <u>legacy of adulthood and living long</u> refers to the increase in the complexity of one's world in adulthood, the concentration of responsibilities during that phase of life, but also the quantity of our life history and its psychological consequences: As our life biographies unfold, we have more and more to store in our memory, more to consider, coordinate, and evaluate. Adult roles in family and professional life can be terribly rich in challenges and responsibilities. Growing older also leads to a longer and swelling past; we leave longer and more complex tracks. The same applies to the planning of the future. As we think about the future including its shrinking horizons, the shadows of the past become longer and longer.

The <u>multi-generational dynamic</u> involves our families, social networks, and historical embeddedness: Sometime during adulthood, we are confronted with an extended vision of our generational responsibility and social embeddedness. For instance, our roles as parents can be extended from concern for our children to include care for our aging parents and also for others in the world of work for whom we serve as mentors. This extended vision amplifies our understanding of the complexities and variations of the social networks in which we live.

Furthermore, sometime during midlife, we shift our predominant perspective from our <u>distance from birth to our distance from death</u>. Up to adulthood, our primary way to mark time is to count distance from birth (chronological age); we worry less about how much time we have left. As we approach old age, distance from death emerges as a stronger component of our time perspective. As we deal with this change in our conception of "lifetime", as we count the years to live more than the years lived, the pressure to set priorities and to re-evaluate the meaning of our lives increases.

The <u>accumulation of unfinished business</u> is another consequence of living longer. The past is not finished, the slate is not always clean, as we move on to the next phase of life. Often our earlier life tasks, such as parenting and education, are not completed "on time" (Neugarten,

1968). They go on and on and seem endless. When we add on the new age-appropriate tasks and roles that are unique to growing older, we face demands beyond what we anticipated. And there are life stories and life plans that we were not able to implement. As we grow older, the incomplete parts of one's life suggest new forms of reconstruction and mastery. In German the concept of Sehnsucht, the longing for personal utopias of life (Baltes, Freund, & Scheibe, 2002),s highlights the idea of managing the unreachable and permanently incomplete parts of life.

Unexpected life circumstances and social change refer to our experiences of events that are not part of our expected pattern for our lives. Some of these events are rare, idiosyncratic ones such as winning a lottery. In fact, based on personal accounts, it is occasionally said that unexpected events such as an accident or a divorce seem to become more the rule than the exception. More and more events also remind us of the physical realities and shortcomings of our bodies. We or close friends seem increasingly to confront biological limitations and illness. Thus the further we live into adulthood, the more people of our own generation we see become sick or even die. Such unexpected or non-normative events (Baltes, 1987; Brim & Ryff, 1980) involve particularly difficult constellations of coping and mastery.

In addition to such age-graded unexpected events, social changes make us confront the unexpected and deal with it. Historical shifts in technology, for instance, carry implications for the intellectual standing and competitiveness of adults (Dubin & Willis, 1990) in general, but also for one's own sense of efficacy. Mores and cultural norms, such as attitudes toward sexual orientation, marriage, work, and leisure evolve. Often these changes are initiated primarily by the younger age groups, who see them not as changes at all, but as the norm for their generation. For older adults, on the other hand, the social changes represent departures from the past, some of which involve true confrontations challenging our ways of managing our lives.

Living long and growing older also result in a deeper experience with and understanding of the dynamic between gains and losses in life. Much of what happens in childhood and adolescence is governed by a belief in growth and progress.The gains, anticipated or realized, are in the foreground. As life extends into adulthood, the focus shifts

(Baltes, 1997; Heckhausen, Dixon, & Baltes, 1989; Staudinger, Marsiske, & Baltes, 1995).
We concern ourselves more and more with maintenance of functioning and avoidance of losses. The savoir vivre of old age, in particular, requires a new quality of reflectivity, a quality that reflects a growing understanding of the role of suffering, including its potential positive outcomes such as acceptance of one's finitude and tranquility.

The search for the meaning of life is perhaps the most explicit manifestation of our continuous struggle in adulthood for purpose and goal-directedness. Meaning of life speaks to the "holistic" essence of our lives, our raison d'être. The topic of life's meaning, perhaps more than the others, is a statement about the combined effect of one's life, about the whole gestalt. As we face demanding life situations of high complexity, as the balance of gains and losses shifts, as we see our futures running out, we focus more and more on taking stock, on developing a balance sheet about our past, current, and future life. We reflect on our values and the purpose of our lives, we make efforts to have our minds outwit the limitations of our aging bodies (Dittmann-Kohli, 1990; Staudinger, 1999; Staudinger & Dittmann-Kohli, 1992).

What does this pattern of facts and everyday topics of midlife (and there are others one could adduce) mean for wisdom and my interest in writing a book about it? First, of course, they suggest that we search for wisdom because by most definitions wisdom involves exactly the kind of knowledge required to tackle such difficult but uncertain matters of life (Baltes & Smith, 1990; Staudinger & Baltes, 1996). Therefore it seemed compelling to me to inquire into the nature of such knowledge, and if it could be identified, to understand the conditions that shape and govern its acquisition and application. And luckily, since the initiating work of Vivian Clayton (1975), a few others in psychology had arrived at similar conclusions and commitments. Meanwhile, and in line with the recent focus on positive psychology (Aspinwall & Staudinger, 2002; Keyes, 2002; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), the search for concepts similar to wisdom, concepts that are designed to denote the flourishing and peaks of human development has been expanded.

The Scientific Frame for a Psychology of Wisdom

Writing a book on wisdom, however, was not only prompted by my own life experiences as I reached adulthood. It fits within a scientific frame as well. Since the 1980s, at

least four conceptual lines of reasoning were proffered by behavioral and social scientists in support of an inquiry into the scientific study of wisdom. Depending on one's own scientific background and priorities, these lines of scholarship are more or less significant. In later sections of this book, I will return to each of them in greater detail.

The first scientific reason for the study of wisdom is its <u>transcultural and transhistorical</u> <u>significance</u>. Throughout history and into modernity, wisdom has been identified by distinguished scholars around the world as a problem of prime importance. Although there have been historical fluctuations in the attention given to wisdom (Assmann, 1991; Lehrer et al., 1996; Oelmüller, 1989; Rice, 1958; Robinson, 1989; Schwartz, 1975; Welsch, 2001), concerns about it have resurfaced again and again. It is as though wisdom were a kind of yardstick identifying and symbolizing our profound desire to lift the spirit of humankind. The history of wisdom, then, has never come to an end. It is part of our ongoing evolution, and it raises its head especially in times of crisis or new challenges.

During the Nazi period in Germany, for instance, the philosopher Max Wundt (1940) managed--despite widespread censorship--to write a powerful critical essay on the nature of then "modern" culture under the disguise of a philosophical treatment of wisdom. Max Wundt was the son of one of the founders of psychology, Wilhelm Wundt. Within the historical frame and peak of Nazi-.Germany, with its strong focus on a particular profile of national and personal identity, Max Wundt used the idea context of wisdom to argue among other things for more pluralism in what are considered acceptable selves and modesty in thinking.

Similarly, in Germany during the 1980s (e.g., Oelmüller, 1989), there was, for some years at least, a marked increased interest in the topic of wisdom. The public was uncertain about the course of German society and felt a need for managing their uncertainty. The topic of wisdom came into the foreground and was connected with a call for a general rejuvenation of the role of the humanities (<u>Geisteswissenschaften</u>) in maintaining a civilized world and keeping cultural evolution "on course." It strikes me, then, that the attention given to the topic of wisdom is historically conditioned, and when primed, the call for wisdom and its lack of presence is heard. Indeed, this may be the reason why at some historical points, some scholars, such as Marcel (1951) or Wundt (1940), have said that wisdom is on the wane. Is it indeed, or

is our concern about its loss the simple reflection of the fact that wisdom waxes and wanes in correlation with its continuing role (sometimes more manifest than at others) as a modulator and evaluator of social change? How can we measure such a contention? Are we psychologists able to capture such an elusive concept as wisdom, or at least parts of it? Or will it remain the intellectual property of the humanities?

The second reason for the scientific study of wisdom is that it is a <u>marker of excellence in human development</u>. Human culture can be described as a continuing quest for finding and creating high levels of psychosocial functioning, for phenomena that can be called progress and excellence (Aspinwall & Staudinger, 2002; Ericsson, 1996; Nisbet, 1980). For many people, wisdom is one of the peaks of excellence in human development, a marker of direction for personal and intellectual growth (Alexander & Langer, 1990; Baltes & Smith, 1990; McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1998; Ryff, 1982). Although in Western cultures it is usually not considered appropriate to seek wisdom publicly or to claim that one has achieved it, we privately long for wisdom and admire it in others. Moving toward wisdom, therefore, is a movement toward a higher stage of development; it is progress.

Wisdom as a marker of excellence applies not only to our lives as individuals, but also to societal functioning, to how we live collectively. Social philosophers and political theorists, therefore, have attempted to specify the nature of wisdom and to demonstrate its role in public discourse and political action (Habermehl, 1995; Jeannot, 1989; Jacobs, 1989; Lehrer et al., 1996; Nichols, 1996; Nozick, 1989). What does it mean to act wisely as a political leader, as a judge, as a human service professional? Obviously, wisdom is more than applying rules laid down as laws and social norms. It seems to involve a special ability to identify the important factors and to place a problem in a larger substantive and temporal context. As we will see later, when scholars from different historical periods and cultures have approached these and similar questions, they have done so within the constraints and opportunities their societies provided. For example, Christian philosophers have often associated wisdom with the divine. The historical process of secularization, on the other hand, has focussed more and more on the explication of concepts such as equality, cultural pluralism, and justice. Does wisdom continue to play a role in these secularized discussions? Is it a meaningful concept to describe our

frontiers of knowledge about the human condition and appropriate ways to optimize human lives and societies?

The third reason for the scientific study of wisdom is that the <u>search for positive markers of aging</u> is a hotly debated topic in aging research. During the last decades, more and more scholars and scientists have been attracted to the study of the old and the process of aging. Whereas biologists have defined aging primarily as a phenomenon of loss and decline in adaptive capacity, behavioral and social scientists have included in their research agenda the search for "developmental",   progressive, or growth-oriented aspects of aging (P. Baltes, 1987, 1997; Blanchard-Fields & Hess, 1996; Bengston & Schaie, 1998; Birren & Schroots, 1996; Brim, 1992; Carstensen, 1995 Labouvie-Vief, 1990; Perlmutter, 1990; Riley & Riley, 1989; Ryff, 1982; Smith & Baltes, 1990a). In fact, students of culture and behavior have argued that it is their particular mission in the gerontological enterprise to demonstrate that old age not only brings loss, but might even harbor opportunities for gains (select as these may be).

The current empirical evidence for positive changes in mind and personality in old age is not overwhelming, although there are positive signs. In psychology, for example, much of the available scientific evidence about the aging mind focusses on decline (Salthouse, 1991). It is also true that when the general population is asked about their expectations of aging, they usually concentrate on increased losses. Old age is not seen as a period rich in positive goals and outcomes (Heckhausen, Dixon, & Baltes, 1989).

A better understanding of wisdom may help us to identify the facets of the aging mind associated with opportunities for gains. It also may help us to age more successfully, to integrate mind and body at a new level of insight and efficacy. Thus, as envisioned by G. Stanley Hall (1922) and Erik Erikson (1959; J. Erikson, 1988), wisdom could serve as a prototype for what may be possible in old age and what we can all strive for. Other concepts, such as the concept of maturity, have been used for similar objectives. Many may feel that the effort to treat maturity as a scientific concept has not been successful and that this outcome is a bad omen for work on wisdom. I grant the possibility. But in my view, the time has come to give wisdom a chance.

Similarly, as developmental cognitive psychologists began to ask questions about the aging mind, they were forced to ask how older adults compared with younger ones in cognitive tasks that are typical of youth and adulthood (such as the speedy processing and recall of new information). Reflecting about the life context of adulthood and the bodies of knowledge that adults are expected to acquire and possess, researchers also asked whether aging may bring with it a new array of cognitive and emotional resources and specializations. And as researchers began to suggest the possibility of new, adulthood-based forms of thinking, such as dialectical and relativistic reasoning (Blanchard-Fields & Hess, 1996; Commons, Sinnot, Richards, & Armons, 1989; Kramer, 1990; Riegel, 1973), or to focus on adulthood stages that incorporate the relationship between cognitive and emotional development (Carstensen, 1995; Labouvie-Vief, 1990; Staudinger, 1999), additional arguments were advanced for the modern-day discovery of wisdom as a topic for developmental-psychological inquiry. Similarly, developmental psychologists increasingly ask themselves how people approach the planning and coordination of their lives (Smith, 1996). Later chapters will address these developments and contributions in greater depth.

The fourth reason for the scientific psychological study of wisdom is that it may be a high-level orchestrating strategy (heuristic) of reasoning about life.and orchestrating mind and virtue towards excellence (Baltes & Staudinger, 2000). Psychologists have been eager to move beyond micro-constructs of information processing and decision making, to be more daring in their efforts to select topics for analysis. All too long, some argue, have experimental psychologists abstained from analyzing the complexity of life. Another example of this reorientation is to do away with the separation of cognition and emotion, of intelligence and personality, and to identify phenomena that encompass both intelligence and personality and that reflect the complexity of everyday life (Gollwitzer & Bargh, 1996; Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1988; Sternberg & Wagner, 1986). Another illustration is the effort in conceptions of and research on rationality to consider tasks and conditions of everyday functioning reflective of high uncertainty (Dawes, 1988; Simon, 1983). Similarly, there is much work in cognitive heuristics (Gigerenzer, Todd and the ABC Group, 1999; Nisbet & Ross, 1980; Tversky & Kahnemann, 1974). Perhaps wisdom can be conceived of as an organizational and

orchestrating heuristic at the highest level of aggregation involving the meaning and conduct of life.

Is a Psychology of Wisdom Possible?

Most work on the topic of wisdom has been theoretical and speculative rather than empirical. This applies also to psychological efforts. One wonders why empirical efforts by psychologists to study wisdom have been rare, even though a wealth of intuitive reasons and theoretical argumentation suggest its significance as a phenomenon of life. One could argue, on the one hand, that the concepts and methods of psychology simply were not ready to tackle a task of such complexity, and that psychologists during the twentieth century have veiled their claims in modesty so as to achieve the respectability of psychology as an empirical science. Indeed, research into the psychology of wisdom is likely to stretch the limits of what psychological-empirical analysis can accomplish.

On the other hand, I believe that there is more to this issue. Some researchers and laypeople alike deem it unwise to try to study wisdom. Why? I suggest there are two primary reasons. First, as I mentioned before, wisdom is a statement about the ideal, about a kind of utopia of the mind. Ideals and utopias are there to open the mind, but they do not necessarily exist as a "real" phenotype, to borrow a term from genetics. Second, even if wisdom exists as a phenotype, it may be hidden from easy inspection. Some see wisdom as something that is buried or covered up, as something divine, as something that by definition is unapproachable and unexplainable through scientific analysis. As said in the dialogues of Buddha about wisdom: The enterprise of wisdom is "unthinkable, incomparable, immeasurable, incalculable . . . an enterprise which equals the unequalled" (Conze, 1970, p. 101). If we were to make wisdom transparent and to transform it into a subject for public knowledge and scientific discourse, the process would change the basic foundation of wisdom. We would "destroy" wisdom as we study it and try to make it explicit. I recall an inscription a famed linguist-colleague wrote in a book he gave me: "To the unexplainable in human behavior!"

Such skepticism deserves respect. Indeed, a recent though sketchy evaluation of psychological research on wisdom by a philosopher (Kekes, 1995, p. 13) goes so far as to conclude that "psychological studies of wisdom are . . . singularly unpromising." Applying

the scientific method to a phenomenon does not produce gains alone. Just consider the history of the Viennese school of operationism as a general method of capturing phenomena by empirical methods. As we try to "operationalize", to measure wisdom, we may painfully and conspicuously fail. Perhaps even worse, we may transform the construct to such a degree that it bears little resemblance to the original phenomenon. Wittgenstein can be called as a witness: "The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by" (1953, p. 232).

Although I am not persuaded that such critical reflections about the limits of an empirical psychology represent deadly objections to a psychological treatment of wisdom (P. Baltes & Smith, 1990; Baltes & Staudinger, 2000), I view them as important suggestions of caution and as advising intellectual modesty. Many of us are awed by what wisdom may connote, as a body of knowledge and as an ensemble of virtues. I do appreciate this point of view, especially after having read cultural-historical accounts of wisdom.

Because of the special idealistic characteristics of wisdom, I know from experience that research on wisdom is likely to lead to some immediate resistance and disappointment. Emotionally and intellectually, I share this intuition and feel the need to acknowledge the limits of what an empirical science might be able to accomplish. Indeed, as we study wisdom psychologically, the phenomenon is constructed according to a new set of rules and principles, namely those of a science like modern-day psychology. Our efforts, therefore, may fail or lead to a phenomenon that others may judge to be a far cry from what wisdom represents in our everyday beliefs or our past cultural-historical heritage.

These notes of caution and difficulty, however, do not imply inaction and frozen pessimism. Rather, they can also motivate us to conduct useful research. For example, there are two ways to explore systematically whether a psychology of wisdom is in touch with cultural-historical notions of wisdom and our everyday personal beliefs. They are to compare historical accounts with the psychological approach chosen and to conduct empirical research on people's beliefs about wisdom. What do we as laypeople or as experts in the behavioral and social sciences think wisdom is? How do we believe it is acquired (if at all)? What is wisdom good for? Such an approach helps us to examine to what degree psychologically derived

conceptions of wisdom maintain contact with the phenomenon originally selected for investigation. Luckily, many of the initial empirical attempts at the psychological study of wisdom were of this kind. The focus was less on observing the behavior and mind of wise people than on collecting data about what people in general thought wisdom is. Chapter 6 summarizes relevant work.

What the Present Book Is not Doing

Because of the richness and "idealism" of the wisdom concept in our natural language, I suspect that some people have high expectations about what this book should cover that will remain unfulfilled.

The first beyond-my-reach expectation concerns questions of the <u>practice of wisdom</u> and its use in one's own personal development - the use of wisdom for enriching our lives, its application as a means of finding meaning. Many publications aim at this goal (e.g., Gudeman, 1989; Lea, 1990; Nisker, 1990; Norman, 1996; Restak, 1997). My exposition of wisdom as a psychological concept will contain some statements about what wisdom is and how societies and individuals may attain it . The theory of wisdom I advance may even suggest how each of us can work toward acquiring an orchestrated way of thinking and a body of knowledge about life that by my definition is wisdom-like. But the focus of this book is not on the specification of the educational and therapeutic methods by which a state of wisdom can be attained. You will find suggestions about a general road toward wisdom; you will not get a specific road map. In fact, in my view it is antithetical to a scholarly book about wisdom to become prescriptive in any absolute or specific sense.

The second expectation likely to be unfulfilled by this book deals with a specification of the particular <u>values to be achieved</u> and <u>vices to be avoided</u> that are at the substantive core of wisdom. What are the important human values one needs to consider as one defines the substance of wisdom? Which values are more important than others in the solution of wisdom problems? Which values give meaning to life? What are the personality characteristics of wise people? Which motivations, dispositions, and judgments does one need to avoid? Wisdom, of course, involves a concern with the nature of values, traits, and vices. As will be shown in the

next chapters, many of the historical treatments of wisdom have aimed at answering this question.

Psychology, however, is not a normative, prescriptive science of values and vices as philosophy, political science, or theology might be (e.g. Kekes, 1996). The primary goal of psychology is to specify the conditions under which different outcomes of the mind, personality, and social functioning are reached, without necessarily stating what is best or worst. Psychologists, of course, are members of society, and therefore as private citizens we share societal norms and expectations about what is desirable and undesirable. And therefore, as individuals, we have opinions about what is good or bad, better or worse. As psychologists, however, we have not evolved an explicit theory about what is best and worst. As a psychologist I feel that, although it clearly matters how we rank values and vices, enlightened views of psychosocial functioning demand that we learn to accept enormous differences in the relative importance that various individuals and groups attach to values and vices (Shklar, 1984). Recognizing the fundamental importance of individual and cultural variation in the significance and ordering of values is indeed essential to wisdom.

These observations on abstention from normative statements on the part of a psychologist not notwithstanding, I will make some efforts to indicate where a psychological conception of wisdom might contain a small amount of prescriptive information (Baltes & Freund, 2002; Baltes & Kunzmann, in press); something akin to a psychological imperative. Specifically, I will argue that this minimalist psychological imperative involves questions of cultural tolerance (freedom) and the joined focus, in any action, on bringing to convergence questions of the common and the personal good.

However, because psychology is not a prescriptive science of values, I will for the most part remain silent when it comes to a specification of the values or goods that are most important to consider or to avoid. This is territory beyond my reach and, I believe, beyond the science of psychology as well. For this reason, I do not want to link this book to any guild of the counseling industry, nor do I know why readers of this book would ask for my advice on how to conduct their lives or how to choose a strategy of life management. Aside from a contribution to a psychology of personal excellence and, perhaps, to an understanding of the

peaks of the civilized mind, what I expect primarily from this book is a contribution to the effort to make our discourse and convictions about the human condition, about human affairs, and about life-span development in a changing world more complete, coherent, and transparent.

This restrictive view of the benefits of the psychology of wisdom advanced here is not intended to mean that there are no other "pragmatic" (Stich, 1990) advantages to reading this book. For example, one of the main characteristics of wisdom described later in this book is "good knowledge about cultural relativism and pluralism in values", about the social and historical conditioning of life decisions, or about the question of balancing the personal with the common good. If a reader were to find the line of reasoning I espouse somewhat novel or enriching, a "deeper" and better organized way to reason about the world of human affairs may result. Similar benefits may ensue from accepting others' propositions about a psychology of wisdom, such as the systematic concern of wisdom with uncertainty and its management, and with the integration of contexts of life. Finally, it might help to read about the profile of criteria and ways to think that I shall describe as the orchestrating cognitive heuristic associated with wisdom. This heuristic is meant to coordinate one's bodies of knowledge and virtues toward the goal of human excellence. Using this orchestrating heuristic of wisdom, we might be better able to reflect critically on the judgments we typically make about ourselves and others, to analyze and manage difficult situations, and possibly to give better advice to others who face similar situations. As a scientist, I know that it is not wise to make such promises.

CHAPTER 2

Ancient Conceptions of Wisdom

Psychologists are not typically in the habit of dwelling on history, searching for the cultural origins, continuities, and transformations of their subject matter. They focus predominantly on present-day culture, its reflections in our minds and bodies, and our roles as individuals and groups in contributing to it. In fact, my own generation of psychologists was often trained to avoid the "mental" and "historical" sciences. We thought it was important for psychology to establish its image as a field of experimental-empirical inquiry. We feared that flirting with the methods and historicism of the humanities might impede progress toward that goal.

For many psychologists including myself, therefore, this chapter reaches beyond our usual territory. When I started to look seriously beyond my discipline and tried to understand wisdom as a historically rooted and conditioned phenomenon, I was struck by the magnitude of the body of literature, the intense commitment through the ages to a scholarly examination of wisdom, and the centrality of wisdom in the search for the "best" knowledge about the world at large and about human thought and behavior in particular. Since the earliest days of literate expression, efforts to capture the best available knowledge about the conduct, mastery, and meaning of life seem to have been a noteworthy part of the writing tradition.

The search for a definition and explanation of wisdom has a long history, and over the centuries interest in pursuing it has waxed and waned repeatedly. In Germany, for instance, curiosity about wisdom revived in the 1980s, especially among philosophers and cultural historians. Two collections of essays by philosophers and cultural historians give cogent testimony: Philosophie und Weisheit (philosophy and wisdom) edited by Willi Oelmüller (1989) and Weisheit (wisdom) edited by Aleida Assmann (1990). In the United States, perhaps with the exception of a special issue of Daedalus published in 1975 and a recent edition of a Summer Institute on Knowledge, Teaching and Wisdom (Lehrer et al., 1996), no comparable "collective" effort to unearth the history of wisdom and reclaim its position in the context of

modern social science and the humanities can yet be discerned. The situation is different in theology and biblical studies. During the twentieth century in both Europe and North America a continuous stream of work dealing with the wisdom literature of the Old Testament has poured forth (Crenshaw, 1987; Harrington, 1996; Klein, 1994; McKay & Clines, 1993; Perry, 1993; Purdue, 1991; Rudolph, 1987).

One of the most difficult tasks in organizing historical writings on wisdom is deciding how to deal with semantic issues. Although semantic issues associated with the concept of wisdom are not a focus of this book, it may be important to draw attention to the many and complicated linguistic and interpretive problems they entail.

First, there is the problem of meaning. Though there is a core of meaning (see Chapter 1), "wisdom" has meant a variety of things (Grimm & Grimm, 1854; Rudolph, 1987; Zedler, 1732-50). There are historical changes and complexities in the definition of wisdom within a given language because languages are continuously transformed and rewritten. Translating wisdom-related words between languages is likely to be even more complicated because two streams are involved: differences between languages and historical changes within languages. The problem of semantic complexity can be illustrated by the fact that within a language, several words may each have close relationships with wisdom--in Latin, for instance, sapientia and prudentia.

Therefore, when and whether in ancient languages a particular word denoted a meaning similar to our historically emerging Western understanding of wisdom is the subject of much debate. For some languages, some agreement has been reached (e.g., Assmann, 1991; Rudolph, 1987). For instance, historical and religious scholars seem to treat the words hikma (Arabic), hokhmah (Hebrew), khrad (Middle Persian), maat (Egyptian), nemegu (Akkadian), and prajna (Sanskrit), sapientia (Latin), and sophia (Greek) as sufficiently similar to modern concepts of wisdom (Weisheit in German, sagesse in French) to permit some form of common and comparative analysis.

Such comparisons, however, are vulnerable to uncertainty and criticism. One open question, for example, is whether these words refer to wisdom as a state of knowledge in general (such as wisdom as an "ideal" world order) or as a state in the mind of individuals.

This issue, for example, seems to haunt the ancient Egyptian literature on wisdom. The Egyptian concept of <u>maat</u> seems to apply more to a state of the world (cosmos) than to individuals. Kant made a similar distinction, for instance, when he used the concept of <u>Weltweisheit</u> (world wisdom) to refer to the discipline of philosophy as the holder of the highest form of knowledge. In contrast, when Kant wrote about wisdom, he focused often on individuals as carriers of wisdom.

Furthermore, there is the problem of authorship. For most ancient writings on wisdom, we are not able to pinpoint a single author or a specific group of authors. This is true of the writings of Confucius--it is likely that he did not write or speak all of the texts attributed to him--and of the wisdom writings and sayings attributed to Buddha or Solomon. Writings of the "wisdom kind" are cultural and collective productions in the true sense of the word. Often they are attributed to single authors, although on scrutiny it becomes evident that these names actually represent "significant" persons who have begun the process, who collected it into an organized whole, or who stand as imaginary symbols and leaders of a particular era of human civilization.

In this chapter, I have accepted the views of more expert historical scholars than I. As to the concept of wisdom, I assume that in each instance there is a sufficient degree of overlap between our modern conception of wisdom and those of other languages and historical periods to indicate the essence of wisdom: that is, the core notion that wisdom constitutes deep knowledge about life, its conduct, and its interpretation . My purpose is not to explore the (fascinating) semantic and attributional problems, but simply to present some historical and cross-cultural snapshots.

A Framework of Questions

My overview is guided by two goals. First, I intend to link the current psychological study of wisdom to the past and to illustrate that the past is a prologue to the present and thus a part of it. As the sociologist Karl Mannheim (1936, p. 3) once wrote: "Strictly speaking it is incorrect to say that the single individual thinks. Rather . . . he participates in thinking further what other men have thought before him." To paraphrase an aphorism that has received much attention and insightful commentary (Merton, 1991), today's minds stand on the shoulders of

past cultural accomplishments. As long as one appreciates that these shoulders by being continuously reconstructed undergo some change themselves, such a view seems defensible.

The second goal of this cultural-historical summary is to offer a frame for evaluating the extent to which a psychology of wisdom addresses the same or similar questions about wisdom that were and are posed by non-psychologist scholars. Wisdom is fundamentally a humanist concept, and I need to have some awareness of the depth and scope of its meaning in the humanist-historical community. In doing so, I also explore areas where a psychology of wisdom is likely to be impotent or to remain silent and, contrariwise, where a psychology of wisdom might offer unique contributions. In other words, with this chapter I am not contributing to the study of the history of wisdom. In light of the depth of historical studies on the topic of wisdom (e.g., Assmann, 1991; Law, 1995; Rice, 1958), this would be presumptuous. Rather, I want to organize the cultural-historical evidence so that it can inform the psychological study of wisdom.

Three general questions may serve as a guiding framework for this chapter. First, what is the <u>content</u> of wisdom? In past accounts, what has been the substantive core of wisdom? Is it knowledge, is it character (personality), or is it both? Is there a single definition of wisdom, or are there many? Furthermore, does knowledge that is categorized as wisdom concern all aspects of the world, or is it restricted to sub-domains such as human affairs, the practice of life, or even only its transcendental aspects, namely those that deal with the meaning of life at a meta-psychological and metaphysical level?

Second, what is the <u>location</u> or <u>carrier</u> of wisdom? Who possesses wisdom, which individuals and which groups; where is wisdom deposited? The question of location is important because in our everyday beliefs we tend to associate wisdom with wise people, a view that may be too restricted and person-centered. Perhaps wisdom is located in the collective, in minds interacting with each other and in documents that represent the outcome of historical and collective thinking about the meaning and conduct of life (Baltes & Staudinger, 1996). Written documents such as legal texts or proverbs may be equally important, and they may me critical for the fixation and historical preservation of wisdom.

And third, how do we <u>attain</u> wisdom? What do cultural-historical texts tell us about how wisdom is acquired and transmitted? Is it a product of the secularized world and its ways of optimizing human development, or is it divine, something acquired through the grace of God and religious beliefs and practice? Furthermore, is it possible to become wise, or is wisdom only an ideal, a kind of utopia to strive toward? Who is responsible for arranging the conditions for becoming wise; what is the role of socialization agents such as priests, teachers, or other mentors? What do cultural-historical texts tell us about the selection process and the societal functions of wisdom?

I believe that the following account of the history of the wisdom concept will provide some insights into these questions, and perhaps even suggest some answers. We will soon realize, however, that there is much variation in the historical treatment of wisdom and the weight attached to each of the questions. Some of this variation is akin to noise in the system, variation without a clearly argued point. Other variations in the treatment of wisdom, however, are systematic and reflect the particularities of given cultural or scholarly positions. Indeed, there are "schools" in the scholarly history of wisdom, two of which, for instance, involve varying positions on whether wisdom is divine or human, and whether it constitutes theoretical or practical knowledge, or both.

<u>The Ancient "Wisdom Literature"</u>

In religious studies and the humanities, the term <u>wisdom literature</u> is used to denote a body of ancient writings that deals with the nature of the world and the conduct of life (Clarke, 1973; Kidner, 1985; Law, 1995; Perry, 1993). For many of us in the Western world, the "wisdom literature" refers to parts of the Old Testament (<u>Book of Proverbs</u>, <u>Book of Job</u>, <u>Wisdom of Solomon</u>, etc.) or the Greek and Roman classics. But the larger territory of the ancient wisdom literature includes earlier and similar documents emanating from Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, India, and China. Indeed, the so-called wisdom literature is very old, dating back to at least the second or third millennium before Christ (Assmann, 1991; Lambert, 1960; Rudolph, 1987). These earliest wisdom-related texts consist primarily of sayings, proverbs, and maxims. Because individual statements such as proverbs or maxims are not full

representations of wisdom (see Chapter 1), they need to be seen in context. It is their combination into a dynamic whole that qualifies them as wisdom literature.

In 1975, <u>Daedalus</u>, the journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, devoted a special issue to asking why, especially in the first millennium before Christ, certain spiritual breakthroughs were made, including advances in our understanding of wisdom and related problems (Schwartz, 1975). In the Middle East, as part of classical Judaism, the Hebrew wisdom literature arose; in Persia, Zoroastrianism; in India, Buddhism and other sects; in China, Confucianism and Taoism; and in Greece, classical pre-Socratic philosophy. Cultural historians are excited about this conjoint development during the first millennium B.C. At the same time, they examine why there was not more contact between cultural areas (Momigliano, 1975) and explore possible interrelationships and influences among these intellectual trends. One prevalent hypothesis is that each civilization, when it has reached a certain level of development, is bound to generate a literature about the problem of wisdom and wisdom-related knowledge and skills.

But even before the first millennium B.C., in the second and third millennium B.C., a "wisdom literature" existed (Assmann, 1991, 1994; Rudolph, 1987). In Mesopotamia and Egypt, for instance, government-affiliated scribe schools produced, preserved, and passed on information about the nature of the world and instructions for everyday behavior, including statements about the ability to listen, to obey, and to remain silent and maintain confidentiality. These earliest bodies of the historical wisdom literature from the third and second millennium B.C. were primarily secular. They were produced by human beings for human beings, and they were based on the belief that conduct in accordance with the stated principles results in well-being. For the most part, the content was conservative in approach and aimed at maintaining the power and procedures of institutions-in-charge, such as the monarchy. Only later did the role of religion in defining a body of good human conduct and finding meaning in life become more prominent.

Wisdom in Old Mesopotamia

The Mesopotamian wisdom literature, largely consisting of short sayings, proverbs, and maxims, is the oldest known to us. Its dominant concern is proficiency in understanding

the world and society, and in becoming a good and effective human being. The earliest manuscripts date back to around 2500 B.C. and evolved with the governments (Sumeria, Babylonia, etc.) that ruled this region up to about the first millennium B.C. The authors of the texts most likely were "literati" and scribes of the Mesopotamian (Sumerian) academies. There is growing consensus that the collections were used in schools as textbooks and represented the beginnings of a canon of the what and how of "good" and "effective" behavior (Gordon, 1968; Lambert, 1960; Rudolph, 1987).

The full recognition of very early onset of the Mesopotamian wisdom literature is fairly recent. Only a little more than a quarter of a century ago an important corpus of Mesopotamian writings, including a didactic poem called The Teachings of Shuruppak (Alster, 1991) and other related collections of proverb-like sayings such as The Counsels of Wisdom (Lambert, 1960), was found and deciphered. Alster, one of the translators of this new-found corpus, dates the first versions of the teachings of Shuruppak to around 2500 B.C. and argues that these Mesopotamian products are the first wisdom-type texts known to us. Because later versions of the Teachings of Shuruppak from about 1800 and 1500-1100 B.C. are available, an opportunity for historical comparison exists.

The Teachings of Shuruppak are placed in the context of advice given by a father to his son. When analyzing the entire pool of Mesopotamian proverbs available to him, Gordon (1968) noted that mothers are more often mentioned in these proverbs than fathers. I draw attention to this fact because the father-son discourse in the Teachings of Shuruppak might otherwise be misinterpreted as implying that in Mesopotamian life, fathers were the primary agents of maintaining cultural traditions and of everyday socialization. The father-son setting may reflect a more general social script, such as the "counsel of the old."

Lambert (1960) attempted a taxonomy of all the precepts and admonitions contained in the Babylonian Counsels of Wisdom and identified nine categories: avoidance of bad companions, improper speech, avoidance of altercations and pacification of enemies, kindness to those in need, the undesirability of marrying a slave girl, the unsuitability of prostitutes as wives, the temptation of a vizier (counselor or high official), the duties and benefits of religion, and deception of friends. Note that the primary content emphasis is on practical matters of

everyday life and on what Rudolph (1987, p. 395) called the "act-consequence connection." As with later so-called manuals on life, such as the 16th-century version of Balthasar Gracian (see p. xx), the focus is on individual dispositions and behaviors, not on a general integrative conception of wisdom.

What are some examples from the Teachings of Shuruppak (Alster, 1991, p. 104)? "You should not buy a screaming donkey. He will cut your middle (behind)"; "You should not plant a field on a road" or "Don't build your house so that it extends into a public place." Other Mesopotamian examples of proverbs and maxims (Gordon, 1968; Lambert, 1960) stemming from about the first third of the second millennium B.C.) include: "Whoever has walked with truth generates life", "Do not cut off the neck of that which (already) has been cut off", "Do not say to a person: What a bad thing you have produced!", "He acquires many things; he must keep close watch over them", "When a poor man has died, do not (try) to revive him", "In my heart I am a human being, (but) in my eyes I am not (yet) a man", "A rebellious male may be permitted a reconciliation: a rebellious female will be dragged in the mud", "Marrying several wives is human; getting many children is divine", or "Let your mouth be controlled and your speech be guarded: Therein is a man's wealth--let your lips be very precious."

It is important to recognize that our knowledge about the cultures in the Mesopotamian region and their written legacy is based on a very small portion of the original materials. Moreover, because of advances in techniques of decoding, we seem to be witnessing a rapid phase of development. Especially in Mesopotamian history, recent decades have seen major changes and advances. Falkowitz (1980), for example, offers a provocative new view of the significance of the Mesopotamian collection of proverbs and maxims. He argues that these most likely were not intended as collections of normative instructions on human conduct, but as linguistic teaching materials. Thus it would not be surprising if our present-day view of the content of that body of ancient wisdom literature may soon turn out to be somewhat obsolete. Of particular interest would be whether the literature contains more evidence of a general and "abstract" body of definitions of wisdom and wise people than appears to be indicated from evidence to date.

Wisdom in Old Egypt

Ancient Egypt produced the second major body of wisdom writings of the Near East region. Its historical impact reached into the wisdom literature of the Old Testament (see below). The Egyptian wisdom literature also consisted primarily of a collection of statements about values and ways to be a productive and well-functioning member of society. In addition, however, Egypt evolved the concept of a "cosmic order (<u>maat</u>) that became basic to the idea of wisdom" (Rudolph, 1987, p. 396). What is available of the Egyptian wisdom literature (one must always keep in mind that only a small fraction of these ancient texts survives), however, suggests that despite the concept of <u>maat</u> there was no integrative statement about a theory and substantive body of wisdom or wise people (as is true for Confucianism, see below).

The Egyptologist Jan Assmann (1991) describes the ancient Egyptian wisdom texts in quite a bit of detail, using especially the <u>Papyrus Chester Beatty IV</u> (13th century B.C.) as a source. Assmann argues that these wisdom-type writings first appeared around 2000 B.C. The Papyrus Chester Beatty IV contains the writings of eight classical Egyptian authors (e.g., Ptahhotep, Cheti), that in total make up something akin to the "canon" of an educational curriculum. Like the early Mesopotamian texts of this kind, the Egyptian texts are often presented as elderly fathers' advice to their sons, and some describe scenarios of several lines ("You are a man who is about to hear words to distinguish between the good and the bad", "If you pay attention to what I have told you, your life will correspond to that of your forefathers." "Imitate your fathers, your ancestors, their words are contained in their writings: open them, read them, emulate the wise! Only he who is willing to be taught will become a master").

The focus of the specific maxims of the papyrus is on concrete situations of daily living, for example, in dealings with administrative officers of the government: "Don't talk to your superior until he asks you; laugh when he laughs: this will please his heart"; "For the requestor, it's more important to be heard than that one's request be acted upon." On the surface, such maxims may appear trivial and strictly utilitarian. But they need to be seen in the context of the entire papyrus and other works (such as the Teachings of Amenemope, which are more religiously based). The papyrus also includes lengthier descriptions of the role and functioning of the <u>maat</u>, the wisdom-like body of knowledge and instructions about what is right, true, and good (J. Assmann, 1991).

Moreover, according to Jan Assmann, these early wisdom texts evolved over the centuries, turning more and more in the direction of specific views and information on the nature of wisdom (maat) and the importance of certain inner-directed personality attributes and of being part of a larger communal system. Thus, although the maxims certainly included much guidance about outward efficacy, they also presented the idea that wise people are concerned not only with their outward effectiveness but also with the state of their inner lives and the control of vices such as greed. In fact, Assmann's interpretation reaches high. He argues that such noted concepts as the "inner and silent man" and a focus on a "sense of community" may have evolved in conjunction with these Egyptian wisdom texts, even if they were not their main educational agenda.

The Wisdom of Confucius

China is another cultural region that made significant early contributions to the wisdom literature. Here, largely for reasons of space, I will concentrate on Confucianism (Brown, 1974; Lin Yutang, 1943; Mei, 1984; Waldenfels, 1989). Other relevant Chinese traditions are Taoism and the School of Yin-Yang.

These schools and ways of thinking about life had their origins in China's classical age of the "hundred philosophers," which extended approximately from 550 until 220 B.C. Confucius (551-479 B.C.) and Confucianism, often identified as China's general "religion" and way of life, acquired a leading role among the various "philosophers of life" during the second century B.C. Confucius himself is considered even today by many Chinese as the "Supreme Sage." A Chinese saying is: "Confucius! Confucius! How great Confucius! Before Confucius there never was a Confucius. Since Confucius there never has been a Confucius. How great is Confucius!" (Brown, 1938, p. 7).

I have found Lin Yutang's (1943) overview of the Confucian classics a particularly helpful source, especially his discussion of problems of semantic meaning, translation, and historical changes from Confucius to his later followers and disciples. The classical book of Confucius, captured in its present form several centuries after his lifetime during the last two centuries B.C., is known as the Analects (Lun yü). The work, in visibility and function perhaps similar to the gospels and their summary of the life and teaching of Jesus, consists of

about 20 sections (496 chapters) and represents a collection of the Master's sayings, aphorisms, dialogues, conversations, and travels, kept and transmitted by his disciples. Many educated Chinese know some passages from the Analects. As Lin Yutang (1943) argues, however, because of its disconnected discourse and the absence of situational context, it is important for Western readers not to focus only on the Analects, but to become familiar with select chapters from each of the so-called Confucian classics (e.g., Book of Songs, Book of History, Book of Changes, Spring and Autumn, Book of Rites).

What, according to Lin Yutang's work, is wisdom in classical Confucianism? More than the ancient Mesopotamian and Egyptian literature, the Confucian writings describe wisdom as an integrated and highly developed state of mind and character. A corpus of specific proverbs, maxims, and aphorisms is also part of the teachings. The teachings, however, include an organized description of the entire frame of the cultivated "wise" or sage person. Wisdom, or the sage, is defined primarily by an ideal person, the "most complete" (Lin Yutang, 1943, p. 44), or the "superior" man (chün-tzu). The most complete or superior man possesses "jen" (true humanhood, with love and warmheartedness being perhaps the critical core) and, in addition, other jen-associated virtues such as reciprocity, loyalty, courage, and trustworthiness. When Confucius was asked about moral virtue, he replied (Brown, 1938, p. 28): "Moral virtue simply consists in being able, anywhere and everywhere, to exercise five particular qualities . . . self respect, magnanimity, sincerity, earnestness, and benevolence."

Thus, for Confucius, wisdom was definitely an integrated whole of perfection: in mind, personality, and social productivity. And, in addition, this view of the human was part of his larger view of a well-functioning social system. To put it briefly, "Confucianism stood for a rationalized social order through the ethical approach, based on personal cultivation. It aimed at political order . . . by trying to achieve the moral harmony in man himself" (Lin Yutang, 1943, p. 3). It is interesting to speculate to what degree such a highly integrated and prescriptive view about the ideal combination of mind and personality was possible only if secular and religious movements are combined. One may argue, for instance, that it was religion that transformed more flexible ideas about the ideal into more absolutist dogmas about truth.

The Confucian road toward becoming a "superior" person or sage was a long one, a lifetime agenda. Mentorship and a program of intensive education and self-cultivation were the cornerstones. As Lin Yutang (1943, p. 18) observed: "Interpreted in the light of modern psychology, this (Confucian) doctrine can be reduced easily to two theories, the theory of habit and the theory of imitation." Of particular difficulty in mastering the journey toward wisdom is the joint focus on knowledge and behavior, on the interdependence between knowing and doing, on the fact that it is in the fulfillment of social responsibilities that a human being realizes complete personal growth.

The following statement, offered by Confucius toward the end of his life, illustrates some of the sequences involved in moving toward being a "superior", wise man: "At 15, I set my heart on learning; at 30 I was firmly established; at 40 I had no more doubts; at 50 I knew the will of Heaven; at 60 I was ready to listen to it; at 70 I could follow my heart's desire without transgressing what was right." Another lengthier statement from the Confucian classics is presented by Lin Yutang (1943, p. 111) as a condensation or summary of how to achieve true selfhood: "In order to learn to be one's self, it is necessary to obtain a wide and extensive knowledge of what has been said and done in the world; critically to inquire into it; carefully to ponder over it; clearly to sift it; and earnestly to carry it out."

The Confucian methods of communicating and teaching the essence of being and becoming a superior person, a sage, include also the kind of proverbs and maxims we are familiar with from the ancient Mesopotamian and Egyptian wisdom literature. In addition to proverbs and vignettes that illustrate what is involved in being a sage and emphasize learning and practice jointly, some of the proverbs offer concrete statements about the process and rules of sage-like behavior.

Among the best-known sayings of Confucius are the following (Brown, 1938; Lin Yutang, 1943): "To learn and to relearn again, isn't it a great pleasure?", "When you see a good man, think of emulating him; when you see a bad man, examine your own heart", "Without the wisdom of the learned, the clown could not be governed; without the labor of the clown, the learned could not be fed."

Of particular significance is the "golden rule" of reciprocity reported as part of a dialogue between Confucius and a student. Tzu Kung asked: "Is there any one word that can serve as a principle for the conduct of life?" Confucius said: "Perhaps the word 'reciprocity': Do not do to others what you would not want others to do to you" (Mei, 1984). Many subsequent writings on high levels of reasoning about human affairs, including those by the philosopher Immanuel Kant, have used this or a similar statement as an important guide for evaluating what is ethical. However, it is also important to recognize that such a statement does not specify by itself what behavior is acceptable. For instance, if the "Do not do to others what you would not want others to do to you" is professed by someone who is pathological such as being a masochist, this prescription fails. In Confucianism, such a limitation is presumably dealt with by the assumption that the wise has developed a set of virtues that exclude the pathological.

Who are the carriers of Confucian wisdom? On the one hand, as is also true for other ancient writings, wisdom is located in the body of Confucian teachings, the <u>Analects</u>. On the other hand, individuals are singled out, like the sages and prophets in the Hebrew tradition of wisdom (see below), as model carriers of wisdom. "The true measure of man is man" (Lin Yutang, 1943, p. 15). In principle, everyone can become a true or "superior person." "No rank was too high, no class too humble, to be taught this universal principle" (Brown, 1938, p. 7). Such a "democratic" view on the talent for wisdom is possible in Confucian thought because the teachings are assumed to be "natural", human, and simple, and also because human nature is considered to be inherently good and oriented toward positive growth. Thus if only a very few people were able in their lifetime to achieve the state of sagehood, the smallness of their number would not be due to their lack of innate potential but to interfering life circumstances (such as the need to earn one's living), lack of mentorship, and a lack of self-development involving desire and will. And moreover, as mentioned before, wisdom is a true ideal. Therefore it is possible that nobody would ever be able to reach the state described by Confucius. It is perhaps for this reason that he was not prepared to identify himself or others as exemplars of his kind of wisdom.

<u>The Wisdom of Buddha</u>

The second major contribution to the ancient Asian history of the concept of wisdom is associated with Gautama Buddha (563 B.C. - about 483 B.C.). Buddha means "the awakened or enlightened one." Gautama Buddha, founder of one of the major world religions and philosophical systems, lived in the region nowadays known as Nepal and northeast India. His lifetime fell in a period of great fervor in mystical and spiritual life. Buddhism was in part a response to dissatisfaction with the Brahmanic Hinduism of the time (Günther, 1984; Tucci, 1984).

Like our knowledge about Jesus, much of our knowledge about Buddha derives from religious tradition rather than historical scholarship (Rahula, 1984). Compared to Confucianism, Buddhism, like the Judeo-Christian tradition of the wisdom literature, is as much a religion as it is a philosophical-psychological system of prescriptions for human behavior and societal functioning. And furthermore, the body of literature on Buddha and Buddhism is enormous, with many language, historical, and "school" variations. There is no single document like the Old Testament that is a commonly accepted authoritative statement of the teachings of Buddhism. I have extracted my assessment of the treatment of wisdom-related matters in Buddhism primarily from encyclopedic writings by Guenther (1984), Nakamura (1984), Rahula (1984), and Tucci (1984), and from a book on Buddhist wisdom written by Humphreys (1961).

We need to recognize also that, in part because of the flexible accommodation of Buddhism to diverse cultural conditions, modern-day Buddhism allows many variations in achieving Enlightenment. The variation is so large that occasionally it is said that the key to success is not the path that is followed, but being "within" rather than "outside" the general Buddhist orientation (Tucci, 1984). Buddhists "of all types have been comparatively individualistic and unwilling to submit to a rigid outer authority" (Nakamura, 1984, p. 425). In this sense, the phrase "the Wisdom of Buddhism" denotes a large body of writings that stretches across a wide field, including the wisdom of the principal followers of the original Gautama Buddha and that of the leading minds among his many followers. Buddhist wisdom is an evolving process. Through the centuries it has been achieved and created by the spiritual

experiences of each generation of Buddhas and their practices as they attempt to achieve Enlightenment.

What are the main statements of Buddhism about wisdom (used here as the equivalent of the state of personal Enlightenment), its carriers, and ways to achieve it? The easiest answer involves the question of carriers of wisdom, of who can achieve it. In principle, everyone can-- if they follow the way toward Enlightenment. Gautama Buddha himself, however, as the son of royal parents and exposed to many special treatments including prophetic signs early in his life, was not an ordinary person. According to Buddha, he himself definitely reached the state of Enlightenment and, moreover, he reached it relatively early in life. At age 35, he declared he had become a "fully awakened one", a supreme Buddha (Rahula, 1984, p. 371). Remember that, in contrast, Confucius not only located the probability of achieving wisdom much later in adulthood, but also refrained from claiming to be wise.

Buddhist wisdom is a very elaborate and complex statement about the world, mind, and personality (Waldenfels, 1989). It is a cosmic system, a way to understand the world at large. In this vein of cosmic truth, Buddhism contains a number of perspectives on and assertions about reality and principles of causality. One example is the notion of the ever-changing quality of things (the impermanence of reality). Another is the doctrine of "conditioned genesis" implying that everything is related to everything else (pan-interdependence): "All things, all men and all events are interrelated and 'interdiffused'" (Humphreys, 1961, p. 20). Another important doctrine is the law of dependent origination, which states that there is a firm and time-ordered developmental sequence: "Every mode of being presupposes another immediately preceding mode from which the subsequent mode derives, in a chain or series of causes" (Tucci, 1984, p. 375).

Within that overarching framework of cosmic truth, people during their own lifetime can achieve Enlightenment, a state that is equated with the "supramundane" state of Nirvana (often translated as bliss or salvation or followed by it). Enlightenment includes knowing the highest truth (dhamma) and attaining the 10 great virtues or paramitas (charity, morality, renunciation, wisdom, effort, patience, truth, determination, universal love, equanimity) and 10 ways to think correctly. Note that the listing includes wisdom (prajna) as one of the 10 great

virtues. This inclusion makes it apparent that the concept of wisdom has several meanings in the literature about Buddhism. On the one hand, it denotes a particular virtue among others. On the other hand, it is used by scholars (as is the wisdom literature in the Western world) as a holistic concept encompassing the entire body of Buddhist knowledge and practice dealing with the conduct of life, goals, and methods of personal development.

When one reaches the state of personal Enlightenment, one has achieved Buddhahood. A negative definition of this state of Enlightenment emphasizes release from the earthly constraints of suffering, sorrow, and illusion. Stated positively, Enlightenment is the Buddhist version of a state of perfect fulfillment akin to religious salvation. In this state, one has overcome the negative "triad of passion, hatred, and ignorance" (Guenther, 1984, p. 417), and is able to have the right view, the right thought, the right speech, the right action, the right mode of living, the right endeavor, the right mindfulness, and the right concentration. Here the definition of what is right interconnects the two main sectors of personal functioning: virtues of personality (character) and virtues of the mind.

To quote from the presumed sayings of Gautama Buddha after he reached the Enlightenment (Rahula, 1974, p. 371): "I have realized this Truth which is deep, difficult to see, difficult to understand . . . comprehensible by the wise. Men who are overpowered by passion and surrounded by a mass of darkness cannot see this Truth which is against the current, which is lofty, deep, subtle and hard to comprehend." In this context, Guenther (1984) speaks of Enlightenment as originally associated with five classes of "superknowledge": miraculous or magical powers, the "divine" eye, "divine" hearing, knowledge of another's thoughts, and recollection of one's previous existences.

How does one achieve the state of Enlightenment, the "to our knowledge ultimate spiritual experience" (Humphreys, 1961, p. 19)? In principle, as I have said, all people can achieve it. The way to achieve Enlightenment is to search continuously for truth, as defined by Buddhism. As a general orienting frame, four noble insights into the human condition are important to understand: First, our everyday existence is full of conflict and suffering (truth of misery). Second, this misery is primarily the outcome of our selfish desires. Third, it is possible to emancipate and free ourselves from these constraints and to reach Enlightenment.

Fourth, the way to achieve this freedom is to pursue the Noble Eightfold Path. This path involves a sequence of transformations of mind and body from ignorance to the highest state of consciousness and knowledge, that is, Enlightenment (Rahula, 1984; Tucci, 1984).

In line with the law of dependent origination and the doctrine of conditioned genesis, Buddhists regard the Noble Eightfold Path as the best ontogenetic course of spiritual training yet available. Its essence is to make "life a continuous stream of becoming, a series of manifestations and extinctions" (Nakamura, 1984, p. 426). The Path incorporates moving toward the eight ways of thinking right (described above), avoiding extremes such as self-mortification (Buddha in his own lifetime had tried this road and failed), and finding the "middle way" between asceticism and hedonism. The Noble Eightfold Path is "no weak compromise, but a sweet reasonableness which avoids fanaticism and laziness with equal care, and marches onward without that haste which brings its own reaction, but without ceasing" (Humphreys, 1961, p. 21). Continuous efforts, meditation, and an effective mentor-pupil relationship are necessary ingredients, as is renunciation of a primary dependence on material goods. The use of yoga-like meditation, not to be confused with its use in Hinduism, is aimed primarily at being able to distance oneself from the biological and environmental context: to decontextualize, activate one's capacities, and reach a state of "supreme purity, indifference to everything, and pure consciousness" (Tucci, 1984, p. 378). If one uses the principles of the Noble Eightfold Path, the right understanding of basic principles and the right motives for moving forward converge.

In Buddhist thinking, the path toward Enlightenment is a tremendous personal effort indeed. Perfection is attained not through an instant flash, but through continuous exercise and example. "You yourself must make the effort; Buddhas do but point the way" (Humphreys, 1961, p. 22). It is occasionally argued, however, that without the guidance of a Buddha, the truth (Enlightenment) is not possible. Moreover, becoming a Buddha, an awakened one, is not always possible within one lifetime. Because in Buddhism we live many lives, the road toward Enlightenment can involve many successive reincarnations and is the culmination of a whole series of previous lives.

Like Confucianism, Buddhist wisdom propounds a strongly integrated view of mind as thinker and character as the promoter of behavioral expression: "Cease to do evil; learn to do good; cleanse your own heart; This is the teaching of the Buddhas" is one of the most famous kernel summaries of Buddhism (Humphreys, 1961, p. 42). This strong convergence of mind and character and its high degree of normativeness raises the question: Is what we call Buddhist wisdom a body of knowledge about human conduct that, when we use non-religious standards of wisdom, we would call wisdom? Because of the religious framework of Buddhism, I am reminded of the use of the word "holy" in Christianity. What is holy is not subject to a world-wide scientific discourse aimed at reaching consensus; it is context-bound and meaningful only in the theological frame provided by a specific religion.

Certainly, according to Buddhist teachings, the state of Enlightenment is supreme knowledge. It deals with a kind of utopian version of human conduct, the meaning of life, and ways to achieve it. When viewed in the context of modern-day cultural pluralism and measured against the yardstick of cultural heterogeneity, however, the Buddhist state of Enlightenment seems but one of many possible outcomes of self-actualization. We will repeatedly return to the issue of whether wisdom is universal or context-specific, and to what degree religion, because of its commitment to a firm set of values, in the final stages of cultural or personal growth can be an "intellectual enemy" of wisdom. The intellectual difficulty arises already in the assertion that Buddhist wisdom "can never be understood until applied in personal practice", "for no scripture can describe a condition of mind which is . . . beyond the reach of concept" (Humphreys, 1961, pp. 13, 259). By these criteria, my attempted summary of Buddhist wisdom is definitely that of a novice if not that of a biased agnostic.

The Wisdom of the Old Testament

Parts of the Old Testament represent another important corpus of the so-called wisdom literature. In the Western world the sheer productivity of commentary on it continues to attract attention (e.g., Blenkinsopp, 1983; Clarke, 1973; Crenshaw, 1981, 1987; Faherty, 1984; Flusser, 1984; Fredericksen, 1984; Harrington, 1996; Kidner, 1985; Lang, 1986; Law, 1995; Murphy, 1981, 1990; Perry, 1993; Scott, 1970). The texts of the Old Testament that are

generally identified as the core of the Hebrew wisdom literature include five books (<u>Proverbs</u>, <u>Job</u>, <u>Ecclesiastes</u>, <u>Ecclesiasticus</u> or <u>Qoholeth</u>, and <u>Wisdom of Solomon</u>).

Wisdom-related texts are located in other places of the Old Testament as well. For instance, <u>Psalms</u> and the <u>Song of Songs</u> have traditionally been included in Roman Catholic collections of biblical writings on wisdom. In fact, the widely known example of Solomon's decision to divide a child claimed by two women is not part of the Hebrew wisdom literature in the narrow sense. That vignette is part of another book of the Old Testament, I Kings, belonging to the collection called <u>The Prophets</u>.

Because most behavioral scientists interested in the topic of wisdom are likely to be underinformed about these biblical writings, I offer one overview. What is the main content of the biblical wisdom literature? In general, it comprises quite distinct types: brief observations on the nature of reality, instructions dealing with the conduct of life, extensive discourse about the deeper meaning of life, and organized descriptions of the divine nature of wisdom. The texts also differ in their dominant flavors. Therefore, to obtain a good feeling for the full sphere of Old Testament wisdom, it is important to consider the books as an ensemble (Kidner, 1985; Murphy & Carm, 1981).

For example, <u>Proverbs</u> presents an optimistic view on life; <u>Job</u> and <u>Ecclesiastes</u> are pessimistic in tone. Kidner (1985) used the analogy of three kinds of houses to describe the essence of the three major historical books: prosperous (<u>Proverbs</u>), stricken (<u>Job</u>), and decaying (<u>Ecclesiastes</u>). Similarly, Crenshaw (1981) captures the uniqueness of the three classical wisdom books of the Old Testament in three of his chapter titles: The Pursuit of Knowledge (<u>Proverbs</u>), The Search for Divine Presence (<u>Job</u>), and The Chasing of Meaning (<u>Ecclesiastes</u>).

We need to recognize also that the biblical wisdom texts reflect historical changes, for example in the nexus between religion and wisdom that on average became stronger with historical time. Therefore, it appears to me at least that the historically more recent biblical writings on wisdom <u>Ecclesiasticus (Ben Sirah)</u> and <u>The Wisdom of Solomon</u> show a particularly strong influence of religion on wisdom. This fact exemplifies that the specific scholarly and interpretative status also depends on the religious positions taken. For my present

purpose, these theological questions are of lesser significance, as I am primarily interested in presenting a synopsis of the wisdom literature of the Old Testament highlighting its essence and dynamics and subsequently using it as a frame for comparison with present-day views of wisdom.

Authorship of Hebrew wisdom texts: The role of King Solomon. For the most part, and contrary to popular views, we do not know the specific authors of the biblical wisdom literature. To make the point that several groupings of contributors were involved in the production and selection of Hebrew wisdom literature, Kidner (1985, p. 17) quotes a popular Hebrew saying: "The law shall not perish from the priest, nor counsel from the wise, nor the word from the prophet." In other words, an unknown number of priests, sages, prophets, scribes, and "wisdom teachers" contributed to the emergence of a vast and rich Hebrew wisdom literature. Indeed, that this is so is perhaps the strongest expression of the view that wisdom is a collective good to which many have contributed, not always in consonance..

Despite the many "pseudonyms" involved in the creation, maintenance, and transformation of Hebrew wisdom texts, there is one towering "master author", at least in our everyday beliefs: King Solomon. Solomon, the successor of King David, lived during the 10th century B.C. and reigned for about 40 years as the king of Israel (962 - 922 B.C.). It is likely that Solomon contributed directly as one of many authors to the oldest wisdom book, Proverbs. His major contribution, however, was that of the leader of a significant court that played a pivotal role in the initiation of Hebrew wisdom texts: "The historical substance of the tradition of Solomon's supreme wisdom is that a productive school of scribes and wisdom writers was established at his court . . . under his patronage" (Scott, 1970, p. 35).

With time, Solomon became the most central figure of Hebrew wisdom, not unlike the Analects with Confucius in the Chinese world. In fact, Solomon's fame as a wise person became symbolic: Solomon was deemed wiser than all the sages of Egypt and the Near East (1 Kings 4:30-31; Kidner, 1985). Because of his special standing and the presumed wisdom of his court, there was a tendency in subsequent history (as was true for other notables of wisdom such as Confucius and Buddha) to attribute later wisdom-related works to him as well. Present-day scholars occasionally argue that the actual life of Solomon is less impressive than his

reputation. To wit: Solomon "is perhaps one of the most overrated figures in the Old Testament, despite his achievements in wisdom, construction, and commerce" (Fredericksen, 1984, p. 913).

Book of Proverbs. Although it seems accepted that Solomon and his court initiated Proverbs, most of the text as we know it today was probably collected and fixed several hundred years after Solomon's death, perhaps somewhere around 500 B.C. or, more likely, closer to the last two centuries B.C. (Sarna, 1984). Furthermore, Proverbs is not of Hebrew origin only. Scholars generally agree that the text owes much to the Egyptian and Babylonian precursors described above. This influence is likely due to early migration movements and contacts associated with, for example, the early (before 1000 B.C.) exodus to and return from Egypt and the 6th-century B.C. Babylonian Exile. The Hebrew author of the "Sayings of the Wise" (a part of Proverbs), for instance, seemed to have used the well-known Egyptian writing "The Instruction of Amenemope" as a model (Faherty, 1984).

In Proverbs and other parts of the Hebrew wisdom literature, wisdom is often represented by a female figure, "Lady Wisdom." Lang (1986) argues that, because of the polytheistic and pagan beliefs of early Israel, this probably means that wisdom in Israel was originally imagined as a goddess (see, however, Murphy, 1990). According to Lang (1986, p. 74-75), what the goddess Wisdom "boasts of can be reduced to three basic categories. She has intellectual capabilities--shrewdness, finesse, the ability to make plans, insight, and of course wisdom (hokmah); she has moral qualities--she hates pride, arrogance, and perverted speech; and she has power." The self-attributed power of Goddess Wisdom is impressive indeed. In an early part of Proverbs, she states: "Through me kings reign and rulers issue just decrees. Through me officials do their work, noble men and all who are responsible for order."

What actually to the Proverbs contain? The substance of Proverbs is a collection of kernel statements about practical or "prudential" wisdom in the form of proverbs, parables, sayings, and riddles (Kidner, 1985; Lang, 1986). They are arranged not only to communicate a particular insight or moral precept, but also to prick the reader into thinking. In general, the focus of Proverbs is on the "demands of practical good management", and its essence suggests

that "the study and practice of wisdom will issue in peace, happiness and success" (Kidner, 1985, pp. 116-117).

In total, there are 31 chapters to Proverbs (Faherty, 1984; Kidner, 1985). The introductory chapters (1-9), likely one of the later products of the ensemble (see, however, Lang, 1986), consist primarily of poems and discourses between a father and his son aimed at teaching the son about wisdom and the practical aspects of life. Even so, the mother and the grandparents come into play as well. In these introductory chapters, wisdom is treated not only as a cultural and human achievement, but as a transcending, God-created body of knowledge: "the Lord by wisdom founded the earth; by understanding he established the heavens" (Prov., 3:19). Indeed, the fear of God (Yahweh) is a guiding theme: "For a man's ways are before the eyes of the Lord, and he watches all his paths."

In the following 13 chapters, called the "Proverbs of Solomon", most likely the earliest pieces of the collection, 375 aphorisms present wisdom as a practical guide to effective and meaningful life: for instance, "A man who is kind benefits himself, but a cruel man hurts himself", "He who spurns his father's discipline is a fool, he who accepts correction is discreet", and "He who speaks the truth gives honest evidence, but a false witness utters deceit." Wisdom is also contrasted in these aphorisms with foolishness and wickedness.

The subsequent chapters (22-24), "The Sayings of the Wise", show much similarity to the earlier Egyptian text called "The Instruction of Amenemope." Themes include mercy to the poor, financial prudence, firmness with children, and hard work. Chapters 25-29 contain the second collection of "Proverbs of Solomon", a total of 128 sayings probably also collected fairly early, that is, before 500 B.C. An example is: "Scoffers set a city aflame, but wise men turn away wrath."

The concluding chapters (30-31) include several somewhat disconnected bodies. "The words of Agur", for example, are noted for their departure from other parts of Proverbs. They emphasize the difficulty humans have in acquiring wisdom. The central message of Proverbs, however, is historical continuity, the expected and the manageable. The other books of the Hebrew wisdom literature focus much more than Proverbs on uncertainties and the dilemmas of human experience.

Book of Job. The Book of Job, the second piece of the earliest Hebrew wisdom literature, is widely acclaimed as perhaps the finest expression of the "Hebrew poetic genius" (Faherty, 1984, p. 925). In comparison to the other books of the Hebrew wisdom literature, the emphasis of Job is somewhat antithetical to an optimistic and rationally based approach to wisdom as a means of leading an effective and practical life. Rather, the focus is on the inner depths of human reflection rather than simple forward action, on human suffering and its potential role in achieving wisdom, and on the complicated relationship between humans and God. In fact, Kidner (1985) argues that much of Job is written as an intellectual counterpoint to the optimistic Proverbs. Statements from Proverbs are used to set the stage for dialectic contrasts of the "yes-but" type.

There are five sections to the book of Job, comprising a total of 42 chapters, most of which were composed probably somewhere between 600 and 400 B.C. The first section is a prologue and the last an epilogue. These are written in narrative form and recount the story of Job, a prosperous, happy, and pious patriarch, who is tested by Satan for the validity of his motives. Even when faced with losing all his worldly resources and family, Job refuses to curse God. The epilogue describes the restoration of Job, his rewards, and his life to a ripe old age.

The main body of Job, an instantiation of reflective-wisdom literature, is part of the three intervening sections probably written somewhat later (4th century B.C.) than the prologue and epilogue, which take the form of poems. It includes the dialogues between Job and his friends, the speeches of Elihu, the speeches of Yahweh (God) and Job's reply. Job's friends (Eliphaz, Bildad, Zophar) engage in a dialectical dialogue about life and man's relation to God. These friends of Job are three distinct types, forming with Job a fertile dynamic of opposing ways of thought: a mystic prophet, a sage who believes in traditional authority, and a dogmatist who accepts the incomprehensible ways of God and accuses Job of sin. Chapter 28 of Job, probably a later addition, contains a "magnificent hymn in praise of wisdom" (Faherty, 1984, p. 926) offered by Job himself. It is also a rebuttal to the "wisdom" contained in the preceding dialogues of Job's friends. Wisdom is presented as transcendental and the property of God.

The concluding chapters of Job are not straightforward. No clear solution or prescriptive interpretation is offered. One possibility is that some text elements of the original are missing, another is that lack of a solution may be an essential part of reflective or "speculative" wisdom.

Ecclesiastes. The third major book of the Hebrew wisdom literature, Ecclesiastes, was written around 300 B.C. It is also known as the Book of Qohelet or Kohelet after its presumed author. There is much discussion about the structure and unity of Ecclesiastes (Murphy, 1981, 1990). It is akin to a "sage's notebook of random events about life" (Flaherty, 1981, p. 929), although other interpreters recognize a deep structure that links its seemingly separate and disconnected elements. Ecclesiastes includes a collection of everyday sayings, maxims, and a narrative that takes the tone of skeptical personal reflections. More than one third of the text is poetry.

The central foci of Ecclesiastes are on the difficulty of finding meaning in life, the uncertainties of life, man's inability to know, the questionable value of worldly achievements, and the often-hidden aspects of reality. These questions have no easy answers. The goal is more to elucidate the complicated dynamics of life than to offer one organized frame and strategy of mastery. Throughout, however, a principal role is allocated to God and his power of distributing gains and losses.

Ecclesiasticus and Wisdom of Solomon. The remaining two major elements of the Judaic wisdom literature, Ecclesiasticus (or Book of Ben Sirah) and The Wisdom of Solomon, are part of the so-called intertestamental literature whose origins lie between 200 B.C. and A.D. 200. The historical and religious status of this literature varies widely between the Judaic and Christian traditions (Flusser, 1984; Reese, 1983). Because of the time span involved, these wisdom texts, then, are less purely Hebrew than the others; they reflect strong Greek and Christian influences. The texts are best preserved in Greek, because for the Greek church they have canonical value.

Ecclesiasticus was originally written probably by Ben Sirah during the second century B.C. in Hebrew and translated, perhaps by the original author's grandson, into Greek. It is written in poetic style and deals with aspects of both practical (like Proverbs) and theoretical

(like Job) wisdom. Ecclesiasticus is a wide-ranging and not always consistent. In general, the tone is conservative. Wisdom is seen as divine in origin and materialized in the law of Moses and the fathers of old. An occasionally highlighted feature of Ecclesiasticus is that the author invokes an historically earlier revelation as the main reason why humans have access to wisdom and why the "residence" of wisdom is said to be in Jerusalem (Rudolph, 1987).

The Wisdom of Solomon (e.g., Clarke, 1973; Murphy, 1990), despite its title, is not a text of King Solomon. Rather, the author assumes the mantle of Solomon and speaks in his name. The text was written in Greek, probably during the last century B.C. by a Hellenic Jewish author living in Egypt. The intended audience most likely were Jews living in Greece. Judaic and Hellenistic thought are fused in this book. Although scholars disagree on whether the book was written by a single author, there is one argument in favor of this interpretation. The book shows a high degree of "inner unity" (Clarke, 1973, p. 3), both in purpose and language, much more than other texts of the Hebrew wisdom literature.

The first part of the Wisdom of Solomon consists of a discussion of the differences between pious and righteous Jews and the wicked and sinful. In the second part, King Solomon is invoked to speak about the nature of wisdom and its acquisition. The third, concluding part consists of an application to real life, that is, how wisdom has been useful in the history of Israel. If one looks for a single and "harmonious" account of Hebrew wisdom, the second part, in its discussion of the nature of wisdom and its acquisition, comes closest. Note, however, that this account does not reflect the full-blown dynamics of Hebrew wisdom, as it does not focus on the difficulties associated with wisdom and the search for the meaning of life, as does the wisdom text of Job.

A few quotations from the Wisdom of Solomon (see Clark, 1973, pp. 44-48) may help to bring its vision of wisdom to life. The first quotations are set in the form of an appeal to rulers (kings), the later quotations are written as if Solomon were speaking. "Hear then, you kings, take this to heart; learn your lesson . . . it is the Lord who gave you your authority . . . to you then who have absolute power I speak, in hope that you may learn wisdom . . . be eager then to hear me, and long for my teaching; so you will learn . . . wisdom shines bright and never fades; she is easily discerned by those who love her, and by those who seek her she is

found . . . the true beginning of wisdom is the desire to learn, and a concern for her means love towards her . . . thus the desire of wisdom leads to kingly stature . . . what wisdom is, and how she came into being, I will tell you; I will hide no secret from you . . . learn what I have to teach you, and it will be for your good."

Then Solomon begins to speak (Clark, 1973, p. 49ff): "I am a mortal man like all the rest . . . no king begins life in any other way . . . therefore I prayed, and prudence was given to me; I called for help, and there came to me a spirit of wisdom . . . I loved her more than health and beauty . . . she is an inexhaustible treasure for mankind, and those who profit by it become God's friends, commended to him by the gifts they derive from her instruction. . . . He himself gave me true understanding of things as they are; a knowledge of the structure of the world . . . the beginning and ends of epochs and their middle course . . . the nature of living creatures . . ."

The conclusion of the second part of the <u>Wisdom of Solomon</u> contains a summary of the central attributes of wisdom. For instance (p. 53ff): "For in wisdom there is a spirit intelligent and holy, unique in its kind yet made up of many parts, subtle, free-moving, lucid, spotless, clear, invulnerable . . . she is found to excel . . . against wisdom no evil can prevail. She spans the world in power from end to end, and orders all things benignly." The text continues, describing the King's desire for wisdom (p. 56ff): "Wisdom I loved; I sought her out when I was young . . . I fell in love with her beauty. . . . She is initiated into the knowledge that belongs to God . . . If riches are a prize to be desired in life, what is richer than wisdom, the active cause of all things? . . . If virtue is the object of a man's affections, the fruits of wisdom's labors are the virtues: temperance and prudence, justice and fortitude, these are her teaching, and in the life of men there is nothing of more value than these. If a man longs, perhaps, for great experience, she knows the past, she can infer what is to come . . . so I determined to bring her home to live with me, knowing that she would be my counsellor in prosperity and my comfort in anxiety and grief." Solomon goes on to lead a prayer to the Lord for the gift of wisdom.

Obviously, the author of the <u>Wisdom of Solomon</u> set out to describe the nature of wisdom in its constructive properties and as a closely argued "idealistic" phenomenon (likely

reflecting the Greek influence on the author). This is not a "classical" text of the Old Testament. As Clark (1973) and others such as Murphy (1990) have argued, the text prefigures many of the themes of the New rather than the Old Testament: Wisdom is seen as divine, it is the voice of God or of God's agent, it is achieved by prayer and divine revelation, it incorporates the best virtues we can achieve. Indeed, in this text we find for the first time a coherent listing of the four cardinal virtues that flow from the work of wisdom: <u>temperance</u> and <u>prudence</u>, <u>justice</u> and <u>fortitude</u>.

Surely, the <u>Wisdom of Solomon</u> is so coherent and enriching that one is tempted to take it as <u>the</u> definition of Hebrew wisdom. Note, therefore, that this would be inappropriate. The wisdom literature of the Old Testament is more complex. It is more than the divine idealism expressed in the <u>Wisdom of Solomon</u>; it also includes the intellectual and emotional labors of Job and his friends, and their uncertainty in finding definite answers to the vexing problems of life and man's relationship to God. And moreover, the content of the <u>Wisdom of Solomon</u> reflects more than the classical tradition of Hebrew wisdom. It considers significant perspectives from the Greek philosophical tradition as well.

<u>Summation of Hebrew wisdom literature.</u> First, it is important to recognize that Hebrew wisdom is part of a wider context of older Near Eastern and Egyptian writings about wisdom-related matters. Second, to capture the richness and dynamics of the Hebrew wisdom concept(s), the Hebrew wisdom books need to be seen as an ensemble, and also as part of the entire and evolving Old Testament. Scott (1970, p. 20), for example, summed up the three main wisdom texts: "How is a man to make a success of life? asks <u>Proverbs</u>. How is he to satisfy his conscience and his thirst for God? asks <u>Job</u>. How can he make his existence bearable, asks <u>Qohelet</u> (<u>Ecclesiastes</u>) in face of life's apparent meaninglessness and man's inscrutable fate?" Third, the ancient Hebrew wisdom texts are increasingly theologized, that is, connected with the Jewish faith. And finally, the latest text, the Wisdom of Solomon, reflects a conception of wisdom that includes ideas from ancient Greek philosophy.

The Hebrew wisdom literature is rich indeed. Does it, however, offer a clearly delineated conception of wisdom, or is it primarily a road map to the goals, questions, conflictual constellations, and uncertainties of wisdom? On the one hand, one can indeed have a

sense of despair and conclude that nearly anything goes. On the other hand, the texts may be close to life and the ill-defined and multifaceted reality surrounding our conceptions of wisdom and its development. In other words, the Hebrew wisdom literature has many voices. Giving each of them in separate texts (e.g., Proverbs, Job, Ecclesiastes) its maximum opportunity to be heard is perhaps, as Kidner suggests, "typical of the Old Testament's way of doing things." In this way more justice can be done to a many-sided subject than by steering a middle course between the extremes (Kidner, 1985, p. 123-124).

What about answers to the three questions I set out as a frame of reference for my analysis of ancient writings on wisdom: what is the content? who are the carriers of wisdom? how is wisdom acquired? Within the conditional nexus of conceptual richness and inconsistency, the answers are fertile. For example, as to the content of wisdom, the Hebrew wisdom literature is rich and in its complexity and focus on uncertainty it reflects the difficult tasks and problems of everyday life. In this vein, the Hebrew wisdom literature is a far cry from demarking a utopian ideal of perfection. The Hebrew wisdom literature also reflects the practical and the theoretical. The theoretical or speculative aspects of Hebrew wisdom, for instance, concern questions of justice, the meaning of life and death, and humans' relationship with the divine. The Hebrew wisdom literature incorporates also, though at different places, stylistic typologies of wisdom such as the distinction between practical-constructive wisdom (Proverbs) and skeptical-reflective wisdom (Job, Ecclesiastes).

Where carriers of wisdom are concerned, again the range is wide. On the one hand, the wisdom literature itself is the primary depository of wisdom. Yet the focus on wise kings, prophets, elders, sages, and other wisdom teachers such as scribes suggests that through religious orientation and direct or indirect revelation, wisdom can be approximated by humans, if not fully achieved. On the other hand, some statements, especially in later times, suggest that wisdom is divine, that it rests only with God or a Goddess such as "Lady Wisdom."

Who and how many of us can expect to acquire wisdom varies across the Hebrew wisdom literature. The text of Proverbs, in its presentation of concrete real-life and practical maxims and the voice of "Lady Wisdom", and very much like the Mesopotamian and Egyptian wisdom texts, suggests that many people can attain the more "practical" parts of wisdom if they

are able and willing to follow the teachings of God, the elders, and the texts provided by the collective work of past generations. At the same time, when one adds to Proverbs the texts of Job and Ecclesiastes and their primary emphasis on theoretical and spiritual wisdom and the meaning of life and death, it is also clear that achievement of this kind of wisdom is either not possible or reserved to a very few. In these writings of the Hebrew wisdom literature, the road toward wisdom is an arduous, life-long task without guarantee of success. Wisdom is not--as in Buddhist conceptions of the Enlightenment--a state of integrated happiness and insight into the conditio humana. Rather, it is a continuous "spiritual" struggle with uncertainty, conflict, and fate.

It is difficult, then, to say something about wisdom that has not been prefigured somewhere in the Hebrew texts on wisdom, but it is equally difficult to use them as a microscope to see a precise underlying structure, or as a frame to define the essence of wisdom in the sense of an optimal state of mind and character. The Hebrew wisdom texts definitely open our mind to the complexity of wisdom; they make us think broadly and deeply, but they don't offer specific and consistent answers. We cannot find, for example, in the Hebrew wisdom literature (perhaps with the exception of the Wisdom of Solomon) a definite list of virtues or ways of thinking that constitute wisdom or a specific description of how to move ahead in one's quest for wisdom. And perhaps this "fuzzy" combination of complexity, uncertainty, and struggle has been the primary strength of the body of Hebrew wisdom literature.

Although a theological analysis of the Hebrew wisdom literature is not a focus of this book, I offer a few observations and references of potential interest to readers who may want to become familiar with the theological scholarship on the topic (e.g., Brown, 1987; Crenshaw, 1981; Harrington, 1996; Kidner, 1986; Lang, 1986; Morgan, 1981; Perry, 1993; Scott, 1970; Sheppard, 1980; von Rad, 1965). Most certainly, the multidimensionality and the conceptual uncertainties of the Hebrew literature on wisdom have been at the center of discourse among theological scholars. They have discussed, for instance, whether it is possible to classify the body of Hebrew wisdom writings into distinct substantive or historical categories, and whether

wisdom constitutes a hermeneutical category (Sheppard, 1980) of theological scholarship used by later writers on wisdom.

One such analysis was presented by von Rad (1965), who, in his <u>Old Testament Theology,</u> attempted to specify three historically ordered kinds of wisdom: "old" or secular wisdom, "theological" wisdom, and "apocalyptic" wisdom. Largely for methodological reasons and lack of clear empirical support (Sheppard, 1980), his thesis, however, has not been widely accepted among biblical scholars. Another more recent effort, whose substantive focus is on <u>Proverbs,</u> was made by Lang (1986). Lang argues that the underlying and unifying frame of <u>Proverbs</u> is the notion of "Lady Wisdom", the poetic personification of human wisdom and divine order. Lady Wisdom is invoked as a symbol and, when called upon in a concrete situation, she speaks in several roles depending on the social context: for example, as a goddess or as a wisdom teacher.

Two issues seem to be the most thorny and controversial in theological efforts to organize the Hebrew wisdom literature: One is that the body of Hebrew wisdom literature has fuzzy boundaries. What texts are to be included, and to what degree does the "classical" wisdom literature differ from non-wisdom texts (Brown, 1987; Crenshaw, 1981; Morgan, 1981)? The second is the question of multiple authorship and the sizable substantive variation resulting from such a "non-integrated" enterprise. Because of the embeddedness of the Hebrew wisdom literature in the contextual stream of the history of Israel and its subsequent historical "reconstruction" by biblical scholars, it is increasingly noted that one should not be surprised about the outcome, namely that the Hebrew wisdom literature is multidimensional, dynamic, and inherently contradictory, with a strong dose of substantive, intellectual, moral, and religious pluralism: "No one group had a monopoly of wisdom or of its form of speech. Its roots went deep and wide. Some of its most appetizing fruits were grown by amateurs" (Kidner, 1985, p. 17). Perhaps this analysis foreshadows the modern situation more than other ancient conceptions that in their exposition seem to excel in clarity and prescriptive structure.

<u>Concluding Perspectives on Ancient Wisdom Writings</u>

On the one hand, these ancient literatures give rich historical substance to some of the "general properties of wisdom" I offered in Chapter 1 as the core of any conception of wisdom.

They help to make the earlier somewhat abstract statements more concrete and represent veritable mines from which many possible meanings of wisdom may be extracted. Our task is to sort out what from our present-day perspective is gold, silver, copper, or valueless though historically attractive dross. On the other hand, in their variations these ancient literatures on wisdom offer the possibility of comparative analysis and further specification of the essences of differences in the meaning of wisdom. To what degree, for instance, does religion modulate the meaning of wisdom, thereby making it less universal than secularized versions of wisdom?

Variations in the meaning of wisdom. Surely, these ancient texts suggest that wisdom is broad and multifaceted. Wisdom-related knowledge and advice is reflected in a wide range of manifestations, from simple admonitions about the practice of everyday life (Mesopotamian and Egyptian texts), to deep dialogues on the spiritual and transcendental meaning of life (Book of Job), to detailed and coordinated formulations of the ideal or superior man (Confucian wisdom), to a highly differentiated path toward achieving a state of Enlightenment and an ensemble of virtues permitting us to think and feel correctly and happily (Buddhist wisdom).

The writings' substantive variation in scope and depth lay to rest the idea that our cultural conception of wisdom is a fixed category identifying a very specific way to think and to behave. Moreover, if I ever thought that I could fully capture wisdom as it exists in our cultural heritage by means of psychological methods and concepts, my hope was unrealistic. When one reads ancient wisdom texts, the limitations of a scientific approach to wisdom take on a new level of reality. I understand now at a deeper level what my words (for instance, in Chapter 1) about the limitations of science in the study of wisdom mean, and why the spiritual in conceptions of wisdom continues to be important, and why wisdom by definition cannot be reduced to scientific or technological knowledge, advanced as the latter might be. And I also understand better why wisdom is a never-ending search, why its earthly manifestations represent by definition less than a perfectly orchestrated system of human functioning.

That wisdom is complex, multifaceted, dynamic, and incomplete in its expression is evident not only in regional and cultural variation of the content of wisdom. It is perhaps most conspicuous in typological analyses of ancient wisdom within a given cultural entity such as Israel. Rudolph (1987), for example, extracts four types of wisdom from the Hebrew texts:

juridical wisdom (Solomon), experiential wisdom (as evident in aphorisms and counsels to the young), theological wisdom (dealing with religious principles involving human relationships with God and the nature of cosmic order), and natural wisdom (akin to scientific knowledge abut the world). These types do not easily converge into a single "gestalt." In other ancient writings on wisdom, we find the foundation for each of these facets as well. Buddhist and perhaps Confucian texts excluded, the suggestion that wisdom may incorporate different kinds of wisdom, each having a unique function in a dynamic ensemble of wisdoms, seems part and parcel of the ancient wisdom literature (see also Assmann, 1991).

Because of the variety within wisdom, I now also understand better why individuals, with their different cultural heritages and individual preferences based on unique life experiences, may have a different focus on what wisdom is. Some, for example because of their familiarity with Confucian and Buddhist wisdom, will tend to focus on the aesthetic and spiritual ideal of wisdom as perfection. Others, because of their familiarity with the Old Testament, will emphasize the contrary view, namely, human inability to control their own development and resolve with certainty the nature of meaning in life.

<u>Wisdom is a topic of transhistorical and transcultural significance: Commonalities at meta-level of analysis?</u> Despite these variations, do the wisdom writings permit nonetheless a transhistorically unified conception of wisdom and of its quintessential nature? My impression is that if one searches for similarities or even universals in the ancient discourse about the nature of wisdom, the similarities are most evident in abstract and general discussions <u>about</u> the subject matter and goals of wisdom, that is, in "<u>metadiscourse about wisdom</u>", rather than in the specifics of content, ownership, and means to achieve wisdom. For example: these texts always record a quest for a high level of functioning of mind and personality. They are also aimed at combining the good for oneself with the good of others. Beyond such general goals, however, they vary substantially in describing what wisdom is, who possesses it, and how it can be achieved.

As I extract the implications of this conclusion from the ancient wisdom literature for a psychological conception of wisdom, I suggest that the core of a transhistorical and transcultural conception of wisdom lies in meta-aspects of wisdom, not in its specific

substantive content. By "meta-aspects" I mean characteristics that, from a certain distance, are statements about the nature of wisdom and about the thought and behavior process associated with the expression of wisdom, and not about its specific elaboration in a concrete situation. For instance, it may be possible to say on a metalevel of analysis that wisdom deals with utmost excellence and the welfare of mankind without specifying what this excellence entails at a microlevel of mind and character.

In this vein, I concentrate further my search for commonalities or universals of wisdom on a fairly abstract level of analysis, that is, on the general definition of the domain of wisdom and on the format (structure) of its body of knowledge and behavior. Later on, when presenting a psychological theory of wisdom (Chapters XXX), I will exploit this insight and argue for wisdom-related knowledge as an <u>orchestrating metastrategy of thinking</u> about oneself, others, and the world at large. At an abstract metalevel of analysis, there is more agreement than is often implied when people emphasize the differences in wisdom between different cultural regions and historical periods. For example, I argue that throughout the historical literature and across cultural regions, wisdom was concerned with the goals and conduct of life and its meaning, with the important matters of life, and with aiming for the highest level of mental and personal accomplishment possible. There also seems to be agreement that certain attributes and behaviors are antithetical to wisdom, such as narrowness in substantive focus, failure to consider dimensions of time (ontogenetic and historical) in one's deliberations, inability to accept the challenge of personal growth, lack of understanding for the need of modulation in motivation and emotion (such as not following the golden rule and avoiding extreme states of passion), or overcommitment to oneself rather than achieving a balance between oneself and the welfare of others.

<u>Wisdom is an extraordinary and superior attribute.</u> Wisdom is an extraordinary and superior attribute, as we see in the Buddhist and Confucian tradition, in the Goddess Lady Wisdom in the Hebrew proverbs, and in the strong emphasis on kings, sages, and priests evident in practically all texts associated with the region nowadays called the Middle or Near East. The possible exceptions are the earliest wisdom texts of Mesopotamia and Egypt, in which, because of their concern with practical aspects of living, wisdom is more closely related

to what we may want to call "common-sense" knowledge associated with the practice of everyday life. Maxims and rules of behavior are in the foreground. Even in these cases, however, wisdom is aimed at a high level of proficiency.

There is, however, variation in what is considered superior or extraordinary. Some concepts of wisdom state that superiority results from harmony (as would be true in its most extreme form for Buddhist wisdom), others that it involves the management of an ongoing, dynamic and deep-seated uncertainty. A second variation concerns whether wisdom is a singular category of superiority or whether it involves a spectrum of wisdoms or even incompatible "types" of wisdom: the optimism of Proverbs vs. the pessimism of Job, for example. Again, the wisdoms of Buddhism and Confucianism tend to move in the direction of singular and homogeneous conceptions. All of wisdom is thought to be represented in one state. The third type of variation involves whether wisdom is located in individual people, collections of people, or some supernatural being. Again, the Asian traditions of Buddhism and Confucianism seem to locate all wisdom in the minds of individuals or their products. The Hebrew tradition, on the other hand, at least where humans are concerned, suggests that the entirety of wisdom is perhaps less represented in individuals than in collectives, with individuals contributing different kinds of wisdom (e.g., Proverbs vs. Job vs. Ecclesiastes). In the Hebrew tradition, then, the highest form of wisdom is instantiated in God or culture, rather than in individuals. At the same time, even in the Old Testament, there are exceptions to this collectivist view of wisdom; some individuals, such as Solomon, are ascribed the ideal of wisdom.

But when we turn from general to specific ways to think wisely, ways to behave wisely, and ways to acquire wisdom, historical and cultural differences become obvious if not paramount. Dissimilarities are perhaps strongest when wisdom is treated as a transcendental and spiritual phenomenon and when the road toward it is specified in detail. At this level of comparison, the similarities between Buddhist, Confucian, and Hebrew wisdom begin to fade. Nonetheless, thinking about the nature of virtues involved rekindles commonalities.

There is much commonality in, for instance, the individual virtues of the mind and character that are considered to be relevant in the various cultural spheres. These virtues, as far

as I can see, in every ancient wisdom text deal with the maximization of positive personal attributes, such as loyalty and concern for others, and the minimization of undesirable attributes such as aggression and greed. It is unlikely, therefore, that the canon of virtues listed by Confucius or Buddha would not be judged to be desirable in the tradition of the Old Testament or the modern Western world. On the contrary, except for the question of reality orientation (that is, the question of which virtues deal with the mastery of everyday life vs. the mastery of an idealized state of Enlightenment), comparing the virtues listed in the Wisdom of Solomon with those offered by Confucius and Buddha reveals a high level of overlap.

We can discern an additional "functional" thread in the descriptions of virtues mentioned as constituents of wisdom. They are describing people who are expected to be productive members of society. In my assessment, the development of wisdom for the sake of individual growth in the sense of "free-ranging self-actualization" was not the primary focus of any of these ancient writings about wisdom. On the contrary, in these ancient wisdom-related texts, the development of wisdom is seen as being in the interest of societal functioning. There is always a concerted effort to place individuals in social contexts and to improve individuals and society. And in this sense, an authoritative frame, whether provided by political leaders or religion, was helpful to the cause of wisdom. In other words, the purpose of wisdom in these writings was to give direction, and the direction included the well-being of the larger social context.

Wisdom deals with the known, the uncertain, and the not known. These ancient literatures on wisdom also suggest that for human beings wisdom involves knowing what is unsettled, what is uncertain, and why. This characteristic becomes the more obvious the more the wisdom writings deal with questions of the meaning of life and the relationship of humans to the supernatural and God. That wisdom includes the not-known and the uncertain is clearly evident, for example, in the sayings of the Seven Sages, in the Old Testament wisdom texts of Job, in Buddhist wisdom involving uncertainty about the specific nature of Enlightenment or the state of Nirvana, and in Confucius's refusal to know the answers to certain questions and his unwillingness to identify anybody who is truly wise.

Some modern-day views of wisdom emphasize the idea that all wisdom-related knowledge is inherently uncertain (e.g., Meacham, 1990). The ancient writings do not support this claim if it is seen as inclusively true for all aspects of wisdom. Much of the ancient wisdom deals with what is known to be good, such as regulating passions in order to achieve wisdom. Not everything in wisdom, then, is considered unfinished or unsettled--only some of it. The "some", however, may be the most relevant.

The acquisition of wisdom requires mentorship and is a life-long task. Some form of mentorship, whether through extensive and supervised readings of texts or through guidance by God, parents, scholars, sages, or priests, is evident in all the ancient writings I have summarized here (see also Clayton & Birren, 1980). People who approach wisdom stand on the shoulders of others before and around them, or they have received their benefits in other forms, such as revelation. Definitely, wisdom is not an accomplishment that individual human beings can reach by themselves: Beyond their own investment and efforts, people in search of wisdom need the inspiration, guidance, and support of "superior" others.

In addition to highlighting the role of mentors or leaders, most of the ancient texts also suggest that achieving wisdom is a lifelong task. Sudden insights or even revelation are part of the story, as in Buddhist wisdom or the Old Testament. Nevertheless, only those who have a sustained record of trying seem generate the opportunities for such insights and revelations. In my view, the most significant impetuses to the acquisition of wisdom (aside from divine revelation) in ancient texts are effort, guidance, and a motivation toward excellence defined in the context of the culture. Wisdom sets a frame for working on one's intellect and character toward the goal of a higher level of human quality. It appears to me, however, that in the ancient texts as an ensemble, except perhaps for Buddhism, the finish line is never reached. The pursuit of wisdom is never-ending.

Ancient wisdom texts emphasize the intimate connection between intellect and virtue (character). Each of the ancient wisdom texts, without exception it seems to me, implies that wisdom refers to mind (knowledge) and character (personality). This view is expressed as far back as in the old Mesopotamian and Egyptian texts. Surely, wisdom is embodied in impersonal carriers such as the Old Testament or the Analects. But when wisdom is manifested

in human form, it is found in individuals or groups of people such as sages, priests, parents, or personified gods like Lady Wisdom in the Hebrew <u>Proverbs</u>. The general expectation is that knowledge and personal virtues go hand in hand.

The strength of the conceptual connection between intellect and character, however, varies widely. In the wisdoms of Buddha and Confucius, the degree of explicitness is perhaps strongest. As in historically later traditions in Christianity, the attributes of the wise mind and the virtues of the wise character are spelled out in great detail, they constitute almost a curriculum or a canon of means and ends. Other ancient texts, such as the Old Testament, contain similar suggestions about the links between the intellect and character, but they are less explicitly spelled out and canonized. The principal exception in the Old Testament is the <u>Wisdom of Solomon,</u> which, however, is known to reflect not only Hebrew but also Greek influence.

<u>Religion aids in the specification of wisdom but is likely to reduce its transcultural validity.</u> My final observation on these ancient wisdom texts concerns the role of religion. My reading of them suggests a close relationship between religion and wisdom. This is not surprising, because religion is one organized way to deal with values, socialization, spirituality, and the conduct and meaning of life.

What is the nature of the relationship between religion and wisdom? I offer two impressions. First, the stronger the role of organized religion in a given society, the more likely it is that wisdom or a related concept will be part of a sophisticated cultural dialogue and agenda. The reverse is likely true as well. As societies evolved, they generated religion as one mental and institutionalized form of spirituality and insight into the human condition. Second, however, I am impressed by another factor. My reading suggests that religions constrain how far wisdom is developed. In fact, there may be a point beyond which religion becomes a hindrance to the generalizability or transcultural validity of wisdom. In other words, religions (or other ideologically framed belief systems) are among the fathers of wisdom but also among its limiting "enemies." Religion opens and closes the mindful territory of wisdom.

I will deal with this perspective here because this topic will be one of the take-off points for the next chapter and its emphasis on the movement of secularization in the European history

of wisdom. Most of the ancient texts about wisdom I have summarized show some religious influence, some more than others. The ancient Mesopotamian and Egyptian texts (and perhaps also the original teachings of Confucius) are the most secular. The wisdom of Buddha, on the other hand, is clearly part of a particular religious tradition. In ancient India, the Buddhist religion and philosophies of life formed an entity. Therefore, I will use it to make my point.

As I studied the nature of Buddha's wisdom, I was struck by its consistency with other systems. The virtues of character defined as essential to wisdom, such as the 10 great virtues or paramitas (charity, morality, patience, truth, etc.) are quite similar to what we can find in other ancient writings such as the Old Testament. In addition, however, Buddhist wisdom includes a highly specific procedural strategy for achieving wisdom (Enlightenment), the so-called Noble Eightfold Path. When attempting to understand this pathway toward Enlightenment--and much different from my reaction to Confucius or the writings of the Old Testament--I asked myself, "Is this wisdom?" I wondered whether, despite its purported humaneness and openness, because of its clear and rather absolutist specification of how to achieve wisdom and the outcome involved (a specific state of Enlightenment), Buddhist wisdom might be somewhat insensitive to freedom, human diversity, and the uncertainties of the absolute in the human condition. Rather, Buddhism seemed to represent one particular and fairly rigid way of defining the goal of personal development and the specific way by which this goal can be achieved. And as I wrestled with my disquieting confusion--disquieting also because as a Western scholar I probably know less about Buddhism than is necessary to have a solid opinion--I tried to formulate the reason for my reaction.

Is it the difference between seeking the truth and knowing the truth, the difference between flexible pluralism and well-specified dogma, that we need to be sensitive to as we reflect on the dynamic between religion and wisdom? Do the great world religions and religion-oriented philosophical systems carry less "universally useful" wisdom as soon as they claim to know the truth and become normative and prescriptive? Perhaps religions and ideologies are the parents of the search for wisdom, but as soon as they become powerful realizers they run the danger, not unlike utopias, of forgetting their original source. Utopias are constructed to open

our minds. But they do so only as long as they are not translated into a concrete and prescriptive solution (Berlin, 1990; Welsch, 1989).

Here, perhaps, is the strength of ancient Hebrew wisdom. It incorporates variety, conflict, and dialectical pluralism, thereby nurturing a profound sense of a search for truth rather than a specification of the canon of truth and its attainment. Whether religiously or ideologically imprinted conceptions offer us the best avenue toward wisdom will be a central issue as we review in the next chapter the other major historical writings about wisdom, during the late Middle Ages and on into modern history. In the end, we will ask whether an ideology-free conception of wisdom is possible at all, or whether, as I tend to believe, wisdom with any kind of universal call exists only at a metalevel, at an abstract level of analysis.

CHAPTER 3

From Cultural-Religious Beliefs to a Philosophical

(Scientific) Analysis of Wisdom

In this chapter, we will take another look at the historical evolution of the concept of wisdom. The previous chapter opened our eyes to the ancient traditions, which closely allied religious and everyday thinking about wisdom. The ancients did not treat wisdom as subject to what we nowadays would call a philosophical analysis, based on propositions and arguments to evaluate the logical or empirical evidence. Our modern way of conceptualizing and evaluating wisdom and of turning philosophers into figures of authority on the structure and function of wisdom became prominent only later. Ancient Greek philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, rather than religious texts, created a lasting foundation for this development.

When writing this chapter on the evolution of a "scholarly" philosophy of wisdom, I was guided by two selection perspectives. The first (which reflects my academic upbringing more than an intentional bias) was a focus on the Western tradition in the philosophy of wisdom that began with classical Greek philosophers. The second was the philosophical analysis of wisdom during the early European Renaissance and the Enlightenment. During these periods, the struggle between theological and philosophical approaches to wisdom reached a critical tension. Because the modern world still feels the tug between religious and secular views of wisdom, I decided that a somewhat more extensive examination of the dialogue might shed some light on the issue.

In the Renaissance discourse of the 15th-17th centuries, the relationship between a religious tradition (particularly Christianity) and secular conceptions of wisdom rose to a new level of open debate and understanding (McKnight, 1991; Rice, 1958). Wisdom, in order to be generalizable and of broad cultural significance, needed to separate itself from dogmatic control by specific religious canons. In this sense, the Renaissance and Enlightenment periods,

perhaps more than any other, contributed to a differentiation between religious and philosophical thinking about wisdom. Therefore, this period is a milestone in the cultural history of wisdom, at least in Western civilization. At the same time, it is fair to say that this differentiation does not mean that in the modern age there is no connection between religion (in the form of theology), religious spirituality, and wisdom. As McKnight (1991) argues, for instance, the modern age continues to struggle with similar dynamics, though at a new level of clarity. To some degree, each historical period needs to engage itself anew in order not to lose the benefits of earlier insights.

In my bird's-eye view of the history of a philosophy of wisdom, I am guided primarily by what twentieth-century philosophers have produced. In addition to shorter articles or essays (e.g., Jacobs, 1989; Kallen, 1971; Kekes, 1983; Nozick, 1990; Robinson, 1990; Wundt, 1940), three works are of special importance: (1) Eugene Rice's Renaissance Idea of Wisdom (1958), (2) a collection of philosophical essays and debates on wisdom, Philosophie und Weisheit, written predominantly by German philosophers and theologians and edited by Willi Oelmüller (1989), and (3) a more recently published volume edited by Keith Lehrer and others, Knowledge, Teaching and Wisdom (1996). In addition, I read some of the central works in the original or in English or German translations (e.g., Plato, Aristotle, Charron, Bacon, Cusanus, Kant, Schopenhauer). The reader should keep in mind, however, that, as a psychologist with limited training in philosophy, I am to a certain extent a novice here. Perhaps worse, I feel somewhat like an interdisciplinary parasite. For the most part, I am exploiting the analyses and conclusions of others without being able to stand behind them as I would if I were a philosopher and had read more of the vast original philosophical work on the topic.

Philosophy and Wisdom

As we begin this all-too-brief journey into a philosophical analysis of wisdom, it may be helpful to place it within a more general history of the evolution of knowledge. The structure of knowledge is complex, and its historical evolution involves differentiation: differentiation based on subject matter (for instance, knowledge about the physical world and about the social world) and differentiation based on ways and methods to know (for instance, knowledge based on cultural or religious tradition and knowledge based on "scientific" rational analysis). The

emergence of philosophy as a field of study was perhaps the first time a societal institution had evolved whose primary task aim was the search for truth at the level of "abstract" knowledge, the testing of truth by logical and empirical analysis, and the organization of such knowledge into consensual statements of fact and theory.

The same historical evolution applies to wisdom. We can trace the continuing refinement of a philosophy of wisdom. The earliest statements about wisdom (such as the "wisdom literature" of the Old Testament, Buddha, and Confucius summarized in chapter 2) were founded on some combination of folk knowledge, state- or government-regulated "educational" knowledge, and religious knowledge. With time, however, the emerging field of philosophy, initially conceived of as <u>the</u> field of science or scholarship, became a separate forum of discourse about wisdom. Certainly, this specialized "philosophical" discourse did not come about instantaneously, nor completely outside religion or other forms of knowledge about wisdom. Nor did it ever separate itself completely from other forms of knowledge. Rather, the process of differentiation that finally resulted in a separate philosophy of wisdom was slow, the boundaries were never clean and precise, and the process continues into the present (Kekes, 1995; McKnight, 1991; Oelmüller, 1989).

The topic of wisdom was not a late child of the mother of all sciences, philosophy. On the contrary, as philosophy emerged as a field of study, wisdom was part of the agenda, not surprisingly. As I said earlier, philosophy meant "the love of wisdom." Since classical Greek times, then, wisdom was not only a matter of cultural or religious beliefs, but a subject matter whose definition and analysis depended increasingly on rational arguments made by humans about a human phenomenon. The intense concern with wisdom and its scientific-rational-philosophical explication continued into the Enlightenment.

A famous statement by the eighteenth century philosopher Immanuel Kant (*Kritik der praktischen Vernunft,* p. 292*; Weischedel,* 1963, Vol. VII) illustrates the power that philosophers attributed to a scientific and philosophical approach in outlining the nature and attainment of wisdom. Because of the often incomplete citation of this passage, I include here a longer version. Kant wrote: "The narrow gate to wisdom lies in science, if one means by wisdom not only what one does, but also what can serve as a guide to teachers, in order to

make explicit and facilitate the path of wisdom that everyone should walk on . . . a science whose preservation should always be the responsibility of philosophy" (Die Wissenschaft ist die enge Pforte, die zur Weisheitslehre führt, wenn unter dieser nicht bloß verstanden wird, was man tut, sondern was Lehrern zur Richtschnur dienen soll, um den Weg der Weisheit den jedermann gehen soll, gut und kenntlich zu bahnen. . . eine Wissenschaft, deren Aufbewahren jederzeit die Philosophie bleiben muss. . . .)." To prevent a possible misunderstanding, because the meaning of the word science (Wissenschaft) has changed since Kant's day, note here that Kant most likely meant science not in the narrow sense of "natural" science, but in the broader sense of scholarship.

The historical conquest of a science of wisdom by philosophy is not the latest statement on the process of historical differentiation. Recent scholarship on the psychology of wisdom, such as Staude's (1981) or Sternberg's (1990) collection of essays on a psychology of wisdom, is yet another instance of the continuing differentiation of knowledge about wisdom. Thus we need to recognize that wisdom is part of many forms of knowledge: personal, everyday, humanistic, and scientific. This fact makes the treatment of wisdom more complicated, but is part of the reality of wisdom. In this vein, the present chapter and the following one illustrate how the treatment of wisdom is part of a historical struggle about which disciplines hold the "best" key to wisdom and how discipline-based approaches supplement and correct each other.

Precursors of Wisdom in Ancient Greece: The Seven Sages

In ancient Greece, the best known forerunners are the "seven wise men" or "seven sages" who lived around 600 B.C. in several regions of the Greek world (Rösler, 1991). These seven wise men were prominent intellectually and politically. Their sayings were inscribed in major temples; each was noted for special aptitudes and accomplishments. As with other important historical figures of wisdom such as Confucius or Solomon of the Old Testament, however, much of what we know about them is fable, produced by later generations. About 200 years after they are presumed to have lived, in the fourth century B.C., in Protagoras, Plato provided for posterity a kind of historical fixation of the seven wise men.

Thus when we enjoy modern compilations of famous phrases of the Seven Sages (e.g., Bien, 1988; Evans, 1989), we need to recognize that who they actually were and what they actually said are now unclear. Of as many as 17 personages variously mentioned as one of the Seven Sages (Bien, 1988; Rösler, 1991), four were always part of the list: Bias, Pittacus, Thales, and Solon. Some of the sayings of the seven (or seventeen) (Evans, 1989, p. 1182) are clearly in the tradition of the aphorisms and maxims discussed earlier: "Most men are bad", proffered Bias of Priene; "consider the end" is credited to Chilo of Sparta; "avoid extremes" and look for "the golden mean" are prescripts by Cleobulus of Lindos. One of Periander of Corinth's statements is "nothing is impossible to industry"; Pittacus of Mitilene said "seize time by the forelock"; Thales of Miletus offered "who hateth suretyship is sure"; and finally there is the famous maxim of Solon of Athens: "Know thyself."

The Seven Sages of ancient Greece are like other historical figures of wisdom: They are symbols and guideposts and therefore subject to continuous historical reconstruction. The sages (notice the magic or holy number, seven) outline the essence of early Greek wisdom. For them, wisdom was not a matter of metaphysics and divine revelation. Rather, it involved a high level of worldly expertise and the willingness and ability to translate this knowledge into "virtuous" action for the good of humankind. The Seven Sages exemplify political-governmental, technological, and juridical, as well as metaphysical knowledge and judgment (Rösler, 1991). Wisdom is important to a good way of life; it is aimed at the good of individuals and the state; it represents advice and leadership at its best.

We should note again that ancient Greek wisdom, as exemplified in the Seven Sages, right from the beginning had a strong flavor of secularism. It was less a part of a religious system than it was in Buddhism or the Old Testament Judaism. There were connections to Greek religious mythology, of course; the Oracle of Delphi was involved in the production and evaluation of wisdom-related insights and the very creation of the tradition of the Seven Sages (Bien, 1988). Predominantly, however, the later founders of a Greek philosophy of wisdom (Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle) worked in a cultural context that was susceptible to accepting the human mind as the forum and yardstick for discourse about the nature of wisdom. In ancient Greece, at least since Socrates, and very unlike the historical traditions of Buddhism

and the Old Testament, wisdom was not a Gordian knot impossible to untie because of deep religious beliefs or the overpowering authority of a deity who opposed an approach to wisdom that was based primarily on rational analysis and human arguments.

The Greek Philosopher Trio: Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle

Three Greeks are generally viewed as the founders of Western philosophy: Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Each of them made wisdom a topic of philosophical analysis (Annas, 1992; Oelmüller, 1989; Rice, 1958; Robinson, 1990). After them, a number of other major and minor schools of Greek and Roman philosophy continued this tradition; the best-known one is stoicism.

We cannot concern ourselves here with questions of the historical validity of authorship. Our focus is on the nature of the Greek philosophers' arguments about wisdom and its role in subsequent philosophical work. It is important to keep in mind, however, that our knowledge of Socrates is more or less completely based on Plato's accounts (Plato knew Socrates intimately only during the last 12 years of Socrates' life) and that some of Plato's and especially Aristotle's original writings have been lost as well. In general, however, Plato's and Aristotle's intellectual wills as we know them today are judged to be authentic, although there is much spirited debate about their deeper meanings.

Socrates (c. 470-399 B.C.)

Socrates himself did not write at all, as a matter of principle (e.g., Taylor, 1984; Vlastos, 1990). His long-term contribution to philosophy is associated mainly with Plato, who took up his thought and continued it into his own life's work.

The Roman statesman and philosopher Cicero (Rice, 1958, p. 8) is credited with saying that Socrates was the first of the great trio who "brought down philosophy from heaven to earth." This was true in more than one sense. First, philosophy was emerging as an enterprise of the human mind and not as something revealed and possessed only by gods or the divine. Second, beginning with Socrates, Greek philosophy expanded its subject matter from the traditional natural-philosophical study of the what, how, and why of nature in general to the analysis of the nature of the human mind and human character. With this movement of

philosophy from heaven to earth, wisdom became and remained a centerpiece of philosophical analysis for centuries to come.

Socrates (mediated through Plato) made three specific contributions to a philosophy of wisdom (see also Lehrer et al., 1996). First, he successfully shifted the central problem of philosophy from cosmology to the formulation of rules of life and the nature of the soul. His second contribution was the use of "Socratic" dialogues to define and question ways to think and ways to behave (e.g., Benson, 1996). Note that the aim of this discourse was the examination not only of the interlocutor but also of the questions themselves. In the context of his discourses, Socrates advanced a feature of wisdom that has become an essential part of the definition of wisdom in the Western world. He argued that, if there is one respect in which he was wiser than others, it is that he understood his own ignorance -- that he knew that he didn't know.

Socrates made a third contribution to the philosophy of wisdom. It deals with his way of understanding the intimate connection between mind and virtue (see also Calef, 1996). Socrates argued fervently for a firm marriage between mind and virtue when it comes to conducting one's life well. But he also argued for the dominant power of knowledge in the regulation of human behavior. In other words, if knowledge about the nature of goodness is achieved, human passions (for instance) are assumed to be under control and good behavior follows: "nobody who really knows what is good and right could act against it" (Fritz 1984, p. 253). In this sense "all virtue is knowledge" and "human wisdom (is) the expert knowledge of virtue" (Calef, 1996, p. 36).

Specifically, Socrates espoused the radical doctrine that an absolute and uncompromisable morality exists, and that it can be identified through rational discourse and insight. Humans forfeit full growth because they mistake apparent good for the real good. Therefore the goal of human development is "the tending of the soul" to achieve a perfect understanding of goodness. Socrates demonstrated his adherence to these principles of absolute morality and the power of the "proper" knowledge of what is right and good on various occasions during his own lifetime. One well-known example, much debated by later

philosophers (e.g., Vlastos, 1990), was Socrates' decision to accept death rather than exile when he was put on trial for the putative corruption of the young.

Plato (c. 428-347 B.C.)

Plato's many contributions are difficult to disentangle from Socrates'. For posterity, Socrates exists in and through Plato. In general, Plato's work contained three principal lines of argument, which in concert formed an integrated philosophical whole (perhaps best represented in The Republic): ethical and political, aesthetic and mystical, and metaphysical. The integration is achieved by articulating several "metatheoretical" perspectives: above all, a theory of Forms and a theory of a tripartite soul. Plato's conception of wisdom is an essential part of this general framework. Remember: It was during this period that Greek philosophers, much influenced by Socrates, began to define their general enterprise, attempting to understand the world and humans through rational means, as "philosophy", as the love of wisdom.

Of particular historical significance as well is Plato's engagement in the institutionalization of philosophy. In 387 B.C., Plato founded the Academy as an institute for the systematic pursuit of philosophical and scientific work. He presided over it until his death in 347 B.C. The Academy was a fount of philosophy and science, the home of many outstanding scholars ranging across many fields of scholarship, including natural history, biology, mathematics, and jurisprudence. In the opinion of some historians of science, the creation of Plato's Academy as a permanent institution for the investigation of both exact and humane sciences was the first establishment of a university. I mention this achievement to indicate that Plato's treatment of philosophy, as the love and pursuit of wisdom, was not a matter of personal and private activity. On the contrary, it was part and parcel of a public and well-institutionalized discourse associated with teaching and research that involved many others. Philosophy--including wisdom--became a collective good and a collective activity held together and nurtured by social institutions.

The major writings of Plato on wisdom are contained in The Republic, in which he outlined his idea of an ideal state and the role of philosophers in it, and in Phaedrus. For Plato, wisdom was "an intellectual and contemplative virtue, a knowledge of eternal, immutable, and intelligible Ideas." Platonic wisdom, moreover, is knowledge of the ideal and therefore divine.

"God is wise; man is a lover of wisdom who tries to become wise" (Rice, 1958, p. 6). Plato, then, did not yet propose that wisdom is a human product. Rather, his theory of Form and Ideas located wisdom in a metaphysical sphere whose foundation is in the divine; it can only be approximated by humans. For Plato, then, only God is wise; man can only be a friend of wisdom, a seeker of wisdom (Bien, 1989).

Aristotle (c. 384-322 B.C.)

The final member of the trio, Aristotle, who became a member of Plato's Academy at age 17 (during Plato's absence, however), stayed at the Academy for about 20 years, and, perhaps because he was not appointed successor to Plato upon Plato's death, founded a school (Lyceum) of his own in Athens. His works most relevant for the study of wisdom are De Philosophia, in which the role of philosophers is discussed; De Anima, with its emphasis on the nature and processes of the soul; Metaphysics, which contains his doctrines or views on wisdom; and especially Nicomachean Ethics (Celano, 1995; Cooper, 1977; Kekes, 1995; A. O. Rorty, 1980, 1996), in which Aristotle elaborates his conceptions of virtue and morality, and of the relationship between knowledge and action and the role of happiness (eudaimonia) as virtuous activity. "Happiness is defined . . . as an activity of the soul in accordance with rationality and virtue" (Rorty, 1980, p. 3).

Aside from the treatment of eudaimonia, much of the general discussion about Aristotle concerns his conceptual movement from Platonic idealism to Aristotelian empiricism and to what degree this movement implied a full rejection of Platonic idealism or only a kind of expansion and transformation (Amadio, 1984; Nussbaum, 1986). Occasionally, it is claimed that in the final analysis, Aristotle was not willing or able to take a definite position, that he waxed and waned in his commitment to empiricism and rejection of Platonic idealism, that he tried to be loyal to his teachers and the Greek tradition despite his "knowing otherwise" (see, however, Cooper, 1977). Moreover, Nussbaum (1986) argues that at least regarding the treatment of ethics and morality, the differences between Plato and Aristotle are often exaggerated, that Aristotle occasionally maintained on purpose a "mixed view", setting the Platonist and his own view "side by side" (p. 377).

Of particular interest for our concern with wisdom are several general frameworks Aristotle proposed for considering all phenomena, that is, the world at large. One (following from Socrates) is the role of the discourse in the understanding of ethical insights and the achievement of knowledge of the wisdom kind (Nussbaum, 1986). Ethical theorizing proceeds by way of a <u>reflective dialogue</u>, within oneself or between individuals, involving beliefs and complex ethical questions presented for exploration. According to Aristotle, such dialogues need to include the beliefs and answers of the "many" and the "wise."

Another important feature of Aristotelian thinking about wisdom is his distinction between <u>several forms of causation</u> (material, efficient, formal, and final), which we must consider jointly in order to understand a given phenomenon, although at any given moment only some of them may be accessible through investigation. Thus wisdom involves knowledge about more than the material, efficient, and formal causes of a given phenomenon; it includes knowledge about the "final cause", about "that for which the other causal modalities are engaged" (Robinson, 1990, p. 17; see also, Mittelstraß, 2000). That Aristotle so explicitly recognizes different kinds of causation will be important as we try to "wisely" understand the many facets and origins of a given phenomenon. Only by considering all forms of causation it is possible, for instance, to recognize that human behavior is both and all: active and passive, determined and open, intellectual and emotional.

In addition, Aristotle's distinction between at least two categories of sciences based on their primary purpose is relevant: <u>theoretical</u> and <u>practical</u>. The theoretical sciences, such as metaphysics, mathematics, and physics, are concerned with the production of knowledge <u>qua</u> knowledge; they deal with phenomena and their causes. The practical sciences, such as ethics and politics, are concerned with action and conduct.

What are Aristotle's more specific views on wisdom? First, he explores whether wisdom is a product of humankind (Celano, 1995; Nussbaum, 1986; Rice, 1958, p. 17). With the view that wisdom is largely the product of human development, Aristotle helped to complete the Socratic project of moving wisdom from heaven to earth. According to Aristotle, humans through a combination of speculative and empirical efforts, through experience-guided individual development, can produce and attain wisdom. Reaching the perfect, "ideal" state of

wisdom may not be possible, but this is for human reasons and not because the source of wisdom is inherently divine. Divine and metaphysical things are part of the domain of knowledge associated with wisdom, but being divine is not necessary for acquiring wisdom. We need to acknowledge, however, that in some writings Aristotle wavers on this point; he once says that wise people "partake in something divine" (Nagel, 1980, p. 12; Cooper, 1977).

A second important part of Aristotle's treatment of wisdom is the intimate connection between morality, ethics, and wisdom-related knowledge that is part of his conception of eudaimonia (Celano, 1995; Cooper, 1977; Kekes, 1995; Nussbaum, 1986; A. O. Rorty, 1980, 1996; Slote, 1992). To be wise is to strive for a condition of eudaimonia or what we now might call moral perfection. The state of eudaimonia is the ultimate end (goal) of life, at least the "most end-like . . . it is desired for its own sake . . . and everything else that is desired is desired for the sake of it" (Cooper, 1977, p. 92). In other words, all other desires are dependent on this ultimate goal of eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is the ultimate guidepost.

Aristotle's central position was that the soul possessed two kinds of equally important powers: moral and intellectual virtues. They need to be joined in well-meaning action and the search for happiness. The "flowering of the soul" toward happiness (eudaimonia) is the main precondition for achieving a state of wisdom: "activity in accordance with virtue" (Amadio, 1984, p. 1170), "life lived in a certain way" (Robinson, 1990, p. 16). For Aristotle, then, the mark of wisdom is the very character of the person. Part of an excellent character is having virtues (conceived of as dispositional characteristics) such as a sense of justice and courage, and achieving temperance in the regulation of one's emotions (Sorabji, 1980; Urmson, 1980). For eudaimonia to emerge, reason, emotion, perception, and action need to interact together in "an ensouled body", with a soul that transcends itself and thereby includes the consideration of matters of the divine (Nagel, 1980).

Third, using his general distinction between theoretical and practical sciences, Aristotle laid the groundwork for a consideration of "types" of wisdom as well as their coordination and integration. In line with his classificatory scheme of sciences, Aristotle distinguished between theoretical wisdom (theoria or sophia) and practical wisdom (phronesis). Theoretical wisdom is contemplative and devoted to the search for knowledge and truth for their own sake. It also

includes "abstract" knowledge about the order and causes of things. Practical wisdom deals with knowledge translated into action, producing outcomes. In modern language, it is akin to professional practice and engineering broadly defined. But practical wisdom also includes matters of politics and ethics. "The <u>phronimos</u>, the practically wise person, is able to judge correctly about the ends of action as well as the proper means to attain them" (Celano, 1995, p. 226).

Dividing wisdom into the practical (<u>phronesis</u>) and the theoretical (<u>sophia</u>) is perhaps our clearest indication that for Aristotle, wisdom was not only a matter of metaphysics and the divine. On the contrary, wisdom could exist in the most worldly matters, such as professional crafts. In each case, however, for expertise to be called practical wisdom, it needed to involve a high level of deliberation and orientation "not merely to particular goals but to the good life in general, with a view to the best" (Sorabji, 1980, p. 205). "Practical wisdom . . . is concerned with human things and things about which it is possible to deliberate. . . . The man who is without qualification good at deliberating is the man who is capable of aiming . . . at the best for man of things attainable by action" (Wiggins, 1980, p. 227-228). But what is the good? According to Celano (1995, p. 226), Aristotle never answered that question. In a strict prescriptive sense, he begged the question of moral goodness. Good is what a <u>phronimos</u> (that is, a person with practical wisdom) does; he is the standard of comparison.

What about the connection between practical and theoretical wisdom and their relative standing? On the one hand, there is evidence for a constructive dialogue between the two kinds of wisdom. Aristotle sees wisdom as coordination and integration of all knowledge: "<u>Sapientis est ordinare</u>" is a saying attributed to Aristotle (Geyer, 1989, p. 58). On the other hand, there is evidence for separatism and "discrimination" against practical wisdom. It is widely accepted that Aristotle ranked theoretical wisdom higher than practical wisdom. Cooper (1977, p. 176) argues that this ordering is due to his psychological theory outlined in <u>De Anima,</u> where "the highest intellectual powers, the theoretical, are split up from the others . . . to constitute a soul all on their own."

But it appears that Aristotle and his interpreters are unclear about why that should be, unless it is simply because theoretical wisdom deals with the most abstract concepts and with

knowledge for its own sake. Nevertheless, why the best practical wisdom should not involve a foundation in the very essence of theoretical wisdom (universal principles, joint concern with all forms of causes, etc.) is not spelled out with sufficient clarity and consistency. One reason for the vexity of this issue in Aristotle's writings, aside from their inconsistencies, is perhaps the fact that viewing practical and theoretical wisdom as "types" makes it difficult to think about them as part of a whole. Can one as a person be in the middle of two types?

A second reason for Aristotle's position that theoretical wisdom ranks higher than practical wisdom may be that Aristotle espoused in <u>De Republica</u> a hierarchical model of "levels of knowledge" ranging from knowledge based on the senses (perception) to "philosophical" knowledge about the most abstract things and their primary causes. The latter, the highest form of knowledge, is identified with theoretical and contemplative <u>sophia</u>. From this vantage point, then, for Aristotle, true "wisdom is knowledge of the first causes and principles" (Rice, 1958, p. 15-16; see also Cooper, 1977, p. 174). Any philosophic system that places knowledge at its most abstract at the top of a scale brings with it the conclusion that the practice of knowledge, with its constraints in time and space and boundedness by the virtues of others, is of a lower quality, at least when judged by criteria of aesthetic or formal beauty (Moravcsik & Temko, 1982).

Aristotle's hierarchical scheme and its implications for the distinction between theoretical and practical wisdom are subject to much debate. Why? Aristotle never made a convincing "rational" argument for practical wisdom. It remains unclear (except for the historical connection to Platonic idealism with its emphasis on knowledge of and about the metaphysical) why Aristotle thought theoretical wisdom (<u>sophia</u>) was of a higher quality and state of <u>eudaimonia</u> than practical wisdom. His indecision and conflictual position on this question is exemplified in an essay by Amelie Rorty (1980, p. 377), who concludes that there is plenty of evidence in Aristotle's writings supporting the position that practical and theoretical wisdom "need not be competitors for the prizes of the best life."

<u>Postlude to Ancient Greek Philosophy of Wisdom</u>

Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle did not write the final Greek word on wisdom. In fact, a special feature of ancient Greek philosophy is that it spawned quite a collection of diverse

philosophical orientations in both Greece and Rome, including stoicism and skepticism, to name but two. Greek and Roman stoicism, in particular, developed an extensive scheme of wisdom as an art of life (Annas, 1992; Robinson, 1989).

Most important for my inquiry into a psychology of wisdom are the conclusions that I have derived from the treatment of wisdom in ancient Greek philosophy. First, the ancient Greek tradition underscores several historical universals that I identified when summarizing other ancient traditions on wisdom (chapter 2): wisdom is a matter of utmost excellence (or even absolute truth) in knowledge; it deals with the conduct and interpretation of life; it involves an intimate connection between mind and character; it deals with theoretical knowledge and practical application; and it represents an ideal that can be approximated only. Second, although it remained for later philosophical efforts during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment to complete the task, the Greek trio of philosophers took an explicit step toward an analytical and secular treatment of wisdom. More than other ancient authors (perhaps with the exception of Confucius), some Greek philosophers (particularly Aristotle) attempted to understand wisdom by applying methods of rational analysis and discourse, not by recourse to revelation, religion, or government-based rules and regulations.

The Greek philosophical tradition, then, initiated the discourse about the secularization of wisdom. Although wisdom continued to be tied to the supranatural in that it had divine qualities, it also became a subject for human debate and for human evolution and the task of living. Beginning with Socrates and reaching a first culmination in Aristotle, wisdom became a matter of science and not only religious tradition.

Soon after Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics (e.g., Cicero) stated this view explicitly in what became a definition quoted again and again in the Renaissance: "sapientia est rerum humanarum divinarumque scientia," wisdom is the science of human and divine things (Rice, 1958). Later philosophical traditions, of course, would continue to challenge the claim that a science of wisdom is possible. Nevertheless, the scientific or scholarly door to wisdom was opened by Aristotelian thinking. At the same time, as brilliantly discussed by Celano (1995), in his review entitled "The end of practical wisdom: Ethics as science in the thirteenth century, it

was this door which resulted in the loss of the union between contemplative-theoretical and practical knowledge or wisdom.

Wisdom and Christian Philosophy (Theology)

Judeo-Christian philosophy transported the idea of wisdom from antiquity into the Middle Ages. In the Western world, much philosophical work was done in the Judeo-Christian tradition by eminent thinkers who tended also to be religious and by leaders of religious scholarship (theology). Because of the dominance of Christianity, the evolution of a concept of wisdom seemed to represented less an extension of Aristotle's exploration of secular and empirical method than a concern with the role of wisdom in the context of religion. The same can be said about Hebrew traditions and their continuation into the Middle Ages. Robinson's (1989, p. 19) observation on the role of revelation can be used to illustrate: "Hebraism prepared the Christian mind for revealed truth."

As a consequence, most Christian theologians and philosophers who wrote on wisdom continued to elaborate on the question of its source. Is wisdom primarily grounded in God (faith) or in humankind (reason)? In addition, they continued to search for the pattern of virtues that were postulated to regulate religious and wisdom-related behavior. Extensive discussions around such originally pagan virtues as fortitude, justice, temperance, and prudence, as well as around Christian virtues such as hope, faith, and love, were part of the work of Christian philosopher-theologians. They, in turn, were much influenced, of course, by the Old Testament.

Augustine (A.D. 396-430). Perhaps the most visible and lasting representatives of the Christian stream of scholarship were Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. They were the towering pillars around which medieval Christian theology attempted to integrate philosophy and religion. And it was in this context that the topic of wisdom continued to attract attention, without, however, reaching a new level of philosophical insight. Wisdom was "imprisoned" (but also protected, as we will see later) by faith and religious beliefs, a frame of mind that was preconditioned by the work on wisdom evident in the Old Testament.

Augustine, working primarily as a bishop in a North African province (Numidia) of the Roman empire, is one of the marker figures. He is best known for his continuation of Platonic

thinking and its integration into Christian thought associated with the New Testament. In his works most relevant for our discussion of wisdom, Confessions, Contra Academicos, and The City of God, Augustine argued for the primacy of God and revelation and grace in finding truth and happiness (eudaimonia): "Sapientia est pietas" (Rice, 1958, p. 213; see also Honnefelder, 1989).

Augustine believed that he had learned from the Platonists to find in God "the author of all existence, the illumination of all truth, the bestower of all beatitude." "The true philosopher is the lover of God" (Burnaby 1984, p. 366, 368). In Augustine's case, of course, God referred to the Christian God and not to Plato's Ideas. He therefore limited wisdom to knowledge of divine things and allocated knowledge of human things to scientia. In addition, for Augustine the seeking of wisdom was founded in the worship of the Christian God (Rice, 1958, p. 4-13). Intellectually, Augustine's position was powerful in its clarity, but its philosophical foundation is often seen as stagnant. Spiritually, however, through his treatment of the concept of original sin, Augustine, for instance, offered a view that permits a constructive view of the conflictual nature of the human condition. Thus it is possible to argue that Augustine made explicit why the search for wisdom is a never-ending struggle.

Aquinas (c. A.D. 1224-1274). Thomas Aquinas represents the other cornerstone of Christian philosophy preceding the Renaissance, making partial "progress" toward a secular philosophical treatment of wisdom. Aquinas revisited primarily Aristotle rather than Plato and was prepared to confront Christian thinking with the discoveries of Greek and especially Aristotelian "science." Thus his Summa theologiae and Summa contra gentiles are often seen as the foremost Christian evolution of Aristotelian premises in the metaphysics of personality, the mind, and Providence (e.g., Celano, 1995; Chenu, 1984; Cruz, 1996; Honnefelder, 1989; Rice, 1958).

Aside from his teacher Albertus Magnus (for a brief review of Albert's conception of wisdom, see Celano, 1995), Thomas Aquinas was much influenced by the Islamic (Arabic) philosopher Averroes, who revitalized Aristotelian thinking in Europe. Among the propositions of Averroes were that there are two, possibly contradictory, kinds of truth: one of faith, the other of reason. In other words, Averroes rejected the belief that there is one overarching,

higher-order realm based on divine order and knowledge. Aquinas, however, rising to Averroes's radical challenge to Christian theology, attempted to find a less separatist integration of Aristotelian and Christian thought.

According to Aquinas, human reason was autonomous, as Averroes implied, but its autonomy was preconditioned by faith and the order of the world as created and revealed by God. Thus reason could operate within faith and yet according to its own laws. In other words, Aquinas proposed that the theologian accepts God and his supreme knowledge as a meta-framework and then elaborates conclusions using human reason (Chenu, 1984). Moreover, he proceeded on the assumption that the good exists in nature and can be "discovered by reason." In a way, Aquinas thus re-shifted the argument from the Aristotelian focus on the good and wise man (phronimos) to principles based on "natural law" (Celano, 1995, p. 239). Human beings would be fallible, but not the principles of the discoverable natural law.

Specifically concerning wisdom, Aquinas proceeded from the classical Aristotelian definition (found in the Metaphysics): "Wisdom is knowledge of first causes and principles." It is a science dealing with "divine objects" and a knowledge of "divine things." The wise person considers the "highest cause of the whole universe, which is God" (Rice, 1958, p. 15-16). According to Aquinas, both metaphysics and theology deal with the domain of wisdom so defined. Theology, however, is based fundamentally on grace and revelation; metaphysics on the use of reason without the aid of grace. Both forms of knowledge, though independent, are not opposed. "There is no hostility between human and divine wisdom" (Rice, 1958, p. 16). It is therefore possible to acquire wisdom (the kind that is part of metaphysics) "naturally" as an intellectual virtue through human means and reason.

Thus, although Aquinas presumed that "theological (divine) wisdom is a higher form of wisdom" (representing the God-produced framework within which human wisdom is conditioned), he, like Aristotle, brought a part of wisdom from heaven to earth. He is more Aristotelian than Platonian. There is theological sapientia, but also human wisdom. This human part of wisdom (scientia) cannot be fully deduced from theological wisdom. Therefore, for Aquinas, the human part of wisdom is different from divine wisdom and not necessarily based

on revelation (Honnefelder, 1989). The starting point for knowledge is the sensory and intellectual experience of reality and its cumulative elaboration (Cruz, 1996).

The role of virtues in Christian conceptions of wisdom. As we see from the quite different perspectives of Augustine and Aquinas, Christian conceptions of wisdom could vary substantially (Robinson, 1989). They ranged from Augustine's view that wisdom requires acceptance of God and obedience to Him (or Jesus Christ) to Thomistic conceptions that include a fair amount of human-based autonomous reasoning without, however, challenging God's essential supremacy. In each case, the ultimate source of wisdom is God: "To be wise is to be touched by the divine wisdom that conveys timeless and boundless verities." Humans cannot reach the true level of divine knowledge. As Aquinas said: "Rational creatures achieve a lower and less simple completeness" (Robinson, 1989, p. 20).

The second topic treated by Christian philosophers-theologians relevant for conceptions of wisdom was also much influenced by Greek philosophy; it deals with the role of character and virtues. Not unlike the Greek philosophers and their view of eudaimonia, the Christians saw virtues in two ways: In a moral and ethical sense focusing on the conformity of actions with accepted standards or ends, and in an agency sense referring to the power to achieve certain outcomes. For our concern with wisdom, the important point here is that the Christian tradition continued to emphasize a close nexus between mind and character.

Specifically, Christian philosophers concerned themselves with seven virtues that together led to excellence in human development. Four of these (prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice), occasionally also called the "natural" virtues, have their origin in the old pagan and Greek world. We can find them in Plato and Aristotle, for instance. The additional three so-called theological or Christian virtues (faith, hope, and love or charity) have their origin in the New Testament (e.g., Apostle Paul).

I have illustrated this nexus between forms of knowing and forms of behaving based on Greek and Christian theology in Figure 3.1. The figure is meant to be a derivative of the "wisdom tree", a popular form of art during the late Middle Ages (fourteenth through sixteenth century). The original paintings (Sears, 1986) depicted the seven liberal arts, the ways to think and domains to know: logic, music, grammar, rhetoric, geometry, astronomy, arithmetic. Some of these wisdom trees included on one side the steps of life (infancy, childhood, etc.) pointing toward the lifelong journey necessary to achieve the knowledge represented by the

liberal arts. In the version constructed for this book, with its emphasis on the joining of knowledge and virtues, the liberal arts are depicted on the right side of the wisdom tree. On the left, I have added the seven pagan and Christian virtues.

Figure 3.1 about here

Depicting the liberal arts and the virtues together, as an integrated whole, gives us a good visual representation of wisdom during the Middle Ages. Although there is no generally agreed definition of the ways to think and ways to behave, I submit that the wisdom tree created in Figure 3.1 outlines the general territory within which the discourse about the behavioral expression of wisdom took place. Wisdom is the capstone of human excellence: the orchestration of the best of mind and the best of character. The intellectual struggle, of course, was to define their essence, origins, interrelations, and possible coalitions - as well as to identify obstacles interfering with their operation.

Again, I have elaborated on Augustine and Aquinas not so much because I believe that their contributions to the structure and function of wisdom are novel and profound, that they represented "progress" in either a philosophical or societal sense (Nisbet, 1980). Rather, my intent was to show that the idea of wisdom was part of the historical stream from the ancient past into more modern times, and that in the Western world this stream fused the great Greek philosophers with theologians - in this case, Christian ones. A similar case, I am confident, could be made for other religious systems (such as Buddhism or Judaism) that kept wisdom in the public and scholarly consciousness (see also Edelstein, 1965).

Note also that in this historical evolution and religious nurturance of the concept of wisdom, and despite theological transformations, early Christian thinking maintained what we identified in Chapter 2 as the transcultural and transhistorical essence of wisdom at a metalevel of analysis. Wisdom continued to be seen as excellence in mind and character, as a concern for the conduct and meaning of life, as something that is guided foremost by criteria of individual well-being and the good of humankind, and finally, as something where at least parts of it can be acquired and practiced. This general meta-outline of wisdom was stable despite much phenotypical variation in the specifics of its origins, ends, and means. It was in the nature of

Christian arguments, of course, to search for a way in which the divine could be part of the framework, in the form of either a deity or natural laws that contained the fundament of wisdom because they were divinely created.

European Renaissance and Humanism: A Second Academic Peak of the Wisdom Discourse

After the Middle Ages, beginning in the Renaissance (fourteenth to sixteenth century) and extending into the Enlightenment (seventeenth to eighteenth century), Europe witnessed a tremendous outpouring of philosophical and theological work on wisdom (Celano, 1995; McKnight, 1991; Rice, 1958). The initial stage was set most likely in Italy (e.g., Petrarch, 1304-1374), but soon German (e.g., Nicholas of Cusa), French (e.g., Pierre Charron), and English scholars (e.g., Thomas Elyot, 1490-1546) joined to make wisdom a centerpiece of philosophical and theological dialogue. For some interpreters, the consequences of this discourse engendered a fundamentally new addition to a philosophical analysis of wisdom, an approach that went beyond Aristotle and was based in secular principles and reason alone (Robinson, 1989).

The word Renaissance (rebirth), of course, was not part of that period's language. It was created a couple of centuries later as historians looked back on European history. The term Renaissance does not fully integrate the social and cultural movements of the time. Often it is argued that humanism is the broader historical movement and that the revival of Antiquity was only part of the story (Gilbert, 1967; Weinstein, 1984). The more broadly based "humanist" focus was on the discovery of humankind (man) by means of human-produced culture and in connection with many other historical changes (e.g., growth of literacy, paradigm of individualism, increase in economic resources). In any case, wisdom-linked topics, such as excellence in mind and character and the quest for self-directed human development at its best, were at the heart of Renaissance and humanist discourse, as were the arguments for the parity of secular thinking and theology, or even for secular superiority.

One observation: We need to be open to what the articulation of a secular philosophical approach might produce. We need to be prepared for the conclusion that there are gains and losses in accepting a philosophical world in which the divine and religious spirituality are taken out of the fundamental equation, a world that by definition does not rely on religious authority

for thinking wisely and behaving wisely. Perhaps the secularization of wisdom has been the primary factor in the "modern" crisis of wisdom and related concepts such as progress (Chandler & Holliday, 1990; Nisbet, 1980; Oelmüller, 1989) or what Marcel (1955) has called the modern "decline" of wisdom.

Cusanus (1401-1464). Eugene Rice's Renaissance Idea of Wisdom (1958) impressively and comprehensively represents the history of wisdom during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in Europe. Rice considers the work of Nicholas of Cusa, also known as Cusanus, to be the most important discussion of wisdom in the late Middle Ages, in part because he best articulates one stream of Christian thought. His De sapientia, published in 1450, was widely disseminated and used by many contemporary and subsequent scholars. Later on, I will contrast the work of Cusanus with that of Pierre Charron, whose De la Sagesse (1601) typifies in France the growing influence of secularism in the conceptualization of wisdom during the Renaissance.

Cusanus (or Nicholas of Cusa), a German philosopher and theologian, was a Neoplatonist (Maurer, 1967; Rice, 1958), and therefore his conception of wisdom was closer to Augustine's than Aristotle's. In fact, the fundamental idea of Platonic and Christian wisdom, namely that wisdom is divine knowledge revealed by God, was perhaps most powerfully and eloquently stated by Cusanus. For him, the Christian God was the absolute maximum of perfection; in God, apparent oppositions and contradictions are unified. Humans can only approach wisdom. One precondition for the attainment of wisdom - and this is very much like Socrates' view - Cusanus argued, is awareness of one's limits: "Knowledge is learned ignorance." The second preconditions were "piety" and the "gift of grace."

The provocatively clear statements of Cusanus's Christian conception of wisdom provided a worthwhile subject for later attack: Wisdom according to Cusanus is "the highest which cannot be higher . . . unintelligible to any intellect . . . unmeasurable by any measure . . . inaudible to any ear . . . indubitable by any doubt . . . and no opinion can be held about it . . . ." (Rice, 1958, pp. 22-23). Humans can only participate in wisdom. Finite man is wise only to the extent that he is able to grasp God, which, in toto, is impossible. Wisdom is God and the word of God. True wisdom is unattainable for man; we can create only a "partial" image of

wisdom through piety and the grace of God. Philosophically minded theologians understood by divine things the Ideas in the mind of God: "Christ as infinite Form and First Cause, or the Trinity as the principium of all things" (Rice, 1958, p. 208).

This full-blown Christian view of wisdom and more moderate forms, such as those of Petrarch and Bruni, however, were only part of the story of the Renaissance and Humanism. The other is the formation of its counterpoint, a secular philosophy of wisdom. At issue was the evolution of a concept of wisdom as "human perfection" that was a "human goal" and a "human accomplishment." It was not necessarily anti-religious. Religion, as a system of beliefs about God and the meaning and conduct of life, could remain largely untouched as long as a separation of philosophical and religious subject matter and ways of argument could be achieved.

Charron (1541-1603). The evolution toward a secular-humanist view is powerfully illustrated in several works written during the sixteenth century (Rice, 1958). An English example is Thomas Elyot's, Of the knowledge which maketh a wise man (1533). Elyot departed from the notions of revelation and grace as preconditions of wisdom without, however, giving up the notion that wisdom in essence is divine. Access to divine wisdom is guaranteed by man's natural capacity to reason.

In 1601, the French skeptical philosopher and theologian Pierre Charron published another major work on wisdom, De La Sagesse, which is my second example of the Renaissance discourse. Because Charron's work leaps further toward secularization than Elyot's, I will present his views in greater detail. Charron, like many of his peer theologian-philosophers during the Renaissance, accepted the Christian view that God is the only carrier of absolute truth. This frame of "fideism," however, did not prevent him from articulating the outlines of a secular view of wisdom by clearly separating faith and reason.

Perhaps it is helpful to note that Pierre Charron was an intellectual heir of the skeptical philosopher Montaigne - in fact, more than intellectual, because Montaigne adopted Charron as his son. As a philosopher of skepticism, Charron assumed that the human mind was inherently flawed and incapable of perfect knowledge and thought. He did not, however, extend his skepticism to God. God was perfect in his knowledge and wisdom (Popkin, 1967).

Charron's treatise on wisdom departed from the tradition of Cusanus (and other contemporaries of the neoplatonic Christian genre) in two important respects: First, Charron "concludes the transformation of <u>sapientia</u> from contemplation to action and from knowledge to virtue." Second, he advanced the task, originally tackled by the Greek philosophers, of bringing the attainment of wisdom from heaven to earth: Wisdom is a "naturally acquired moral virtue. The result is a purely human wisdom" (Rice, 1958, p. 178-179).

This "secularization" of wisdom was possible by the use of philosophical skepticism about the powers of the mind (intellect). In the cognitive domain, Charron argued that God alone represented truth. What he attributed to humans, however, was control over their motivational system, over the planful conduct of their lives. "The will alone is really ours and in our power" (Rice, 1958, p. 185). Humans may not think perfectly, but they can be virtuous and recognize through reason the differences between good and bad. And wisdom is more virtue than intellect.

Charron explicitly focused not on metaphysics and transcendental divine phenomena as the domain of wisdom, but on worldly phenomena and actions that are "simply, naturally, and ethically good" (Rice, 1958, p. 210). Wisdom is "a rectitude, a beautiful and noble formation of the whole man within and without, in his thoughts, words, actions, and every movement." In this "excellence and perfection of man as man . . . the three fundamental tendencies of Renaissance wisdom become explicit: humanism, secularism, and moralism" (Rice, 1958, p. 180). Part of this perfected whole are the naturally acquired pagan virtues mentioned earlier: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance.

What about the lifetime ontogeny of wisdom in Charron's view? The beginning is self-knowledge with several components: The first (and this component reflects the notion of intellectual skepticism) is the understanding of one's and others' intellectual "basic" ignorance. The recognition of ignorance results in a profound attitude of intellectual liberty and the proper use of reason: clean of prejudice and open to alternatives. Because the intellect, by definition, cannot know the absolute truth, wisdom demands liberty "equivalent to a universal relativism" (Rice, 1958, p. 190). The second major component in the acquisition of wisdom is the recognition of the ability to choose the good, to regulate the passions, and to use reason in the

interest of becoming virtuous. Like the Stoics, Charron postulated that human nature by divine creation is "naturally" predisposed to have a "will" directed toward love and doing the good, and to follow the duties of morality: to God, to ourselves, and to our neighbors. That person becomes an "homme bien", a wise person, who is able to realize the good "seeds of nature" by refining, through the use of reason and action, the virtues of justice, temperance, prudence, and fortitude. The developmental outcome is human beings in harmony with themselves and their worlds.

Charron, then, by his profound split of faith and reason, by his decision to exclude matters of the divine from the domain of wisdom, and by his allocation of the primary source of wisdom to "natural" human conditions (although preconditioned by God), represents one prototype of the Renaissance secularization of the idea of wisdom. Wisdom became "an autonomous and naturally acquired moral virtue" and not a divine property that we can obtain only through the practice of religion, revelation, and grace (Rice, 1958, p. 205).

This semi-secular view of late Christian Renaissance wisdom offered an important counterpoint to the more traditional Christian wisdom of Augustine, Aquinas, and Cusanus. Not unlike classical Confucianism, for Charron wisdom is a way to think, to feel, and to behave ("a moral virtue") that is open to all humans, that can be acquired through reason- and will-guided exercise of their intellectual faculties, and that is independent of any revealed religion. Human wisdom is acquired by humans and for humans, though within a framework of natural constraints arranged by God. In many ways, Charron's approach has a counterpart in modern-day conceptions of wisdom. The basic difference would be that for many modern scholars, the natural constraints on humans that Charron assumed were arranged by God would be those "arranged" by biological and cultural evolution. And this difference, of course, has consequences. The foundation and consequences of cultural evolution are not directly based on the statement and achievement of purported moral good.

The Period of Empiricism and the Enlightenment

As part of an intellectual amalgamation of Greek philosophy, Judaism, and Christianity, the topic of wisdom was preserved in Europe through the Middle Ages into modernity as an important subject matter for philosophical discourse. Preservation, as we have seen, was a

continuing struggle, however, and Christian philosophers of the time did not give us a new philosophy of wisdom. On the contrary, throughout the Middle Ages and at least into the early Renaissance, Western philosophers continued to wrestle with a kind of "new" religious version of Platonic idealism of wisdom that gave faith and God priority over human reason, and theoretical wisdom priority over practical wisdom. Only toward the end of the Renaissance and in the context of humanism, as exemplified in the work of Charron, did wisdom recapture its broader ancient meaning and potential for further philosophical analysis.

In many respects, then, the strong hold of religion during the Middle Ages in Europe constrained the philosophical conception of wisdom. This constraint provided two seemingly contradictory solutions. On the one hand, by locating of the foundation of wisdom in the divine, it offered a logically consistent argument. On the other hand, by virtue of the content and procedural base of a particular religion, it obfuscated the notion of wisdom as the highest form of human search for the best. The hold of religion over philosophy was not to be overcome until the Renaissance beginnings of the Enlightenment (such as the work of Charron) offered further opportunities for philosophical discourse, including scholars whose primary commitment was not to religion and faith but to philosophy as an enterprise by humans for humans.

Whether this innovation necessarily implied a nurturant and supportive attitude toward wisdom is a different matter, of course. On the one hand, Renaissance humanism certainly had emphasized human dignity, personal responsibility, and freedom, as well as other moral virtues such as justice and tolerance, as essential features of human life (Abbagnano, 1967). On the other hand, however, the juxtaposition of these attributes of human dignity with the subsequent achievements of the Enlightenment (in 18th-century Europe) and the beginnings of systematic empirical science (British empiricism beginning in the 17th century) called into question whether wisdom remained a useful concept. Could wisdom be captured by the methods of an enlightened and empirical science? Who or what would be the equivalent to a "divine" organizer and inventor of wisdom, for instance?

I have chosen to illustrate this development by reference to two eminent representatives of distinct schools of enlightened thought: Francis Bacon, representing British empiricism, and

Immanuel Kant, representing German idealistic or critical philosophy. Their work shows how the topic of wisdom, although it continued to be treated as important enough to be considered and commented upon, began to wane as a leading organizational concept in philosophical analysis. As the divine was moved to the background, wisdom seemed to have lost its power as an organizing and explanatory system.

British empiricism: The example of Francis Bacon. British empiricism, a philosophical movement that can be seen as the opening of the Enlightenment, contributed to the downfall of the classical conception of wisdom. Its central tenets also challenged some of the special characteristics of wisdom as a goal and as a source of knowledge. The impact of British empiricism, and other empiricist traditions, on conceptions of wisdom can be illustrated nicely by one of its most important early proponents, Francis Bacon. A more complete summary of British empiricism, of course, would focus on its famous foursome: Francis Bacon, John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume (e.g., Levi, 1984).

To illustrate the empiricists' general orientation toward the concept of wisdom, however, I have decided to concentrate on Francis Bacon (1561-1626) for several reasons. He was the earliest historically, he published a book on wisdom (Bacon, 1611), and he engaged in various projects of utopian reform (McKnight, 1991; Spiers, 1884). Bacon spent a fair amount of his life writing letters to important personages and for the common good, in which he commented on important matters of everyday social and political life (though often without apparent impact). Thus today Bacon is also "remembered in literary terms for the sharp worldly wisdom of a few dozen essays" (Lea & Urbach , 1994, p. 564).

Nevertheless, the choice of Bacon has some disadvantages. The major one has two parts: First, his articulation of empiricism is less clear than John Locke's (Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690) or David Hume's (Treatise of Human Nature, 1739-40). In my depiction of the essence of British empiricism, therefore, I will make use of Locke and Hume as well. And second, Bacon's book on wisdom, Wisdom of the Ancients (De Sapientia Veterum Liber, 1611), as an erudite exposition of an empiricist's view on wisdom is less than one might expect.

Let us review first the major tenets of "radical" empiricism and why these are somewhat antithetical to considering wisdom as quintessential or fundamental to philosophical scholarship. The fundamental contribution of Bacon to British empiricism, of the "Baconian spirit", is his nearly single-minded advocacy of "experience as the only source of valid knowledge and his profound enthusiasm for the perfection of natural science." British empiricists, while keeping humanist perspectives in mind, wanted to create a "basic science of man."

In British empiricism (e.g., Levi, 1994), then, knowledge and behavioral expression, whatever domain they involved, were the outcome of the interaction between humans and their environment - that is, of experience. Knowledge and behavior are not divine but human products; in fact, "materialistic" ideas were part of this thinking since the early work of Thomas Hobbes. To this end, British empiricism (and especially Locke) focussed on ontogenetic processes, the genetic approach, as the forum within which knowledge is acquired. The ultimate source of human knowledge is sensory, and simple sensory materials are combined into complex conceptual tools.

In the final analysis, then, whatever wisdom could be for British empiricists, it had to reflect human (secular) experiences, what people could extract during their individual development from the physical and social world surrounding them and use as building blocks for more complex outcomes. And, because the primary truth criterion of British empiricism is scientific evidence based on inductive natural-science methods, whatever wisdom could be was further defined by what we know scientifically about the conduct and meaning of life. The scope and depth of that body of "wisdom-related" knowledge, however, was small if not nonexistent. Therefore much of the empiricists' agenda for a conception of wisdom had to be one for the future rather than for their own day.

Bacon's Wisdom of the Ancients (1611) reflects this relative impotence of the state of knowledge about the empirical truth of wisdom in an interesting way. First, Bacon offers no clear, scientifically guided definition of wisdom, nor does he discuss it from the perspective of empiricism. This lack of an empirical orientation, of course, could reflect the fact that Wisdom of the Ancients was written before Bacon published his major works on empiricism and the

sciences, such as the <u>Novum Organum</u> (1620). This interpretation, however, is perhaps less persuasive because we know that Bacon began work on that book at about the time his wisdom book was completed. Second, Bacon's book on wisdom is not at all an organized account of empirical knowledge associated with wisdom. Quite the contrary. Bacon himself pointed out that he saw his essays on life and wisdom as distinct from his usual and likely more important work, as "the recreation of his other studies" (Stiers, 1888, p. 44). The general format is modelled after the <u>Essays</u> of Montaigne and especially after the <u>Letters to Lucilius</u> of the Roman stoic philosopher Seneca.

In <u>Wisdom of the Ancients</u> (see also the commentary by Rippel, 1990), Francis Bacon attends to what we have called the prototypical subject matter of wisdom: knowledge about difficult matters of the conduct of life and the structure and function of society: questions of leadership, of the passions, of friendship, of the conduct of war, of self-love, and so on. He does so by reference to 31 famous Greek myths (Kassandra, Orpheus, Proteus, Daedalus, Dionysus, Scylla, Sphinx, etc.), which he interprets in light of important insights about the conduct and meaning of life.

Actually, another and earlier book of essays by Bacon is equally relevant, although it does not carry wisdom in the title: <u>Bacon's Essays: Or Councils Civil and Moral</u>, begun in 1597 and expanded several times, ending up as 58 essays that "abound with condensed thought and practical wisdom, neatly, expressly, and weightily stated" (Spiers, 1884, p. xii). Among the titles of essays are Of truth, Of death, Of adversity, Of love, Of nobility, Of counsels, Of regimen of health, Of fortune, Of youth and age, and Of the vicissitude of things. Beginning with the 1612 edition, the <u>Essays</u> contained one titled "Of wisdom for a man's self." Its focus was on the negative consequences of self-love and contained such often-quoted statements as "men that are great lovers of themselves waste the public" and "wisdom for a man's self is . . . a depraved thing" (Spiers, 1884, p. 160).

To return to Bacon's <u>Wisdom of the Ancients</u>: In the preface, Bacon argued for the significance of using ancient fables as a forum of discourse. Myths and parables contain much deep knowledge that is important to nurture; they make up a profound body of historically grounded insights. After a synopsis of each of the ancient Greek myths, Bacon offered his

interpretation of the kernel of wisdom in each of these fables. For example: "This myth seems to criticize the freedom to give useless and untimely advice (Kassandra); this myth seems to have been constructed to illuminate the dynamics and changing fates of kings and rebellions (Typhon); this mythical story seems to have been produced to demonstrate issues of legitimacy and prudence in the conduct of war (Perseus); this myth seems to deal with ethics . . . and the passions (Dionysus)."

One the one hand, then, we can be disappointed by the lack of empirical science in Bacon's account of wisdom. On the other hand, his analysis is interesting nonetheless. It not only demonstrates the Renaissance erudition often overlooked in describing the founders of British empiricism. Bacon's approach certainly was not "full-fledged empiricism." Furthermore, it can be seen as the recognition of the limits of empirical science and the ensuing consequence to involve other forms of knowledge. Not having available a scientific body of evidence about humans, but truthful to his argument for the role of secular experience in the development of knowledge, Bacon relied on classical and historically stored experiences and their putative lessons. What was missing, of course, was an effort to organize this knowledge around a coherent theory of wisdom.

Such a lack of an empirically grounded theory of wisdom is understandable. The sheer call for empirical knowledge and the application of the scientific method did not produce the kind of information that would have permitted a coherent account of the how and why of reason and action. The British empiricists, therefore, were among the first to participate not only in the gains but also in the costs of "natural-science" secularization of humankind. They seemed to know what and how we should know, and that we should not rely on the use of divine principles such as revelation; but, aside from "experiential" and "reasoned" insights based on our cultural heritage, what they could offer as wisdom was relatively little. Bacon's essays powerfully illustrate this discrepancy.

As later empiricists, such as David Hume, worked on their conception of humankind using such philosophical categories as justice, freedom, moral judgment, and the intersection between reason and motivation (MacNabb, 1967), for instance, much of their work had to be theoretical rather than empirical, despite its fundamental groundedness in empirical metatheory.

For Hume, when it comes to intellectual progress, religion, rather than "metaphysics", was the main enemy. Most likely, he saw wisdom as rather close to the religious spirit.

The British empiricists dealt not only with matters of the origin of knowledge and behavior in the epistemological and ontogenetic sense, but with other aspects that may also have been relevant for their relative neglect of wisdom. Locke's political theory, for instance, explicitly denied the divine right of kings and the absolute power of the sovereign. He insisted that "all men have a natural right to freedom and equality." The historical affiliation of wisdom with social and religious elites (Assmann, 1991) and its identification with exquisite excellence, therefore, may not have engendered its use by British empiricists who were not free of a political agenda. The emerging focus of that historical period, in England and France, was on human rights, a critical relationship between the state and the individual (e.g., Hobbes's social contract), and on representative democracy (Levi, 1984). As British empiricists attempted to work out these ideas, it appears to me that the concept of wisdom did not offer itself as a guiding theoretical force.

<u>Enlightenment: The example of Kant.</u> The Enlightenment of the 18th century is perhaps the most critical period in which divine and traditional conceptions of authority were critically reexamined and new forms of human reason and social arrangements were explored. One prototype of this dramatic historical evolution in thought and social process is Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), the eminent German proponent of a "critical transcendental or idealist philosophy." And Kant invested serious effort into the search for philosophical analysis of wisdom.

Kant's writings on the topic of wisdom are distributed across his entire work, but the principal ideas are contained in his <u>Critique of Pure Reason</u> (1781, 1787) and his <u>Critique of Practical Reason</u> (1790). Although Kant used the idea of wisdom throughout in his vast opus (see below), most summaries of his work do not explicitly mention his conception of wisdom at all (e.g., Oelmüller, 1989; Walsh, 1967). It takes special effort, therefore, to locate Kant's written views on the subject.

Perhaps the two most important Kantian perspectives on wisdom are the following: In the <u>Critique of Practical Reason</u>, Kant continued to argue for the validity of the classical

definition of philosophy, namely that it "involves a prescription for the concept of the highest good and for the behavior by which it can be accomplished" (Bien, 1989, p. 49). Furthermore, Kant firmly believed that science, in the sense of an organized (reasoned) account of evidence, is a prerequisite for wisdom and the teaching of wisdom. Therefore reason (<u>Vernunft</u>) should be engaged to develop a better and better science of wisdom. As I mentioned earlier, a widely used quotation from Kant demonstrates this line of reasoning: "The narrow gate to wisdom (<u>Weisheitslehre</u>) lies in science." This citation, however, cannot be taken as implying that for Kant wisdom is a derivative of science. On the contrary, Kant emphasized repeatedly (e.g., 1768, p. 984) that wisdom is more than science, that it includes knowledge based on other principles and sources of evidence.

Wisdom, then, for Kant, in line with the emphasis of the Enlightenment on reason (as faulty as human reasoning may be), is a human product for humans. It is not speculation or revelation. Whatever wisdom involves, it needs to be in concert with our scientific knowledge about the nature of the world. As Krings (1989; see also Bien, 1989; Honnefelder, 1989; Zons, 1989) argued: Kant's concept of reason implies the integrative coordination of the world of science and the practical world of humankind. Philosophy, in this sense, is the science of the highest good and its realization in human life.

With this general approach to wisdom, Kant exemplifies the philosophical accomplishments of the Enlightenment: the increasing focus on philosophy as the activity of humans for humans. At the same time that he argues that reason (the intellect) in itself is constrained and has limits, Kant challenges what humans alone can accomplish. Reason "precipitates itself into darkness and contradictions" (Walsh, 1968, p. 309) unless we know what we cannot know and why we cannot know it. Even within these limitations, however, human wisdom for Kant is "the idea of the rule-perfected (<u>gesetzmäßig-vollkommenen</u>) practical use of reason" (Weischedel, Vol. XII, p. 511, my translation). Kant also makes clear that wisdom is different from other concepts such as prudence or sagacity (<u>Klugheit</u>) in that these, contrary to wisdom, are not always guided by consideration of morality and the well-being of others.

An elaboration of Kant's main thoughts on the nature of knowledge, such as his distinction between a priori and a posteriori concepts or knowledge, is beyond the scope of this book. I would like to mention a few aspects, however, that are relevant for a Kantian view on wisdom. In general, Kant proceeds from the basic notion that philosophy is "the idea of perfect wisdom which shows us the final or end purposes (Zwecke) of human reason."

The first aspect I highlight in Kant's treatment of wisdom is his argument that a priori factors and intuitions (as "transcendental" conditions of knowledge) make it possible for us to have some level of consensus. This is so because the mind assimilates reality using its own a priori categories to process information. Thus the faculty of "pure" reason gives us direction to what is good and moral, and we as humans share this ability. For wisdom to become manifest as behavior, however, what Kant calls practical reason enters. It speaks to the integration of mind and character to produce moral action. Moral action includes the regulation of desires and passions and the recognition of the essential good. Pure reason gives the insight into what is moral; practical reason is the capacity to act accordingly.

The second aspect I would like to call attention to is Kant's distinction between things-in-themselves (noumena) and what appears to a perceiving mind (phenomena). For our concern with wisdom, the resulting Kantian emphasis is not only on seeing beyond appearances, but also on recognizing that the limits to our knowledge are the limits of what is possible in principle based on the functioning of a priori categories of the mind: "We cannot know things as they really are through sense perception" (Walsh, 1967). Another quotation from Kant's writings makes this point. When commenting on wisdom (e.g., Collected Works, Weischedel, 1963, Vol. XI, p. 296), he emphasizes that human wisdom is in principle not "error-free" (unfehlbar). This, of course, is another variation on the historically pervasive theme of wisdom as good knowledge about why and what we do not know and how we can achieve the best knowledge possible.

The third aspect relevant for a Kantian perspective on wisdom is his view on moral actions and their grounding in experience-based practical reason. The moral worth of an action lies, as Kant writes in his Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, "not in the purpose to be attained by it, but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon" (Walsh, 1967, p.

317). Intentions for action, rather than outcomes, are critical. Outcomes are not final criteria for evaluating the morality of a given action, because they are dependent not only on one's own actions but also on other factors not under the agent's control. Moreover, Kant argues for the principle that moral actions can be judged by the criterion whether they are universal. Again, this is a variation on the theme found in ancient wisdom writings, as in Confucius: Don't do what you don't think should be done by others facing similar life circumstances, including what you do not want done to yourself. As Kant pointed out in a footnote in his <u>Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals</u>, this statement would be trivial unless it is grounded in his conception of duty and human dignity, that is, the "practical imperative": "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means."

The fourth aspect of the Kantian perspective relevant to wisdom concerns his arguments about the role of passions and self-control and their interference in the pursuit of wisdom (Bien, 1989; Krings, 1989). For philosophers to deserve the name, or for people to be teachers of wisdom, they need to achieve two necessary attributes in addition to knowledge <u>qua</u> knowledge: First, to demonstrate self-control of passions; second, to demonstrate without uncertainty that their interests are motivated to contribute to the general good. In this emphasis on the regulation of emotions and motivations in matters of practical reason (<u>Vernunft</u>), Kant joined in the tradition that sees wisdom as an integrated whole of mind and character.

In Kant's version, however, the collaboration between mind and character was not egalitarian. Rather, the integration to be achieved for wisdom to emerge implied the command of mind over character. A quotation from Kant's writings on metaphysics and logic makes this point explicitly (Collected Works, Weischedel, 1963, Vol. VI, pp 410, my translation): "Wisdom is the convergence of the will to the final purpose (the highest good) . . . thus wisdom for the human is nothing else but the inner principle of the will to follow moral laws, whatever the subject matter involved." Indeed, some of Kant's words on the arduousness of gaining the kind of self-knowledge required for wisdom make reference to the depths of hell (Collected Works, Weischedel, 1963, Vol. VIII, p. 576, my translation): "The moral knowing of oneself, which requires pushing forward into the . . . depths and abysses (<u>Abgrund</u>) of

one's heart, is necessary for the development of human wisdom . . . it requires doing away with internal barriers of evil will . . . it is a hell-like journey (Höllenfahrt) that opens the way toward the godlike (Vergötterung)."

Despite Kant's prescriptive statements on the nature of the highest good and morality, his observations on human reality, then, emphasized the limits of pure and practical reason and the level of cultural evolution achieved (Bien, 1989). For Kant, therefore, philosophy, as the science of the highest good and its ways in life, was fundamentally an incomplete ideal. In reality, the teachers of wisdom (philosophers) as well as ordinary people can only aspire toward it, they cannot achieve it in full.

Consider the following quotation from the Preface to Kant's Critique of pure reason as a further illustration of this point (my translation): "Human reason (Vernunft) has a special fate in one category of its insights (Erkenntnisse): human reason is bothered by questions it cannot ignore because they are constituted by the nature of reason itself; these questions cannot be answered, however, because they are beyond the ability (Vermögen) of human reason." Here, then, Kant rekindled another universal about wisdom (see chapter 1): It is the search for the ideal good in general and about the perfect answer to issues of the human condition, but the search does not have a final destination. This ideal, however, although in a fundamental sense not real, is an important and necessary yardstick of reason. It is direction-giving, but not the end point. To quote from Kant (Collected Works, Weischedel, Vol VI, p. 514, my translation): "even though one does not want to assign to them objective reality (Existenz) . . . they are not . . . a brain invention (Hirngespinst) . . . but they offer an indispensable directional measure of reason."

Kant also offers some guidance on procedural matters, on how wisdom can be approached though never fully attained. He mentions three maxims (Collected Works, Weischedel, Vol. XII, p. 511, my translation): "(1) self-guided reasoning (Selbstdenken), (2) to place yourself in thinking and communication at the location of the other, and (3) always to think in consonance with yourself." In the section from which this quotation is taken, Kant also offers his conception of the lifetime development of wisdom as the highest level of practical reason. He believes that wisdom is age-friendly and locates its attainment around age 60.

In a concluding commentary on Kant's position on wisdom, we need to return to my initial observation: That considering the vast and intense writings by earlier Renaissance philosophers on the topic of wisdom, one could argue that Kant wrote relatively little on wisdom in an analytical sense. He espoused the importance of wisdom, he wrote much text that highlights its significance, he definitely thought about seeing in wisdom a new level of integration of scientific knowledge and reason-based morality, and he placed the science and education of wisdom (Weisheitslehre) at the core of philosophy. Yet I was somehow surprised at Kant's relative failure to define an analytical and substantive frame of wisdom. I wonder whether this was a signal for what was to come: In the Enlightenment, wisdom lost its appeal as an inclusive theoretical-philosophical category. Other concepts took center stage.

Those other concepts are relevant, of course, for a theoretical account of wisdom. Consider only Kant's work aimed at elucidating the a priori conditions for reason and the associated limitations on our minds, or his exploration of the existence of God, freedom, self knowledge, and morality. Yet, aside from a few statements such as that wisdom requires the full integration of will and morality and that this integration of will and morality needs to consider (rational insights), Kant did not formulate a specific framework of propositions, a theory of wisdom. Wisdom was more like a conception that was expected to put it all together without specifying how this is to be accomplished or what the structural foundation is. Kant was aware of this incompleteness.

Kant, then, perhaps more than anybody else during the Enlightenment, made clear that wisdom, representing a utopian vision, is more than a human (ein Mensch) can achieve. When commenting on his lack of ability to settle this question, Immanuel Kant invoked the principle of divine wisdom and identified human wisdom as less than that (Collected Works, Weischedel, 1963, Vol. XI, p. 185, my translation): "Wisdom, that is, practical reason . . . involving principles of conduct fully appropriate to the final purpose of all things, appropriate to the highest good, is situated only with God (wohnt allein bei Gott); and not acting contrary to that idea in any manifest way is what one could refer to as human wisdom." My reading of Kant, then, suggests that wisdom, despite his valiant efforts to bring much of it under human control, is ultimately beyond reach.

<u>Philosophy in the Post-Enlightenment: Exit of Wisdom as a Fundamental Category</u>

The post-Renaissance and post-Enlightenment periods in European philosophy moved further and further from wisdom. They were not fertile ground for moving a "philosophical analysis" of wisdom forward as a positive construction. If anything, the original notion of wisdom as final truth was falsified.

I have treated Bacon and Kant as typical illustrations of the waning of wisdom as a fundamental category of philosophical analysis. They separated philosophy from theology, propagated of natural science methods as part of philosophy, and were concerned with secularization and humans' effort to reject figures of authority including divine revelation. At the same time, their rejection of wisdom as a category of philosophical analysis was a forerunner to a modern view of wisdom - not as philosophically or empirically grounded truth, but as a high level of knowledge about the human condition that is based on multiple forms and bodies of evidence (see concluding chapter).

I would like to conclude this section with a few more illustrations in support of the point that the last two centuries spelled the exit of wisdom as a fundamental category in philosophy. As the 19th century developed, the movement away from wisdom to other categories of philosophical analysis became stronger and stronger. The movement away from a treatment of wisdom included even those philosophical streams, such as romanticism and pragmatism, where the very core of wisdom, that is, the "cultural and personal development of humankind" was the center of attention (see also Robinson, 1990; Tetens, 1777). Certainly, wisdom-related topics continued to be discussed in this work. But, the conceptual framework within which these discussions took place was not wisdom.

<u>German Philosophers: Herder, Schopenhauer, Dilthey</u>

Let us look briefly at the transition to more "accidental" commentaries about wisdom in German philosophy during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Three prominent German philosophical scholars may illustrate: Johann Gottfried Herder, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Wilhelm Dilthey.

<u>Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803).</u> Herder, a contemporary of Goethe at Weimar, was philosophically, historically, and theologically inclined. He was a prolific writer on topics

including many facets of humankind and cultural history. Despite his immense capacity and range and his inclination to seek out excellence in human and societal development, Herder does not seem to have focussed on the concept of wisdom except for a couple of short observations.

Herder was interested, of course, in related topics, such as the meaning and purpose of life. Throughout his work, he emphasized the dual role of language as a constitutive factor in human evolution and in human ontogenesis. Therefore, it is not surprising that Herder underscores the role of language-based knowledge in education (Bildung) and the lifelong striving for individual perfection. In a discussion of lifelong human development (Suphan, 1889, p. 487), where he explores the potential for continued education after adulthood, Herder identifies wisdom as a desirable goal, as the "responsibility" (Pflicht) of the mature years. Aside from relating wisdom to the search for truth, for the highest level of morality, and for overcoming one's prejudices, however, Herder does not further specify wisdom. It is also noteworthy that these observations on wisdom are part of Herder's work as a theologian, the so-called Riga Predigten (sermons).

Another wisdom-relevant exposition is contained in the Herder-edited journal entitled Adrastea (1802, volume 4, Suphan, 1886, p. 47), where he uses Confucian writings from the "Book of the Juste Middle", a book dealing with ways and means to achieve wisdom. To remind us of some of the Confucian sayings that Herder reprints: "The rule of wisdom is not to do to others what we do not want others to do to us", "the one who aspires toward perfection begins a long journey", and "the perfect human being holds the middle (mean)." I mention this event of Herder's publishing life also because it is often forgotten that German humanists of that time considered Oriental and Asian writings and thoughts in their work.

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860). One possible exception to the trend away from wisdom as an analytical concept in German philosophy is Arthur Schopenhauer (Schopenhauer, 1961), generally labelled a philosopher of pessimism and "antirationalist" and "mild" skepticism (Popkin, 1967). In philosophy, Schopenhauer is best known for his articulation of the concept of "will" as an important part of metaphysics.

Wisdom was still part of Schopenhauer's concerns. Philosophy, according to Schopenhauer, should deal with important matters of the human condition, with "solving the riddle of the world." Nevertheless, any philosophical "solution . . . must not be one that involves overstepping the boundaries within which all human knowledge is set and confined" (Gardiner, 1967, p. 326). In this vein, Schopenhauer showed much commitment to questions of the conduct and meaning of life in other aspects of his work as well. For instance, in 1841 he translated the 16th-century Oraculo manual y arte de prudencia of Balthasar Gracian (1653) from Spanish into German. This oracle consists of several hundred vignettes that summarize skills of life, akin to a philosophical guidebook on prudence or sagacity.

Schopenhauer's principal thoughts on wisdom are contained in two publications: an essay on the stages of life entitled Aphorism on the wisdom of life (Schopenhauer, 1851) and the section on ethics in his Parerga and Paralipomena (Schopenhauer, 1851). As a preamble to the Aphorism and a kind of kernel instantiation of wisdom, Schopenhauer used a quotation from Voltaire, whom he admired: "Those who don't understand the essence of their age will suffer only its disadvantages." As a pessimist and antirationalist, Schopenhauer proceeded from the assumption that reason is not the force in our mental activities and action. Rather, human nature is less regulated by reason than by powerful motivational forces, many of which are negative in their consequences. Reason, including scientific inquiry, is essentially an instrument to serve our will, to satisfy our wants and desires. All an individual can accomplish is to reduce the effects of negative forces and to increase the likelihood for occasional insights of the wisdom kind. Occasionally, this general approach is characterized -- in my view overinterpreted -- as if "Schopenhauer utterly rejected such ideas as the inevitability of human progress and the perfectibility of man and replaced them with a picture of mankind in general as doomed to an eternal round of torment and misery" (Gardiner, 1967, p. 329).

Schopenhauer's writings on wisdom and human life are more varied than this characterization. In fact, Schopenhauer (Collected Works, Weischedel, 1963, Vol. V, p. 705) offers a definition of wisdom that is like Kant's (Schopenhauer admired Kant) conception, and it deviates from his usual skeptical position: "It seems to me that wisdom is not only theoretical but also practical perfection (Vollkommenheit). I would define wisdom as the complete and true

knowledge (<u>Erkenntnis</u>) of things in the whole and general, a state of knowledge that has permeated (<u>durchdrungen</u>) the individual human (<u>den Menschen</u>) so totally manifested in his actions as a regulatory force and for all his behavior." At the same time, in other writings that reflect his general philosophical orientation, Schopenhauer emphasized human frailties and those of nature.

For Schopenhauer, wisdom reflected a deep insight into human nature and the "negative" conditions of life. The moral virtue of individuals was their capacity to liberate themselves from the forces of the will as much as possible, and to see life as it was: full of difficult dynamics between the ego and others, between happiness and sadness, between good and bad. Witness some of the relevant citations from the Collected Works of Schopenhauer (1963): "Nobody is wise all the time", wisdom takes something like "lucida intervalla", that is, somewhat rare moments of high-level insight of the mind (Vol. V, p 63). Or to illustrate the powerful and irrational role of human will-related motives: Schopenhauer writes "that the actions of Man (Menschen) on the whole and in principle are not regulated by reason and its intentions . . . but emanate from Man's innate and immutable character" (Vol. V, p. 274), a character that Schopenhauer judges to be guided largely by egoist motives associated with the will.

That it was the pessimist and intellectual skeptic Schopenhauer who in 19th-century German philosophy elaborated on the theme of wisdom is interesting for another reason as well. The philosophical tradition of skepticism (see also Charron, 1601) kept wisdom in the territory of philosophical discourse, small as this territory had become (Marquard, 1989; Oelmüller, 1989). Skepticism, of course, ranges from radical skepticism that says no definite knowledge is possible to mild or mitigated forms of skepticism in which only certain kinds of knowledge are possible (Popkin, 1987). In each case, however, skeptical philosophers question absolute and dogmatic insights or prescriptions. Here is the likely connection to wisdom. One of the core attributes of wisdom is the recognition of uncertainty and ways to understand and manage it (chapter 1). Schopenhauer's work continued and amplified the tradition of explicating that "problems of metaphysics do not have a direct or satisfactory solution" (Collected Works, Vol. V, p. 116, my translation).

<u>Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911).</u> The hiatus of the concept of wisdom was perhaps most evident in the work of Wilhelm Dilthey. I selected Dilthey as a test case because his overview writings on the history of culture and philosophy are extensive and historically comparative. Furthermore, from a substantive and methodological point of view, much of Dilthey's intellectual agenda (Rickamn, 1967), as the founder of humanist sciences (<u>Geisteswissenschaften</u>), is very close to what we have labelled the classical domain of wisdom: the conduct and meaning of life, and the embedding of an analysis of life within the larger frame of the human condition. In fact, two volumes (V and VI) of Dilthey's collective opus (<u>Wilhelm Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften)</u> are devoted to his so-called philosophy of life.

My examination of these volumes and much of Dilthey's remaining work could not unearth much concern for a systematic discussion of the concept of wisdom. What his writings do include, however, is extensive commentaries on the problematic that was created subsequent to the secularization of knowledge through the joining of two schools of thought: the British empiricists and their French counterparts (e.g., d'Alembert's introduction to the French Encyclopedia), and the Kantian conclusions about the constraints on knowledge. After these two events, philosophy was never the same, wrote Dilthey.

Reflecting on the juggernaut created by these new insights, Dilthey made valiant efforts to rescue the structural clarity that German philosophy of idealism had entailed, where it was possible to maintain a view in which human reasoning could be considered as flawless because it was based on recognition of the divine in nature. Dilthey could not transcend, however, the uncertainties created for philosophy by empiricism and Kant's critical analysis of human reason and provide a new integration. Rather, he had to settle for a powerful argument for separatism, for the special role that the humanities and hermeneutics (<u>Geisteswissenschaften</u>) play in understanding the world.

In sum: Beginning with the critical analysis of Kant in the previous century, the German philosophical tradition of the late nineteenth century, despite its dominant concern with historical, cultural-anthropological, and humanist accounts of humankind (as reflected for instance in the monumental works of Herder and Dilthey), disengaged from wisdom as a fundamental category of philosophical analysis.

What this historical process perhaps prefigured is another conception of wisdom, namely its conception as a high level of common-sense knowledge about life. If one takes this interpretive posture, Schopenhauer's concern with wisdom is less exceptional. He just antedated later approaches. In this line of thinking, what continued to be important were efforts to understand life and its varied expressions by more subjective and hermeneutic methods. Meaning of life (Lebenssinn), life experience (Lebenserfahrung), and life conduct (Lebensführung) were central to the work of most German philosophers of that time. To return to Dilthey one more time: For him, the enduring significance and objective of philosophy, in addition to its role as foundational for the nature of the sciences, was the systematic "struggle (Auseinandersetzung) with the never-ending human need (Bedürfnis) to understand and reflect about being (Sein), reason (Grund), value, purpose, and their interrelationship in the integrative conception of one's view of the world (Weltanschauung)" (Dilthey, Vol. V, p. 416).

The French Encyclopedia

A second example of the exit of wisdom from the main discourse of Western philosophy is eighteenth-century French philosophy. From 1751 until 1780, under the primary leadership of Diderot and d'Alembert, the French Encyclopedia (Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire Raisonné des Sciences des Arts et des Métiers) was compiled. It is generally considered to be the first comprehensive treatment of the sciences. D'Alembert's introduction to the encyclopedia is often highlighted as one of the best historical statements about the growing significance of the empirical sciences and their epistemological basis.

In this colossal work of 35 volumes appearing over several decades, the entries on wisdom (sagesse) filled a mere three pages (Volume 14, 1965, p. 496 - 498). There were five entries: sagesse as virtue, sagesse as moral wisdom, sagesse as a name for philosophy, sagesse as a concept in mythology meaning cultural history, and sagesse as the book of wisdom in the Old Testament.

In the longest entry, sagesse as moral wisdom (defined as performing one's duties vis-à-vis God, oneself, and others), the main issue is the search for the motivational sources of such behavior in face of the recognition that man is mortal, that he is finite. The author presents

arguments dealing with the "motivational" problems that a lack of life beyond earthly life generates for motivating people to behave with wisdom. It is argued that only a man who believes in immortality and transcendence can lift himself to have the motivation for wisdom, to a state where personal motives are not in the way of wisdom. Reference is made to the troubling position of epicureanism and the shortcomings of stoicism to solve this problem.

In general, this entry is not a carefully reasoned text when compared with the many publications of the Renaissance (Price, 1958) that dealt with this topic, or the treatment of wisdom in the major German encyclopedia that appeared at this time (Zedler, volumes published from 1730 until 1732). Therefore, I believe the brevity and questioning tone of this text on wisdom carry historical meaning. I view this text as an illustration of the problems that secularization engendered for philosophers of the time who were interested in the pursuit of wisdom without recourse to the divine. As wisdom, to invoke Aristotle's legacy, was taken from heaven to earth, as scholars interested in the pursuit of wisdom-related matters were forced to use methods of empirical science, as they were inquiring into the logical foundation of wisdom-related virtues and morality, they faced the limits of what human reasoning can accomplish. This is the tale of the secularization of the wisdom concept and its allocation to humans rather than the divine.

The lack of an extensive discussion of the concept of wisdom in the French Encyclopedia should not be misunderstood as avoidance of the topics that earlier were elaborated in the context of wisdom. Most certainly, the basic philosophy of the French Encyclopedia was "strongly humanistic in tone" (Wilson, 1967, p. 508) and covered at length many of the topics traditionally considered in philosophical discussions of wisdom: Man (humankind), theories of the good, and "progress" were in the center, explicitly or implicitly. But for French philosophy (and France in the eighteenth century was the European center of scholarship), the concept of wisdom seemed to have lost its intellectual vitality as a basic category and goal of systematic philosophical analysis.

American Philosophy of Pragmatism

To examine the exit of wisdom as a fundamental category of philosophical analysis, I explored the use of the concept of wisdom in one more philosophical tradition: American

pragmatism of the 18th and 19th centuries (e.g., Ezorsky, 1967; Thayer, 1967, 1975). The hallmark figures are Charles Peirce (Collected works, edited by Hartshorne et al., 1931-1958), William James, and John Dewey.

In principle and where the substance of its theoretical stance is concerned, American pragmatism could have been a hotbed for a discussion of wisdom. Why? Pragmatism, in its varied forms, is fundamentally concerned with what the territory of wisdom is all about, that is, the relationship between thought and action in interpreting and conducting our lives. The emphasis of pragmatism is on understanding the way "individuals interpret environing conditions for purposes of successful action" (Thayer, 1967, p. 433). Moreover, in pragmatism, individual lives and their contexts are in the foreground, how and whether we as individuals are able to develop "world formulae" (James) of thinking and behaving, as well as modes of achieving, despite doubt, so-called "warranted assertibility" (Dewey) in our everyday planful behavior and decision making. Furthermore, in their deliberations and arguments, the major pragmatists were much influenced by Kant, who, as we have seen, spent some time on articulating and evaluating the usefulness of the wisdom concept.

Thus, as the Aristotelians added practical wisdom to theoretical wisdom, pragmatists did not restrict themselves to abstract modes of reasoning about truth and usefulness. Rather, they couched their arguments in terms of the meaning and conduct of life. In fact, pragmatism is occasionally defined as a method of ascertaining how to behave successfully in life, that is, with purpose and good practical consequences. The synthesis of logic and human effectiveness, therefore, was a goal of pragmatism.

Pragmatism was a forerunner of the more modern version of rationality as an "instrumental" and purposeful activity (e.g., Nozick, 1993; Sxxx, 1995). Consider a few quotations from Peirce (Peirce, 1873, after Burks, 1966, Vol. VII, p. 218, 219): "The intellectual significance of beliefs lies wholly in the conclusions which may be drawn from them, and ultimately in their effects upon our conduct" . . . "or in other words the rationality of thought lies in its reference to a possible future." Finally, "that everything is to be tested by its practical results was the great text of my early papers" (1897 in a letter to James, Vol. VII and VIII, p. 186). A quote from William James is another instantiation of the pragmatists' deep

belief in instrumentality of reasoning: "It is far too little recognized how entirely the intellect is built up of practical interests" (James, 1908c, p. 84).

Reviewing the writings of Peirce, James, and Dewey underscored the impression that despite much similarity in topical emphasis, wisdom was not a central organizing concept in the discourse associated with the evolution and articulation of pragmatism. Yes, questions of the conduct and meaning of life, of how to ascertain truth, of how to relate knowledge to behavior (action), of how to reach legitimated actions (e.g., the concept of "warranted assertibility") in the interest of individuals and society, all were at the heart of the pragmatic school of thought. Yet references to the concept of wisdom were extremely rare and casual. They reflected only the notion of using wisdom as an everyday word for denoting excellence and the best of thinking and behaving.

To illustrate this more casual use of the concept of wisdom, a few quotations follow from texts where the major pragmatists referred to wisdom. Peirce, for instance, wrote in the context of a discussion of science and morality: "Conscience . . . that system of morals is the traditional wisdom of the ages of experience" (Hartshorne et al., 1965, Vol. I and II, p. 21). In other places, Peirce's references to wisdom are similarly nondistinct from a theoretical and analytical point of view (p. 352, 421): "In regard to the greatest affairs of life, the wise man follows his heart and does not trust his head", and "no man can be wise whose supreme desire is the well-being of himself or of any other existing person or collection of persons." To offer one more illustration reflecting Peirce's view on the questionable validity of widely shared maxims, proverbs, and sayings (Hartshorne et al., 1965, Vol. V and VI, p. 314): "No bygone fashion seems more grotesque than a panache of obsolete wisdom." Among the most serious references to wisdom by Peirce might be the following from his *Private Thoughts Principally on the Conduct of Life* , written in 1860: "The difference between wisdom and knowledge is this: Knowledge is that which we get empirically but wisdom is wrought by the unfolding of mind", and "wisdom is not learnt from books" (Fisch, 1982 Vol. I, p. 4-5).

The same conclusion applies to William James, which is perhaps the more surprising as James often wrote less as a logician than as a humanist, and, aside from his essays on wisdom-related topics such as the value of life and the sentiment of rationality, advanced in his

summative book on pragmatism (James, 1907) such concepts as "living reason." In the introduction to the first volume of the *Works of William James*, Thayer (1975, p. xxxviiii) highlights this perspective when he wrote: "The special merit that James found in the pragmatic methods was its service in directing speculative thought, with its theoretical clarity and moments of superior vision, into human centers. The nobility of reason, and its ultimate responsibility, are alike realized in the human struggles to comprehend the conditions of existence so as to discover in them the energies for significant humane and creative uses. This was "living reason" (*Pragmatism,* p. 138), a force for change in a changing world; but one by which human experience is enriched in quality and extended in scope and variety." Thayer says that James reflects "ripe wisdom."

These are powerful observations by Thayer on James's agenda. I argue that if wisdom had been at the center of his attention, James would have used the concept more often and in a systematic manner. He did not; his references to wisdom were very rare, and when present, they were more accidental than systematic. When writing about finding the right balance between the opposite dangers of believing too little or of believing too much (e.g., in religion), James involves "the measure of wisdom as men" (James, 1908, xi). On another occasion, when discussing whether life is worth living in the face of uncertainty about outcomes and the importance of trusting in yourself, he writes: "In such a case . . . the part of wisdom as well as of courage is to *believe what is in the line of your needs*, for only by such belief is the need fulfilled" (James, 1908b, p. 59, italics original). This sentence is underscored by another observation: "The part of wisdom clearly is to believe what one desires" (1908c, p. 97). Closer to expressing a view on the combination of sources for wisdom is another quotation, from *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902, p. 476). When commenting on the usefulness of diverse bodies of knowledge including that associated with science, James writes: "We combine what they (expert specialists) tell us with the rest of our wisdom, and form our final judgment independently." James's private subjective conception of wisdom, then, included bodies of knowledge beyond scientific evidence.

No particular interest in the topic of wisdom was discernible by me in the writings of the last of the famed pragmatist trio, John Dewey. Certainly, Dewey devoted much of his work

to important topics associated with human existence, including the goals and methods of education, the idea of common-sense knowledge, the concept of good judgment, the notion of freedom, democracy, values, and morality. Again, however, wisdom is used as a concept of everyday language, not as a tool for systematic analysis.

One lengthy passage on wisdom appears in *How We Think* (Dewey, 1933, p. 63-65). Under the heading *Informational Studies May Fail to Develop Wisdom*, Dewey emphasizes the distinction between learning as information gain and wisdom: "Information is knowledge that is merely acquired and stored up; wisdom is knowledge operating in the direction of powers to the better living of life. Information, merely as information, implies no special training of intellectual capacity; wisdom is the finest fruit of that training. In school, amassing information always tends to escape from the ideal of wisdom or good judgment." Interestingly, at another place, in *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (Dewey, 1938, p. 61), when discussing common sense and good judgment, Dewey may even have deliberately avoided using the concept of wisdom. He used "sagacity" instead: "Sagacity is power to discriminate the factors that are relevant and important in significance in given situations; it is power of discernment."

In sum: To my knowledge, no definition of wisdom was ever offered by Peirce, James, or Dewey, nor is there any evidence that they made an effort to use wisdom as a guiding concept, and thereby to continue the longstanding philosophical stream of taking seriously the definition of philosophy as the "love of wisdom." Thus my review of the pragmatists' main writings also supports the conclusion that during the last two centuries of Western philosophical thought, wisdom has lost its standing as a fundamental topic of philosophical discourse and analysis. And this was true for those schools of thought as well, such as the pragmatists, whose substantive lens was oriented toward the fundamental issues of human existence. It would be interesting, of course, but largely beyond my ability, to examine whether similar historical developments occurred in other philosophical quarters, for instance those associated with Asian schools of philosophical thought.

To prevent a possible misunderstanding: That wisdom has lost ground in philosophical analysis since the Renaissance, the appearance of empiricism, and the Enlightenment, does not mean that the construct of wisdom disappeared completely from philosophical studies. It did

not. Similarly, it would not be accurate or correct to argue that the writings on wisdom had left no footprints. From time to time, philosophers readdress the topic of wisdom, and the insights generated in the context of the search for a philosophically clean and pure conception of wisdom became part of the legacy. As I'll try to show in the next chapter, some of this legacy is the deep insight into the conclusion that -- although divine revelation is not the answer -- human reason has its fundamental limitations as well. In this regard, the journey, for instance, from Kant's critique of pure reason to modern versions of rationality (e.g., Nozick, 1993) is continuous and shorter than one might expect.

And it is also true that the intellectual branch of religion (theology) contains insights and connections that link the Middle Ages to the present in meaningful ways (McKnight, 1991). The spiritual dimension of wisdom and the quest for mastering the uncertain in life continue to be with us. In the next chapter, I shall return to this point of view. Wisdom is both more and less than scientific and technocratic knowledge, and it is for this reason that efforts to treat wisdom as a high level of common-sense knowledge (e.g., Geertz, 1983) about the human condition may be an appropriate direction for scholarship to pursue. Moreover, some of the facets of wisdom that were identified by philosophers, such as morality, make wisdom part of the ongoing philosophical discourse (Kekes, 1995).

CHAPTER 4

Wisdom in the Twentieth Century: From Philosophy Toward Interdisciplinary Scholarship

In this chapter, I intend to accomplish three things. First, I would like to summarize twentieth-century contributions to the philosophy of wisdom. Specifically, I ask whether current efforts involve new perspectives and whether the exit of philosophy from a concentrated treatment of wisdom as an analytical concept continues. Second, I briefly explore the degree to which other social-science disciplines, such as political science, have engaged in discussion of wisdom. Third, I use one example of a recent philosophical treatment of wisdom to show why it would be profitable for other disciplines, such as psychology, to join in the search for a more comprehensive scientific account of the structure and function of wisdom.

In the end, I believe that wisdom is an interdisciplinary construction, that several disciplines are required to elaborate the concept, in the same way that the coordination of several senses and representational modes is needed to grasp the meaning **system (<remove?)** of an elephant. Disciplines differ in what methods and questions they enlist to capture a given subject matter. Opening the concept of wisdom to other disciplines, therefore, permits exploring whether wisdom is a quality of mind and behavior whose representation and analysis require more than philosophical and cultural-historical approaches alone.

Current-Day Philosophy of Wisdom

As I summarize my views of twentieth-century Western philosophical scholarship on wisdom, remember that my primary goal is not to be comprehensive but to understand whether there have been new developments or changes in emphasis. Philosophy, of course, is one of the oldest scholarly enterprises, and much of its work is fairly stable because of the benefits of long-term accumulation. It would probably come as a surprise if radically new insights were available. Yet, even if there were no new developments, philosophy has changed **(add here?: since the nineteenth century**.

For instance, much of philosophy today talks about diverse positions and the reasons for holding different world views and associated justifications (Ross, 1996, p. 249): "Take just about any fundamental issue in philosophy . . . there will be contrary positions held by equally competent, industrious, intellectual and sincere philosophers." One development about which many philosophers agree, however, is that this century has seen much clarification of the main intellectual positions that philosophers have developed over the centuries. On average, modern philosophers are more skilled in comparative analysis and therefore able to understand each other better, although they may differ in their preferred positions. This change in the level of intersubjectivity among philosophers should also be revealed in current-day discussions of the concept of wisdom.

The high emphasis placed on communication is evident in the work of Karl Jaspers (1951), the eminent German twentieth-century philosopher. In his <u>Ways to wisdom: An introduction to philosophy</u>, he writes (p. 27): "Communication is the aim of philosophy, and in communication all its other aims are ultimately rooted: awareness of being, illumination through love, attainment of peace." Jaspers's work on philosophy as wisdom **makes for educative reading (replace with?: itself is illuminating)**. He elaborates on the philosophy of such topics as "The Comprehensive", "The Idea of God", "The Unconditional Imperative", and "Faith and Enlightenment." The aim of philosophers is the fight for our inner independence and transcending reflection. Personally, I also enjoyed Jaspers's far-reaching statements on the history of philosophy: "The whole of the history of philosophy . . . is like a single vast moment in the growing self-awareness of man. Greek philosophy travelled the path from myth to logos . . . Christian-medieval philosophy . . . from revelation to theology . . . modern European philosophy arose hand in hand with modern natural science and man's new personal rejection of all authority. The ensuing insight: 'Man is finite and imperfectible'" (pp. 134-137).

Are there "new" developments in philosophy that might bear on our understanding of wisdom? My answer is yes. Some of them are associated with the fact that philosophers themselves are increasingly interested in linking their own work to other disciplines, such as cognitive science or human development. Such a strategy, of course, is in the best tradition of philosophy if it is defined as a discipline that sees transdisciplinarity and the integration of

knowledge among its principal goals. As a consequence of considering work in other disciplines, the concepts of reason and rationality, for instance, have taken on a new face. Philosophers such as Nozick (1993) and Stich (1990), for example, make use of arguments and findings advanced by cognitive psychologists who study judgment and decision making (Dawes, 1988; Mellers, Schwartz, & Cooke, 1997; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Simon, 1981) as well as so-called situated cognition (Greeno et al., 1993; Levine et al., 1993).

On the more specific level of wisdom, two theoretical approaches are immediately relevant. The first is an increasing understanding of the action context within which human reasoning operates. One important example is the continued refinement of pragmatism and its consequences for the structure and function of rationality (Bratman, 1986; Nozick, 1993; Rorty, 1982, 1987, 1988; Saatkamp, 1995). A second example is social constructivism (Habermehl, 1995; Habermas, 1971). In this tradition, philosophers have articulated more clearly than before the nature of the reciprocal transaction between the individual and the social in the creation and transformation of human reasoning.

In my view, these elaborations of traditional philosophical world views (such as idealism and scientific positivism) are significant because they reflect a striving for understanding human factors (motivational, cognitive, and social) in the search for truth criteria. For instance, social constructivism makes apparent the socio-cultural factors that constrain reasoning and intersubjectivity beyond those associated with the neurophysiological architecture of the brain. Pragmatism highlights the motivational and purposeful in mindful behavior and undergirds the argument that "thinking pure"--that is, without some conditioning by social or self interest--is likely to be extremely difficult or even impossible in principle. As Rorty (1987, p. 60) put it, what ties some of the newer developments (Dewey, Foucault, Habermas, James, Nietzsche) together is "the sense that there is nothing deep down inside us except what we have put there ourselves, no criterion that we have not created . . . no standard of rationality that is not an appeal to such a criterion, no rigorous argumentation that is not obedient to our own conventions."

The focus on social constructivism and pragmatism makes it evident that "pure" reasoning based on idealist conceptions is at best a special case of human rationality. Not

surprisingly, therefore, philosophers increasingly recognize that the philosophical utopia of wisdom as "rationality pure" is not possible. In many ways, these insights are part of the completion of the project of the Enlightenment. The consequences of some of these new emphases and developments in philosophy and neighboring fields are evident in at least some of the recent philosophy-inspired publications on wisdom (Hartshorne, 1987; Kekes, 1995; Habermehl, 1995; Lehrer et al., 1996; Maxwell, 1984; Nozick, 1990; Rorty, 1987). The construction of wisdom by humans for humans, and the multiple reasons why a homogeneous concept of wisdom is utopian, have acquired a new and more elaborate raison d'être.

One other development in current-day philosophy is also noteworthy. Some philosophers, using the concept of wisdom as a mental cue, now try to integrate philosophical traditions beyond the Western world. One example is a Multicultural Philosophy Reader (Kessler, 1995) that appeared under the title Voices of Wisdom. Although I do not know the specific origin of the title, it strikes me that the use of wisdom in the title permitted more attention to Asian, African, Buddhist, and Hindu conceptions than usual. It is also probably an indirect criticism of Western philosophy. In any case, by invoking the notion of wisdom, the **authors (or compilers?)** pay renewed attention to philosophical categories that have had less prominence in Western philosophical thought during the last centuries (Dalmiya, 1996; **(insert?: cf.)** Jaspers, 1951, however). Examples would be, to take Hindu conceptions, the treatment of topics such as release from suffering, duty and the stages of life, and the nature of bondage. Indeed, there are good reasons to assume that wisdom emerges not only from intellect, but also from emotional dispositions such as the propensity to care (Dalmiya, 1996).

But the good news is not unalloyed. Some philosophers point to circumstances in philosophical circles that hinder an active treatment of wisdom. Midgley (1989) for instance identifies certain tendencies in contemporary philosophy (such as scientism, narrow specializations, and cantankerousness) that conspire against the notion that philosophy ought to have something to do with the acquisition of wisdom by individuals and with our living better both as individuals and as communities. A similar perspective surfaces in May's work entitled Nietzsche on the Struggle between Knowledge and Wisdom (1993). According to May, Nietzsche proposed that the ancient wisdoms pitted themselves against knowledge. As a

philosopher, Nietzsche submitted that wisdom, with its personal and incomplete truth perspectives, might once again challenge <u>Wissenschaft</u> (science-based knowledge) and its monopoly on consensus-based methods of knowledge. May embraces such a view, arguing that a consideration of the structure and function of wisdom in the Nietzschean sense of personal truth (see also Heidegger) would benefit philosophy today.

Indeed, many branches of philosophy, such as analytical philosophy or linguistic philosophy, couldn't care less about wisdom. As is true for the last two centuries of Western philosophical thought, wisdom, then, in current philosophy is less a general guidepost than a hitching post, either for the past or for philosophizing about life and matters of the human condition (Oelmüller, 1989, p. 174). It is invoked occasionally, of course, whenever philosophers set out to discuss or write about topics that seem to require wisdom: The meaning of life, justice, the dangers of modern society, fragmentation of the human mind (Habermehl, 1995). Some philosophers do anthropological or social philosophy. But encyclopedic accounts and definitions of philosophy for the most part are based on a different language.

This certainly does not mean, however, that wisdom-related subject matter is not part of what today's philosophers claim as their territory. Some efforts to create a general definition of philosophy continue to hint at its original concern with wisdom. For example: Philosophy is "a reflection upon the varieties of human experience" or "the rational, methodical, and systematic consideration of those topics that are of greatest concern to man." When more specific definitions are attempted, some definitely are in the realm of the traditional subject matter of wisdom: Philosophy is "an effort to codify the rules of human thought in order to promote rationality; an examination of the values of truth, goodness, and beauty; an examination of man's moral responsibilities and his social obligations" (Levi, 1987, p. 248).

It appears to me that a concern with wisdom among philosophers also varies by cultural region and historical moment. It would be interesting to know, for instance, how philosophy is conceptualized and taught in Asian countries. There are also cultural and temporal variations within the Western world. Historical moments, whenever they are seen as testing the limits of happiness, justice, and morality, may engender an interest in wisdom, such as the recent surge of wisdom-discourse among German philosophers which perhaps is a compensatory move to

draw attention to the role of the humanities in modern technocratic societies. In this spirit, the collection of eminent German philosophers who participated in the workshops leading up to Oelmüller's Philosophy and Wisdom (1989) demonstrated an immediate and intense involvement with the topic of wisdom.

The same is true for the publication of a Summer Institute on Knowledge, Teaching and Wisdom that took place in the USA (Lehrer et al., 1996). The ensuing discussions and commentaries of these workshops, which are part of the published proceedings, are lively. Thus, even though philosophy is no longer identical with the search for wisdom, topics of wisdom are expected to be a part of the discourse among philosophers who see their role as analysts of and commentators on important aspects of the human condition and its location in historical time and social-cultural space.

The Continued Secularization of Wisdom: Giving up the Philosophical Utopia of Wisdom

No doubt, then, the secularization of wisdom is continuing into the present, with all its gains and losses. To revitalize or legitimate their efforts, philosophical scholars who take up the topic of wisdom often make their case by pointing to the classical definition of philosophy as the love and pursuit of wisdom (Nozick, 1990; Oelmüller, 1989). Many then proceed to ask: And does this definition of philosophy still hold?

A quotation from the opening to Nozick's book on The nature of rationality (1993) is a good illustration: "The word philosophy means the love of wisdom, but what philosophers really love is reasoning" (p. x). The interesting question is what philosophers reason about: Is it primarily reasoning? Nozick himself worries that this is the case (Nozick, 1989). Consider in this context also the observation of the Indian philosopher Dalmiya (1996, p. 207): "In being purely rational, the (philosophers) are not remaining true to the etymologically sanctioned vocation", that is, the love of wisdom. In this spirit, Dalmiya's "claim is that love--or the ways of the heart--can be as effective as reason--or rules of the head--in reaching a cognitive goal."

The spiritual dimension of wisdom is enhanced by philosophically inclined scholars such as theologians and scholars in the tradition of religious studies. They continue to be interested in the promotion and specification of wisdom, and I assume that in everyday life, the idea of wisdom is kept in consciousness by religious activity. Indeed, it seems to me that if we

count sheer numbers of publications, most of the present-day scholarship on wisdom emanates from philosophers or theologians of religion.

The secularization of wisdom, combined with other historical trends including scienticism and technological modernization, on the one hand, then, pushed wisdom into the background, made it ambivalent as a subject matter of study. On the other hand, the secularization of wisdom has resulted in some conclusions about wisdom that appear to be generally axiomatic, at least among Western philosophers who are primarily philosophers rather than theologians. It is now widely accepted, for example, that wisdom is not primarily divine and based on revelation. Religions, of course, can be carriers of wisdom; these are, however, predominantly seen as outcomes of human rather than divine activity. In fact, as Honnefelder (1989) pointed out, it would be difficult to imagine that any modern philosophical conception of wisdom would not be based primarily on the results of human activity and human insights.

And there is more to the conclusions modern philosophers seem to have reached about wisdom. For example, I read the literature as indicating wide agreement in the conclusion that not all of wisdom can be expected to be "scholarly" or "scientific" knowledge. Thus one widely shared insight among modern philosophers seems to be that all knowledge is bounded (limited) by our ways of thinking and wanting (Hardin, 1988; Nozick, 1993). Furthermore, modern philosophy acknowledges that the sources of knowledge are several, and that they are not necessarily subject to harmonious integration. In other words, besides scholarly and scientific knowledge, there are bodies of knowledge that derive their validity and meaning from personal experiences and processes of socialization such as common-sense knowledge about people and their minds and behavior, about values and motives, and about cultural and ethnic differences in ways to think and feel. Many of these bodies of knowledge are not tested by the "scientific method"; nevertheless they are significant for the conduct and interpretation of life and may be true in the empirical sense, although we may not know the extent to which they are true.

This review of twentieth-century commentary points to the conclusion that philosophers have completed the journey that started millennia ago when wisdom was taken from heaven to earth, during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, when the foundation of wisdom was

located in the mind of human beings and their recognition of the evidence. Modern philosophers have added to this human aspect reasons for the conclusion that wisdom as an ideal body of knowledge and judgment about the conduct and meaning of life is not possible. In current philosophy, the body of motivationally and intellectually based arguments against idealistic conceptions of mind (including wisdom) is paramount. Yet with this new insight it is still possible to use Simon's (1983) notion of bounded rationality, for instance, to explore a construct of wisdom that is useful as philosophers contemplate what philosophy--as the love of wisdom--can contribute to defining the structure and function of wisdom.

As I shall argue later, one important conclusion for the completion of the wisdom project is to have other disciplines such as psychology join in the explication of wisdom. This collaboration will necessarily involve the joining of a priori (theoretical) and a posteriori (empirical) forms of evidence as well as of bodies of knowledge whose foundation is less in scientific knowledge than in insights associated with common-sense knowledge and related heuristics. There is increasing consensus that, in our search for the meaning and conduct of life, we humans drink from many fountains, and some are more scientific than others.

Modern Philosophers' Views on Attributes of Wisdom

I return to the question of what twentieth-century philosophers write about wisdom. This time, the inquiry is on the level of the semantic fabric of wisdom. Although we find few systematic attempts to define wisdom, there are many attempts to outline its meaning and consequences. In the following paragraphs, therefore, I ask one more question of twentieth-century philosophers who work on wisdom. As intellectual experts on such topics as meaning of life, virtue, and morality, how do they characterize wisdom? Are there attributes that current-day philosophers either list regularly as attributes of wisdom or don't object to when others do?

Here (and this may not be surprising in light of the long history of the wisdom concept) I found in the recent philosophical writings on wisdom a fair degree of consistency. Western philosophers advance a convoy of attributes that as "meta-criteria" of wisdom-related knowledge and behavior. Individual philosophers have rarely listed all of these attributes, but I have located no evidence that any of them would be considered inappropriate.

- wisdom is life-orientational and action-guiding knowledge dealing with a good life

- wisdom is holistic, integrative, and balanced knowledge regarding mind and human excellence

- wisdom is knowledge about limits and uncertainty

- wisdom involves pluralism and tolerance of diversity

- wisdom is experiential knowledge

- wisdom is justified knowledge and needs to consider multiple sources of knowledge including scientific ones

For readers of this book, these attributes will sound familiar. You may remember most of them, although in different language, from chapter 1, where I outlined the core attributes of modern and ancient "universals" of wisdom. That modern philosophers share in them, therefore, is no surprise. But repeating them and making them explicit as worded by twentieth-century philosophers offers a special kind of intellectual legitimacy. Why? Philosophers, more than any other intellectual professionals, are generally considered experts in matters of truth criteria and fundamental topics of the human condition: questions of justice, virtue, the common good, or the meaning of life. What philosophers, as experts in "the reflexivity and metatheory of humankind", therefore, offer as their views and observations on wisdom is likely to have a solid foundation in our cultural and intellectual heritage.

The attributes listed above and discussed in more detail below are more encompassing than analytical. They also overlap. Some recent work aims at greater specification. One example is the contributions by Garrett (1996), Ryan (1996), Norman (1996), and Golding (1996), who attempt to pinpoint the linguistic and componential essence of wisdom. Garrett (1996, p. 220), for instance, proposes the following: "Wisdom is that understanding and those justified beliefs which are essential for living the best life." Norman, on the other hand, argues that the intimate connection between mind and character and the notion that wisdom requires consistency between mind and behavior make wisdom a disposition, a trait-like characteristic. Ryan (1996, p. 221) adds the notion of free agency and controllability of one's actions. She suggests the following definition of a wise person: "A person S is wise if and only if (1) S is a free agent, (2) S knows how to live well, (3) S lives well, and (4) S's living well is caused by S's knowledge of how to live well." Golding, finally, in the context of the teaching of wisdom

in contemporary academe makes an effort to distinguish between the propositions necessary if one were to define wisdom as knowledge vs. practice vs. understanding vs. good judgment vs. creative thinking.

Such efforts at specification are helpful because they identify the various components and beliefs that can be attributed to wisdom. And they are also helpful because they locate various philosophical positions on wisdom in such a framework: Is it mere knowledge? Does it include judgment and behavior? Is it always associated with persons? Or can wisdom exist independent of a given person, for instance in a text? What is a good life? What are the means to a good life? Do the means offer universal access to a good life if consistently applied? From my point of view, these questions in themselves, though they are important ones, do not offer a solution. The meaning context of wisdom is larger.

Wisdom is life-orientation and action-guiding knowledge dealing with a good life. The central issue of this attribute involves the fundamental values of being human, the purpose(s) of life, and desirable ways to achieve a good life. To undergird my perspective on wisdom, let me mention that this emphasis was the main theme of a series of workshops leading to Oelmüller's edited book Philosophy and Wisdom (1989). With the modern technological world as a backdrop, the central position expressed was that philosophers help us to think clearly about such issues and make sure that important human values such as freedom and justice are not lost in the process of modernization. As Welsch (1989) put it in his chapter: "Wisdom is the telos of philosophy." The same argument is made in the introductory chapter to Knowledge, Teaching and Wisdom by Lehrer and Smith (1996, p. 5-6). Knowledge and wisdom are joined in the nexus of value and evaluation. Since Plato and Socrates, Lehrer and Smith argue, to know in the sense of wisdom "is to become an expert in judging value" and worth.

Wisdom, however, so present-day philosophers argue, is not mere knowledge; it is knowledge to guide action. Wundt (1940), for instance, wrote: "Wisdom is lived knowledge." He went on to say: "A wise person who doesn't live according to his wisdom is not wise" (pp. 42-43). More recently, Kekes (1983, p. 277) made the same general point: "To understand wisdom we have to understand its connection with knowledge, action, and judgment", and furthermore: "wisdom is a character-trait intimately connected with self-direction. The more

wisdom a person has the more likely it is that he will succeed in living a good life" (p. 277); "wisdom is to arrange one's life so as to aim to satisfy those wants that accord with his ideals" (p. 285). "Growth in wisdom and self-direction go hand in hand" (p. 286).

The same line of argument, the link from knowledge to behavior--reflecting the historical tradition of viewing wisdom as the ideal coalition of mind and character advancing toward human excellence--is also at the core of <u>Knowledge, Teaching and Wisdom</u> (Lehrer et al., 1996). To achieve wisdom, knowledge of and means toward the good need to defeat knowledge of and means toward the bad. This insight also makes clear that wisdom requires a <u>consonance in means and ends</u>. Otherwise, reaching good ends by bad means would unjustifiably qualify as "perfect" wisdom. Understanding the full scenario of desirable means and ends as well as their undesirable counterparts is what Lehrer and Smith (1996, p. 16) call the "justified acceptance and preference."

What are the means, the skills and personal resources, to achieve a good life aside from having the right goals and intentions? In philosophy, much of the discourse regarding the "means" concerns expositions about virtues and vices (e.g., Kekes, 1995; Shklar, 1984; Slote, 1992; Suits, 1978; Wallace, 1978). Continuing the longstanding philosophical tradition of theories and beliefs about virtues, the assumption is that evolution has generated a human being with dispositions that are less than entirely benevolent and centered on the common good (cf. the writings by Kant on this topic in chapter 3). Virtues, in this line of reasoning are meant to indicate both means and ends. Foremost, however, it appears to me that the virtues are more means than ends, because the endstates are not fully specified (see also Rawls, 1981; Slote, 1983, 1992), except for the nearly universal position among philosophers that the endstates need to represent an ideal of a good life in harmony with others, and that the good life achieved in a given context should be available to as many people as possible.

What about the origins of virtues and the avoidance of vices? Not least because of the dominant rejection of the divine in modern philosophy as a source of explanation, and the ensuing vexity of where wisdom should come from if one begins to be secular in orientation, what is open in these discussions of vices and virtues is the "empirical" foundation of virtues and their operation. Are they deeply ingrained in the human mind, or are they primarily the

result of socialization, that is, the struggle to acquire norms about the desirable and the undesirable, and the skills and personal resources to think and behave accordingly? Many philosophers (like modern evolutionary psychologists), it seems to me, follow the "naturalistic" tradition. The principal difference is that biological-cultural evolution and their associated insights about the good and bad substitute for the divine. But as Lehrer and Smith (1996, p. 8) correctly state, in my opinion: "Reduce knowledge to something natural or supernatural and thereby bypass the question of worth."

In the end biology and culture need to join in defining worth and the means to reach it. The argument goes: Nothing that is as universal as virtues and vices can be so without a strong foundation in or connection with the biological constitution of the species and the coevolution between genetics and culture (Durham, 1991). It may surprise social scientists, but quite a few philosophers argue for "universal" and therefore genetically modulated predispositions toward virtues and vices. **(Repetition: remove this sentence?) Human evolution has resulted in biologically based predispositions for both virtues and vices.** To advance our understanding of virtues and vices, we need to recognize the dual evolution of human biology and culture. In the search for the most important virtues, virtues that are necessary to modulate and regulate vices, Wallace (1978), for instance, identifies such critical traits as communal behavior, conscientiousness, courage and restraint, and benevolence. "All these traits perform functions that are, in one way or another, essential to human life. If such traits were lacking . . . they could not live together the sort of life characteristic of human beings. When these traits are developed . . . they are virtues, human excellences" (p. 161).

So far, I have mentioned virtues and vices, but the exposition was more about virtues than vices. It is important, however, to recognize that achievement of virtues requires knowledge of one's vices. Reference to an essay by Max Wundt (1940) might be helpful to place this argument in a historical context where wisdom was challenged. Wundt wrote his essay on wisdom (most likely under censorship) during the height of the Nazi regime. He set the stage by postulating a gap between the spirit of the time (Geist) and the human condition (Leben). The contextual examples given for his painful outcry, that is, the modern technical world and empirical positivism, are less persuasive and probably reflect the effect of

censorship. But, the language he chose fits equally well the topics not mentioned in his essay, such as nationalism, dogmatism, fascism, and the ethnic biases of Nazism.

In any case, Wundt invoked the idea of wisdom to deal with a situation of "deep need", a hiatus between mind and reality, between virtues and vices. By recalling some of the most fundamental ideas of wisdom and its beauty as counterforces to vices, Wundt suggested that humankind may be able to "save itself", to return, for example, to a higher level of self-knowledge. Wisdom, then, is fundamentally associated with a positive orientation toward a valuable life. At the same time, it entails avoiding undesirable alternative pathways despite seductive and vice-generating alternatives (see also Habermehl, 1995). Wisdom is knowledge about the good <u>and</u> the bad, and about ways to solve the conflict resulting from the fact that human nature is biologically rigged in both directions.

<u>Wisdom is holistic, integrative, and balanced knowledge.</u> The essay by Wundt (1940, p. 42) also contains text to illustrate that wisdom is holistic, integrative, and balanced knowledge: "Wisdom is an integrated and completed whole (<u>abgeschlossenes Ganzes</u>)." Ebertz (1986) speaks in the same context of the <u>coherence</u> of knowledge including preferences and justifications. One of the strengths of possessing holistic, integrative, and balanced knowledge is its flexible application to specific instances.

Kekes (1983; see also his 1995 work summarized below) describes the holistic, integrative, and balanced aspect of wisdom as <u>interpretive knowledge</u>. Interpretive knowledge involves knowledge not only of separate facts, but of their interrelated significance, of priorities involving means and ends to a good life. Hartshorne (1987) invokes the concept of "<u>moderation</u>" or balanced knowledge to stress the notion that wisdom compares and integrates distinct lines of emotional and cognitive information. Similarly, all the authors in Oelmüller's book (1989) concur that wisdom involves a larger view, permitting treatment of an issue from a distance, a view that compares, interrelates, and balances goals, means, contexts, people, and time.

A <u>tour de force</u> recent effort by Welsch (1995) advances a new conception of integrated and coordinated reason or "<u>transversal reason</u>" (<u>transversale Vernunft</u>). Welsch elaborates a modern version of reason that considers the philosophical paradigms of the past (platonic,

Kantian, and romantic), but at the same time responds to the twentieth-century relativist and constructivist arguments of Foucault, Lyotard, and Derrida and their philosophical ilk. The aim of transversal reason is to interrelate differing modes of thinking and criteria of evidence in order to reach a new level of understanding at a higher level of coordination.

Welsch (1995) is explicit that transversal reason is inherently uncertain, both about conclusions and about perspectives. Nevertheless, the special strength of transversal reason is to see the "whole" and to keep multiple perspectives in mind without reaching definite conclusions when they are not possible. In such a situation, transversal reason would suggest holding back, leaving the right answer open, collecting more information, engaging in transversal cognitive operations, and working on ways to avoid premature closure. Coordinated and interpenetrated pluralism without hegemony of one or the other form of reason is Welsch's proposal for understanding the whole and moving toward wisdom.

The modern characterization of wisdom as integrative, holistic, moderated, balanced, and coherent knowledge, then, is far from what earlier philosophers attempted, that is, to find one optimal if not perfect solution. My reading of current philosophy on this question suggests the opposite. The holistic perspective and its coordination involves uncertainty and oppositional tendencies. For many modern philosophers, especially if they are working outside the field of religion, the body of wisdom is not complete or harmonious. The new insight is that wisdom does not only consist of moving beyond uncertainty and conflict, but that it includes the explication and holding in mind of the uncertain and the conflictual.

This lack of harmony applies not only to the conflict between the body and the mind, for instance regarding the dysfunctional role of passions in the expression of wisdom. It applies also to the very essence of the virtue of wisdom itself. One illustration is Slote's (1983, 1992) argument for relative virtues. He proposes, first, that even within a theory of virtues, there is disagreement about hierarchy. Moreover, Slote concludes, some constellations of virtues are incompatible with one another, or specific in their functionality (that is, effectiveness regarding the achievement of a good life) to particular periods in the life span.

Slote argues that a virtue, such as life-planfulness (and wisdom, I would add), is not absolute, but specific to distinct phases of life, especially adulthood. In the same spirit and with

a focus on childhood, he asks whether, if good life is the outcome criterion, the cardinal virtues (e.g., courage, temperance, justice) are important for young children. Slote (1983, pp. 39-59) implies that they are not, that these virtues are appropriate primarily to the lives of adults. Indeed, the idea of lifetime preferences for particular virtues and goods (a position that, incidentally, sets Slote apart from other utilitarian thinkers; see Slote, p. 10) will concern us in later sections of this book as we discuss lifespan psychological conceptions of wisdom. The functionality of virtues, then, according to Slote is not absolute, but time- and context-contingent. As a consequence, there is an inherent dynamic of selection between virtues and their expression. Indeed, many dramas of life involve conflicts between goods, not only conflicts between the good and the bad.

Wisdom is knowledge about limits and uncertainty. The previous observations prefigured this attribute. Uncertainty is a crucial part of the ensemble of attributes of wisdom discussed by many modern philosophers. Limits can include both limits of the mind and limiting (boundary) conditions of life. The philosophical assertion that wisdom deals with limits (boundary conditions of the body, the mind, and of life circumstances) and uncertainty can be found in many variations. To quote Wundt (1940, p. 39ff) again: "Wisdom is knowledge about the boundary . . . and we expect it more from old age . . . because it had more opportunity to become aware of human limitations . . . wisdom views life under the law of death . . . and finitude." The idea of uncertainty is also part of Wundt's essay: "Wisdom is not only one side . . . it always focuses also on the other side . . . each thing has two sides . . . there is contradiction." And perhaps commenting on Nazi dogmas and politics, Wundt in 1940 implicated the recognition of one's limits and of uncertainty in knowledge when he reminded his readers of the philosophical foundations for the famed wise saying "I know that I don't know" (p. 36).

One excellent demonstration of the role uncertainty in producing good lives is the work of Martha Nussbaum (1986) entitled The fragility of goodness. Reflecting ancient Greek philosophical traditions on ethics and morality, Nussbaum examines the role of chance and vulnerability, and of other conditions, in the development of a self-sufficient and optimal life. Uncertainty plays an equally important role in more recent efforts at outlining rationality, such

as theories of rational choice. Dawes (1988, p. 264), for instance, writes: "An essential part of wisdom is the ability to determine what is uncertain; that is, to appreciate the limits of our knowledge and to understand its probabilistic nature in many contexts." The same argument is central to American pragmatism. Doubt and uncertainty about the antecedents and consequence of a given behavior (choice) are a necessary precondition for the existence of a major problem of life pragmatics.

In Nussbaum's (1986) largely Aristotelian analysis, fragility and uncertainty concern internal and external forces of individual life and their consequences for the ethics of a good life. Her data are four great Greek tragedies from the fifth century B.C. and the work of Plato and Aristotle. Using these Greek tragedies as her forum, Nussbaum examines chance (luck) and the fact that good things that are relevant for a good life do not persist forever but can be reversed. In addition, she elaborates to what degree good things stand in the way of each other, are commensurate or incompatible. Furthermore, she asks about the role of "ungovernable parts of the human being's internal make-up" (p. 7). Following Nussbaum's exposition, the Greeks already had a dynamic view on **this (what?)**: They "characteristically . . . link these ethical questions very closely to questions about the procedures, capabilities, and limits of reason . . . and, on the other hand, . . . (to) questionable ethical motives, motives having to do with closedness, safety, and power" (p. 8).

Uncertainty, then, is broad-based. It can concern the definition of a problem (what is the problem?), of strategies of problem solution (what are the goals and effective means?), and of the outcome (what intended and unintended consequences follow from a chosen course of action?). As we see in Nussbaum's work, then, current-day philosophy is exceedingly friendly toward limits and uncertainty, the lack of a close connection between beliefs and action, and the lack of predictability, not only in matters of wisdom. As Oelmüller (1989, pp. 168, 169) phrased it: "Philosophy since the nineteenth century is predominantly 'critical' analysis, of consciousness and its conditions, of language, its sentences and grammar **(close quote here?)**. As a consequence, monolithic conceptions of perfection in mind and character are no longer part of a modern philosophy of wisdom (Slote, 1983; Welsch, 1989, 1995). Conceptions that proceed from the strict assumption that wisdom is a kind of "final authority"

in knowledge, or the reflection of a non-challengeable social institution of truth and order, then, are part of the divine-motivated past. Wisdom is systematic discourse about differing ways of looking at the world and the specific problem at hand.

At the same time, the fact that wisdom deals with limits and uncertainty is not meant to imply that there are no answers. Oelmüller (1989, p. 179) put it well. Wisdom may offer not the last answers and solutions, but the best possible answer within the constraints of limited knowledge and uncertainty; it is knowledge informed by general perspectives and applied as well as possible to a concrete situation. It is knowledge that recognizes, for instance, the biological and the cultural in human beings, the active and the passive, the opportunities and the constraints. Along the same line of argument, Welsch (1995, p. 764) identifies as a critical element of wisdom that "the wise is an expert for the uncertain", for a mode of "transversal" thinking in which the distinctiveness of ways to be rational (such as paradigms of evidence), the disorder of the whole system, and potential areas of conflict are visited in coordinated succession and considered. As a result, says Welsch, in some situations the solution to a problem consists of not only avoiding the incorrect, but leaving open what the correct solution might be. One response to a situation of uncertainty, then, is not to know the proper way, but to know which way is wrong.

Such statements about the uncertainty and limits of knowledge and judgment square well with current philosophy on the nature of rationality in general (e.g., Bratman, 1986; Nozick, 1993; Rescher, 1988; Saatkamp, 1995). Recognizing the fundamental limits and uncertainties of rationality has become a widely accepted insight. From Kant onward, philosophers have made explicit why the application of a priori and a posteriori knowledge in human reasoning about real-life problems does not always offer perfect or optimal solutions. In this respect, the advances of philosophy associated, for instance, with social constructivism and pragmatism have truly enlightened us. Absolute and comprehensive truth about worldly phenomena involving human affairs seems to be part of the past. At best, our reasoning about human affairs can be what Simon (1981) calls bounded rationality, that is, rationality conditioned by assumptions, contexts, and specificity of outcome criteria.

Wisdom is experiential knowledge. Contemporary philosophical writings about wisdom emphasize on direct experience rather than experience from a distance. There are two foundations for this attribute of wisdom, each going back to ancient writings, such as the Greek philosophical tradition.

One foundation for the recognition is the outcome of the secularization of wisdom: Wisdom is not obtained by revelation. It is the product of a long process of cultural evolution; its transmission from generation to generation is part of human socialization and of one's lifetime commitment to the pursuit of wisdom. Rich and varied experience, collective and individual, is a necessary condition for wisdom. We can turn to the Aristotelian method of dialogue between "the wise" and "the many" as an example, or the role of public plays such as the Greek tragedies (e.g., Nussbaum, 1986). Continuing this tradition and considering the role of experience in the lifelong process of education (Bildung), German philosophers like Dilthey (Vol. 5, p. 367) developed the concept of Lebenserfahrung (life experience) to demarcate the organizational process that is one of the necessary preconditions of wisdom.

The other foundation for the experiential attribute of wisdom is the assertion that knowledge in the abstract is not enough. It takes direct experiences, in a wide variety of life circumstances including challenging ones, to move toward wisdom. This factor may become most explicit when the issue is one of application of wisdom-related knowledge in practical situations requiring judgment and advice. Why? Without rich, direct, life-based experiences, it would be difficult for wisdom to demonstrate one of its essential characteristics: the generalization of general principles to a specific instance. Such generalization is based on the coordination of scope with domain-specific depth.

Of particular importance in appreciating the experiential basis of wisdom is another suggestion about the nature of wisdom-relevant experience often mentioned by philosophers of wisdom. The argument is that life circumstances resulting in wisdom require special opportunities that occasionally are historically conditioned and also packaged in enduring works of art, such as the Greek tragedies. Thus some historical moments may be especially conducive to wisdom. Remember the argument made in the context of Old Testament wisdom (chapter 2), that particular historical conditions during Hebrew history, such as the exile to

Babylon, were especially powerful in advancing Hebrew conceptions of wisdom. A similar argument is found among present-day German philosophers (Oelmüller, 1989) who emphasize experience with and reflections about Nazi Germany as a fertile ground for a better understanding of the nature of wisdom. Such arguments underscore a more general principle: wisdom-producing experiences are based on personal life circumstances, experienced directly or vicariously, that stretch the limits of humankind and personal capacity. Not just any life history will do.

    Wisdom is knowledge about pluralism and tolerance of diversity. Attributes such as pluralism and tolerance seem to be mentioned more in recent philosophical writings than in earlier ones (Kekes, 1983; Nozick, 1990: Oelmüller, 1989b; Welsch, 1989, 1995). Despite the continuing search for universals in ethics and morality, plurality has become a fact of the modern world, descriptively and prescriptively: plurality in ways to live, in basic beliefs about good and bad, in cultural models of what constitutes efficacy or success, in ways to act (Welsch, 1989, p. 228). There is more than one answer to the question of what constitutes the means and ends to a good life. The French postmodern social philosopher, Jean-Francois Lyotard, is perhaps the most extreme representative of philosophical pluralism as a metatheoretical paradigm.

    In my assessment, the increasing recognition of pluralism and tolerance of differences in the work of philosophers interested in defining the essence of wisdom has three facets. The first, perhaps a reflection of the secularization of wisdom, is the renunciation of any dogmatic and metaphysical position about "final truth." The second is the increasing recognition of individual and cultural diversity and their significance as positive conditions in cultural evolution and human development. The third is the effort to develop modes of reason that are aimed at interrelating diverse modes of thinking. The concept of transversal reason developed by Welsch (1995), with its focus on pluralism and the sequential and coordinated interrelating of multiple perspectives, modes of thinking, and value systems, is an example.

    What are illustrations of this line of argument? Kekes (1983), for instance, proceeds from a critique of any position that describes wisdom as a single coalition of virtues, as one singular matrix of goals and means. Such a position he calls the "monistic interpretation of the

good life" (p. 285). Rather, Kekes argues, wants, ideals, and satisfactions "change from person to person, society to society, age to age. Identically virtuous people may be inspired by different ideals and we must know about these ideals before we can judge the goodness of the life they guide." And Kekes continues, concluding that champions of the monistic view are likely "in the grip of a vision . . . they believe that sound metaphysical reasoning can reveal to us how things are, in themselves, . . . and they believe that from this understanding we can also deduce how we should live" (pp. 285-286).

The second line of advocating tolerance and pluralism emanates from an increasing insight into diversity as a positive feature, not only in evolution but also in modern societies (Welsch, 1989, 1995). Social-philosophical traditions of liberalism, and also new conceptions of the nature of human reason (Bratman, 1986; Maxwell, 1984; Nozick, 1993; Rescher, 1988; Stick, 1990), are at the basis of this argument. The quintessential conclusion is that cultural dogmatism and belief in the final truth of the correctness of one's thinking and way of life are fundamentally flawed. "Progress" in social-philosophical thinking requires recognizing of cultural pluralism (and tolerance for diversity) in ways to think and ways to live. "The plurality of realities and worlds . . .protects us from **(the dominance of or domination by?)** (<u>Herrschaft</u>) by one. . . ." (Welsch, 1989, p. 291). The more one is able to recognize and consider pluralism in ways to think and ways to behave that are in themselves not "anti-human" but differential expressions of potential for the good, the closer one is to wisdom.

Critics of a pluralistic position denounce it as rampant relativism, as "anything-goes social philosophy." Aren't there any values, and ends, that would qualify as final, as unquestionable guidelines, any methods of inquiry that are of perfect intersubjectivity? Obviously, pure relativism cannot be the answer, and this certainly is recognized by proponents of pluralism as a new attribute in philosophical thinking in general and wisdom in specific (Marquard, 1989; Welsch, 1989, 1995).

To this end, pluralism and tolerance are not seen as sole principles. Rather, they are an essential part of a larger conception of perspectives on the good in humans. The Confucian and Kantian "practical imperative" principle, for instance, of "don't do what you don't think should be done by others facing similar life circumstances, including what you do not want done to

yourself", would be one universalistic principle that exists conjointly with pluralism and tolerance. Yet the main point made here is that a view on the human condition that is weak on pluralism and tolerance is not wise. Pluralism and tolerance have become a serious part of the overall story. Another way of putting this argument is to recognize that--aside from principles of socially based norms involving justice--a modern Western view of human rights includes certain rights of individuality and variability. Wisdom, for modern philosophers, therefore, implies a principle of sensitivity toward other forms of thinking and other ways of living, a farewell to any notion of the absolute in questions of optimality.

Wisdom is justified knowledge and needs to consider multiple sources of knowledge as part of its foundation. A significant advance of philosophy has been to specify the conditions for justification of knowledge (e.g., epistemic vs. pragmatic justification) and to consider the argument that several classes of justification need to converge to obtain a full representation of wisdom. To this end, Garrett (1996, p. 23) defines wisdom as "that understanding and those justified beliefs which are essential to living the best life." Thus, aside from logical-epistemic forms of justification, we need to consider pragmatic justifications that are based on a posteriori and common-sense evidence about means-end relationships. Many modern philosophers are well aware of the limits of knowledge based on the scientific, empirical method and of the dangers inherent in applying everything that science has to offer. For them, the scientific conception of rationality is too narrow to capture the full spectrum of knowledge that needs to be brought to bear on wisdom (Krings, 1989; Welsch, 1995). Some of the foundational basis of wisdom lies in cultural traditions and common-sense knowledge, not in science.

To prevent a possible misunderstanding: current conceptions of wisdom by philosophers converge in the conclusion that wisdom cannot go against what science considers to be "true." Oelmüller (1989b, p. 177) used Kant's dictum, "the narrow gate to wisdom lies in science", to make this point. There are two arguments to this assertion. A first is perhaps trivial. If wisdom deals with important matters of life, it would not be wise to forgo "scientifically grounded" means to reach the stated goals. As Kant had already argued: those who hate science and, purposefully bypassing science, "call upon wisdom instead", are not wise. They are "misologues" (Oelmüller, 1989b, p. 175). The second argument for the use of

scientific knowledge in wisdom is that it protects us against aberrations involving, for instance, rampant dogmatism based on ideology and religion. As Kant originally suggested, the consideration of scientific knowledge protects wisdom from "speculative" and "irrational" input and conclusions. If, for instance, the reasoned conclusion of science is that there was biological evolution, it is not "wise" to argue with force and rigidity that humankind as it exists today was created by God. If science were to demonstrate that the only and otherwise harmless way to treat a given illness is to use a particular medication, it would not be wise not to use it, but to opt for prayer.

At the same time, however, there are widely recognized limits to science and scientific knowledge. Some limits simply involve a lack of scientific knowledge with a sufficient degree of certainty or a lack of relevant scientific work. This is true for many questions of human behavior, for instance. Other limits to science concern moral issues of application of scientific knowledge. Consider the example of human cloning. Although science may offer the knowledge base for cloning adult cells, it is an open question whether and under what conditions that knowledge should be put to use. This decision is informed by other bodies of knowledge and norms, such as religious ones or secularized forms of morality.

Some of the current philosophical work on wisdom, then, highlights the recognition that knowledge concerning the human condition involves diverse bodies of justification, some of which may be contradictory. Empirically based scientific evidence is but part of the knowledge base, albeit an important one. Although "today, the philosophical mind cannot, like a dreamer or misologue, bypass science and become a teacher of wisdom" (Oelmüller, 1989, p. 196, my translation), today's philosophers are also well-equipped to argue that other forms of knowledge, for instance of the religious or common-sensical kind, are serious partners in achieving a productive and spiritual dialogue about topics and judgments involving wisdom.

In this sense of integration of various bodies of knowledge, the desire of social philosophers to comment "wisely" on the pragmatics of life and the state of society is part of their trade and motivational nexus. To this end, philosophical essays aspiring to reflect the footprints of wisdom, as an integrative and multiple-perspective body of knowledge about the human condition, continue to be prominent. Robert Nozick's (1989) chapter on wisdom in The

Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations, covering such topics as dying, sexuality, happiness, value, and meaning, is a good and noteworthy example. So are his introductory observations that reflect the sadness that philosophers can experience if they watch their field become too specialized and overcommitted to rationality as the only means to perform good philosophy: "the predominant current perspective on philosophy has been 'cleansed' to leave a tradition in which the rational mind speaks (only) to the rational mind" (Nozick, 1989, p. 18).

With this critical view of contemporary philosophy, Nozick deplores the movement in philosophy away from using other methods of inference, methods that include not only the logos but also the mythos and associated forms of human intuitions (see also Labouvie-Vief, 1995). True to his argument, Nozick tackles the full spectrum of what wisdom in his view is all about, substantively and procedurally: "Wisdom is what you need to know (**replace to with: or? and?**) understand in order to live well and cope with the central problems and avoid the dangers in the predicament(s) human beings find themselves in" (p. 267). And in the spirit of multiple ways to gain knowledge, and of relegating the rational to one special case, Nozick elaborates on topics such as dying, the meaning of life, and happiness. The results are insightful commentaries, but they are not meant to propose a theory of wisdom or ways to test it. His more recent book, The nature of rationality (1993), elaborates on this approach and argues more explicitly for the usefulness of pragmatic justification. Such justifications by definition include empirical evidence on means-ends relationships. We will return to this topic.

Humanities and Wisdom

The interest of psychologists in joining philosophers in making a contribution to the understanding of wisdom, of course, is not singular. Other social science and humanist disciplines such as economics, political science, and the literature sciences have made efforts as well. Covering these efforts is central to this book. I would like to offer here a few observations and points of entry for those who would like to pursue this line of inquiry.

Regarding literary scholarship, work on the study of proverbs and maxims was introduced already in chapter 1 (e.g., Mieder, 1993). Another prominent example of literary studies work is the analysis of wisdom in poetry, as instantiated, for instance, in Cook's book on Canons and Wisdom (1993). Cook claims that one reason why certain forms of poetry

attain such a highly valued and probably ineradicable position in the discourse of society is that they crystallize important insights into the human condition. Like proverbs, then, poetic forms of expression are viewed as coded insights. It is also argued that the special feature of poetry is to revisit Plato's argument that wisdom reflects the best coordination of beauty and human insight, aesthetics and logos. Cook illustrates this view by probing several examples of poetry. He refrains, however, from attempting a definition of wisdom.

Another illustration of the discourse about wisdom in literature is Perry's work on Wisdom literature and the structure of proverbs (1993). It shows that not all sayings such as maxims and proverbs qualify as wisdom. For Perry, simple unidirectional sayings such as "Sleep before you act" would not qualify. True wisdom sayings would need to incorporate contradictions and conflict combined with a reflective position (see also Peng & Nisbett, 1998). One example that Perry uses to illustrate is a fourteenth-century text by Juan Manuel:

<div style="text-align:center">

All things

appear good and are good

and appear bad and are bad

and appear good and are bad

and appear bad and are good.

</div>

Perry applies what he calls a "quadripartite" structure to the analysis of historical and ancient wisdom sayings. This analysis indeed makes it evident that wisdom is reflexive and suggests taking multiple perspectives. If it is applied to individual proverbs, none is bound to carry the full message of the notion of wisdom. We need to consider them in combination with others. Consider the following pair as a sample case: (1) Absence makes the heart grow fonder, (2) Out of sight, out of mind. It's the combination of both--in their contradiction--that brings them closer to wisdom.

Political Theory and Wisdom

Using texts of the wisdom literature and writings about the concept of wisdom is also part of work in political theory and political science. I offer two examples to illustrate.

The first is an essay by Nichols (1996). Proceeding from the modern-day insight that "simple" rationalist theories of political action are lacking in cogency, Nichols explores the use

of maxims associated with practical wisdom as action guidelines. His basic thesis is that politics lies between pure practice and full-blown theory, and he argues that the ancient discussions by Plato and Aristotle involving the distinction between phronesis (practical wisdom) and episteme (science) mark the same territory. To use another terminology, they make explicit that knowledge about the human condition involves both mythos and logos.

Advancing the functional benefits of practical wisdom, Nichols argues, requires putting off grand moves of encompassing theory in politics and engaging instead in more modest conceptual analysis. Like Aristotle, he analyzes the active part of practical wisdom and the role that maxims (and related concepts such as aphorisms, precepts, epigrams, and proverbs or adages) play in the generation of action and its regulation. He (1996, pp. 701-702) suggests that such maxims are pretheoretical in foundation, that their truth characteristic is less philosophical than praxeological. But, the praxeological value of maxims and related sentences is generally understood and accepted. These sayings concern important matters of everyday life, especially the "multifariousness" and "intractable diversity" of human experience. Maxims are not necessarily meant to "solve problems", but they are action-guiding; they prevent us from reaching solutions without sufficient reflection.

To demonstrate the significance of this line of thinking for political theory and politics, Nichols examines the maxims in the works of several noted political-science figures: in the *Maximes* of the seventeenth-century Duc de La Rochefoucauld (1678), the *Statesman* of the nineteenth-century Colonial Office mandarin Sir Henry Taylor (1836), and the *Maxims and Reflections of a Renaissance Statesman* by the diplomat-historian Francesco Guicciardini (1965). Other works such as that of the Spaniard Balthasar Gracian, could have been considered as well. As you may recall, these maxims follow similar patterns: "Self-love is the greatest of all flatterers" (La Rochefoucauld), "A commission should seldom consist of more than three members" (Taylor), or "Small beginnings . . . are often the cause of great misfortune or of great success" (Guicciardini). Each of the three works contains hundreds of such maxim-like sentences covering diverse domains of life, contexts, and personal characteristics.

Nichols emphasizes that these sentences, aphorisms, and maxims need to be seen in context. They are not, as individual items, perfect prescriptions. Moreover, they need to be

seen in tandem to understand the dynamics and often conflictual meaning. Consider the following juxtaposition: "Experience is the mother of wisdom" vs. "Experience is the mistress of fools." As Nichols (p. 701) writes: "Maxims' plausibility and normic guardedness come not from their status as individual statements, but from their *multiplicity of play against one another"* (italics by Nichols). "The tension and contradictions among maxims are neither nuisances or delphic mystifications, but fundamental to their operation as counsels." The relations among the various maxims set the context for thinking about the problem; they prevent one from all-too-quick action, but they do not offer a singular solution. The counsel given is "no command."

According to Nichols, Guicciardini's maxims in particular reach the ultimate level of dualistic, reflexive commentary, approaching what he calls a level of "world irony." He argues that such critical reflexivity is fundamental to practical wisdom and illustrates that "simple" rational models of knowledge are insufficient. Recognizing the joint relevance of practical wisdom and grand theory, Nichols (p. 702) sees the abstract-scientific and the common sense associated with everyday life as important parts of the effort to build political theory that reflects the coordination of several sources of knowledge of mythos and logos to use another arena of language.

To quote Nichols: "Without ironic wisdom, no actor is equipped to stay in the field. It provides a riposte to the criticism that rejecting 'rules' for acting leaves merely a vacuous emphasis. . . . It provides an answer to the question, if the actor simply adjusts to circumstances, what constancy and integrity can s/he have? And it provides an essential defense against *hubris*." Together, says Nichols, practical wisdom and grand theory make for good political sense, they combine the theoretical with the praxeological.

Paul Sterns (1997) offers a related line of argument when he examines why the Platonian-Aristotelian idea of phronesis (practical wisdom) has assumed great importance among political theorists. The foundation for considering the significance of practical wisdom for modern political theory is similar to Nichols's. It is the belief that, contrary to the application to politics of methods of natural science (with their emphasis on logos and scientific rationality), the practical wisdom idea of phronesis preserves the distinctiveness of politics. It

explicitly refuses to apply "inappropriate" methods of precision and certainty in domains where certainty does not exist. Again, the exploration of the usefulness of the idea of wisdom is oriented toward a rejection of simple rationalist theory and paradigms.

The specific forum that Stern selects for a treatment of the concept of phronesis is Plato's

discussion of the relative merits of political rule by wisdom and rule by law. Remember that Plato's conception of wisdom is not restricted to practical wisdom, which is an Aristotelian specification. Rather, it incorporates the theoretical-abstract and the practical (see chapter 3).

A starting point for Stern's (1997, p. 264) analysis is that "phronesis, the capacity for making sound judgments in varying circumstances, must be keenly aware of that which is particular, contingent, and fluctuating. As such, it . . . refuses . . . to find certainty where it does not exist." Consequently, political theorists are looking at other forms of knowledge, for instance forms that are based on "shared human beliefs." But, what is to be done if shared beliefs do not exist, if beliefs instead conflict? What is the role of phronesis, the rules of wisdom vs. the rules of law (or theory), in such instances?

This is not the place to elucidate the details and many levels of Stern's analysis. But perhaps one point is critical: because of marked differences between people and their life circumstances, universal laws and universal theory-based generalizations are not possible. In this variability is where logos ends, and where practical wisdom enters. Wisdom in the sense of phronesis is oriented toward recognizing the particulars, the unique contingencies that are manifested in a given political context.: "Human beings are so dissimilar or diverse, both in themselves and in their actions, that no general principle, at least no general and *simple* principle, can comprehend them. Adding to their elusiveness is their great variability so that they are *almost* never at rest" (p. 268). This great diversity and fluctuation make dubious a direct application of theoretical knowledge of humankind to specific activities and individuals. Thus the argument for other forms of experiential knowledge and the role of phronesis.

At the same time, the argument advanced for phronesis--in Plato's sense--considers the important function of the theoretical: "The rule of wisdom must be qualified by that which is 'necessary', the rule of law" or the theory-based generalization. In the now perhaps too-often

quoted Kantian words, one would say: It is the gate of science through which wisdom must proceed, although science in itself is not sufficient for wisdom. Phronesis is limited by the necessities of generalizable "law"; it includes, however, additional knowledge and insights about the diversity and contingency of the human condition.

The conditionality of wisdom, however, is not identical with arbitrariness. We must recognize the general as well as the individual and move (through human and societal action) toward what is the "best." This is achieved in the long run by adding experiential to theoretical knowledge. It is here that human socialization, beliefs, and intuitions enter, phenomena that are not fully explicable by law or universal theory. Phronesis, then, is "open", because of the variability and changing fabric of the human condition, but phronesis is not "arbitrary", because there is nonarbitrary guidance from human knowledge and cultural evolution. Arbitrariness is regulated by intersubjectivity, that is, shared beliefs that include shared insights and beliefs about variations between individuals and changing contexts of life. As a consequence, phronesis includes latitude as well as direction. In sum, for Stern the complexity of the "eidos" of human beings requires more than one overarching theory consisting only of abstract and generalizable principles. It requires a combination of the theoretical and the practical.

One can question, of course, whether these revisitations and expositions by Stern (1997) of the structure and function of practical wisdom in Hellenistic philosophy are a major contribution to modern political theory. At least, however, they offer an insight into why extant "formal" and "rationalist" political theory falls short of the complexities of political demands, why the abstract-rational paradigm alone is not the final answer, why the democratic process includes common-sensical forms of knowledge as ingredients for political goals and political actions, why there is important politics-related knowledge that is quasi-independent with respect to theoretical foundations. Reflecting about wisdom assists us in keeping our minds open to the complex realities of life; it protects us from elevating logos and formal rationality to the only and final yardstick of human existence and social policy.

Wisdom as Critical Reflection on the State of Art in a Discipline

These illustrations of the use of wisdom in modern political theory point to a more general use of the concept of wisdom in the social sciences. The figure of wisdom is invoked in general efforts to redirect the stream of work in almost any field, ranging from the natural sciences over the life sciences to the social sciences and the humanities. Often, these efforts are embedded in essays about the field or thought-provoking editorials.

The basic argument typically proceeds to lay out the shortcomings of a given field of the phenomena studied and the methods used (e.g., Maxwell, 1984; Midgley, 1989). The idea of wisdom is then introduced to argue for a sweeping change in the basics. Definitions of wisdom in these contexts vary, or they are left vague. In my view, such usage reflects what I call the use of wisdom as a metaheuristic, as an organizational mental script aimed at looking for the good and the deep. Therefore, have I spent some time finding illustrations of this principle.

Here is one such approach in the philosophy of science. In <u>From Knowledge to Wisdom</u>, Nicholas Maxwell (1984) attempts to make a case for a "revolution in the aims and methods of science" (subtitle of book). Maxwell argues that traditional methods of rationality- and knowledgebased science are inappropriate. They are inappropriate because they do not address explicitly the aim of generating knowledge for improving our action potentials for a good life. For Maxwell, the riddle of life is not understanding the natural-science principles of the universe but understanding humans and their desires to generate a good life. He holds that "inquiry, in order to be rational, in order to offer us rational help with realizing what is of value, must give absolute intellectual priority to our life and its problems" (p. 65).

To highlight the change in approach to knowledge and science Maxwell advocates, he uses the concept of a "philosophy of wisdom" as opposed to the traditional "philosophy of knowledge." To wit: "Whereas for the philosophy of knowledge the fundamental kind of rational learning is acquiring knowledge, for the philosophy of wisdom the fundamental kind of rational learning is learning how to live, learning how to see, to experience, to participate in and create what is of value in existence" (p. 66).

For Maxwell, therefore, the central task of any science is to devote reason to the enhancement of wisdom--wisdom being understood as the desire and active endeavor and ability to achieve what is desirable and of value in life. Maxwell goes on to list a number of

desirable states, including happiness, health, sanity, freedom, justice, and friendship. In many words and with many examples ranging from philosophy to biology, he suggests that a focus on improving the human condition is ill-served by the existing processes and methods of science and knowledge generation because of their "authoritarian" focus on the principles of scientific and logical rationality. He argues that the world would be better off if scholars and scientists would put human beings and their ways of living into the foreground. Such a focus would require different methods of discovery and inquiry. Maxwell labels his alternative approach "aim-oriented rationalism."

This is not the place to evaluate Maxwell's line of argument, which can easily be read as antiscience and criticized for putting up a melodramatic straw man simply to make the point that the welfare of humans and their world should be the most important guiding principle as science and social policy are used to generate new knowledge.

The important message here is another one. Maxwell's work illustrates how any scientist can use the concept of wisdom as a perspective, guidepost, or mental heuristic by which the process of scientific discovery ought to be planned or modified. Similar aims, using the concept of wisdom to redirect and focus on the most important aspects of the human condition as criteria, are numerous, and they can be found in most any field of the sciences. In my view, such efforts are footprints of wisdom; they illustrate the important social function that the concept of wisdom holds in the search for meaning and priorities of life, both on the individual and the social level of analysis. But, typically such work is less illuminating regarding the specifics of the concept of wisdom itself. The specifics are mostly left to the reader to be spelled out, or when they are spelled out, they represent a subsample of what the wisdom concept signifies as a whole when looked at more systematically.

Maxwell's intellectual agenda, to redirect science and knowledge from a philosophy of knowledge to a philosophy of wisdom, thus symbolizes in what direction the treatment of wisdom might go in other fields as well. It might bring to the fore human ideals and their practice in our pursuits of new knowledge and its application. Often, the focus is on questions of values and decision making in situations of conflict or limitations on resources. In these (**which?**) publications, wisdom is rarely defined; its common-sense meaning is assumed to

carry the message: wisdom as reflection, wisdom as modulation, wisdom as balance, wisdom as dealing with the fundamental questions of the human condition, wisdom as striving for the ideal, wisdom as a corrective against the primacy of economic productivity or the power of select constituencies, or against the seduction of egoist passions. We want to keep this direction-giving meaning-space of wisdom in mind as we explore further the kind of benefits that wisdom as a guiding mental script may have to offer.

CHAPTER 5

Beyond Philosophy: What a Psychology of Wisdom Might Contribute

(Kathleen suggests moving this paragraph from p. 16) **Modern research and theory on wisdom need to overcome disciplinary hegemony. We need to search for ways by which the various social sciences, including philosophy and psychology, can enlighten each other to produce novel insights into the structure and function of wisdom, insights and knowledge that take advantage of what the empirical sciences can muster. Wisdom is a concept that originally, like so many others, belonged to and was nurtured in philosophy. Meanwhile, at least since Kant, most philosophers have acknowledged the difficulties of complementing a philosophical analysis of wisdom with empirically based evidence on what constitutes wisdom in everyday life. The time has come to let the methods and theoretical concepts of disciplines other than philosophy participate in the search for wisdom and for philosophers to collaborate - or at least watch with curiosity and an open mind.**

My purpose in this chapter is to show the benefits to the study of wisdom that could accrue from a collaborative interplay between disciplines. Specifically, using one concrete example of a philosophical theory, I will demonstrate why a psychological approach to the study of wisdom can enrich the wisdom project. As an interesting sidelight, the author I have chosen as my illustration has expressed contempt for what psychologists have accomplished so far concerning wisdom (see below). He seems firmly attached to the opinion that philosophy holds hegemony over the topic of wisdom.

For me, interdisciplinary collaboration produces many benefits. My journey into the philosophy and cultural history of wisdom, for instance, has produced a larger and deeper understanding than I as a psychologist would have been able to bring to my work on wisdom. Studying the philosophy and cultural history of wisdom has taught me a lot and made me aware

of longstanding discussions and insights: for instance about the complexity of wisdom, about *a priori* constraints on human reasoning, about the difficulty of identifying primary goals of life, about the intricate problem of bringing means and ends to convergence, about separating the theoretical from the practical in wisdom, about the role of wisdom in encapsulating the advances in cultural evolution, about the role of tolerance and uncertainty in problem-solving, and about our inability to find absolute truth and prescription in matters of human affairs.

As a consequence, I feel that I have a much better understanding of the Catch-22 situation of a psychologist who is interested in the study of wisdom. Wisdom is of such high complexity, cultural depth, and intellectual reflection that a psychological approach is bound to fail if it does not recognize its limits, if it is not situated properly in the territory ranging from philosophy to the behavioral sciences. It is important, therefore, to spell out what psychologists might contribute to understanding the structure and function of wisdom and what they cannot. From my point of view, then, it is difficult to underestimate the contributions of philosophical insights into the complexity and conundrum-like quality of wisdom that, after early work in Asian and Greco-Roman philosophy as well as in religious writings, reached their first modern peak in the Renaissance.

It is also important to understand why, since the Enlightenment, wisdom has left center stage in philosophical work. Why, for instance, in current discussions of pragmatism and the multifariousness of the nature of rationality, is the analytical treatment of wisdom is less frequent and intense? Perhaps paraphrasing a saying by Ortega y Gasset helps to express my deep respect: Historical (and philosophical, I add) knowledge is of the highest importance for the maintenance and continuation of human civilization; not so much because it offers new solutions as because it prevents us from re-committing the naive errors of earlier historical times. Indeed, it is critical that I as a psychologist keep these lessons in mind and understand that many philosophical insights need to be recaptured in each generation by its own efforts.

As a psychologist, however, I am interested in moving beyond philosophy, in exploring wisdom from a psychological stance, and I need to explain why I consider this quest important. For this purpose, I return to one recent philosophical treatment of wisdom, Kekes's <u>Moral Wisdom and Good Lives</u> (1995). I choose it less to highlight this particular book,

although it is certainly deserving. My primary goal is to show its limitations and suggest why it is useful to enrich a philosophical treatment of wisdom with a psychological effort on the same topic.

For many, this exercise might be superfluous because they are persuaded already. For them, it might be an accepted tenet of the modern human sciences that the power of transdisciplinary dialogue and coordination of separate disciplinary efforts moves us ahead in our understanding of a complex social phenomenon (Mittelstraß, 19XX) such as wisdom. Therefore many a reader might want to skip this chapter. Proceeding to the next chapter would be useful indeed, if you believe that you already have a solid understanding of what an empirical-psychological approach to the study of wisdom might entail; for instance, if you understand the empirical and experimental method, how empirical researchers use observations and testable propositions about a phenomenon, of how they attempt to combine deductive with inductive approaches in developing and testing theory, and how for them, the criterion of intersubjectivity (consensus) in evidence goes beyond the use of logic, discourse, and hermeneutic insights (beliefs) into how and why human behavior occurs, and includes evidence of the experimental empirical kind.

What this chapter attempts to do, then, is to specify some of the lacunae in philosophical analyses of wisdom and to pose some questions that psychologists would want to ask of the concept: its measurement, empirical antecedents, correlates, and consequences. In other words, how might we as psychologists open up the study of wisdom by adding psychological constructs and methods?

Kekes: A Current-Day Philosopher on Wisdom

Let me begin by repeating one conclusion about recent philosophical efforts at wisdom. Most of the current philosophical work on wisdom is oriented less toward specifying of a theory of wisdom than toward articulating some general theoretical perspectives on wise knowledge, wise thinking, and wise behavior (see chapter 4). This was true, for instance, for Oelmüller's (1989) and Lehrer's (1996) impressive collections of contributions, and for Nozick's 1989) Examined Life. There are, however, occasional exceptions, philosophy-inspired works that attempt a single integrative account of a philosophy of wisdom.

One recent example of an integrative effort is the book by John Kekes mentioned above, Moral Wisdom and Good Lives (1995). In this book, Kekes updated and expanded his earlier (1983) philosophical writings on wisdom. You might wonder why I selected Kekes as an example of a current philosopher on wisdom; there are reasons not to select him. In historical perspective, his work does not offer much that is new; moreover, its focus is restricted to moral wisdom, a single facet of wisdom. Yet despite a lack of novelty and branching out beyond philosophy, the book is well-written and offers an opportunity for discourse among disciplines as well as connections to my own work on wisdom as a psychologist. And the fact that the book is restricted to moral wisdom is of little significance for the arguments I would like to advance. In fact, there is a particular strength to this fact. The morality dimension of wisdom is one aspect that philosophers consider a regular part of their considerations, but also a topic where (since Kohlberg's [1973] important work) behavioral scientists have begun to add their own perspectives.

My selection of Kekes's treatment of wisdom as an illustration is legitimated because his work reflects what philosophy can and cannot accomplish when it takes on the topic of wisdom. To preview: Philosophy can inform us well about some general principles of thinking about the nature of wisdom. As practitioners of a nonempirical science, however, philosophers have a difficult time going beyond words, cultural beliefs, and their own personal logical as well as hermeneutic-intuitive insights into the why, how, and what for of human behavior. Regarding the empirical testing of reality, then, philosophers are not necessarily the best experts in "the gate of science" through which wisdom is expected to proceed. This is especially true if they, like Kekes, make little effort to explore scientific bodies of knowledge of the empirical-experimental kind that might assist them in learning about the psychological principles involved in identifying goals intentions and producing good ends.

Although I might argue that it is unfortunate that Kekes, who relies in significant ways on "psychological" explanations, did not try to link his philosophical-theoretical work to modern behavioral-science conceptions of the same subject matter, this very fact represents a fortunate opportunity for my present intention. Kekes's lack of consideration of the behavioral and social sciences will open the door for meaningful cross-disciplinary dialogue and the

specification of what psychologists might see as their potential contribution to a theory of wisdom, modest as this contribution is at present.

Kekes on Moral Wisdom. Let me begin with Kekes's opening sentence of his Preface: "Moral wisdom is a virtue--the virtue of reflection." For Kekes, moral wisdom is the capacity for judgment, including the choice of "right", "sound", or "just" means and ends. The judgments concern life and conduct. Within this frame, moral wisdom has two inseparable aspects of knowledge, evaluation, and judgment; the theoretical and the practical. The theoretical involves knowledge of what is true or right, the practical concentrates mainly on sound sense in practical affairs (pp. 4-5).

The exercise of moral wisdom presupposes that the goods and evils are known. **The nature of goods and evils is (replace with?: Goods and evils are)** associated with two classes of values: primary values, assumed to be "natural" and universal, and secondary values that can vary with context. The universal status of primary values implies that "they are objective because their status is independent of what anyone believes about them" (p. 28). The most general definition is: "the idea behind primary values is that human nature dictates that some things will normally benefit all human beings and, similarly, that some things will normally harm everyone" (p. 19). Whereas primary values are invariant and condition the uniformity of what constitutes a good life across historical and cultural contexts, secondary values generate and express individuality.

Primary values are many. In the tradition of eudaimonism, Kekes believes that it is in human nature to know these primary values. The case is fairly straightforward for biological properties. "Part of human nature is that all healthy members of the species have many of the same physiological needs and capacities" (p. 19). Expanding the list is more difficult and requires many intuitive judgments by Kekes on what is primary or secondary. Beyond basic physiological needs, for instance, Kekes includes in his long list of primary values such attributes as social contact and positive feelings about oneself. Again, the fundamental underlying assumption is that we all know what these primary values are.

Kekes's definition of secondary values is less explicit. In principle, secondary values involve all behaviors and attitudes that permit expression of the primary values. In other words,

we can reach primary values in rather varied ways. These various ways and attitudes are secondary values. "Secondary values are formed by the reciprocal adjustment between our moral tradition and individuality" (p. 23). Examples of secondary values would be the choice of a profession or a style of life. Note again that secondary values are assumed to derive their status from historically, socially, and culturally <u>variable</u> aspects of a good life. An expressed good life displays uniformity, however, in its attention to primary values and pluralism (individuality) in regard to secondary values.

The conceptual framework for Kekes's approach is Greek eudaimonism and Aristotle's view on philosophical (sophia) and practical (phronesis) wisdom. In more modern language, Kekes' theory of moral wisdom is a theory of virtues and associated expressions of a good life. The goods and evils are interpreted "anthropocentrically as benefits . . . and harms for human beings" (p. 29). Like various writers in the middle ages (see chapter 2), Kekes argues for an orchestrated coalition of mind and character. If certain virtues are present, a good life is possible. Of all virtues, moral wisdom is the highest. This approach to wisdom, of course, has a long history. To quote from a 1707 German publication by Syrbius on the history of the wisdom concept reported in volume 54 of the eighteenth-century "<u>Grosses Vollständiges Universal-Lexikon aller Wissenschaften und Künste</u>" of Johann Heinrich Zedler (p. 1135): "Wisdom is the possession of the true and the good."

Kekes adds to the Aristotelian view of eudaimonism the notion of "agonism." For me, this position is similar to Kant's (see chapter 3). Agonism implies that moral behavior is difficult, for both internal and external reasons. Nonetheless, moral wisdom can be attained even though some aspects of the human body (for instance, its biological desires) and objective life circumstances (e.g., poverty) may prevent people from living out their lives to the fullest potential of moral wisdom. In fact, objective limitations on opportunities, labelled by Kekes as "permanent adversities", can generate the development and expression of moral wisdom. In the face of adversities, human beings evolve and learn how to deliberate to find the best possible good life.

Does Kekes posit one telling characteristic of wisdom? First and foremost, moral wisdom is reflective (see also Kekes's earlier publication on wisdom in 1983). The knowledge

and judgment of moral wisdom is a process "by which a decision is reached about what to do or not to do, given the goods the agent wants to achieve and the agent's concrete situation." It includes consideration of "what can be otherwise" (p. 26). Therefore, "moral wisdom is a virtue, the virtue of reflection."

Kekes on Individual Development (Ontogeny) of Moral Wisdom. What are the conditions for moral wisdom and ways to reach it? For Kekes, as for most humanists and social scientists, moral wisdom is the outcome of a "lifelong engagement in specific tasks" (p. 204), a continuous engagement that moves us forward toward moral wisdom.

The ontogenetic path toward wisdom comprises coordinated steps. The attainment of moral wisdom is not either/or, but a process of increasing the quality of moral wisdom one possesses. In other words, as we develop into adulthood we can have more and more of moral wisdom, increasing degrees of wisdom. Kekes also argues that moral wisdom comes to the fore "when the smooth flow of life is interrupted. These interruptions force us to stand back and reflect on the sources and on what we can do to cope with them. That is why moral wisdom is the virtue of reflection, and not of action" (p. 213).

In articulating the developmental sources of movement toward moral wisdom, Kekes highlights several components. Aside from learning about the opportunities and adversities of life, the principal components involved in the acquisition of moral wisdom deal with nurturing a set of virtues. Some of these virtues are major ones such as courage, moderation, and justice. Others Kekes considers minor ones such as tact, cheerfulness, and efficiency. Moral wisdom is the result of combining these virtues into a general body of knowledge and attitude towards life. Moral wisdom is "the most important one" because it not only deals with good conduct in general, but includes in addition "knowing what the good generally is in that specific area, how to evaluate the particular situation we face in light of that general knowledge, and how to judge complex situations in which knowledge and evaluation are difficult" (p. 205).

The structure and function of the self are important. To achieve the virtues required for moral wisdom, Kekes says we must evolve several self-related processes. Evolving these self-related processes of reflection is assumed to help us exercise control of life. Moral imagination, self-knowledge, and moral depth are the most important. In many ways, Kekes's writings on

the self are akin to the outlines of a psychological theory of self-development and its relationship with morality (e.g., Keller, 1996).

Moral imagination, the first of the three processes to be acquired and refined during life development, according to Kekes focuses on the enlargement of the field of possibilities. By "cultivating greater breadth . . . we make available to ourselves a richer variety of possibilities . . . so that if permanent adversities foreclose some possibilities, we shall still have others left" (p. 210). Moral imagination, then, leads us to recognize and correct the narrowness of our vision of a good life. For a psychologist, this process is similar to Markus' (1986) conception of multiple possible selves, but focused on the notion of a good life.

Self-knowledge is the second mode of reflection whose refinement permits us to have more control in our lives and to achieve higher levels of moral wisdom. "The object of self-knowledge and of the control we can exercise in possession of it is our character . . . This involves a description and interpretation of the relevant autobiographical facts with a view of constructing a coherent account of our life."

A cornerstone in the development of self-reflection, according to Kekes, is the recognition of our fortuitous character, its dependability on genetic factors, early experiences, and education. Furthermore, self-knowledge involves recognition of our own vulnerabilities, of the fact that we ourselves are obstacles in the pursuit of moral wisdom, and recognition that we are part of an environment with its own limitations. A desirable result is that we become more deliberate and committed in our aiming at transforming our fortuitous character to realize possibilities of moral wisdom "only within these limits." (p. 211). A good level of self-knowledge thus is an informed and well-organized inventory of our moral resources and constraints. It helps us to live as well as possible given the limits and possibilities they present.

By moral depth, Kekes means the strengthening of our motivation for living a good life even though we recognize the many adversities and reasons why a perfect (**remove?:** good) life is not possible. Moral depth is also meant to function as a protective device against hopelessness. By giving us a deep understanding of the various conditions of life, moral depth is assumed to steer a course toward moral wisdom in an imperfect world.

Reaching higher and higher levels of wisdom through increased moral depth is paralleled by <u>losing innocence</u>, losing "illusions" about ourselves and about the world. Kekes distinguishes three levels of innocence that we are purported to pass through in our movement toward moral wisdom: prereflective innocence, unreflective innocence, and reflective innocence. Reflective innocence is the deepest insight into our potential and limitations. It is possessed by agents who have "so perfect a habituation . . . that is passed into their nature. . . . They have made it so by . . . long exercise . . . coming upon a fine rich nature" (p. 215; these words are quotations from Montaigne). Reaching this reflective innocence, according to Kekes, is important for at least two reasons. First, it prevents us from making tragic choices. Second, it has a motivational function in that it helps us to escape frustrations and appreciate the limitations of the human condition and at the same time to move selectively toward what is possible.

At this point, Kekes offers his views on the overall structure and function of the development of moral wisdom. He emphasizes that human development always consists of specialization with associated costs: "All virtue, like all genuine learning, results from specialization of human powers", "every kind of human excellence comes from a strong concentration of energies and it always has its consequent costs" (p. 221). Having reached a high level of moral wisdom, though, does not guarantee a good life, it only increases its probability. To conclude with Kekes: "The fact remains, however, that permanent adversities may ruin a life no matter how much moral wisdom the person living it has" (p. 223).

These perspectives on the gains and losses of life, incidentally, are consistent with psychological lifespan theory, to be discussed in more detail later. In my work with Margret Baltes, for instance, we focus on three processes as fundamental to human development: selection, optimization, and compensation (P. Baltes and Baltes, 1990). We argue that successful lives are based on a well-orchestrated application of these three processes to maximize gains and to minimize losses. Moreover, we show that in old age what Kekes calls permanent adversities become paramount.

<u>What a Psychology of Wisdom Might Contribute</u>

From the transdisciplinary bridge linking philosophy to psychology, where do we see the strength of Kekes's work, where its apparent weakness? I mentioned at the beginning of this description of <u>Moral wisdom and good lives</u> that it illustrates of what philosophers interested in an integrative account of wisdom present to us. And I also emphasized that recognizing what philosophy has contributed to our understanding of wisdom is most important, that it provides a foundation we need to keep in mind as we psychologists look at wisdom.

Kekes's work, in the Aristotelian tradition of phronesis and within the framework of virtue-based eudaimonism (see chapter 3), is foremost a book on practical matters of leading a good life, with the added proviso that it focuses is on moral wisdom. In my view, the book is persuasive, it is written with deep knowledge of philosophical traditions, and it shows a commitment to a theory of virtues.

At the same time, this work, despite recognizing the important influence of Kant, does not take in all of Kant's insights on philosophy in general and wisdom in particular. Kant was more than an idealist philosopher, he was deeply concerned with empirical evidence. In this sense, Kekes made little effort to heed Kant's or the British empiricists' principle that new theoretical efforts at wisdom needed to pass through the gate of science (<u>Wissenschaft</u>). So whatever a philosopher says, for instance, about the link between desires, beliefs, intentions, and behavior--as Kekes is happy to do--these statements need to be tested against empirical and experimental evidence.

For a philosopher to remain in one territory of expertise, such as the use of logic and personal-hermeneutic truth criteria, is acceptable, of course. Nevertheless, I believe it is fair to state that Kekes does not show the intellectual modesty that would go with such an orientation. Rather, not only is his inclination to consider evidence from other social-science disciplines absent, but he explicitly rejects such an approach at least for psychology. In one footnote (p. 13) this rejection becomes conspicuous. When discussing ways to understand moral wisdom by use of the inductive-empirical method, which he implicitly equates with psychology (that is, by identifying concrete examples of wise behavior, tracing its sources, and generalizing from this analysis to the larger phenomenon of wisdom), Kekes presents himself as a philosophical

hegemonist. He argues, without a careful review of the evidence (psychological work on wisdom is much broader than he implies), that such an inductive-empirical approach is bound to fail, and "this is the reason why psychological studies of wisdom are so singularly unpromising" (my emphasis).

This uniform rejection of psychological approaches to the study of wisdom strikes me as poorly argued, especially when we consider that much of what Kekes attempted to do is inherently psychological. It is correct, of course, to suggest that empirical science involving the concept of wisdom is difficult, and that there is a danger that the use of empirical methods may fall short of capturing the richness of the concept of wisdom. I have argued so myself (Baltes & Smith, 1990). It is not sound, however, to proceed using psychological conceptions without making an effort to understand their methodology and intent. Using himself as the agent of thinking, Kekes **proffers (replace with: describes)** how the mind is constructed and how it functions. I believe that Kant, if he were to live in today's world, would have in his discussion of wisdom moved beyond that methodology, as do other philosophers who have opened their eyes to the usefulness of empirical methods in understanding the nature of rationality (Nozick, 1993). Here lies an opening for productive cross-disciplinary collaboration.

To illustrate: Kekes proceeds from a dictionary definition of wisdom and characterizes people's conceptions of primary values and moral wisdom as he sees them from the armchair of a philosopher. He ignores empirical work that is aimed at identifying these very conceptions and that examines the degree of intersubjectivity that everyday beliefs about values, wisdom, and wise people display. As I will describe in the next chapter, such work exists. When attempting to compose or formulate a theory of the ontogenetic development of wisdom, Kekes identifies various components of self-development and action control. Again, he gives us his personal intuitive views on what might be operative in the acquisition of wisdom, in the translation of knowledge into behavior. He makes no serious effort to provide empirical support for his observations. At the same time, there is ample empirical-psychological work on the ontogeny of the self, including studies of the processes that make the self an effective agent or that get in the way of effective self-agency (Bandura, 1996; Skinner, 1996).

Let me use as a first example the notion of exercise of personal control in promoting one's development and functioning so that means and ends converge. When Kekes describes a sense of personal control in designing and implementing a good life, he speaks about the exercise of control without appreciating that this concept has a rich theoretical and empirical history in psychology, that we know a great deal about the foundation and regulation of control (e.g., M. Baltes & Baltes, 1986; Bandura, 1996; Gollwitzer & Bargh, 1996; Oettingen, in press; Skinner, 1996). The structure and function of personal control and related concepts such as agency and self-efficacy are well understood, including their motivational and cognitive components.

In a way, Kekes applies common-sense or folk psychology when developing his arguments. As we know from empirical work, however, the correspondence of such beliefs or predictions with psychological findings on how people actually behave is highly inconsistent (Christensen & Turner, 1993; Davies & Stone, 1995; Haselager, 1997; Kelley, 1992). Many of the empirical findings on the structure and function of the sense of psychological control, for instance, are counterintuitive and do not square with what we as intuitive folk psychologists might think. Philosophers are well aware of this problem (e.g., Greenwood, 1991; James & Pettit, 1990; Scott-Kakures, 1995). For instance, regarding agency, psychologists have learned to distinguish carefully between means-ends or causality beliefs (that is, general common-sensical beliefs about what causal factor produces certain outcomes) and personal agency or self-efficacy beliefs, that is, beliefs about whether one has personal access to the means that are relevant for outcomes and is able to implement them (Skinner, Chapman, & Baltes, 1988; Little, 1998; Skinner, 1996). Furthermore, psychologists have moved to fill the hiatus between desires, beliefs, action plans, and the implementation of action. It is definitely not true that carefully reasoned statements about beliefs, desires, and intentions to act in themselves produce action and the intended outcomes (Bandura, 1996; Gollwitzer & Bargh, 1996). Many mechanisms and contextual factors are involved, and psychological research is aimed at identifying these and their collaboration.

To offer one concrete example: In the case of agency and self-efficacy beliefs, we know quite a bit about when such agency beliefs are functional (pragmatically effective) and when

they are not (Bandura, 1996; Oettingen, 1996; Skinner, 1996; Smith, 1996). For instance, in the naive theories that people (including "expert" psychologists and philosophers) hold, it is often assumed that having a plan and thinking positively about future outcomes have positive consequences and lift one's chances of showing the required behavior. Indeed, this connection between beliefs, desires, and intentions is part of the philosophical story of wisdom as virtue (eudaimonia). But, there is more to be known about this connection or mind and behavior.

Take the case of a wish to diet in order to lose weight (Oettingen, 1996). The desire and plan to diet and having fantasies about the anticipated outcome (e.g., fantasizing about lying on the beach with a slim body) are important, but not enough to produce the desired change in behavior. To be realized, the intention requires a set of steps, and here is where science enters. Meanwhile, we know, for instance, that the benefits of fantasizing positively about the future outcome apply primarily to the initiation phase; that is, when we are deciding whether to begin a diet in order to lose weight. In later phases of the intentional process, however, when the goal is to engage behaviors (means) that involve a dietary change such as eating less, fantasizing about the plan and its outcome (e.g., lying on the beach with a slim body) becomes dysfunctional. If one were to continue this activity, one would be stuck in the desire and planning phase. Fantasy in the second phase of the process of a successful change in diet needs to direct itself to the means of dieting, that is, when and how to eat less. Thus the successful strategy in the implementation phase is not to fantasize anymore about the outcome but rather about the means of getting there - that is, about dieting itself (Gollwitzer & Bargh, 1996; Oettingen, 1996, in press). If one is not able to shift the focus of one's fantasy, the likelihood of success is slim.

To understand a mind-behavior phenomenon well, therefore, requires more than a good philosophical or common-sense, naive-psychology type of analysis. We as individuals do not know everything about the whys and hows of our behavior. Some of what we know is false if tested against the reality of implementation. It takes experimental and empirical research to test one's intuitions and logical analyses of planning against reality. Sometimes one's intuition pays off when tested against reality, at other times reality looks different from what we expected. Thus the well-reasoned and well-intended words and personal intuitions of the philosopher--

168

emanating foremost from logical analysis, subjective hermeneutics, and everyday expectations in the sense of folk or naive psychology--alone are not sufficient. The real and "interdisciplinary" challenge is to weave differing methods together to achieve a better understanding of the subject matter and the links between cognitions and behavior. The human sciences, then, have advanced beyond logical analysis, discourse-based intersubjectivity, and the clarity and beauty of words. To chart the structure and function of a given phenomenon, such as wisdom, takes a more concerted effort drawing from scholarship and knowledge accumulated in various disciplines (including my own, psychology).

I could take up almost any of the concepts and arguments Kekes mustered in his effort to articulate a philosophical and developmental conception of moral wisdom. In each instance, there is a body of highly relevant empirical evidence, findings and theories that enrich our understanding. A few more examples must suffice. One concerns the linkage between moral knowledge and moral behavior. In this instance, the seminal conceptual and empirical work of Kohlberg and others of this tradition (e.g., Kohlberg, 1973, 1994; Helwig, 1997, p. 192; Keller, 1996) is of paramount importance. Kohlberg, in his six-stage theory of moral development and empirical research, drew on the work of Piaget and various philosophers (such as Kant, Rawls, and Habermas) and thereby forged important and enduring links between the fields of moral development and moral philosophy. Kekes does not cite this work, which incidentally on the empirical level is also rich in the diverse outcomes of the beliefs-behavior so typical of work in the behavioral sciences: cases of corroboration and cases of lack of support.

There are many other examples from Kekes's theory of moral wisdom one could use to make the case for intertwining philosophical and empirical psychological methods. For instance, **on?** how the self "really" develops (Lewis, 1995), **of?** how moral beliefs are translated into behavior if they are (Keller, 1996), **of?** how adults engage themselves in identifying positive goals to optimize subjective well-being (Bandura, 1996; Markus & Cross, 1990; Ryff, 1995), **on?** how to manage the gains and losses of life (M. Baltes & Carstensen, 1996; Brim, 1992; Hobfoll, 1989; Staudinger, Marsiske, & Baltes, 1995), or on how to organize knowledge and how to organize practice and mentorship to make the idea of a virtue

come to fruition, that is, to reach the highest level of excellence possible (Ericsson, 1996). This exercise in a critical analysis of Kekes's work from a psychological point of view, however, would be inappropriate and might appear like revenge on Kekes's mental lapse or inattention to work in other social-science disciplines.

So let me emphasize: My intellectual opponent is not Kekes. His philosophical work is laudable and I recommend reading it. Certainly, my intellectual enemy is not philosophy either. The contributions of philosophical analysis to the concept of wisdom are many and deep. We need to recognize, however, that philosophy is inherently theoretical. Its evidence derives more from a priori methods of reasoning, articulation of theoretical concepts, the use of personal insights, discourse-based intersubjectivity, and a creative application of hermeneutics (Gadamer, 19XX). Philosophers tend to ignore evidence based on strategies of empirical science which combine the deductive with the inductive, the descriptive with the experimental.

Paragraph moved to p. 1

I dare to conclude, therefore, that Kekes's otherwise impressive opus reveals why work on wisdom in philosophy has not progressed much during the last few centuries, why the topic of wisdom has lost impetus in mere philosophical analysis. Philosophy has its own procedural methodological constraints, and these constraints will not be overcome by philosophical analysis alone. For wisdom theory to fulfill, for instance, some of the Kantian mandate for consideration of the role of science (Wissenschaft) and the empirical evidence on the boundaries of rationality, it needs to be conducted in a spirit of interdisciplinarity including the empirical-experimental human sciences. Thought analysis and thought experiments, although powerful and necessary, are but part of this inquiry. In short, wisdom as studied by philosophers alone is neither the only nor the final answer to what a comprehensive theory of wisdom can possibly be.

Psychological Questions about the Structure and Function of Wisdom: A First Look

What about the role of psychology in this enterprise? Psychology, of course, is a discipline with a widely ranging spectrum of subject matter and methods. For many, it is a dual-discipline located between the humanist-hermeneutic (geisteswissenschaftlichen) and the

natural sciences. Most psychologists would agree, however, that a central emphasis of psychological work is on the empirical-experimental study of mind and behavior.

Psychological methodology, of course, though empirical, is not meant to exclude methods of qualitative and hermeneutic-phenomenological analysis. Another emphasis of psychology lies in the use of prediction and its verification or falsification. Predictions require consensus-based testing against empirically and experimentally observed reality. Often such testing is not possible. One implication is that the subject matter, though psychologically interesting, is not amenable to a full-blown psychological analysis. The topic of the unconscious is such an example, where at best a partial psychological analysis has been achieved. Wisdom may be another example where psychological methods are insufficient.

What are some of the questions that psychologists ask of wisdom and the kind of hypotheses that translate these questions into empirical-experimental research (Baltes & Staudinger, 1993; Clayton & Birren, 1980; Dittmann-Kohli & Baltes, 1990; Staudinger & Baltes, 1996; chapters in Sternberg, 1990)? Although I present some of these questions and hypotheses separately, I do not suggest that they are independent of each other. On the contrary, movement toward an empirically and experimentally grounded theory of wisdom implies they are part of an interlocking network in which one question and its possible answer each condition the other. Note also that not all questions and associated hypotheses are derived or derivable from the same overall frame. At present, psychology does not offer a unified theory.

I have selected the questions and hypotheses to introduce the general tenor of a psychological approach to wisdom primarily from five perspectives. First, I consider the philosophical and humanist work summarized in the preceding chapters and ask to what degree such considerations are subject to empirical psychological study. Here is where folk, naive, implicit, and common-sense psychology enters. Specifically, I consider these areas (here abbreviated under the heading of folk psychology) to be one of the important conceptual links between philosophy and psychology. I ask for empirical evidence of how beliefs that people in general, including philosophers, hold about the nature and function of wisdom are organized.

Second, I ask how psychologists might approach the study of wisdom as behavioral manifestation, how it could be measured and explicated through empirical research and experimentation. Third, I ask about the individual and the collective. Is wisdom located in individuals, or to what degree is it dispersed and most realized when people interact with one another as collaborators in the search for it? Fourth, I explore the ontogeny of wisdom and ask about the conditions that promote or interfere with the development of wisdom, including interindividual differences. Which people and under which conditions move farther along the path of wisdom? Fifth, I ask how wisdom might function on the individual level as a body of knowledge about the human condition when we are planning, managing, and reviewing our own lives or others'. Other questions could be posed, but these represent a first window.

(Not clear>) As I describe in the following explorations some of the more specific questions and hypotheses that derive from these perspectives, I will not summarize particular research outcomes. That I will do in later chapters. Rather, my focus is on opening our minds to a general framework within which psychological research on wisdom might proceed. Because of my own knowledge and beliefs, I am of course somewhat biased toward the types of questions that have motivated past research (Clayton & Birren, 1980; Sternberg, 1990), including my own and that of my colleagues at the Berlin Max Planck Institute for Human Development (Baltes, Dittmann-Kohli, & Dixon, 1984; Baltes, Smith, & Staudinger, 1992).

Subjective (Naive) Beliefs about Wisdom

As philosophers and cultural historians have studied wisdom, they have used their own minds and everyday beliefs about wisdom. This is true alone because of the semantic meaning space of wisdom that language provides. In a certain sense, then, philosophers are subjects themselves worthy of study. Aside from being scholars, they as erudite members of the human species have personal theories about what constitutes wisdom. Indeed, it is interesting to ask to what degree such personal "naive" theories influence the articulation of scientific theory. It is also interesting to ask how individuals, subgroups, and cultures differ in their views.

In psychology, the larger field representing the inquiry into the personal or subjective beliefs that people hold about a given phenomenon is the psychology of common sense, or folk psychology (Christensen & Turner, 1993; Fletcher, 1995; Haselager, 1997; Kelley, 1992;

Stich, 1983; Wellman, 1990). Folk psychology is typically defined as a culture's or a subgroup's body of shared beliefs or ways of thinking about the world. Although the usual focus is on commonalities in such beliefs, some work highlights individual differences, for instance ones associated with professional specialization or gender. Relevant writings are also found under (**insert?: the search terms**) <u>naive psychology</u>, <u>ethnopsychology</u>, <u>implicit theories</u>, and <u>theories of mind</u>.

An important topic in folk psychology is whether naive or intuitive folk beliefs predict behavior, that is, whether they function as organizing and "causal" factors. Causal linkage between beliefs and behavior is explored not only with regard to one's everyday behavior, but also with regard to their influence on how scholars develop psychological theory (Kelley, 1992; Fletcher, 1995). To what degree do we study phenomena that we are personally interested in; to what degree do our beliefs about phenomena guide or "bias" the nature of our inquiry and the interpretation of our empirical observations?

The beliefs-behavior connection question, although perhaps the one that has generated the most heat, is not the only one. Psychologists are not only interested in learning about the degree to which our intuitive beliefs about or insights into human behavior predict other behaviors, they are also interested in ascertaining the cognitive-representational structure of such beliefs in the first place. Beliefs represent a phenomenon in itself worth systematic inquiry. Irrespective of their connection as "causal" predictors of behavior, subjective intuitive beliefs of the folk-psychology kind are part of human behavior. One would like to know how they developed and how they are maintained, transformed (for instance with age), and organized.

It is perhaps not surprising that the general lines of inquiry associated with folk or naive psychology have spawned perhaps the largest body of research in the psychological study of wisdom (Clayton & Birren, 1980; Holliday & Chandler, 1986; Pasupathi & Baltes, in press; Staudinger & Baltes, 1994; Sternberg, 1990). What do people report wisdom to be, which people are considered wise, what are the specific attributes that people assign to wisdom, are there cultural and individual differences (by culture, gender, and social class for instance) in

such reports about wisdom and wise people? How do such beliefs develop in the life span? Do they change with age and as people move into old age?

Because of the long tradition of wisdom in the history of humankind and its relatively precise location in language, the general hypothesis in work on the folk psychology of wisdom is that there is much consensual intersubjectivity, that is, that people hold fairly consistent and differentiated beliefs about wisdom and wise people. On the basis of philosophical and cultural-historical analyses of the concept of wisdom presented in earlier chapters, I would also predict that such beliefs communicate a close link between mind and character, between reasoning and certain personality characteristics. *Wisdom as virtue* is the mental cue for this prediction. Nevertheless, finding high consistency would not mean that variations are unimportant. On the contrary, especially with a high degree of consensual intersubjectivity minor variations can take on special significance.

How to Define and Measure Wisdom on the Behavioral Level?

Psychologists have a tradition of searching for the behavioral expressions of a given "intervening" or "cognitive" construct. We are not only interested in knowing what people think wisdom is, or what scholars construct wisdom to be, we are foremost interested in measuring "wisdom in action", to observe it in operation as we think and behave. We search for the manifestations and consequences of wisdom, for the footprints of wisdom, in judgment, problem solving, and other aspects of human adaptation. So far, psychological research on the behavioral expressions of wisdom in action and of the consequences of wisdom on subsequent human development is rare (Pasupathi & Baltes, in press; Staudinger & Baltes, 1996). In fact, my research group's work on this topic is the principal exception to this conclusion.

What are some of the interesting questions and hypotheses? We might investigate whether people, when they think and wrestle with difficult problems of life, invoke the concept of wisdom. Do they ask themselves what a wise person would do in this instance, or with whom they should consult because they think that person to be wise? Another kind of research into the behavioral manifestations of wisdom would present people with difficult life decisions (such as what to consider and do when a good friend calls and says that he or she is thinking

about suicide), and then study what they say when asked to think aloud about the problem. A further type of research into the behavioral expression of wisdom would ask people to nominate wise people and "objectively" measure the nominees' dispositions and behaviors, especially when they are in a situation where they are asked to give the kind of counsel that falls under the rubric of wisdom.

A personality- and cognitive style-related question in this line of inquiry would be to examine whether people nominated as having much life experience of the wisdom kind display dispositions (such as caring for others) and bodies of knowledge (such as maxims and proverbs) that bring the knowledge of wisdom to life. Aside from their ability to draw out wisdom-related knowledge as proverbs, for instance, people nominated as being wise might manifest specific cognitive styles or cognitive heuristics that reflect core aspects of wisdom such as the "golden mean of moderation" or the importance of the "don't to do others what you don't want others to do to you" or Golden Rule principle. Finally, people nominated as wise should excel in knowledge about the human condition, about issues of the conduct, meaning, and interpretation of life.

In general, the hypotheses for such research are straightforward and derive from the general set of attributes of wisdom and wise people outlined in previous chapters. Thus one would expect that people differ in significant ways in their general power or ability to generate better or worse counsel. Also important in this context is whether the behavioral expressions of wisdom reflect convergence between mind and character or may also reflect instances where people have the knowledge to give wise counsel, but not the motivation and skills to act on these criteria. My own prediction would be that psychological research would show that there is a fair degree of "disassociation" between wisdom as knowledge and wisdom as self-relevant action. Such a prediction is in line with relevant research on morality; moral judgment and moral behavior do not exhibit much consistency. Moral judgment is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for moral behavior.

As psychologists study attributes of wisdom, they will be challenged to translate them into measures and tests of personal and social competence as well as interindividual differences in personality, abilities, and styles of thinking and temperament. One would expect people who

display excellent behavioral skills in tasks of wisdom to be very rare. The philosophical and cultural-historical analysis of wisdom suggests that wisdom is a truly superior level of human excellence. One conclusion might be that psychology has not produced an instrumentarium of measures that parallels the profile of attributes identified as being at the core of wisdom. In fact, there are good reasons to believe so. For instance, psychologists have shied away from quantifying attributes such as virtue, emotional maturity, and excellence of character.

Is Wisdom General or Specific?

The cultural history of the wisdom concept suggests that wisdom involves a high level of knowledge and personal achievement across a broad domain of personal and interpersonal functioning. In other words, wisdom is shown in many contexts and settings distributed over time and space. The scope is not endless, of course. There are specializations, such as a focus on the moral dimension. Furthermore, aside from the early work by the Greek philosophers on wisdom as encompassing all that is theoretical and practical, the content focus of the wisdom discourse has moved more and more in the direction of existential aspects of the human condition. Within that general frame of subject matter, however, on the whole one is impressed with the large scope that is assigned to wisdom.

In modern cognitive or personality psychology, on the other hand, there are few instances of a high level of functioning with wide scope in subject matter. Rather, when it comes to situations of true excellence, domain-specificity is in the foreground (Ericsson & Smith, 1991; see, however, Tetlock, 1991). In part, this may be because of the subject matter bias introduced by our preference for methodological precision. That is, psychological researchers tend to look for domains of study that are clearly demarcated and therefore easier to assess methodologically.

Despite the difficulty that psychologists have encountered in identifying domain-broad excellence, my theoretical stance, derived from the semantic and cultural-historical analysis of wisdom, favors high generality. The crucial question is at what level of analysis such generality can be found. On the one hand, it is likely that within the territory of wisdom (that is, knowledge and judgment about important topics relevant for human affairs and the human condition), subentities can be identified, such as specialized knowledge and adaptive

competence in questions of death and dying. But, excellence in these subentities, although consistent with wisdom, does not represent wisdom in itself. Wisdom is expected to include cognitive representations and personal qualities that coordinate many domains of the practice of life and take a high-level view across them.

Methodologically, such a broad-generality view of wisdom can be examined, for instance, by reference to what one might call "metalevel cognitive heuristics." A metalevel view on human affairs and the human condition would imply a kind of specialization for the general. It would not imply that knowledge in depth is available for all subtopics. An everyday analogy may be the decathlon in athletics. Athletes who excel in the decathlon are never world-record holders in individual disciplines. They reach excellence in all or most of the ten disciplines, however, and therefore they are the most admired and probably most adaptively fit. Decathletes typically begin with excellence in a few events. This example from sports, therefore, also indicates that knowledge in depth or excellence in some subareas is required to move to the more broadly based phenomenon of wisdom. We can find precursors and building blocks toward wisdom. Their orchestrated scaffolding makes for expertise at a higher level of analysis.

Much psychological research could be done on the question of domain-generality vs. domain-specificity. For instance, I would predict that people nominated as wise may not have expertise in depth in all domains of the conduct and meaning of life. Their special strength, however, is that their knowledge is organized so that they can apply it flexibly to a wide variety of topics dealing with fundamental aspects of the human condition: issues of life and death, career planning, child-rearing, interpersonal conflict, or planning for retirement. Their level of knowledge and judgment operates at a metalevel. It deals with general principles of wisdom applied to specific situations rather than domain-specific skills. For instance, I would predict that when people considered as wise are presented with subject matter less familiar to them, their reasoning and judgment would nonetheless reflect the dimensions of wisdom: for instance, a stance of reflection, moderation, balance, and consideration of long-term outcomes as well as contextual variations.

Wisdom: Individual or Collaborative?

The cultural-historical writings highlight the collective in wisdom. A good illustration is the very idea of a "wisdom literature", the joining of various wisdom texts of the Old Testament into the whole of wisdom, or the proposition advanced by Assmann (1994) that wisdom involves "types" of wisdom that in their totality are not represented in a single person. Thus, since the time that wisdom was **taken** (**demoted or moved?)** from heaven (as a gift from God, the divine) to earth (as a product of humans for humans), the notion of wisdom represented in a single individual has become an exception. Note in this context also what I have written in earlier chapters. With very few exceptions, all major historical figures known for their wisdom have disqualified themselves from the appellation.

Wisdom, then, has a strong social-collective property. For psychologists, one conceptual approach speaks of wisdom as an instantiation of collaborative or interactive-minds cognition (Baltes & Staudinger, 1996; Resnick, Levine, & Teasley, 1991; Rogoff, 1990; Staudinger, 1996). The ensemble of bodies of knowledge relevant for wisdom is located in many sources. A first prediction results from this vantage point. As I said before, when wisdom is tested at the individual level of performance, very few people should reach high levels. None, perhaps, should be classifiable as truly wise. Second, as we arrange for conditions in which people have the opportunity to participate in social discourse about life dilemmas of the wisdom kind, we should observe marked increases in the subsequent performances of individuals. In other words, wisdom is a case where the positive effects of cognitive collaboration and social transactions shine, where, with the opportunity for social discourse about the problem at hand, we reach beyond our usual level of attainment. Note that this is not always true for group problem-solving. In many group problem-solving situations, the group hinders rather than helps reaching one's best (Staudinger, 1966).

The general prediction, then, states that performance in wisdom tasks involves strong social-facilitation effects and the benefits of standing on the shoulders of others (see also Baltes & Smith, 1990; Staudinger, 1996). Specifically, because wisdom represents the best that the human species as a collectivity has generated about difficult human affairs, I predict that performance in wisdom-type tasks will be significantly enhanced if people engage in collaborative thinking with others whom they respect as experts in matters of the human

condition or judge to be wise. In the same vein, I would also predict that having relatively brief access to wisdom-related texts produced by others would yield large increases in one's own level of performance.

Collectivity represents a kind of scaffolding and protective dose against the fragmentation of one's own mode of memory access and reasoning. My assumption is that we know much more about the topic and essence of wisdom than meets our own eye. What we need is help by others so that we can find the key to open the door to wisdom. The most extreme case of such a prediction is that this social facilitation would happen "internally", that is, by invoking inner voices as conversation partners about the topic at hand, such as one's favorite teacher, relative, friend, or figure of historical or national prominence, such as Kant, Gandhi, or Martin Luther King. Having such conversations would be expected to generate a more powerful access to the bodies of knowledge available to us, bodies of knowledge that would otherwise be inactivated or would remain fragmented (Stich, 1990).

How Does Wisdom Develop in the Life Course and What are the Predictors of Wisdom?

How wisdom develops across the life span should be on the agenda of psychologists' inquiry into wisdom. A first prediction results from the collaborative-collectivist approach to wisdom just discussed. I would predict that individuals who frequently interact with less wise people will have a difficult time developing a high level of wisdom-related skills and knowledge. Conversely, that people with higher levels of wisdom should report the enhancing role of mentors, "coaches", or social convoys in the achievement of wisdom. Wisdom involves apprenticeship (Rogoff, 1990) and is expected to be dependent on the orchestration of the social good in the optimization of human development.

But, the search for the developmental conditions and sequelae of wisdom are much broader (Baltes & Smith, 1990; Baltes & Staudinger, 1993; Sternberg, 1990). Developmental theories typically reflect a profile of conditions as well as their temporal and spatial context. Two aspects of any developmental approach to wisdom are immediately apparent. The first is that it takes time to achieve wisdom. Associated with this point of view is that wisdom is not an either/or situation. Rather, as is true for practically all aspects of human excellence, there is a trajectory toward wisdom. For wisdom to be studied developmentally, it therefore needs to be

construed as a dimension of "more or less." As people move in the direction of wisdom, we expect them not to achieve it at once in a flash, but through a continuing process of acquisition and transformation. The historical-philosophical analysis of wisdom suggests that the process is slow, and under current life circumstances the achievement of a high level of wisdom is unsuccessful more often than not. The "more or less" view of wisdom is important as psychologists begin to measure the amount and the quality of wisdom that people display as well as the precursor bodies of knowledge and skills that are part of the building plan of wisdom.

The second implication of a developmental theory of wisdom is that the nexus of conditions that can be expected to promote wisdom is multivariate and systemic. A coalition of cognitive, social, and institutional forces and their temporal and spatial dynamics is at work. In the conceptual orientation of developmental theory (Lerner, 1998), these forces operate both from a distance and in proximity. A special feature of ontogeny is that its theoretical analysis requires both distal and proximal causation.

A number of questions and hypotheses ensue. What are the institutional, social, and personal conditions that promote the acquisition of wisdom? Do these conditions operate independently or conjointly, in certain temporal sequences only, or in more varied combinations? To what degree is it necessary for both proximal and distal factors to be operative for wisdom to be manifested? In addition to the combination of influences and their temporal and spatial organization, are some factors always necessary, though in themselves not sufficient? One of these, for instance, aside from a certain level of cognitive standing, could be the motivation to promote the personal and the common good.

A certain level of general education seems to be a must for the emergence of wisdom, because without it, the collective goods of the past that are necessary for the insights of wisdom would not be accessible. Here, the thoughtful discussions of the American pragmatists concerning the teaching of life skills and the project of education (Dewey, 1933) are most relevant, as are the efforts of German humanists such as Herder and Dilthey concerning the structure and function of education as Bildung. But definitely, there is more than formal

education per se is needed to achieve wisdom, and the challenge is to find a framework that permits looking at the system of wisdom-enhancing influences, including their coordination.

The field of developmental psychology offers some frameworks within which the conditions for wisdom can be studied and specific predictions can be made (Baltes, Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 1998; Baltes & Smith, 1990; Staudinger, Lopez, & Baltes, 1997; Sternberg, 1990). Developmental psychology is particularly suited for this purpose for several reasons. One is that the very idea of development encompasses the notion of progress and the reaching of higher and higher levels of functioning as a lifetime unfolds. Another is the holistic perspective that developmental psychologists may highlight (e.g., Damon, 1996; Magnusson, 1996). Such a perspective is useful because it corresponds to the view of wisdom as integrating cognitive, social, personal, and interpersonal attributes. In addition, developmental psychologists emphasize the contextual, the fact that ontogeny exists in contexts (family, school, work, etc.) that in turn evince temporal and spatial properties (Lerner, 1998). Thus developmental thinking lends itself to efforts to understand how domains of cognitive, motivational, and social functioning are coordinated into a well-functioning whole, and to view successful development as the outcome of the interplay between individuals and their contexts of living such as the family, the school environment, work, and communal life. All these aspects are part of the wisdom concept.

Developmental theories, because of their complexity and basic concern with change, make another point as well. Developmental predictions are difficult, especially if they involve a statement about the few who reach the highest level of functioning in a given domain. In addition, developmental psychologists increasingly recognize the existence of multiple pathways toward a given outcome (equifinality). There are "many ways to Rome", to use an everyday saying. But, we also know that, contrary to medieval theological views, "not all roads lead to Rome." Therefore, predicting the ontogeny of wisdom will not be a simple Buddhist-like pathway with fixed steps and sequences.

Despite this general position on the difficulty of predicting the lifespan development of wisdom in individuals, some specific questions and hypotheses can be posed. For instance, regarding the role of cognitive development: The historical analysis of the wisdom concept

suggests that for wisdom to emerge, takes more than the acquisition of modes of formal-logical reasoning. As a consequence, one would predict that general measures of intelligence in themselves, such as IQ tests, would not be among the most powerful predictors of wisdom. Rather, wisdom-relevant cognitive predictors are more likely to be found with measures that index strategic processes of reasoning, such as cognitive style and cognitive heuristics. For instance, among the facets of wisdom are qualities such as flexibility, balance in reasoning and judgment, and a thinking style that is sympathetic to dialectical reasoning and oppositional evidence. Developmental cognitive psychologists have studied such phenomena, for instance when attempting to specify the structure and function of dialectical reasoning (Alexander & Langer, 1990; Basseches, 1984; Kramer, 1990; Riegel, 1973) or cognitive style (Sternberg, 1996). As a consequence, one would predict that people who score high on such dimensions as flexible cognitive style and dialectical modes of reasoning would be more likely to achieve wisdom. In fact, achieving such styles and modes of thinking may be another of the necessary though not sufficient building blocks of wisdom.

Emotional and social intelligence is another cognitive domain where one would predict that people strong in these dimensions are more likely to move toward higher levels of wisdom. A side prediction, however, would be that this is true only if the resources of social and emotional intelligence are invested into goals that reflect the social good of wisdom, not only personal advancement. For instance, there is good reason to assume that people capable of effectively regulating emotional states associated with dilemmas of life by cognitive rather than affective-dysfunctional modes might have a better chance of being considered wise or scoring high on wisdom tasks. Indeed, there is research to argue that with age, adults get better at such strategies of emotional regulation (Blanchard-Fields & Hess, 1996; Carstensen, 1995; Labouvie-Vief, 1995).

Another issue is the motivational impetus associated with an ontogenetic trajectory where excellence is the goal. Aside from self-efficacy and investment in one's own long-term future (Bandura, 1996; Ericsson, 1996), personality research has identified a number of motivational dimensions that can be expected to contribute to one's movement toward wisdom. For instance, there is the argument for the necessary presence of attributes such as empathy and

a sense of caring for others. Similarly, in the lifespan literature on personality development, goals such as generativity and personal growth have been advanced as central to adulthood growth, for instance in the work of Erikson and schools of thought associated with the Eriksonian tradition (Erikson, 1959; McAdam & de St. Aubin, 1998; Ryff, 1995; Staudinger et al., 1997). Thus one would expect that people with clear expectations about such adulthood goals and with high scores on relevant measures would participate more fully in the lifetime movement toward wisdom.

<u>How and Why Do People Differ in Wisdom?</u>

The previous observations have already opened the window for psychological research on wisdom in the tradition of a psychology of interindividual differences. Psychology as a field is interested in commonalities and differences. A prominent theme in psychological work on wisdom, therefore, would entail the search for predictors of individual differences in wisdom. The developmental approach described above suggested a number of predictors that are part of this search. Many individual differences in later life are the outcome of differences in the course of development.

Here, I focus on cultural factors as an illustration. One promising approach could be the study of individual differences in wisdom associated with age, gender, social class, professional specialization, and culture. Obviously, when wisdom is defined as a state of excellence, it involves some form of an elite. Therefore, psychologists would predict that living and participating in environments that generate knowledge about the human condition and about the quest for meaning of life, as philosophers or certain types of clinical psychologists (e.g., existential therapists) do, would enjoy a larger share of wisdom-enhancing factors (Smith, Staudinger, & Baltes, 1994). As a consequence, the proportion of people with higher wisdom scores should be larger in these groups.

At the same time, I predict that cultural differences in wisdom, if measured at a metalevel of assessment, would be relatively small. For a cultural psychologist (Cole, 1996; Markus & Kitayama, 1994; Shweder, 1991), this prediction may come as a surprise. Often, phenomena such as wisdom are referred to by cultural psychologists as prototypical examples of cultural variation. My analysis of the cultural history of wisdom (see also Assmann, 1991,

1994) suggests that this is not the case, however, that naive theories of wisdom display primarily commonality rather than differences, and that, therefore, the cultural variations in wisdom performance are relatively small as well. Of course, cultures differ in the profile of wisdom-enhancing conditions they offer as a general backdrop to living. For instance, Japanese might focus more strongly on social interconnectedness in human functioning whereas Americans may tend toward individual autonomy. In any case, I tend to believe that the cultural drive toward wisdom and its core profile are fairly universal. Therefore, I would expect individual differences between cultures on the whole to be smaller than generally assumed.

Let me prevent a possible misunderstanding. This prediction of smaller than generally expected cultural differences does not exclude the finding that the specific groups that participate most in the acquisition of wisdom differ from culture to culture, and moreover, that cultures differ in the overall level of wisdom they achieve. Here may lie important differences and perhaps even a yardstick for the evaluation of cultural profiles of functioning. Yet my argument is that an evaluation of the "top" responses from each culture (for instance, from Japanese and Americans) in wisdom-related tasks would result in similar outcomes. As for social interconnectedness and individual autonomy, top responses in each culture would exhibit the wisdom criterion of moderation and balance. In other words, I suggest that transcultural commonality in the profile of wisdom is paramount and that differences are apparent foremost in regard to which subgroups yield the highest manifestation of wisdom. I do recognize, of course, that this prediction invites debate and is open to further modulation if not falsification. This is the story of empirical science.

How Is Wisdom Realized in Everyday Life and What Is it Good For?

Psychologists inquire not only for reasons of theoretical analysis. We are also interested in practical aspects. How does wisdom operate in our lives? What are its consequences as we deal with everyday situations and interact with others? To what degree does the movement toward or achievement of wisdom, for instance, contribute to a sense of subjective well-being, to what degree do make people use of the resources that wise people are assumed to possess? What does wise counsel look like, how is it organized and offered? Under what conditions do

people seek out the counsel of the wise? Are there gains and losses associated with attempting to be wise? Can one strive too much for wisdom?

One prediction is that people who score high in wisdom also display an all-around positive profile of functioning and, therefore, are attractive to others. This is so because wisdom is the outcome of a positive pathway of personal and intellectual development. Specifically, if one were to evaluate dimensions of personality, people high in wisdom would be expected to show a profile moving in the desirable direction. Furthermore, we would expect this profile not to be extreme. Wisdom is a personality profile of balance and moderation.

Another hypothesis would entail a prediction about the likelihood of seeking and enjoying counsel from people judged to be wise. Psychologists would like to know how people are selected for wise counsel, and how the transactions between wise people and their partners are organized. One prediction would be that wisdom requires flexibility in approach, depending on the conditions. For instance, wisdom can be seen as the art of problem finding (Arlin, 1990), but also as the art of choosing the proper approach to deliberation. Furthermore, if it is necessary and adaptive, one would predict that--in contrast to the usual expectation that wise counsel does not excel in speed--wise people can if necessary operate under high pressure of time. At the same time, in other situations they would not seek a quick response, but a climate of interpersonal discourse that puts the deliberative process of the other person at the center and recognizes the lifetime dimension of human development and its temporal and contextual extension.

In general, then, I predict that the deliberations and the advice given by people high in wisdom represent the profile of wisdom criteria mentioned above: concern for the overall situation, for movement toward growth, for the temporal-contextual dimensions of lifespan development, for back-up solutions, for the uncertain in life, and for the well-being of others. Perhaps most important, advice from wise people would reflect concern for the condition that human beings who are in search of wisdom or wise advice are agents on their own behalf who, as co-producers of their own development (Lerner & Busch-Rossnagel, 1991), need opportunities for discourse and self-action more than they need immediate and other-based

solutions. Thus wise people above all possess a rich and well-organized pool of cognitive-emotional resources that can be activated in the appropriate context.

A more uncertain prediction concerns the implications of striving for and achieving wisdom for one's own subjective well-being. Objectively speaking, higher levels of wisdom would be reflected in higher levels of personal functioning. But, the situation may be more complicated regarding subjectivity. If wisdom indeed implies balance and moderation, my prediction would be that it is not simply associated with higher (though not the highest) levels of personal well-being in a linear manner. Rather, the reflectivity inherent in wisdom suggests that wise people are not serene and free of melancholic feelings. Such a view can be used to suggest that wisdom in its higher forms assumes some curvilinear relationships with other psychological attributes (see also Staudinger, Lopez, & Baltes, 1997).

From Theoretical Speculations to Psychological Research: A Long Journey

In the following chapters, I will summarize psychological research on wisdom with a primary emphasis on our own work at the Berlin Max Planck Institute for Human Development. Some of this work deals with the questions and hypotheses outlined. As you read this work, you want to keep in mind the important framework of wisdom that philosophers, cultural historians, and cultural anthropologists have identified and articulated.

Thus, as we ask psychological questions about wisdom, two features seem desirable. A first is that the definitional frame should be as similar to the humanist and philosophical view on wisdom as possible. The second is that psychologists should muster the unique strength of psychology as an empirical-experimental science, that is, we should use methods suited to achieving an empirical representation of wisdom. Whatever we as psychologists aspire to, we would like to know whether our expectations about a phenomenon and its behavioral manifestation are consistent not only with our own beliefs, but with reality as scientifically observed.

We also need to be somewhat modest in our expectations about the journey ahead of us. First, as the preceding chapters have shown (perhaps more than pleases most readers) wisdom is a complex and multifarious subject matter. Therefore capturing wisdom as a psychological phenomenon will not be easy. Second, empirical science is cumulative. It would not surprise

me, therefore, if a reasonably good psychology of wisdom takes many decades of concerted efforts. At best, then, the subsequent chapters are about a "psychology of wisdom in the making." A Chinese proverb tells the story: "Even a long journey begins with a single step."

CHAPTER 6

Everyday Beliefs About Wisdom and Wise Persons:

Toward Implicit and Folk Theory

As psychologists study wisdom empirically, a first set of questions addresses the topic of how people understand wisdom and wise persons as concepts. What is their language-based mental representations of wisdom and wise person?

Such research on everyday beliefs about wisdom and wise persons can be seen as a prelude to a more comprehensive account of the nature of people's mental representations of wisdom and wise persons. Beyond characterizing the language-based representation of wisdom and wise persons, one can ask how these beliefs and mental representations are organized, whether and in which form they influence judgments, how these beliefs play out in creating a link between beliefs and intentions, and finally, in which form after intentions are created, they continue to act as organizers of behavior.

In general, efforts to study beliefs about a given human attribute and its logical status in the planning and implementation of behavior have become prominent during the recent decades. They are psychologists' versions of the effort to understand the belief-desire-intention-behavior link that is one of the major and longstanding topics of pragmatic philosophy (Bratman, 1986). To what degree is it possible to understand and predict behavior based on what people tell you about a given phenomenon and the way they go about behaving and acting?

In psychology, this general approach is know under a variation of headings, such as implicit theory, common-sense theory, and folk pschology (Churchland, 1981; Fletcher, 1995; Kelley, 1991). In developmental psychology, a well-known example is work on childrens' theory of the mind (Harris, 199X; Wellman, 199X). Questions about the measurement of beliefs, such as about wisdom and wise persons and about their role in the organization and regulation of behavior, while perhaps simple on the surface, are difficult to answer, both conceptually and empirically (e.g., Fletcher, 1995). Not surprisingly, therefore, in the opinion of the research community work on everyday beliefs and related phenomena is controversial if

not circumspect. We will return to this topic when evaluating the research on beliefs about wisdom and wise persons that has been conducted so far.

At this point, let me sijply say that my own view, not unlike that of Fletcher (1995, p. 93), is to argue that both ends of the "spectrum represent folly." Any given psychological construct that involves the mind has both, subjective-phenomenological and behavioral-functional characeristics. It takes a careful way of assessing and crafting their separateness before studying their connections and mutural interrelationships as antecedents, correlates, and consequences.

Having stated the limitations and opportunities of work on everyday beliefs, implicit theory and related topics, my task would be easier if I ressearch on everyday beliefs about wisdom and wise persons had been conducted having the general theoretical and methodological frame of implicit theory, common-sense psychology, and folk psychology in mind. That is not so, in part because, with few exceptions (Sowarka, 1989; Sternberg, 1985), these developments did not interpenetrate. Thus, I cannot report on research on implicit theories of wisdom and wise persons that proceeded within the methoddological frames outlined by critics of the folk psychological approach. Nonetheless, there is much to be learned. In the present context, I will explore the evidence on three topics and associated lines of work:

* Everyday beliefs about wisdom and wise persons

* Role of wisdom as a belief and mental representation in the regulation of behavior

* Comparison of everyday and philosopical conceptions of wisdom

The first line of work examines the language-based meaning that people possess about wisdom and wise persons. How do people characterize in their own words wisdom and wise persons? Is the meaning of wisdom well understood and, for instance, consistent with the essence of dictionary definitions such as that from the 1933 Oxford Unabridged Dictionary, that wisdom concerns "the capacity of judging rightly in matters relating to life and conduct; soundness of judgment in the choice of means and ends."

Several follow-up question can ensure. Is there a differences when people are asked about wisdom as opposed to wise persons? How and when in their lifetime do people acquire this belief about the meaning of wisdom? Do people differ in such beliefs, for example by age,

gender, and cultural memberships, and what is the source and nature of these differences? Clayton and Birren (1980), for instance, highlighted a possible difference between Eastern and Western conceptions of wisdom. They submit that Asian samples are likely to highlight more than Western samples the intuitive and life-experiential knowledge base of wisdom than the role of intelligence and science-based evidence.

The second line of work on beliefs moves beyond the characterization of wisdom itself and inquires into the study of wisdom as an implicit theory including the questions of the functional significance of wisdom. Conceptually, although this is not always done, one can link such work to approaches labelled as naive theory, folk psychology, and common-sense psychology (Fletcher, 1995; Greenwood, 1991; Kelley, 1991; Sowarka, 1989). In such work, we ask questions about the degree to which concepts such as wisdom (a) show characeristics of a particular "naive" theoretical account of the hows and whys of a particular behavior, and (b) to what extent wisdom-associated beliefs and mental representations serve as organizing and regulators of a class of behaviors. One example is whether wisdom is a general goal of human life and also an organizer of the means and ends that guides us as we attempt to move toward a more and more "developed" state of functioning.

This second lines of inquiry elevates work on beliefs about wisdom and wise person to a processual account of human behavior and human development, both cognitively and motivationally. For researchers who pursue this work, it is not enough to know how the concept of wisdom is manifested when people are asked directly about the characteristics of wise persons and of wisdom itself.

To understand wisdom in the context of life and human development, they would like to know also whether people when behaving, when judging, when reflecting, when thinking about their past and future, when acting as mentors, when giving advice to others, are indeed guided by some features of the wisdom concept. Does wisdom come to the minds of people, as a cue or as an organizer in their mental and behavioral activities? Do people, for instance, think about wisdom or being wise when dealing with a difficult life problem, when searching to articulate a problem, when looking for ways of solving it, and what are the kind of life situations in which people do that? Finally, does the evoking of wisdom as mental

representation act as a guiding force, as a kind of super-goal in the regulation of behavior? One concrete example of such an instance would be the use of wisdom-related proverbs. In chapter 1, I had reviewed some of that literature.

In the third line of inquiry, I want to compare everyday definitions and beliefs about wisdom with the scholarly conception of wisdom that has evolved in scholarly fields such as philosophy. To what degree is a scholarly definition of wisdom, such as definitions offered by philosophers, consistent with such everyday beliefs? Where do they converge, where is uniqueness? What is the minimum degree of convergence one should expect? Of particular importance in this comparison is whether scholarly definition of wisdom imply a purist, utopian ideal whereas everyday beliefs allocate wisdom to people who are clearly of better mind and character than most without, however, having reached a state of perfection. Another difference may concern the level of abstractness and of organization.

In the following, I have seleced from extant research some of the key psychological studies for each of the three topical areas. In my selection, I was guided also by historical precedence giving credit primarily to those who originated this line of work. Let me begin by noting that there is more research about the first two, the definitional questions, the question of the meaning space of wisdom and its overlap with scholarly conceptions, than about the second kind; the one that asks about wisdom as a naive, folk-psychological theory and about the regulatory, contextual and functional use of wisdom in everyday life.

General Expectations about Findings

For the outcome of this work on everyday beliefs and common-sense theories, I hold several expectations. These expectations are motivated primarily by two sources. First, what I learned when studying the cultural history of wisdom. Second, by applying knowledge that emerged in the context of lifespan psychology and social-cognitive development during adulthood (Baltes, Staudinger, & Lindenberger, 1998; Blanchard-Fields & Hess, 1996).

The first expectation is that people, as they reach adulthood, should display a reasonably clear conception of the meaning space of wisdom and of a wise person; a meaning space that is not identical but consistent with dictionary definitions of wisdom. This is so, because as shown in the opening chapters of this book, cultural-historical analyses suggests

that wisdom is a well-familiar form of collective knowledge and has a longstanding tradition spanning thousands of years and evincing much similarity across cultures.

Second, I expect both similarities and differences when comparing everyday beliefs about wisdom and wise persons with scholarly conceptions of wisdom as advanced, for instance, by philosophers. Similarity should be evident primarily in the general orientation and core of the wisdom concept: for example, the focus of wisdom on joining mind and charcter as well as the focus of wisdom on using the resources and capacities associated with it for the well-being of others. I also predict that everyday beliefs will include personal knowledge about direct experiences with wise persons as well as of situations in which wisdom was required. This expectation is necessary if we are to claim, as I do, that wisdom is significant in the lives of people.

What about differences? My expectation of differences between everyday beliefs and scholarly conceptions of wisdom concerns four features: (a) the threshold value for the presence of wisdom, (b) the comprehensiveness of the concept, © the degree of conceptual differentiation (organization), and (d) the conceptual level of representation.

With the threshold level, I mean the benchmark level that is required for wisdom to be inferred. With comprehensiveness, I mean the degree to which all wisdom-relevant criteria are present in the beliefs of people. With differentiation, I refer to the degree of organizational complexity or gestalt of beliefs associated with wisdom and wise persons. With level of representation, I imply differences, for instances, in the degree of concreteness vs. Abstractness.

In each of these cases, I suggest most human beings, such as laypersons, will evince less: a lesser benchmark criterion, less comprehensiveness, less differentiation or organization, and less abstractness. Regarding the threshold criterion, this is so in my view because the interest of scholars is in demarking the pure and theoretical form of wisdom. Such an extraordinarily high standard evolved also in connection with the historical association of wisdom with conceptions of beauty, the divine, the holy, and philosophical truth.

Scholars of wisdom, then, are akin to experts in any field. In fact, such differences between expert definitions of a human phenomenon and laypersons' defintions are true for

most phenomena whose origin lies in language, human experience, and common-sense psychology. In these instances, the added value of scholarly analysis is that its attempts to go beyond natural language-based representations and the noise of everyday life to define the ideal. Most likely, the scholarly representation will also be less person-based than concept-base. They think more about widom than about wise persons so to speak.

In short: I expect laypersons to have a good understanding of the basics and the raw structure of the concept of wisdom, and especially of wise persons. The structure of their beliefs, however, will be less strict as to the criterion of wisdom, less comprehensive, less organized, and less abstract than the beliefs of people who engage themselves as experts on the topic of wisdom such as philosophers; and do this by means of methods of science or logical analysis. Thus, philosophers because of their training are likely to be more expert carriers of the full meaning of the wisdom concept than laypersons. Remember, the very meaning of philosophy is the love or pursuit of wisdom. Philosophers have the benefit of the wisdom of their profession. Their understanding of wisdom is the constructive fusion of two sources: common-sense beliefs of wisdom and the philosophical analysis of wisdom.

Methodologically, one question remains. What happens if one moves from beliefs of a single individual to samples of individuals or the population as whole? Doesn't it seem reasonable to expect that when individual views are averaged or aggregated in some concept-driven way, that the resulting beliefs will entail larger and larger parts of the meaning space of wisdom. Moreover, if these aggregated beliefs were analyzed with criteria from the dictionary definition or the philosophers' definitional frame in mind, would it not be possible to find close to perfect identity of laypersons' beliefs with expert definitions of wisdom.

Certainly, this could happen if the experts themselves, such as philosophers, were part of the sample. However, excluding that strategy, my prediction still would be that the collective productions of beliefs about wisdom and wise persons would show increases in similarity, if individuals would have the chance of a discourse about wisdom before responding to the task of defining wisdom and characterizing wise persons. Our best knowledge about wisdom is collective. Thus, as people engage in collaborative discourse, which in another context we labelled as an instantiation of interactive minds (Baltes & Staudinger, 1996), a larger scope of

a collectively developed concept such as wisdom was well as a more organized representation are likely to come to the fore. In the end, however, my expectation is that on the concept level of wisdom, the agreed upon definition would be more concrete and less abstract.

Why? For three interrrelated reasons: (1) scholarly efforts are cumulative and only rarely can the frontiers of this scholarly discourse be reached after a single effort. (2) In matters of the meaning and conduct of human affairs, that is wisdom, there is much variation.and uncertainty. Even scholars are far from full agreement. (3) The knowledge and will of an emancipated society is not only based on scientific arguments. Wisdom is more than scientific knowledge. Therefore, I consider it unlikely that expert knowledge of a given profession will ever be the defining yardstick for everyday beliefs about wisdom. In fact, as I tried to show in the opening chapters, the absence of such an absolute yardstick happens to be an essential part of wisdom itself. Moreover, I tend to believe that the practical of everyday life enhances the notion that wisdom that for laypersons wisdom is more in people than in abstractions.

Everyday (Subjective) Beliefs About Wisdom and Wise Persons

Having set the conceptual and methodological stage, having outlines some of the expectations and their rationales, lets move to concrete research about everaday, subjective beliefs about wisdom and wise persons. Table 1 summarizes the main outcomes of five studies that I highlight in this chapter. Note, as you take a first look at this Table, that the findings summarized are based on two sources. One is the original responses of individuals, the other is the interpretation of these responses by the investigators. On average, the individual responses typically are more conrete and less integrated than the summarizing labels that the investigators attached to them. For this reason added in Table 6.1 where possible are specific instantiations on the level of items. These item examples, then, are closer to the raw data that individuals produced.

(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE)

The historically first relevant study is that of Vivian Clayton (1976; Clayton & Birren, 1990). Her research participants consisted of 83 male and female individuals representing the three age categories of young adulthood, middle adulthood, and old age. In a pilot study, Clayton generated a total of 13 descriptors that people used when asked to describe a wise

person: experienced, intuitive, introspective, pragmatic, understandingh, gentle, empathetic, intelligent, peaceful, knowledgeable, sense of humor, observant. Using a pair-wise similarity scaling approach, she asked her research participants to indicate the similarity between these descriptors. In addition, she included three additional descriptors in this procedure: wise, age, and myself.

By means of multidimensional scaling and wise as a reference point and as also shown in Table 1 (above), Clayton deduced from this set of observations three underlying dimensions that are in the core of characterizing a wise person: (a) a reflective component, identified by qualities of introspection and intuition, (b) an affective component, identified by the qualities of understanding, empathy, peacefulness, and gentleness, and © a general cognitive component consisting of two subfacets, knowledge and pragmatic experience on the one hand, and intelligent and observant on the other.

The Clayton study produced two more findings dealing with individual differences. While the general outcome was one of much similarity between age groups, there were some differences. A fist was that the structure of the meaning space of wisdom was more differentiated in the older age/cohort group. Their conception seemed to be more elaborated and displayed a stronger core, less ambiguity in the words of Clayton and Birren (1980, p. 137). The second finding was that older research participants displayed a a more reserved attitude toward the benefits of age and experience with regard to wisdom. Older adults placed the stimulus "aged" significantly further frrom the stimulus "wise" than either the young or middle-aged adults. Such a finding is consistent with the view that old age brings with it a more realistic attitude towards the assessment of one's wisdom. Another possibility is that, if older persons are wiser, that they would show what is known from the historical literature on wisdom, namely that those closer to wisdom are the ones who know best that they are not wise (see also, Meacham, 1983, 1990).

Clayton's (1976) meanwhile classical study set the foundation for several findings that should become part of the story on everyday beliefs about wisdom and wise persons. Yes and foremost, as is true for cultural-historical and philosophical analyses, wisdom is perceived as a coalition of attributes that represent an integration of cognitive, affective, and reflective

qualities. In my words, wisdom is a matter of mind, character, and virtue. Furthermore, there is much agreement among individuals in their beliefs about wise persons. The differences are in the detail of the concept, not in its core.

In my view, one can deduce one more perspective from the Clayton and Birren data, although this interpretation goes against the basic position of the investigators. As mentioned, Clayton and Birren in their theoretical work emphasize potential differences between Asian and Western conceptions of wisdom, allocating a stronger role to the reflective and intuitive in Asian conceptions. If you remember my writings on this topic in chapters 2 and 3, I had not reached such a position. On the contrary, I concluded that regarding this aspect of wisdom, there is more similarity than dissimilarity across historical periods and cultures. The findings by Clayton and Birren in a way support my position. Theirs was an American sample, and it was this sample that produced a structural view of wisdom where the integration of cognitive, affective, and reflective qualities made up the core of wisdom. It is possible, of course, that were one to compare Asian with Western samples in more detail, differences of the kind that Clayton and Birren expected could emerge. However, as I would submit that these would not affect the essence of the core.

A study by Sowarka (1989, 1990) is a logical follow-up of Clayton's (1976) work. Specifically, Sowarka used content analysis to analyze interview data that Johnson (1982) had collected. Available were 41 interviews with American elderly women and men who were asked to describe from their own life experience individuals they consider to be wise. An added feature of the Sowarka study is that this is one of the very few studies that attempted to identify the contexts and functions of the use of wisdom. Several findings are notworthy.

First, the data resulting from the conctent analysis showed the relative ease with which the elderly sample identified individuals from their own biographies whom they were willing to characterize as wise. In total, the 41 subjects identified in their interviews 120 such persons. And they had little trouble characterizing them. Thus, Sowarka concludes that concept of wisdom is close to a natural category of language.

Second, as was true for the Clayton and Birren data, the structure of the characterization involved the coordination of mind, personality, and interpersonal competence. Specifically, the

qualitiess that the interviewees used to characterize the wise persons nominated fell into four sectors: (a) desirable personality attributes such as a good character, (b) intellectual abilities permitting good judgment, (c) high social intelligence, and (d) social positions or roles where nurturing and optimizing social relationships are central, such as being a parent or a work supervisor.

There was a third finding in Sowarka analysis and reconstruction of the subjective beliefs about wisdom and wise persons, namely variations in emphasis around the core of wisdom. Interestingly, this finding emerged "hidden" as a gender difference. Although the primary finding was one of much similarity, there was one clear instantiation of a gender difference. More men were identified as wise than women. This gender differences, however, in my view can be interpeted as a sample case for the effect of the role of variations in life experience in creating a particular subjective view of wisdom.

To understand this gender difference, it is important to examine carfully the life history of the respective men and women in the sample. Although men and women were matched regarding educational leve, they were not matched on occupational status. Fewer women had professional careers. Not surprisingly, therefore, the larger number of wise persons nominated by men came primarily from the context of adult work life (with its larger pool of men), whereas women had selected their nominees primarily from the context of the family life such as when they nominated one of their own parents or grandparents.

On the one hand, one might criticize the study for not having equated men and women on occupational status. However, in my view on can take this putative design deficit also as an advantage and argue that the gender effect is likely primarily one of a gender difference in the composition of life careers.

With that assumption ind mind, the data show that variations in life contexts produce a difference in regard to one's knowledge about wise persons, and the particular attributes that become central when on thinks about wisdom. The opportunity of experiencing work contexts, as was true for most men in the sample, generates an additional set of potentially wise persons than if one's life experiences are very much defined by the context of family and kinship functioning. Interpreting these results this way is supported by other findings, namely

that when occupational status is controlled for, gender differences in wisdom-related indicators are small (Baltes & Staudinger, 1998).

What about the contexts and situation that the participants in Sowarka's study mentioned? Remember this was one of the innovations in Sowarka's analysis of the Johnson (1982) data. Specifically, she analyzed the behavioral and action contexts that the interviewees mentioned when speaking about wise persons. Doing so, Sowarka was able to identify 77 events or scenarios in which the nominated wise persons were characterized as showing wisdom.. I would like to highlight two of the results.

First, the identification of wise persons was practically always associated with memories about specific action contexts and life situations. These contexts mostly involved difficult and complex problems of everyday life and, in addition, often included the task of giving advice or acting effectively on behalf of all involved to solve the problem. Second, the large majority of the wisdom-prone situations were of the interpersonal kind. They concerned dynamics between people, although men in their recollections of work contexts also reported examples where the wise persons had reached high levels of professional success because of their special cognitive and social powers.

When it comes to the overall goal of research on the nature of everyday beliefs about wisdom and wise persons, work by Sternberg (1985, 1990b) is perhaps the richest and most ambitious. His program of research, conducted within the framework of implicit theory, addresses questions from each of the three topical areas outlined: research into the meaning of wisdom, research to understand and compare responses from laypersons with. responses from experts such as philosophers, research into the dimensions that people use when characterizing wisdom, as well as research aimed at examining whether wisdom-related information affects our behavior.

The Sternberg (1985) studies also considered variations in methodology. Some, for instance, provided the research participants with a predefined set of attributes, others focussed on spontaneous productions. To prevent a flavor of the richness of the approach, let me summarize some of the design features. For instance, Sternberg began by asking laypersons and college professors of differing subject matter (art, business, philosophy, and physics) to

enumerate behavioral expressions typical for an "ideal" intelligent, creative, and wise person. Subsequently, college students were asked to sort those behavioral characteristics into categories that were found in the first studies to be most typical of an ideal intelligent, creative, and wise person. In a follow-up study, another group of research participants was asked to evaluate their own standing on the most prototypical behavioral characeristics. Finally, letters of reference were constructed in which a person was characterized by sentences that, based on the previous studies, were in the prototypical center of the beliefs about intelligence, creativity, and wisdom. Another group of subjects was then asked to rate the persons described in the letters regarding their level of intelligence, creativity, and wisdom.

Three results of this series of multi-method and multi-group experiments are of special relevance for examining the structure and function of beliefs about wisdom and wise persons.   Lets b intelligence and creativity, in terms of language-based attributes. His work offers convincing evidence for the uniqueness of the wisdom construct where everyday beliefs are concerned. People differentiate between the meaning context of the three concepts compared.

Regarding individual differences, Sternberg's findings are consistent with the expectations outlined above. On the one hand, there was much similarity in the responses of the different subgroups regarding the meaning of these concepts. But Sternberg also found variations. For instance, for the group of philosophy professors, intelligence and wisdom were judged to be more similar to each other than creativity and wisdom or creativity and intelligence. This was not true for other subgroups.

Sternberg's findings also provided expectation-consistent evidence for the subject matter of wisdom. For instance, when looking at specific components, the relationship between wisdom and intelligence was based primarily on the social rather than the intellectual-academic aspect of intelligence. Note the similarity of this finding with the evidence provided by Sowarka (1989) who highlighted the social in the action contexts that her subjects identified as typical for wisdom. In the same vein, Sternberg's results emphasized that our subjective beliefs about wisdom and wise persons consider both, intellectual and personality-emotional variables. In the everyday beliefs of people, wisdom is more than intelligence.

Let me proceed to the next question in Sternberg's research program. After identifying the uniqueness and content location of the wisdom-wise person construct in the space provided by related concepts such as intelligence and creativity, Sternberg proceeded to identify, by multidimensional scaling analysis, the dimensions that were in the core of wisdom and wise persons. For this purpose, he used as stimuli in the rating procedures many of the attributes that he had identified in work where the responses about wisdom and wise persons were primarily subject-generated. Six intercorrelated dimensions resulted that in concert delineate wisdom:

1. Reasoning ability: e.g., good problem-solving ability, logical mind

2. Sagacity: e.g., concern for others, acceptance of advice

3. Learning from ideas and the environment: e.g., perceptive, learns from mistakes

4. Judgment: acts within own limitations, is sensible

5. Expeditious use of information: e.g., experienced, seeks out information

6. Perspicacity: e.g., intuition, offers right and true solutions

When looking at these six characteristics of wise persons, and as mentioned above, my expectation is that you, the reader, like I, have a sense of fit. However, and this I mentioned before as well, this sense of a good match is likely enhanced by the labels given to the dimensions, an effort that Sternberg in later theoretical work (Sternberg, 1990b) expanded. There, he went further in the direction of taking a birds' eye and conceptual view of the data and let his own theoretical mind speak. Thus, he identified six domains which lead people to label a person as wise: 1. Understanding of presuppositions, meaning, and limits; 2. Resisting automatization of one's own thought but seeking to understand it in others; 3. Judiciousness as primary intellectual style; 4. Understanding of ambiguity and obstacles; 5. Desire to understand what is known and what it means, and 6. Depth of understanding, needing to find appreciation in context.

The evolution of these descriptions from the inductive account to deductive and theory-driven characterizations illustrates the aforementioned problem of research on subjective beliefs, the possible confounding of people's beliefs with their interpretation and organization

by the researcher. The general labels given by Sternberg to the dimensions of wisdom reflect a higher level of organization than the individual items by themselves might suggest.

Irrespective of this theory-added effort, however, the results of Sternberg's program of research supports the view that when people of varying age and gender are asked to characterize wisdom and wise person, their responses, evince wisdom as being unique. Moreover, while their responses do not have the precision and comprehensiveness of the philosophical analytical account of wisdom (see earlier chapters), the direction associated with these subjective beliefs is consistent with that analysis.

The Sternberg findings do not stand alone. Let me use one other study on subjective theories of wisdom conducted at about the same time by Holliday and Chandler (1986). Like Sternberg's research, their work proceeded in the context of implicit theory and the notion of prototypicality. In this spirit, they focused not only on those words that people use to describe wisdom and wise persons, but especially on those attributes they judge to be the prototypical indicators of these concepts. Their primary method of data reduction was factor analysis.

When one selects from the Holiday and Chandler analysis the factors associated with those attributes judged to be "prototypical" of a wise person and wise behavior, two factors emerged. Holliday and Chandler labelled these as:

1. Exceptional understanding of ordinary experience, and
2. Excellence in judgment and communication skills

The three remaining factors, all relevant for high level of functioning, but not unique to wise persons were: General competencies, interpersonal skills, and social unobtrusiveness. Restricting, as I do in this presentation, the Holliday and Chandler analysis to the two factors that derive from the attributes of high prototypicality of wisdom and wise persons, permits to highlight the "unique" essence of wisdom.

The first factor, exceptional understanding of ordinary experience, makes it clear that wise persons see more in life than others. Their mental representations add significance and meaning to a given event. The second factor, judgment and communication skills, and not unlike the findings by Sowarka (1989), moves into the foreground the wisdom-specific ability

of weighing information in a balanced and priority-oriented manner and being able to do so in the context of social discourse, interpersonal relations, and advice giving.

In their theoretical interpretation of the findings, Chandler and Holliday (see also, Chandler, 1990) offer an innovative link between their findings and a major theory of modern pragmatic and communication philosophy, that of Habermas (19XX). Mentioning this is important because it offers a further illustration of how work on the delineation of subjective beliefs can be projected into higher-level theory, theories that likely were not in the minds of the individuals when responding to questions about wisdom and wise persons. Specifically, Chandler argues that the findings are consistent with the joining of all three components of Habermas's theory of knowledge: (a) technical knowledge, (b) practical knowledge, and © emancipatory knowledge. With this interpretation, wisdom becomes the overall and encompassing gestalt of all knowledge about human affairs.

My final example of research into subjective beliefs of wisdom is meant to illustrate another usage of this mode of work. It deals with the question of how work on subjective beliefs can be intertwined with explicit psychological theory of wisdom. This was the goal of a study conducted in my laboratory by Staudinger, Maciel, Smith, and Baltes (1998). The major finding is summarized in the right column of Table 1 (above).

Specifically, we asked whether the psychological theory of wisdom developed by us as the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm (see chapter 7 for more detail) exhibits sufficient similarity with common-sense views on wisdom. In this instance, attributes that emerged in previous research provided the basis. Subsequently, we added attributes that were an essential part of our own theoretical conception of wisdom.(see chapter 7).

In total, we used 131 attributes and characteristics. Examples are: "a wise person knows when to give or withhold advice", or "knows that individual life goals and values may change during the life course". We then asked 102 adult women differing in age to rate these statement regarding their degree of typicality of an "ideally wise person". Of the 131 attributes, 60 came from the earlier research by Holliday and Chandler (30 items), Sternberg (21 items), and Sowarka (1989). To these we added 62 items to characterize the five dimensions that we

have specified to mark the domain of wisdom (see chapter 7). Finally, as a control, we included 9 items that were antithetical to the core of wisdom.

Of the 131 items, 31 items turned out to be judged as very typical of an ideal wise person. In this context, as an aside, I mention that 22 of the 31 items were consistent with our own theoretical conception. As shown in Table 1 (above), a factor analysis of these 31 items resulted in four factors:

* Exceptional knowledge about the use of wisdom

* Exceptional knowledge about contexts and priorities of life

* Exceptional personality functioning, and

* Exceptional knowledge about human learning and the acquisition of wisdom.

These four facets of the concept of an ideal wise person were robust across the individual raters, the degree of consensus between the 102 study participants was very high. The correlational consistency of the ratings between individuals (across the items) was well above .90. The typical behavioral indicators typical of wisdom, then, were shared by the vast majority of the women who functioned as raters. Such an outcome suggests that wisdom is akin to what Rosch and Lloyd (1978) called a natural-category concept. A category that evinces little variation across individuals. This study also made a contribution toward understanding the relationship between everyday conceptions and scholarly conceptions. We obtained evidence that the items selected based on a theory of wisdom, received on average the highest prototypical ratings. This finding illustrates perhaps the fact that a scholarly effort toward an explicit psychological theory of wisdom facilitates the identification of the most significant aspect of wisdom and wise persons.

As mentioned, interindividual consensus of ratings was a key finding in this work. However, there were also one piece of evidence for the kind of individual differences that can be expected. Through Q-factor analysis, a statistical technique to identify subgroups of persons, we could identify four subgroups of raters who differed somewhat in the relative constellations of 31 items they considered typical of an ideal wise person. For instance, relatively speaking, some placed the cognitive knowledge-based factors of wisdom closer to the core, while others put personality aspects closer to the core of an ideal wise person. Having

obtained such a differential finding is helpful in understanding why wisdom researchers (e.g., Birren & Fisher, 1990) differ in their theoretical emphases and weighing of what is most important; for instance, the cognitive, the emotional, or the motivational in the pattern of attributes that in concert define the core of wisdom. Researchers, like philosophers, are both: common-sense people as well as experts.

Although I focussed on these five studies, there are others. For the most part, their findings are consistent with what has been summarized so far. Lets consider the work of Orwoll and Perlmutter (1990) as one illustration. Its special theoretical emphasis was on demonstrating that everyday beliefs about wisdom make it clear that wisdom is more than a set of cognitive functions, that wisdom is integrative and includes facets of personality. Their findings, like all other findings on this topic known to me, support such a view. In their discussion of this finding, Orwoll and Perlmutter highlight especially the role of self-development and self-transcendence as key topics of the adult-developmental agenda.

In addition, and again to underscore the consistency in such research on subjective beliefs about wisdom, the Orwoll and Perlmutter work supported a couple of other findings reported in prior research. For instance, the fact that older adults assign themselves lower scores on wisdom than younger adult assign to them. Furthermore, as was true for Sowarka's results for instance, that among the persons nominated as wise by women and men are more men than women. In my view, and as mentioned in the context of the Sowarka study, this effect is largely due to gender differences in occupational career patterns. In fact, when people in the Orwoll and Perlmutter study were asked directly about the role of gender in wisdom, their beliefs do not indicate that gender is a relevant variable.

Wisdom as a Naive Theory and Regulator of Behavior and Development

_____Although my assumption is that many psychologists interested in the study of wisdom and wise persons are motivated by the idea that wisdom is something that "drives" behavior and gives direction to human development, that specifies goals and means to reach these goals, research on this topic is rare, and at best indirect.

What do I mean by indirect evidence? One way to interpret the findings summarized above would be to assume that the qualities assigned to wise persons actually can be seen as

evidence on the goals and means that guide individual toward the kind for excellence that wisdom represents. Thus, if wise persons are characterized, for instance, as being high in empathy or exceptionally competent interpersonal skills, this actually, so the indirect interpretation, would mean that being high in empathy and interpersonal skills are desirable, both as goals and as means to reach goals.

In the same line of thought: Moreover, if one were able to decompose the attributes into goals, such as being generative, and means, such as having interpersonal skills, a package would result that leads to concerted action, namely to orchestrate a coalition of means and goals. In this vein, wisdom would be the most general form of specifying high level, that is, wisdom-typical goals and means. These goals and means is what people would need to display as they attempt to be well-functioning members of society, in the best sense of what wisdom is all about.

I guess such an indirect approach to the study of everyday beliefs about wisdom and wise persons can be defended; and likely this approach may have been at the foundation of why we have engaged in this research. However, we also need to acknowledge that extant research has not pursued this hypothesis as explicitly as it could have done, and this certainly includes my own work as well. People were not asked about goals, nor were they asked about means to reach these goals; nor were they asked when and under which conditions they invoke wisdom as a guide or naive theory to implement movement towards wisdom. Rather, the primary focus of the extant research was to characterize wisdom and wise persons without any specification regarding the goals and means involved, how the various attributes are expected to be orchestrated, and in which situations.

Let me illustrate this problem with a study conducted in my laboratory (Heckhausen, Dixon, & Baltes, 1989; Heckhausen & Baltes, 1991). The focus of this work on charting subjective beliefs or expectations about the gains and losses of adulthood and old age. For this purpose, a gain was conceptually defined as becoming stronger in an attribute that is desirable (such as being intelligent) or weaker in an attribute that is undesirable (such as being hostile). Conversely, a loss was defined as becoming weaker in something judged to be desirable (healthy) or higher in something that is undesirable (such as being frail).

In total, more than 300 attributes such as intelligent, strong, healthy, reflective, wise, etc., were evaluated by adults regarding their desirability and likely change pattern during adulthood. At what age would they, on average, be expected to change and in which direction? Figure 6.1 shows one of the outcomes. For the most part, people believe that beginning during middle adulthood, there is an increasingly larger number of losses, although expected gains still outnumber losses until the late 60ies.

Note that there are only two major exceptions to this trend. Wisdom and dignity are expected to become stronger around age 50. Now, one could argue, in line with the argument presented above, that wisdom and dignity in this work can be seen as representing goals and means involving the purpose (goal) and conduct of life. Striving toward them, with goals and means in mind that characterize a wise person, is identical with engineering a self-organizational process that moves us closer and closer to wisdom and dignity.

However, such findings also make my major point that such evidence is at best consistent with the implicit theories that researchers hold themselves. In this vein, it is intuitively appealing to argue that wisdom and dignity are likely to be represented a constructs that function as goals and means in the regulation of human development. Yet, even on the level of subjective evidence, we do not know whether individuals would report, when asked, that they are aware of such mental representations, and that they believe, that their conception of wisdom entails the knowledge and skills that permits them to identify life goals and the means to pursue and reach them.

The issue is even trickier if one were to argue that people would not only hold such beliefs but that such beliefs are evidence for their actual operation as causal antecedent factors. That inference would go way beyond what such descriptive research on everyday beliefs about wisdom and wise persons can demonstrate. To show that such beliefs indeed influence behavior, including the effective movement toward higher levels of wisdom-related functioning, would require an entirely different set of studies including systematic variation of such beliefs (e.g., Gollwitzer & Bargh, 1996). Articulating naive theories of wisdom and wise persons and forging their connection with behavioral regulation, then, is a valid hope for the

future. At present, however, the evidence is not there. What is available is evidence that is not inconsistent with such a possibility.

Another exemplar of the use of wisdom-related knowledge may lie in knowledge of proverbs and their activationn. As I mentioned in chapter 1, when one opens in everyday life a conversation about wisdom and wise persons, it is often mentioned that proverbs are relevant. Proverbs are seen as footprints of wisdom meant to give direction for thinking and reflection. Indeed, the essence of proverbs is that they are short and contain a highly condensed kernel of common-sense "truth." Another feature of good proverbs is that they are contextually and temporally flexible; they are transported easily, from subject matter to subject matter, from language to language, and from historical period to historical period. For a proverb to be powerful, it must prove a certain effectiveness, as a cue that organizes and makes us be reflective.

At the same time, proverbs are ideal illustrations for the chameon nature of their usefulness of validity. Remember from chapter 1, it is important to note at the outset (e.g., Perry, 1993) that none of the proverbs (or maxims for that matter) in themselves are wisdom. First, individual proverbs often contradict each other. In chapter 1, I mentioned as a classical case the difference between "Clothes make the man" versus "don't judge a book by its cover." Individual proverbs, then, typically activate one or another of the various facets that make for wisdom. This ffeature, however, in itself does not contradict wisdom. Because wisdom is inherently integrative and dynamic and often suggests "true" oppositional tendencies. Not surprisingly, therefore, the pool of individual maxims offers examples that contradict each other.

What is interesting is to investigate whether when people try to act wisely they are guided by proverbs, or whether the people who are considered wise, indeed possess a larger and well-constructed pool of proverbs. Moreover, would their collection of proverbs be of the quality that we know from the wisdom literature or from modern-day so-called wisdom sayings: "Consider the end" credited to the sage Chilo of Sparta; Solon's : "Know thyself", or the Chinese saying "Even a long journey begins with a single step."

These observations and commentaries show that are many niches and enticing opportunities for innovative psychological research in this area. A first would be to pursue work that would test the concept of wisdom as a subjective or folk psychological theory of what human excellence is and how one can attain such excellence. Does the concept of wisdom indeed incorporate knowledge and beliefs about these features? If yes, how does the theory evolve and to what degree are the principles consistent with psychological knowledge about human functioning and human development?

Another promising line of inquiry would be to put even more into the fore individual differences in subjective beliefs and folk psychological theories of wisdom than is true to date. This would require extending the spectrum of comparison including the cultural dimension. For instance, although many argue without apparent objections that there are major differences in cultural conceptions of wisdom such as in the conceptions of wisdom that Asian cultures hold in comparison to Western cultures. Aside from declarative statements on this question, the empirical evidence is largely absent. And as to the one often stated major differences between Asian and Western conceptions, that is, the relative emphasis on the social interconnectedness and the intuitive in Asian conceptions of human functioning, this has been found for the concept of intelligence itself (Azuma, 198X, XXXX).

However, a difference regarding the conception of intelligence is not the same as one for wisdom, a concept that I claim has been reserved universally for the integrative and the social in all cultures. In fact, the study by Clayton (1976) on wisdom and wise persons summarized above, and contrary to her own expectation, did obtain for an American sample exactly the profile of a coalition between cognitive, affective, and reflective qualities that she in her theoretical introduction reserved for Asian beliefs about wisdom. I do not claim that no differences would be found. However, I do claim that these differences will be less in the core of wisdom than in the specifics and in differences in the weighing of attributes; and I would also expect that within cultures, the individual differences (for instance by gender, education, and occupational status) are larger than the between-culture differences. However, psychology is an empirical science, and we will need to await the relevant data to settle this question.

Comparison of Everyday and Implicit Beliefs with the Philosophical Conception of Wisdom

To the third lines of questions: The comparison of everyday beliefs and folk psychological conceptions of wisdom with scholarly efforts to define wise as that offered by philosophers. I had predicted that there would be much similarity regarding the core of wisdom and wise persons. At the same time, that there would be differences, for instance, in the benchmark of wisdom, in the degree of comprehensiveness, in the level of abstraction.

There is not much direct empirical research on this question. The major exception is part of a study by Sternberg (1985). In this study, the focus was on judging the similarity of attributes in regard to three criteria: wisdom, creativity, and intelligence. One of the groups of evaluators were professors of philosophy. Indeed, their ratings produced one noted exception from the general finding of high consensus. They judged the relationship between wisdom and intelligence to be lower than the others. We can only speculate about this reason. My suggestion is that this is due to the fact that in the philosophy of wisdom, the joining of mind and virtue was always central (Kekes, 1995). The concept of intelligence by itself does not generate such a virtue- or morality-related meaning space. In fact, philosophers likely have a tendency to resist the equating of wisdom and intelligence. As a result, for philosophers the overlap between intelligence and wisdom is lower than for other groups.

Beyond this one study, my conclusions about the similarity of everyday beliefs about wisdom and wise persons are speculative and theory-based. Let me begin by illustration using one exemplar of a definition advanced in philosophy that is more elaborated than an abstract definition such as that wisdom deals with the goals and means of a good life. Consider the following, relatively detailed definition of a wise person from a recent philosophical treatment of wisdom.

Habermehl (1995) summarizes the following attributes: A wise person (1) is broadly informed about facts relevant to his/her opinions, and carefully measures their significance, (2) withholds judgment when the weight of evidence is unclear, (3) is proficient in the art of reasoning, (4) is able to see that some seemingly complex or unrelated phenomena are in fact connected by a common thread, (5) is able to see that some phenomena which seem at first to be quite simple are instead quite complex, (6) is able to anticipate the more distant repercussions of immediate events, (7) is able to distinguish between cosmetic or superficial

dimensions of events and their underlying realities, (8) is animated by an eagerness to see things accurately and broadly, (9) is able to maintain a perspective that rises beyond preoccupation with narrow self-interest, and (10) is open o the possibility of revising (or perhaps radically altering) his/her opinions as new developments require.

Definitely, this framework of wisdom implies a very high standard, it is more comprehensive, differentiated, and abstract than what individuals would list who are not philosophers. Nevertheless, when presented with such a frame, laypersons will report much agreement, perhaps they are even impressed with its content and organization.

However, laypersons, while moving in the same general territory as expert scholars, to show differences as well. For instance, and this is demonstrated in the analyses of interviews about wise persons presented by Sowarka (1989), they focus more strongly on the practical. They also offer little evidence that they believe that their exemplars of wisdom were perfect human beings as a philosophical definition of wisdom would imply. The benchmark of philosophical analysis is the utopian ideal, the benchmark for everyday people is excellence in comparison with other everyday people.

I suggest that everyday beliefs about wisdom and wise persons in one respect extends beyond what I have seen in strictly philosophical definitions. It involves concreteness and the willingness to move into what I call "wisdom in action". As I read the attributes of wisdom and wise persons summarized, for instance, in Table 1, these views reflect not only the cognitive knowledge base of wisdom, but also the behavioral manifestations required for wisdom to be offered to others. Wanting to help others, being able to listen, being able to relate interpersonally, these attributes on the surface are more motivational and social than cognitive.

Laypersons likely place these attributes into the foreground for a number of reasons. One is their explicit connection of wisdom to wise persons. Philosophers, on the other hand, reflect less about people when delineating wisdom than about an abstract concept and philosophical arguments about the structure of wisdom. Conversely, laypersons, if they are engaged with wisdom, they are engaged with the experiential life contexts in which they observed wisdom. Their engagement with wisdom, then, is less oriented toward a cognitive representation of the word in terms of logical and semantic analysis than would be true for

philosophers. Rather than reading abstract texts about wisdom, laypersons take their meaning of wisdom and wise person from their own personal experiences. Often, these experiences deal with what wise persons have done for them and others.

In sum: both philosophers and laypersons are affected to some degree from input that originates in theoretical and life-practical contexts and experiences. However, they would be questionable philosophers, if the conceptions of wisdom of philosophers would not be primarily conditioned by concepts and methods of philosophy, and the treatment of the concept of wisdom (rather than of wise persons) in the philosophical literature (e.g., Oelmüller, 1989).

Laypersons' beliefs about wisdom, on the other hand, I submit are primarily the consequence of personal experiences with wise persons. They share, of course, in the general and dictionary-based meaning space of the wisdom concept. However, their primary mental representations are people- and life-experience bound. Thus, their characterizations of wisdom are based on the "gestalt" of exemplars of wisdom from their life or knowledge from history. Not surprisingly, therefore, spontaneous productions of people when asked about wisdom are much associated with the notion of wise persons and , in addition, invokes such wise people in context: as mentors, thinkers, helpers, interpreters, and models. The gestalt of wisdom for the everyday person, then, more so than is true for philosophers, is primarily an exemplar person notion, one or more individuals who are seen as acting or having acted wisely (Sowarka, 1989).

Role of Everyday Beliefs in the Construction of a Psychological Theory of Wisdom

We need to return to the conceptual foundation of this work on beliefs and implicit theories about wisdom and wise persons? What does it mean and not mean, which part is valid, which inference would be premature or even false? To make progress on these questions, we return to the distinction between the two major lines of inquiry specified at the beginning of this chapter: work on beliefs about wisdom and wise persons and work on the common-sense or folk psychology of wisdom that extends beyond describing the beliefs about wisdom and wise persons, to include beliefs and implicit naive theory about the role of wisdom in the regulation of behavior.

It is beyond the scope of this book to outline in more details the pros and cons regarding the study of everyday beliefs. Be it sufficient to state that the recent cognitive revolution in psychology has strengthened the naive or implicit theory approach. Thus, since the 70ies, we see a strong flurry of such work. However, as is often true for cyclical developments in the sciences, critics are back. Thus, in the present scene, opinions range from the reverential, stating that assessing the subjective and what people think about a given phenomenon is the essence of human psychology, to the dismissive implying that beliefs are just epiphenomena and noise for a construction of good scientific psychological theory. The later has been the hallmark of classical behaviorism, for instance. No doubt, what everyday beliefs about the nature and principles of human behavior tells us, for instance in the form of proverbs, often does not square with the scientific evidence on the rules that govern behavior(Rodgers, 1990). But is that the only criterion to consider? Aside from the search for the beliefs-intention-behavior connection, these beliefs have their own standing as phenomena to be understood.

The close association with intuitive-implicit beliefs and effectors to create explicit scientific theory is particularly relevant for the study of human phenomena. It is easy for researchers to feel that they have more insight into their "subjects" than would be true for other organisms such as mice or the butterfly. It is a main position of folk psychological approaches (Fletcher, 1995), therefore, that it is justifiable to make use of the pre-scientific knowledge that laypersons have about the causes, reasons, and mechanisms of behavior. I agree. Certainly, when tested against scientific standards, the validity of these preconceptions can be questioned in the same way as some researchers based on empirical work might question the utility of certain statistical models. In the long run, if folk psychological theories were shown to be false when measured against the yardstick of science, they still exist as phenomena, although over time they might change to approximate what science suggests to be a more adequate account. Despite powerful biological-evolutionary and cultural-experiential determinants, common-sense beliefs can change, and there is plenty of historical evidence to show that this is the case, for instance regarding the sources and explanations of illnesses.

Now, what are the most critical perspectives and arguments in this debate about the structure and function of everyday beliefs and folk psychology? The critics of research on implicit beliefs focus primarily on the second question posed in this chapter, namely whether beliefs can be seen as "theoretical and functional", as part of the determining forces that control human action and human development. It is the belief-desire-intention-implementation connection that is at stake here, and especially whether the mechanisms of behavior that laypersons believe are the forces in this sequence indeed are the real forces. Let me review some of the relevant arguments much of which is drawn from the work of Fletcher (1995).

The first argument against such a folk psychological account is that it is circular from a measurement point of view. The data base is entirely subjective, there is not effort made to vary conditions and to separate the measurement source of the beliefs from the measurement source regarding the effects of the beliefs. Contrary to traditional scientific theory, then, it is objected that common-sense beliefs confound antecedents with consequents, causes with outcomes.

Another set of arguments against common-sense or folk psychological beliefs state that they do not have the characteristics of an organized theory in the first place.; and finally, that folk psychological account lack generalizability, that they are local by definition. The most extreme case made against folk psychology (Churchland, 1991) is what is called "eliminative materialism". It is the objective of that position to consider common-sense and folk psychological as transitional as something to be overcome and eliminated from serious science. In many ways, the fundamental objection to the use of implicit and common-sense psychology is a rehearsal of the classical arguments against introspection as a method of inquiry (Boring, 1948). Note in this context, however, that implicit theories and common-sense accounts go beyond introspective accounts of a single individual. If aggregated across people, they have aspects of collectivity and, therefore, also intersubjectivity; though concededly foremost on the level of descriptive analysis.

It is important to consider these critical perspectives, although supporters of common-sense or folk psychological approach are quick to argue that it would be erroneous to conclude that these arguments falsify the approach in principle. Problems of an approach do not necessarily imply that it is useless in principle.

Note for instance, the argument that any particular method of science is limited in precision and scope. Therefore, it is important to recognize that in the final analysis the description and explanation of human behavior is a multimethod and multiperspective task. As suggested already by Aristotle, for instance, the art of human science is to consider in concert all forms of causality (e.g., material, efficient, formal, final), not to elevate one over the other. In this spirit, my guiding assumption is, for instance, that beliefs do determine behavior to some degree, although their power and range of determination is only part of the overall system of causal factors that regulate human behavior.

Not to forget the other side of the argument, those considerations that lead some researchers to embrace implicit theory and common-sense psychology. What is their defense?

A first argument is that humans themselves do process information against standards of reality. Common-sense and folk psychology have been evolving over the millennia, driven by both biological-evolutionary and experiential-cultural factors. Whatever the beliefs and implicit theoretical accounts are, they should have some basis in reality. As Fletcher (1995, p. 96-97) stated: "It would be surprising if folk psychology turned out to be complete rubbish". Thus, it is worthwhile to take its building blocks seriously and to make it part of scientific analysis.

A second argument supportive of implicit theory and common-sense psychology is phenomenological. The phenomenological position states that whatever people believe and think is something to be studied and understood. Subjective phenomena are part of human behavior. The legitimation of work on subjective beliefs does not only rest in the question whether such subjective knowledge about the belief-desire-intention-implementation connection is valid. Rather, this question itself is a matter of scientific inquiry.

Another pro argument is that implicit theories and folk psychological conceptions are a valuable source for the development of theories within scientific psychology. If that were not the case, our everyday lives as scientists would be completely detached from our everyday lives as everyday people. It appears unreasonable to ignore our own and culture's insights into our behavior as a sources for theories. Of course, from a scientific point of view, these subjective beliefs are not the final criterion. Subsequently, they can be further elaborated and tested by other more traditional means of scientific inquiry.

Returning to beliefs and implicit, folk-psychological accounts of wisdom. My conclusion is that the first question, the study of beliefs about wisdom and wise persons, these findings are scientifically useful. Aside from design and measurement limitations, even researchers most critical of common-sense approaches, are likely not to reject this data base. What people report to us as their characterizations of wisdom and wise persons is scientific evidence. This is particularly true if variations in methodology, as is true for the present situation, result in similar outcomes.

The situation is much more complicated for the second question, the study of wisdom as a naive, implicit, common-sense, folk-psychological theory. There is not much work of this kind to begin with. However, where the work suggested that wisdom or wise persons are seen as entailing principles that regulate behavior, that elucidate the beliefs-desire-intention-implementation nexus of behavior initiation and development, this evidence needs to be taken as having the status of hypotheses that need further testing by alternative methods.

Are there examples in the present work that illustrate this conundrum? One example is the evidence on wisdom as a goal in development. If people stated in their reports that this is the case, we would need additional research to demonstrate that this is the case, using for instance, methods of cognitive action psychology (Gollwitzer & Bargh, 1996). Or lets take the attribute of

What is the implication for a psychological theory of wisdom? I offer three perspectives and recommendations.

The first is the importance of achieving in psychological research a sufficient degree of similarity between everyday conceptions of wisdom and scientific conceptions of wisdom. Like it was true for explicating philosophical conceptions, it appears to me that whatever psychologists decide to label as wisdom, it needs to entail the core of the concept of wisdom as it is contained in everyday beliefs about wisdom. The essential aspects obtained in work on the everyday beliefs that people hold about wisdom are rather similar to dictionary definitions of wisdom: knowledge and behavior that reflects a high degree of understanding of the human condition, deep insights into the priorities of life as well as into the ways and means by which to live a good life. To achieve this, so say the beliefs of laypersons, it is critical to have a

person who is able to integrate and coordinate the intellectual, the emotional, the motivational, and the interpersonal, and do this in a way that the welfare of humankind is the primary criterion.

The second is the significance in psychological theory of wisdom to distinguish clearly between the study of wisdom as a concept and the study of wise persons. In the theoretical analysis of wisdom conducted foremost by philosophers but also in cultural-historical accounts (see chapters 2-5), wisdom was not meant to be solely represented in individuals. In fact, the general argument was closer to the conclusion that, except for god, no single individual would hold all of wisdom or be all wise. Rather, wisdom is seen as a collectively generated and represented phenomenon. For instance, wisdom at its best is represented in writings, not in people. For philosophers, especially, the core representation of wisdom is semantic-conceptual not personological.

Concluding Perspectives

What have we learned from a review of the extant research on everyday beliefs about wisdom and wise persons? There are several conclusions as well as several suggestions for further research. Some are data of consensual validation, others demonstrate how little we know.

First, research on everyday beliefs about wisdom and wise persons has shown that these concepts are a part of natural language as people use it. Since the groundbreaking work of Clayton (1976; Clayton & Birren, 1980), studies reevealed with much consistency that wisdom is a familiar concept to adults, wise persons are part of reality about which it is easy for most people to report. Exemplars of wisdom do exist in the lives of most ordinary people (Sowarka, 1989; Orwoll & Perlmutter, 1990).

Second, this work on beliefs about wisdom and wise person has shown that wisdom has uniqueness. It is far from being identical with other positive conceptions of human functioning such as intelligence and creativity. The work, however, is not complete. We do not know enough about the meaning space if other concepts would be added that are closer to wisdom, such as prudence or cleverness.

Third, everyday beliefs about wisdom and wise persons are also pretty close to what language identifies as the core of wisdom. This is at least true for the American and German samples that participated in this research. Although individuals by themselves rarely produce a comprehensive definitional account, and they even more rarely use dictionary definitions spontaneously, what they report in their own language is consistent with the view that wisdom deals with the conduct and meaning of life, that it is a highly desirable quality, and that in terms of behavioral indicators, it involves such things as sound judgements, good advice, and other ways of dealing efficiently with difficult problems of life.

Fourth, the implicit theories and beliefs of adults about wisdom and wise persons highlights the integrative nature of wisdom. If the individuals' beliefs and responses are aggregated into summarizing statements that reflect what samples of people report, wisdom is reconstructed to represent a constellation of desirable attributes that characterize the whole of a person: its intellectual, emotional-affective, reflective, and interpersonal qualities. The words used to describe these characteristics vary from persons to person, as do the labels that investigators use to identify the relevant dimension (see Table 6.1). The core meaning, however, appears highly similar.

Fourth, wisdom and being a wise person is seen as something developmental. People agree that it takes much effort and a long time of experience to become wise. Unfortunately, we know little about the age when children and adolescents acquire knowledge of the concepts of wisdom and wise persons, and to what degree their conceptions are simply "underdeveloped" concetions, or whether their conceptions evince particular differences in qualities or emphasis.

Fifth, the consistency and richness of everyday beliefs with wisdom is enhanced when the research goes beyond spontaneous productions and asks people to respond to a predefined set of stimuli that as a whole are supposed to indicate wisdom and wise persons. In these instances, adult research participants exhibit a response pattern that is more comprehensive in its coverage of the excellence in the mind-personality-virtue-social intelligence interface that wisdom represents. The analyses also showed that people believe that wisdom is developmental. It takes time, experience, and guidance. It is in this spirit, that German research participants placed, on average, the emergence of wisdom in late midlife.

Sixth, when people are asked for spontaneous descriptions of wisdom, their characterization is less that of an abstract conception of wisdom, as would be true for philosophers, than a characterization of exemplars of wise persons whom they know from their lives. This is an important insight. It is important because it makes clear that everyday beliefs do not consider the theoretical analysis of wisdom, for instance its foundation in the philosophical writings about wisdom or wisdom-related texts such as the bible or constitutions of state. Wisdom in everyday life is represented by knowledge of select people judged to be wise, much more so than by a conceptual analysis of wisdom, for instance, of how means and ends can be linked together to produce a good life.

Seventh, when considering extant research on everyday beliefs about wisdom and wise person in the framework of common-sense or folk psychology, and especially its critical evluation (Churchland, 1991; Fletcher, 1995), it becomes conspicuous that some of the most important questions about the beliefs about wisdom and wise persons have not been studied. With very few exceptions, we know close to nothing about the role of wisdom-related factors in the operation of the belief-desire-intention-implementation frame that regulates behavior and its development across the lifespan. The same is true for other conceptions of cognitive and behavioral regulation that focus. For instance, less on conscious goal-attainment than on the operation of automatic response chains. To what degree, for instance, is wisdom is an organizing cue in memory, a cue that enlists wisdom-related but otherwise fragmented bodies of knowledge, to what degree generates the activation of wisdom attentional focus on the good rather than the bad?

Ninth, wisdom in everyday life is something that can be achieved. Its benchmark is different from the utopian definition of wisdom that philosophers and religious scholars of the middle ages and the Enlightenment pursued. Wisdom is what the best of us, in our everyday worlds, do achieve. Wisdom in everyday life has a more or less quality, its threshold is not beyond reach.

In sum: Research on subjective beliefs about wisdom and wise persons has provided us with empirical findings that demonstrate that the wisdom construct has a place in everyday reality and the minds of most people, In everyday life, wisdom is not utopian, but down to

earth. In a way, these data show that the historical Aristotelian endeavor, of taking wisdom from heaven to earth, has taken a further step. Wisdom has become part of the lives of everyday people. At the same time, the research is in its infancy. The territory is far from being identified. This applies especially to the role of wisdom and wise persons in producing the kind of behavior that wisdom is intended to signifiy: the goals (ends) and means (ways) of becoming and being wise, of being excellent at living a good and meaningful life.

NOTES

CONSIDER WRITING ABOUT MORALITY --KEKES-- WHEN DISCUSSING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EVERYDAY BELIEFS AND PHILOLSOPOHICAL CONCEPTIONS OF WISDOM

References

(1765/1967). Sagesse. In D. Diderot & J. L. d'Alembert (Eds.), *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences des arts et des métiers* (Vol. 14, pp. 496-498). Stuttgart: E. Fromman.

(1853). Weisheit. In J. Meyer (Ed.), *Das große Conversations-Lexikon für die gebildeten Stände* (Vol. 14, pp. 40-41). Amsterdam: Bildburghausen.

(1936). Sapienza, libro della. In G. Treccani (Ed.), *Enciclopedia italiana* (Vol. XXXII, pp. 810-811). Rome: Royal Italian Press.

(1967). Peirce, Charles Sanders. In P. Edwards (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. New York: Macmillan.

(1970). *Astasahasrika prajñaparamita (E. Conze, Trans.)*. Calcutta: Asiatic Society.

(1984). Biblical literature. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 879-938). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

(1984). Buddha. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 369-441). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

(1984). Dilthey, Wilhelm. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed.). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

(1984). Humanities. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 8, pp. 1179). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

(1984). Kant, Immanuel. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed.). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

(1984). Virtue, teachability of. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Brittanica* (Vol. 10, pp. 455-456).

(1987). Enlightenment. In G. H. R. Parkinson (Ed.), *An encyclopedia of philosophy*. London: Croom Helm.

(1987). Humanism. In G. H. R. Parkinson (Ed.), *An encyclopedia of philosophy*. London: Croom Helm.

(1987). Idealism. In G. H. R. Parkinson (Ed.), *An encyclopedia of philosophy*. London: Croom Helm.

(1987). Petrarch. In G. H. R. Parkinson (Ed.), *An encyclopedia of philosophy*. London: Croom Helm.

(1987). Philosophy. In G. H. R. Parkinson (Ed.), *An encyclopedia of philosophy*. London: Croom Helm.

(1987). Renaissance. In G. H. R. Parkinson (Ed.), *An encyclopedia of philosophy*. London: Croom Helm.

(1987). Wisdom. In G. H. R. Parkinson (Ed.), *An encyclopedia of philosophy*. London: Croom Helm.

(1989). Prudence. In J. A. Simpson & E. S. C. Weiner (Eds.), *The Oxford English dictionary* (Vol. 12, pp. 728-729). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

(1989). Wisdom. In J. A. Simpson & E. S. C. Weiner (Eds.), *The Oxford English dictionary* (Vol. 20, pp. 421-426). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Abbagnano, N. (1967). Humanism. In P. Edwards (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of philosophy* (Vol. 4, pp. 69-72). New York: Macmillan.

Abramson, P. R. (1997). Probing well beyond the bounds of conventional wisdom. *American Journal of Political Science, 41*, 675-682.

Achenbaum, W. A., & Orwoll, L. (1991). Becoming wise: A psycho-gerontological interpretation of the Book of Job. *International Journal of Aging and Human Development, 32*, 21-39.

Ackerman, B. A. (1980). *Social injustice in the liberal state*. Binghampton, NY: Vail-Ballou Press.

Ackrill, J. H. (1980). Aristotle on Eudaemonia. In A. O. Rorty (Ed.), *Essays on Aristotle's "Ethics"* (pp. 15-34). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Acton, H. B. (1967). Idealism. In P. Edwards (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of philosophy* (Vol. 4, pp. 110-118). New York: Macmillan.

Adler, M. J. (1986). *A guidebook to lifelong learning*. New York: Macmillan.

Adler, M. J. (1992). 101: Wisdom. In M. J. Adler (Ed.), *The great ideas: One hundred two essays* (pp. 938-945): Macmillan.

Aebli, H. (1989). Weisheit: Auch ein Ordnen des Tuns? *Zeitschrift für Pädagogik, 35*, 605-620.

Agazzi, E. (Ed.). (1991). *Science et sagesse: Entretiens de l'Académie Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences, 1990*. Freiburg: Universitätsverlag Freiburg.

al-Ghazzali, M. (1953). *Our beginning in wisdom*. Ann Arbor, MI: Edwards Brothers, Inc.

Alexander, C. N., & Langer, E. J. (Eds.). (1990). *Higher stages of human development*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Alster, B. (1974). *The instructions of Suruppak: A Sumerian proverb collection*. Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag.

Alster, B. (1991). Väterliche Weisheit in Mesopotamien. In A. Assmann (Ed.), *Weisheit: Archäologie der literarischen Kommunikation III* (pp. 103-115). München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.

Amadio, A. H. (1984). Aristotle. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 1, pp. 1162-1171). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Annas, J. (1992). *Hellenistic philosophy of mind*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Annas, J. (1993). *The morality of happiness*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Ardelt, M. (1997). Wisdom and life satisfactin in old age. *Journal of Gerontology, 52B*, 15-27.

Arewa, E., & Dundes, A. (1964). Proverbs and the ethnography of speaking folklore. *American Anthropologist, 66*, 70-85.

Arlin, P. K. (1990). Wisdom: The art of problem finding. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), *Wisdom: Its nature, origins, and development* (pp. 230-243). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Arlin, P. K. (1993). Wisdom and expertise in teaching: An integration of perspectives. *Learning and individual differences, 5*, 341-349.

Assmann, A. (1990). Which knowledge is valuable? Concepts of wisdom in a historical perspective.

Assmann, A. (1990, December 18). Heilsames Wissen: "Weisheit" im Spiegel des Kulturvergleichs. *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 14.

Assmann, A. (1991). Was ist Weisheit? Wegmarken in einem weitem Feld. In A. Assmann (Ed.), *Weisheit: Archäologie der literarischen Kommunikation III* (pp. ??). München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.

Assmann, A. (Ed.). (1991). *Weisheit: Archäologie der literarischen Kommunikation III*. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.

Assmann, A. (1994). Wholesome knowledge: Concepts of wisdom in a historical and cross-cultural perspective. In D. L. Featherman, R. M. Lerner, & M. Perlmutter (Eds.), *Life-span development and behavior* (Vol. 12, pp. 187-224). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Assmann, A., & Assmann, J. (1987). Weisheit II.

Assmann, J. (1991). Weisheit, Schrift und Literatur im alten Ägypten. In A. Assmann (Ed.), *Weisheit: Archäologie der literarischen Kommunikation III* (pp. 475-490). München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.

Austad, C. S. (1992). The wisdom group: A psychotherapeutic model for elderly persons. *Psychological Reports, 70*, 356-358.

Ayalti, H. (1963). *Yiddish proverbs*. New York: Schocken Books.

Azuma, H. (1982). Current trends in studies of behavioral development in Japan. *International Journal of Behavioral Development, 5*, 153-169.

Azuma, H. (1984). Psychology in a non-Western country. *International Journal of Psychology, 19*, 45-55.

Azuma, H. (1986). Why study child development in Japan? In H. W. Stevenson, H. Azuma, & K. Hakuta (Eds.), *Child development and education in Japan* (pp. 3-12). New York: W. H. Freeman.

Azuma, H., & Kashiwagi, K. (1987). Descriptors for an intelligent person: A Japanese study. *Japanese Psychological Research, 29*, 17-26.

Bacon, F. (16??). *The essays, or councils, civil and moral*.

Bacon, F. (1609). *De sapientia veterum liber*. London: Barker.

Bacon, F. (1609/1884). *Bacon's essays and Wisdom of the ancients*. Boston: Little, Brown.

Bacon, F. (1609/1990). *Weisheit der Alten*. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer.

Bacon, F. (1620). *Novum organum*.

Baltes, M. M., & Baltes, P. B. (1986). *The psychology of control and aging*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Baltes, M. M., & Carstensen, L. L. (1996). Gutes Leben im Alter. *Psychologische Rundschau, 47*, 199-215.

Baltes, M. M., & Carstensen, L. L. (1996). The process of successful ageing. *Aging and Society, 16*, 397-422.

Baltes, P. (1993). *Lebenstechnik: Eine kritische Theorie des Alltags*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
 Buchgesellschaft.

Baltes, P. B. (1987). Theoretical propositions of life-span developmental psychology: On the dynamics
 between growth and decline. *Developmental Psychology, 23*, 611–626.

Baltes, P. B. (1990). Weisheit als Expertenwissen: Lebenswissen und Altersintelligenz. In H. Scheidgen, P.
 Strittmatter, & W. H. Tack (Eds.), *Information ist noch kein Wissen* (pp. 169-186). Weinheim:
 Beltz.

Baltes, P. B. (1995). *The search for a psychology of wisdom.* Paper presented at the Opening Ceremony of the
 new Psychology Building, University of Göteborg.

Baltes, P. B. (1997). On the incomplete architecture of human ontogeny: Selection, optimization, and
 compensation as foundation of developmental theory. *American Psychologist, 52*, 366–380.

Baltes, P. B., & Baltes, M. M. (1990). Psychological perspectives on successful aging: The model of selective
 optimization with compensation. In P. B. Baltes & M. M. Baltes (Eds.), *Successful aging:
 Perspectives from the behavioral sciences* (pp. 1-34). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Baltes, P. B., Dittmann-Kohli, F., & Dixon, R. A. (1984). New perspectives on the development of
 intelligence in adulthood: Toward a dual-process conception and a model of selective optimization
 with compensation. In P. B. Baltes & O. G. B. Jr. (Eds.), *Life-span development and behavior*
 (Vol. 6, pp. 33-76). New York: Academic Press.

Baltes, P. B., Lindenberger, U., & Staudinger, U. M. (1998). Life-span theory in developmental psychology.
 In W. Damon & R. M. Lerner (Eds.), *Handbook of child psychology. Vol. 1: Theoretical models of
 human development* (5th ed., pp. 1029-1143). New York: Wiley.

Baltes, P. B., Reese, H. W., & Lipsitt, L. P. (1980). Life-span developmental psychology. *Annual Review of Psychology, 31*, 65–110.

Baltes, P. B., & Smith, J. (1990). The psychology of wisdom and its ontogenesis. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), *Wisdom: Its nature, origins, and development* (pp. 87-120). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Baltes, P. B., & Smith, J. (1990). Weisheit und Weisheitsentwicklung: Prolegomena zu einer psychologischen Weisheitstheorie. *Zeitschrift für Entwicklungspsychologie und Pädagogische Psychologie, 22*, 95-135.

Baltes, P. B., Smith, J., & Staudinger, U. M. (1992). Wisdom and successful aging. In T. Sonderegger (Ed.), *Nebraska symposium on motivation* (Vol. 39, pp. 123-167). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

Baltes, P. B., Smith, J., Staudinger, U. M., & Sowarka, D. (1990). Wisdom: One facet of successful aging? In M. Perlmutter (Ed.), *Late life potential* (pp. 63-81). Washington, DC: The Gerontological Society of America.

Baltes, P. B., & Staudinger, U. M. (1993). The search for a psychology of wisdom. *Current Directions in Psychological Science, 2*, 75-80.

Baltes, P. B., & Staudinger, U. M. (1995). Wisdom. In G. L. Maddox (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of aging* (2nd ed., pp. 971-974). New York: Springer.

Baltes, P. B., & Staudinger, U. M. (1996). Interactive minds in a life-span perspective: Prologue. In P. B. Baltes & U. M. Staudinger (Eds.), *Interactive minds: Life-span perspectives on the social foundation of cognition* (pp. 1-32). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Baltes, P. B., & Staudinger, U. M. (Eds.). (1996). *Interactive minds: Life-span perspectives on the social foundation of cognition*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Baltes, P. B., & Staudinger, U. M. (1998). Wisdom. In H. Friedman (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of mental health* (pp. 699-706). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Baltes, P. B., Staudinger, U. M., & Lindenberger, U. (1999). Lifespan psychology: Theory and application to intellectual functioning. *Annual Review of Psychology, 50*, 471-507.

Baltes, P. B., Staudinger, U. M., Maercker, A., & Smith, J. (1995). People nominated as wise: A comparative study of wisdom-related knowledge. *Psychology and Aging, 10*, 155-166.

Bandura, A. (1995). *Self-efficacy in a changing society*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bargh, J. A., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (1994). Environmental control of goal-directed action: Automatic and strategic contingencies between situations and behavior. In W. D. Spaulding (Ed.), *Integrative views of motivation, cognition, and emotion. Nebraska symposium on motivation* (Vol. 41, pp. 71-124). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

Baron, J. (1985). *Rationality and intelligence*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Baron, J. (1988). *Thinking and deciding*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Barry, B., & Hardin, R. (Eds.). (1982). *Rational man and irrational society?* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Basseches, M. (1984). *Dialectical thinking and adult development*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Basso, K. H. (1996). *Wisdom sits in places: Landscape and language among the Western Apache*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.

Bauer, G. P. (1990). *Wit and wisdom in dynamic psychotherapy*. Northvale, N. J.: J. Aronson.

Bayer, H., & Bayer, A. (1985). *Sprichwörterlexicon*. München: Beck.

Baynes, K., Bohman, J., & McCarthy, T. (Eds.). (1987). *After philosophy: End or transformation?* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Belsky, J. K. (1988). *Here tomorrow: Making the most of life after 50*. New York: Ballantine Books.

Bengtson, V. L., & Schaie, K. W. (Eds.). (1989). *The course of later life: Research and reflections*. New York: Springer.

Bengtson, V. L., & Schaie, K. W. (Eds.). (1999). *Handbook of theories of aging*. New York: Springer.

Benson, H. H. (1996). The aims of the socratic Elenchos. In K. Lehrer, B. J. Lum, B. A. Slichta, & N. D. Smith (Eds.), *Knowledge, teaching and wisdom* (pp. 21-33). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Benz, R. (Ed.). (1924). *Die deutschen Volksbücher*. Jena: Eugen Diederichs.

Berg, C. A., & Klaczynski, P. (1994). Practical intelligence and problem solving: Searching for perspectives.

Berg, C. A., Strough, J., Calderone, K., Meegan, S. P., & Sansone, C. (1997). The social context of planning and preventing everyday problems from occurring. In S. L. Friedman & E. K. Scholnick (Eds.), *The developmental psychology of planning: Why, how, and when do we plan?* (pp. 209-236). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Berlin, I. (1977). *Vico and Herder: Two studies in the history of ideas*. New York: Vintage Books.

Berlin, I. (1990). *The crooked timber of humanity*. New York: Knopf.

Bernstein, R. J. (1967). Dewey, John. In P. Edwards (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of philosophy* (Vol. 2, pp. 380–385). New York: Macmillan.

Beth-Pastoor, C. P. C. (1968). *Science a road to wisdom*. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel.

Bien, G. (1988). Über den Begriff der Weisheit in der antiken Philosophie. *Studia Philosophica, 47*, 33-52.

Bien, G. (1989). Einige Bemerkungen zum Verhältnis von Philosophie, Wissenschaft und Weisheit. In W. Oelmüller (Ed.), *Philosophie und Weisheit* (pp. 39-53). Paderborn: Schöningh.

Birren, J. E., & Fisher, L. M. (1990). The elements of wisdom: Overview and integration. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), *Wisdom: Its nature, origins, and development* (pp. 317-332). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Birren, J. E., & Schroots, J. J. F. (1996). History, concepts, and theory in the psychology of aging. In J. E. Birren & K. W. Schaie (Eds.), *Handbook of the psychology of aging* (4th ed., pp. 3–23). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Blanchard-Fields, F., & Hess, T. M. (1996). *Perspectives on cognitive change in adulthood and aging*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Blanshard, B. (1967). Wisdom. In P. Edwards (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of philosophy* (Vol. 8, pp. 322-324). New York: Macmillan.

Blenkinsopp, J. (1983). *Wisdom and law in the Old Testament*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Bogdan, R. J. (Ed.). (1991). *Mind and common sense: Philosophical essays on commonsense psychology.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Boring, E. G. (1948). Current trends in psychology: A special review. *Psychological Bulletin, 45*, 75-84.

Boring, E. G., Langfeld, H. S., & Weld, H. P. (Eds.). (1948). *Foundations of psychology.* New York: Wiley.

Boteach, S. (1996). *Wisdom, understanding, and knowledge.* Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson Inc.

Botterill, G. (1994). Folk psychology. *Philosophical Quarterly, 44*, 246-252.

Botterill, G. (1994). Mind and common sense: Philosophical essays on commonsense psychology. *Philosophical Quarterly, 44*, 246-252.

Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1985). *Culture and the evolutionary process.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bratman, M. E. (1987). *Intention, plans and practical reason.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Brent, S. B., & Watson, D. (1980). Aging and wisdom: Individual and collective aspects.

Brim, O. G., Jr. (1988). Losing and winning: The nature of ambition in everyday life. *Psychology Today, 9*, 48-52.

Brim, O. G., Jr. (1992). *Ambition: How we manage success and failure throughout our lives.* New York: Basic Books.

Brinton, C. (1967). Encyclopédie. In P. Edwards (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of philosophy* (Vol. 2, pp. 519-525). New York: Macmillan.

Brown, A. R. (1987). Wisdom literature: Theoretical perspectives. In M. Eliade (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of religion* (Vol. 15, pp. 409-412). New York: Macmillan.

Brown, B. (1938). *The wisdom of the Chinese: Their philosophy in sayings and in proverbs.* Garden City, NY: Garden City Publishing.

Brown, P. (1975). Society and the supernatural: A medieval change. *Daedalus, 19*, 133-151.

Brunner, H. (Ed.). (1998). *Die Weisheitsbücher der Ägypter.* Düsseldorf: Artemis & Winkler.

Bryce, G. E. (1979). *A legacy of wisdom: The Egyptian contribution to the wisdom of Israel*. London: Associated University Presses.

Buck, C. D. (Ed.). (1949). *A dictionary of selected synonyms in the principal Indo-European languages*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Buhr, M. (Ed.). (1986). *Philosophische Weisheiten aus zweieinhalb Jahrtausenden*. Hanau: Verlag Werner Dausien.

Burks, A. W. (Ed.). (1966). *The collected papers of Charles Sander Peirce*. (Vol. VII: Science and philosophy). Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

Burnaby, J. (1984). Augustine of Hippo. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 1, pp. 363-368). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Byrne, R. W., & Whiten, A. (Eds.). (1988). *Machiavellian intelligence*. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.

Cadoux, T. J. (1984). Solon. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 1045-1047). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Cady, S., Ronan, M., & Taussig, H. (1986). *Sophia: The future of feminist spirituality*. San Francisco: Harper & Rowe.

Cain, S. (1984). Biblical writings: Old Testament history. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 895-906). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Cairns, R. B., & Cairns, B. D. (1995). *Lifelines and risks: Pathways of youth in our time.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Calef, S. W. (1996). What good is human wisdom? In K. Lehrer, B. J. Lum, B. A. Slichta, & N. D. Smith (Eds.), *Knowledge, teaching and wisdom* (pp. 35-47). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Calhoun, D. H. (1996). Which "socratic method"? Models of education in Plato's dialogues. In K. Lehrer, B. J. Lum, B. A. Slichta, & N. D. Smith (Eds.), *Knowledge, teaching and wisdom* (pp. 49-70). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Cantor, N. (1990). From thought to behavior: "Having" and "doing" in the study of personality and cognition. *American Psychologist*.

Cantor, N., & Fleeson, W. (1994). Social intelligence and intelligent goal pursuit: A cognitive slice of motivation. In W. D. Spaulding (Ed.), *Nebraska symposium on motivation* (Vol. 41, pp. 125-179). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska.

Cantor, N., & Kihlstrom, J. F. (1989). Social intelligence and cognitive assessments of personality. In R. S. Wyer, Jr. & T. K. E. Srull (Eds.), *Social intelligence and cognitive assessments of personality. Advances in social cognition, Vol. 2.* (pp. 1-59). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Cantor, N., & Kihlstrom, J. F. (1989). Social intelligence and cognitive assessments of personality. In R. S. Wyer & T. K. Strull (Eds.), *Advances in social cognition* (Vol. 2, pp. 1-59). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Cantor, N., & Norem, J. K. (1989). Defensive pessimism and stress and coping. *Social Cognition, 7*(92-112).

Cantor, N., Norem, J. K., & Brower, A. M. (1987). Life tasks, self-concept ideals, and cognitive strategies in a life transition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53*, 1178-1191.

Cantor, N., & Zirkel, S. (1990). Personality, cognition, and purposive behavior. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), *Handbook of personality: Theory and research*. New York: Guilford Press.

Capra, F. (1989). *Uncommon wisdom: Conversations with remarkable people*. Toronto: Bantam Books.

Cardanus. (1544). *De sapiente*.

Carstensen, L. L. (1995). Evidence for a life-span theory of socioemotional selectivity. *Current Directions in Psychological Science, 4*, 151-156.

Carstensen, L. L., Edelstein, B. A., & Dornbrandt, L. (Eds.). (1996). *The practical handbook of clinical gerontology*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Celano, A. J. (1995). The end of practical wisdom: Ethics as science in the thirteenth century. *Journal of the History of Philosophy, 33*, 225-243.

Chandler, M. J., & Holliday, S. (1990). Wisdom in a postapocalyptic age. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), *Wisdom: Its nature, origins, and development* (pp. 121-141). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Chappell, M. S. (1996). Changing perspectives on aging and intelligence: An empirical update. *Journal of Adult Development, 3*, 233-239.

Charlton, W. (1980). Moral beauty and overniceness. *British Journal of Aesthetics, XX*, 291-304.

Charron, P. (1601). *De la sagesse: Trois livres*. Bourdeaux: Simon Millanges.

Chenu, M.-D. (1984). Thomas Aquinas, Saint. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 18, pp. 363-368). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Chinen, A. B. (1992). Fairy tales and spiritual development in later life: The story of the shing fish. In T. R. Cole & D. D. Tassel (Eds.), *Handbook of the humanities and aging* (pp. 197-214). New York: Springer.

Christensen, S. M., & Turner, D. R. (Eds.). (1993). *Folk psychology and the philosophy of mind*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Christianson, G., & Izbicki, T. M. (Eds.). (1991). *Nicholas of Cusa: In search of God and wisdom*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Churchland, P. (1991). Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. In R. Boyd, P. Gasper, & J. D. Trout (Eds.), *The philosophy of science* (pp. 615-630). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Churchland, P. M. (1979). *Scientific realism and the plasticity of mind*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Churchland, P. M. (1991). Folk psychology and the explanation of human behavior. In J. D. Greenwood (Ed.), *The future of folk psychology: Intentionality and cognitive science* (pp. 51-69). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Clapp, J. G. (1967). Locke, John. In P. Edwards (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of philosophy* (Vol. 4, pp. 487-503). New York: Macmillan.

Clark, A. (1994). Beliefs and desires incorporated. *Journal of Philosophy, 91*, 404-426.

Clarke, E. G. (1973). *The wisdom of Solomon: Commentary by Clarke*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Clayton, V. (1982). The nature and function of knowledge in the later years. *International Journal of Aging and Human Development, 15*, 315-321.

Clayton, V. P. (1975). Erikson's theory of human development as it applies to the aged: Wisdom as contradictory cognition. *Human Development, 18*, 119-128.

Clayton, V. P. (1982). Wisdom and intelligence: The nature and function of knowledge in the later years. *International Journal of Aging and Human Development, 15*, 315-323.

Clayton, V. P., & Birren, J. E. (1980). The development of wisdom across the life span: A reexamination of an ancient topic. In P. B. Baltes & J. O. G. Brim (Eds.), *Life-span development and behavior* (Vol. 3, pp. 103-135). New York: Academic Press.

Cohen, L. H. (Ed.). (1988). *Life events and psychological functioning*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.

Cole, M. (1996). Interacting minds in a life-span perspective: A cultural/historical approach to culture and cognitive development. In P. B. Baltes & U. M. Staudinger (Eds.), *Interactive minds: Life-span perspectives on the social foundation of cognition* (pp. 59-87). Cambridge University Press: New York.

Cole, T. (1984). The prophecy of senescence: G. Stanley Hall and the reconstruction of old age in America. *Gerontologist, 24*, 360-366.

Cole, T. R. (1992). *The journey of life: A cultural history of aging in America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Cole, T. R., & Gadow, S. A. (Eds.). (1986). *What does it mean to grow old?* Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Cole, T. R., & Tassel, D. D. (Eds.). (1992). *Handbook of the humanities and aging*. New York: Springer.

Commons, M. L., Sinnott, J. D., Richards, F. A., & Armon, C. (Eds.). (1989). *Adult development: Comparisons and applications of developmental models*. (Vol. 1). New York: Praeger.

Congjie, L. (1996). *The great thoughts of China*. New York: Wiley.

Conze, E. (1975). *The large sutra on perfect wisdom*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Conze, E. (1979). *The perfection of wisdom in eight thousand slokas (Prajnaparamita)*. Calcutta: The Asiatic Society.

Cook, A. (1993). *Canons and wisdom*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Cooper, J. M. (1986). *Reason and human good in Aristotle*. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.

Cox, R. S. (1972). The old English dicts of Cato. *Anglia: Zeitschrift fur englische Philologie, 90*, 1-42.

Cranston, M. (1967). Bacon, Francis. In P. Edwards (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of philosophy* (Vol. 1, pp. 235–240). New York: Macmillan.

Crenshaw, J. L. (Ed.). (1976). *Studies in ancient Israelite wisdom*. New York: KTAV Publishing House.

Crenshaw, J. L. (Ed.). (1981). *Old Testament wisdom: An introduction*. Atlanta: John Knox Press.

Crenshaw, J. L. (1987). *Ecclesiastes: A commentary*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press.

Crenshaw, J. L. (1987). Wisdom literature: Biblical books. In M. Eliade (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of religion* (Vol. 15, pp. 401-408). New York: Macmillan.

Cruz, T. F. (1996). Rediscovering Aquinas' concept of knowledge. In K. Lehrer, B. J. Lum, B. A. Slichta, & N. D. Smith (Eds.), *Knowledge, teaching and wisdom* (pp. 111-124). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Cues, v. N. (1450). *De sapientia*.

Cunningham, W. (Ed.). (1906). *The wisdom of the wise*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Cupnick, G. C. (1993). Observing the social world. *Canadian Psychology, 34*, 166-171.

Cusa, N. d. (1988). *Idiota de sapienta — Der Laie über die Weisheit*. Hamburg: Meiner.

Da, A. (1996). Crazy wisdom. In A. Da (Ed.), *The heart's shout* (pp. 318-321). Middletown, CA: Dawn Horse Press.

Da, A. (1996). *The heart's shout*. Middletown, CA: Dawn Horse Press.

Dalmiya, V. (1996). Why don't lovers of wisdom dare to love? In K. Lehrer, B. J. Lum, B. A. Slichta, & N. D. Smith (Eds.), *Knowledge, teaching and wisdom* (pp. 207-218). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Damon, W. (1996). The lifelong transformation of moral goals through social influence. In P. B. Baltes & U. M. Staudinger (Eds.), *Interactive minds: Life-span perspectives on the social foundation of cognition* (pp. 198-220). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Davies, M., & Stone, T. (Eds.). (1995). *Folk psychology: The theory of mind debate*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Dawes, R. M. (1988). *Rational choice in an uncertain world*. Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Descartes, R. (1644). *Principia Philosophiae*.

Desmond, A. (1997). *Huxley: From devil's disciple to evolution's High Priest*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Dewey, J. (1916). *Democracy and education*. New York: Free Press.

Dewey, J. (1920). *Reconstruction in philosophy*. New York: Henry Holt.

Dewey, J. (1922). *Human nature and conduct*. New York: Holt.

Dewey, J. (1931). The development of American pragmatism. In J. Dewey (Ed.), *Philosophy and civilization* (pp. 13-35). New York: Minton, Balch, & Co.

Dewey, J. (1933). *How we think: A restatement of the relation of reflective thinking to the educative process*. Boston, MA: Heath & Co.

Dewey, J. (1933). The place of judgment on reflective activity. In J. Dewey (Ed.), *How we think: A restatement of the relation of reflective thinking to the educative process* (pp. 119-131). Boston, MA: Heath & Co.

Dewey, J. (1938). *Logic: The theory of inquiry*. New York, NY: Holt.

Dewey, J. (1946). *Problems of men*. New York: Philosophical Library.

Diderot, D., & d'Alembert, J. L. (Eds.). (1751-1780). *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences des arts et des métiers*. Stuttgart: E. Fromman.

Dilthey, W. (1958-). *Gesammelte Schriften in XXI Bänden*. Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner.

Dilthey, W. (1961). Die geistige Welt: Einleitung in die Philosophie des Lebens. In W. Dilthey (Ed.), *Gesammelte Schriften in XXI Bänden* (Vol. V,). Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner.

Dittmann-Kohli, F. (1984). Weisheit als mögliches Ergebnis der Intelligenzentwicklung im Erwachsenenalter. *Sprache and Kognition, 2*, 112-132.

Dittmann-Kohli, F. (1991). *Lebenssinn und Selbstverständnis im Erwachsenenalter: Eine Entwicklungsperspektive.* Unpublished Habilitation thesis, Max Planck Institute for Human Development and Education, Berlin.

Dittmann-Kohli, F., & Baltes, P. B. (1990). Toward a neofunctionalist conception of adult intellectual development: Wisdom as a prototypical case of intellectual growth. In C. Alexander & E. Langer (Eds.), *Higher stages of human development: Perspectives on adult growth* (pp. 54-78). New York: Oxford University Press.

Dörner, D. (1996). *The logic of failure: Why things go wrong and what we can do to make them right*. New York: Metropolitan Books.

Duchesne-Guillemin, J. (1987). Knowledge and ignorance. In M. Eliade (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of religion* (Vol. 8, pp. 343-356). New York: Macmillan.

Durham, W. H. (1990). Advances in evolutionary culture theory. *Annual Review of Anthropology, 19*, 187-210.

Durham, W. H. (1991). *Coevolution: Genes, culture and human diversity*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Dworkin, R. (1977). *Taking rights seriously*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Dyson, A. E. (1996). *The fifth dimension*. Ipswich, UK: Macmillan.

E.S. (1984). Human rights. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 8, pp. 1183-1189). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Ebertz, R. P. (1996). Socratic teaching and the search for coherence. In K. Lehrer, B. J. Lum, B. A. Slichta, & N. D. Smith (Eds.), *Knowledge, teaching and wisdom* (pp. 71-81). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Edel, A. (1973-74). Happiness and pleasure. In P. P. Wiener (Ed.), *Dictionary of the history of ideas: Studies of selected pivotal ideas* (Vol. 2, pp. 374-387). New York: Scribner.

Edelstein, W. (1965). *Eruditio and sapientia: Weltbildung und Erziehung in der Karolingerzeit*. Freiburg: Rombach.

Edwards, P., Alston, W. P., & Prior, A. N. (1967). Russell, Bertrand Arthur William. In P. Edwards (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of philosophy* (Vol. ?, pp. 235-258). New York: Macmillan.

Egan, F. (1995). Folk psychology and cognitive architecture. *Philosophy of Science, 62*, 179-196.

Elyot, T. (1533/1946). *Of the knowledge which maketh a wise man*. Oxford, OH: Anchor Press.

Epstein, M. (1995). *Thoughts without a thinker: Psychotherapy from a Buddhist perspective*. New York: Basic Books.

Erasmus, D. (1511/1979). *The praise of folly (C. H. Miller, Ed.)*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Ericsson, K. A. (Ed.). (1996). *The road to excellence: The acquisition of expert performance in the arts and sciences, sports and games*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Ericsson, K. A., & Smith, J. (Eds.). (1991). *Towards a general theory of expertise: Prospects and limits*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Erikson, E. H. (1959). Identity and the life cycle: Selected papers. *Psychological Issues, 1*, 1-171.

Erikson, E. H. (1968). *Identity, youth and crisis*. New York: Norton.

Erikson, E. H. (1982). *The life cycle completed*. New York: Norton.

Erikson, E. H., Erikson, J. M., & Kivnick, H. (1986). *Vital involvement in old age: The experience of old age in our time*. London: Norton.

Erikson, J. M. (1988). *Wisdom and the senses*. New York: Norton.

Etzioni, A. (1992). On the place of virtues in a pluralistic democracy. *American Behavioral Scientist, 35*, 530-540.

Evans, I. H. (1989). *Brewer's dictionary of phrase and fable*. New York: Harper & Row.

Ezorsky, G. (1967). Pragmatic theory of truth. In P. Edwards (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of philosophy* (Vol. 6, pp. 427-430). New York: Macmillan.

Faherty, R. L. (1984). Biblical writings: The Ketuvim. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 922-930). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Falk, A. (1995). Wisdom updated. *Philosophy of Science, 62*, 389-403.

Falkner, T. M., & Luce, J. d. (1992). A view from antiquity: Greece, Rome, and Elders. In T. R. Cole & D. D. Tassel (Eds.), *Handbook of the humanities and aging* (pp. 3-39). New York: Springer.

Falkowitz, R. S. (1980). *The Sumerian rhetoric collections.* Unpublished Doctoral dissertation, Philadelphia, PA.

Featherman, D. L., Smith, J., & Peterson, J. G. (1990). Successful aging in a post-retired society. In P. B. Baltes & M. M. Baltes (Eds.), *Successful aging: Perspectives from the behavioral sciences* (pp. 50-93). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Fergusson, R. (1983). Wisdom. In R. Fergusson (Ed.), *Penguin Dictionary of Proverbs* (pp. 259-262). Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Fergusson, R. C. (1983). *The facts on file dictionary of proverbs*. New York, NY: Facts on File Publications.

Finnegan, R. (1981). Proverbs in Africa. In W. Mieder & A. Dundes (Eds.), *The wisdom of many: Essays on the proverb* (pp. 10-42). New York: Garland Publishing.

Fisch, M. H. (Ed.). (1982). *Writings of Charles Peirce*. (Vol. 1: 1857-1866). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Fletcher, G. J. O. (1995). *The scientific credibility of folk psychology*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Flusser, D. (1984). Biblical literature: Intertestamental literature. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 931-938). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Fögen, M. T. (1993). *Die Enteignung der Wahrsager*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Ford, D. F. (1992). *A long rumour of wisdom: Redescribing theology*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Fowler, E. T. (1910). *The wisdom of folly*. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

Fowler, M. (1682). *The properties of heavenly wisdom in a sermon preached at the last assizes held at Shrewsbury, in the county of Salop*. London: Benjamin Tooke.

Frankena, W. A. (1963). *Ethics*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Fredericksen, L. (1994). Biblical literature and its critical interpretation: The Nevi'im (The Prophets), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 14, pp. 929-944). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Freeman, J. T. (1979). *Aging: Its history and literature*. New York: Human Sciences Press.

Friedrich, H. (1987, November 29). Wenn ein Wissen reif ist. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.

Fries, J. F. (1989). *Aging well*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Fritz, K. v. (1984). Philosophy, history of western: Ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 14, pp. 250-256). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Fuller, R., Noonan Walsh, P., & McGinley, P. (Eds.). (1997). *A century of psychology*. London: Routledge.

Fusco Johnson, T. (1995). Aging well in contemporary society. *American Behavioral Scientist, 39*, 120-130.

G.P.G. (1984). Humanistic scholarship. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 8, pp. 1170-1179). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

G.Ri. (1936). Sapienziali, libri. In G. Treccani (Ed.), *Enciclopedia italiana* (Vol. XXXII, pp. 811). Rome: Royal Italian Press.

Gadamer, H. G. (1986). *The idea of good in Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Gäng, P. (1990). Sich seiner selbst erinnern. Androgyne Weisheit im tantrischen Buddhismus. In A. Assmann (Ed.), *Weisheit* (pp. 271-288). München: Fink Verlag.

Gardiner, P. (1967). Herder, Johann Gottfried. In P. Edwards (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of philosophy* (Vol. 3, pp. 486-489). New York: Macmillan.

Gardiner, P. (1967). Schopenhauer, Arthur. In P. Edwards (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of philosophy* (Vol. 7, pp. 325-332). New York: Macmillan.

Gardner, H. (1983). *Frames of mind: The theory of multiple intelligences*. New York: Basic Books.

Gardner, J. W., & Gardner-Reese, F. (1975). *Know or listen to those who know*. New York: Norton.

Garrett, R. (1996). Three definitions of wisdom. In K. Lehrer, B. J. Lum, B. A. Slichta, & N. D. Smith (Eds.), *Knowledge, teaching and wisdom* (pp. 221-232). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Gatzemeier, M. (1996). Weisheit. In J. Mittelstraß (Ed.), *Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie* (pp. 640). Stuttgart: J.G.B. Metzler.

Geertz, C. (1973). *The interpretation of cultures*. New York: Basic Books.

Geertz, C. (1983). *Common sense as a cultural system*. New York: Basic Books.

Geldsetzer, L., & Han-ding, H. (1998). *Grundlagen der chinesischen Philosophie*. Stuttgart: Reclam.

Gergen, K. J. (1990). Proverbs, pragmatics, and prediction. *Canadian Psychology, 31*, 212-214.

Gergen, K. J. (1992). Mind and common sense: Philosophical essays on commonsense psychology. *CHOICE, 29*, 1619.

Geyer, C.-F. (1989). Philosophie im Spannungsfeld von Weisheit und Wissenschaft. In W. Oelmüller (Ed.), *Philosophie und Weisheit* (pp. 54-64). Paderborn: Schöningh.

Gilbert, N. W. (1967). Renaissance. In P. Edwards (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of philosophy* (Vol. 7, pp. 174-179). New York: Macmillan.

Gilligan, C. (1982). *In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Glass, L., & Mackey, M. C. (1988). *From clocks to chaos. The rhythms of life*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Glenn Gray, J. (1968). *The promise of wisdom: An introduction to philosophy of education*. Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott.

Goethe, J. W. (1777). Prometheus.

Golding, J. L. (1996). The question of wisdom in the contemporary academy. In K. Lehrer, B. J. Lum, B. A. Slichta, & N. D. Smith (Eds.), *Knowledge, teaching and wisdom* (pp. 267-277). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Gollwitzer, P. M., & Bargh, J. A. (Eds.). (1996). *The psychology of action: Linking cognition and motivation to action*. New York: Guilford Press.

Gordon, E. I. (Ed.). (1968). *Sumerian proverbs: Glimpses of everyday life in ancient Mesopotamia*. New York: Greenwood Press.

Gracian, B. (1647). Oráculo manual y arte de prudencia.

Gracian, B. (1653/1986). *Hand-Orakel und Kunst der Weltklugheit (Original: Oraculo manual, y arte de prudencia. Übertragen von Arthur Schopenhauer)*. Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag.

Green, S. K. (1984). Senility versus wisdom: The meaning of old age as a cause for behavior. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 5*, 105-110.

Greenfield, S. B. (1968). *A critical history of old English literature*. New York: New York University Press.

Greenfield, S. B. (1968). Lore and wisdom. In S. B. Greenfield (Ed.), *A critical history of old English literature* (pp. 191-212). New York: New York University Press.

Greeno, J. G., Chi, M. T. H., Clancey, W. J., & Elman, J. (1993). Situated action. *Cognitive Science (Special issue), 17*.

Greenwood, J. D. (Ed.). (1991). *The future of folk psychology: Intentionality and cognitive science*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Griffis, W. E. (??). *Proverbs of Japan*. New York: Japan Society.

Grimm, J., & Grimm, W. (1854-1960). *Deutsches Wörterbuch*. Leipzig: Hirzel.

Grimm, J., & Grimm, W. (1854/1960). Weisheit. In J. Grimm & W. Grimm (Eds.), *Deutsches Wörterbuch* (Vol. 28, pp. 1109-1134). Leipzig: Hirzel.

Gu.A. (1936). Sapienza. In G. Treccani (Ed.), *Enciclopedia italiana* (Vol. XXXII, pp. 810). Rome: Royal Italian Press.

Gudeman, D. W. (1989). *Wisdom for our time*. San Diego, CA: Quality Life Publishing.

Guenther, H. V. (1984). Buddhist mysticism. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 3, pp. 414-418). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Guicciardini, F. (1965). *Maxims and reflections of a renaissance statesman (Translation: Mario Domandi)*. New York: Harper & Row.

Gumbrecht, H. U. (1992). Who were the *Philosophes*? In H. U. Gumbrecht (Ed.), *Making sense in life and literature* (Vol. 79, pp. 133-177). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

H.D.I. (1984). Herder, Johann Gottfried von. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 8, pp. 799-800). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Häberle, P. (1993). Wege und Verfahren des Verfassungslebens. In P. Badura & R. Scholz (Eds.), *Festschrift für Peter Lerche zum 65. Geburtstag* (pp. 189-211). München: C.H.Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung.

Habermas, J. (1971). *Knowledge and human interests (translated by J. Shapiro)*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Habermehl, L. L. (Ed.). (1995). *The counterfeit wisdom of shallow minds: A critique of some leading offenders of the 1980s*. New York: Peter Lang.

Habermehl, L. L. (1995). The shallow mind. In L. L. Habermehl (Ed.), *The counterfeit wisdom of shallow minds: A critique of some leading offenders of the 1980s* (pp. 1-47). New York: Peter Lang.

Hadot, P. (1995). *Philosophy as a way of life*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Hall, G. S. (1922). *Senescence, the last half of life*. New York: Appleton.

Hallie, P. P. (1987?). Stoicism. In M. Eliade (Ed.), *??* (Vol. ??, pp. 19-22).

Hardin, R. (1988). *Morality within the limits of reason*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Harré, R., & Gillet, G. (1994). *The discursive mind*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Harrington, D. J. (1996). *Wisdom texts from Qumran*. New York: Routledge.

Harris, D. (1984). Enlightenment. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 6, pp. 887-894). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Harris, D. B. (Ed.). (1957). *The concept of development*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Hartelman, P. (1997). *Stochastic catastrophic theory*. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press.

Hartshorne, C. (1987). *Wisdom as moderation: A philosophy of the middle way*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Hartshorne, C., & Weiss, P. (Eds.). (1965). *The collected papers of Charles Sanders Pierce*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

Hartshorne, C., Weiss, P., & Burks, A. W. (Eds.). (1931-1958). *The collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

Harvey, E. R. (Ed.). (1984). *The court of sapience*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, (originally published around 1450, author unknown).

Haselager, W. F. G. (1997). *Cognitive science and folk psychology: The right frame of mind*. London: Sage.

Haught, J. F., & Yeager, D. M. (1997). Polanyi's finalism. *Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science, 32*, 615-627.

Heckhausen, J., & Baltes, P. B. (1991). Perceived controllability of expected psychological change across adulthood and old age. *Journal of Gerontology: Psychological Sciences, 46*, 165-173.

Heckhausen, J., Dixon, R. A., & Baltes, P. B. (1989). Gains and losses in development throughout adulthood as perceived by different age groups. *Developmental Psychology, 255*, 109–121.

Helwig, C. C. (1997). Making moral cognition respectable (again): A retrospective review of Lawrence Kohlberg. *Contemporary Psychology, 42*, 191-195.

Herbert, G. B. (1989). *Thomas Hobbes: The unity of scientific and moral wisdom*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

Herder, J. G. (1802). *Adrastea*. Leipzig: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch.

Herder, J. G. v. (1769/1889). Es ist eine neue Bildung und Fortbildung des Menschen möglich. In B. Suphan (Ed.), *Herders sämmtliche Werke* (Vol. 32, pp. 478-501). Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung.

Herder, J. G. v. (1802/1886). Adrastea. In B. Suphan (Ed.), *Herders sämmtliche Werke* (Vol. 4, pp. ??-??). Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung.

Herrick, B. (1952). The beautiful and the holy. *The Philosophical Forum, 10*, 32-40.

Himmelweit, H. T., & Gaskell, G. (Eds.). (1990). *Societal psychology*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Hinrichs, B. (1997). Brain research and folk psychology. *Humanist, 57*, 26-32.

Hinüber, O. V. (1997). Old age and old monks in Pali Buddhism. In S. Formanek & S. Linhart (Eds.), *Aging: Asian concepts and experiences past and present* (pp. 65-78). Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

Hira, F. J., & Faulkender, P. J. (1997). Perceiving wisdom: Do age and gender play a part? *International Journal of Aging and Human Development, 44*, 85-101.

Hirsch, E. D. (1987). *Cultural literacy: What every American needs to know*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.

Hirsch, E. D., Kett, J. F., & Trefil, J. (1988). *The dictionary of cultural literacy: What every American needs to know*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.

Hirschman, A. O. (1995). *A propensity to self-subversion*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Hobfoll, S. E. (1989). Conservation of resources. *American Psychologist, 44*, 513-524.

Hodges, H. A. (1968). Dilthey, Wilhelm. *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 4*, 185-087.

Hoglund, K. G., Huwiler, E. F., Glass, J. T., & Lee, R. W. (1987). *The listening heart: Essays in wisdom and the psalms in honor of Roland E. Murphy*. Sheffield: JSOT Press.

Holahan, C. K., Sears, R. R., & Cronbach, L. J. (1995). *The gifted group in later maturity*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Holliday, S. G., & Chandler, M. J. (1986). Wisdom: Explorations in adult competence. In J. A. Meacham (Ed.), *Contributions to human development* (Vol. 17, pp. 1-96). Basel: Karger.

Honnefelder, L. (1989). Weisheit durch den Weg der Wissenschaft: Theologie und Philosophie bei Augustinus und Thomas von Aquin. In W. Oelmüller (Ed.), *Philosophie und Weisheit* (pp. 65-77). Paderborn: Schöningh.

Hoose, B. (1994). *Received wisdom?* New York: Cassell.

Hösle, V. (1997). "Wir brauchen moralische Energie". *Der Spiegel, 46*, 247-252.

Hume, D. (1739-1740). *Treatise of human nature*.

Humphrey, N. K. (1988). The social function of intellect. In R. W. Byrne & A. Whiten (Eds.), *Machiavellian intelligence* (pp. 13-26). Oxford, Uk: Clarendon Press.

Humphreys, A. L. (Ed.). (1907). *Practical wisdom*. London.

Humphreys, S. (1961). *The wisdom of Buddhism*. New York: Random House.

Humphreys, S. C. (1975). "Transcendence" and intellectual roles: The Ancient Greek case. *Daedalus, 19*, 91-118.

Irwin, T., & Fine, G. (Eds.). (1996). *Aristotle: Introductory readings*. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.

Isaacowitz, D. M., Turk Charles, S., & Carstensen, L. L. (in press). Emotion and cognition. In F. I. M. Craik & T. A. Salthouse (Eds.), *Handbook of aging and cognition* (2nd ed.,).

Ja.L.S. (1984). Stoicism. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. ?, pp. 698-702). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Jackson, F., & Pettit, P. (1990). In defense of folk psychology. *Philosophical Studies, 57*, 7-30.

Jacobs, J. (1989). Practical wisdom, objectivity and relativism. *American Philosophical Quarterly, 26*, 199-209.

James, W. (1879-82/1908). The sentiment of rationality. In W. James (Ed.), *The will to believe and other essays in popular philosophy* (pp. 63-110). New York, NY: Longmans, Green, & Co.

James, W. (1896/1908). Is life worth living? In W. James (Ed.), *The will to believe and other essays in popular philosophy* (pp. 32-62). New York, NY: Longmans, Green, & Co.

James, W. (1897). *The will to believe and other essays in popular philosophy*. New York, NY: Longmans, Green, & Co.

James, W. (1902). *The varieties of religious experience: A study in human nature*. New York, NY: Random House.

James, W. (1907). *Pragmatism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

James, w. (1976). *Essays in radical empiricalism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Jaspers, K. (1932). Existenz als Unbedingtheit in Situation, Bewußtsein und Handlung. In K. Jaspers (Ed.), *Existenzerhellung* (pp. 201-254). Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

Jaspers, K. (1951). *Way to wisdom: An introduction to philosophy*. London: Victor Gollancz.

Jeannot, T. M. (1989). Moral leadership and practical wisdom. *International Journal of Social Economics, 16*, 14-38.

Johnson, P. (1990). *Intellectuals*. New York: Harper & Row.

Johnson, R. E. (1979). A study of wisdom as reported by older adults in America (PhD thesis, Wright Institute, Berkeley). *Dissertation Abstracts International, 42-02B*, 0748.

Kaiser, W. (1973-74). Wisdom of the fool. In P. P. Wiener (Ed.), *Dictionary of the history of ideas: Studies of selected pivotal ideas* (Vol. 4, pp. 515-520). New York: Scribner.

Kallen, H. M. (1971). Philosophy, aging and the aged. *Journal of Value Inquiry, 6*, 1-21.

Kalugila, L. (1980). *The wise king*. Lund, Sweden: CWK Gleerup.

Kant, I. Grounding for the metaphysics of morals.

Kant, I. (1781). *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Riga: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch.

Kant, I. (1968). Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. In W. Weischedel (Ed.), *Werke* (Vol. VII, pp. XX-XX). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Kant, I. (1968). XXX. In W. Weischedel (Ed.), *Werke*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Karasu, T. B. (1993). *Wisdom in the practice of psychotherapy*. New York: Basic Books.

Karnos, D. D., & Shoemaker, R. G. (Eds.). (1993). *Falling in love with wisdom*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kekes, J. (1983). Wisdom. *American Philosophical Quarterly, 20*, 277-286.

Kekes, J. (1995). *Moral wisdom and good lives*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Keller, M. (1996). *Moralische Sensibilität: Entwicklung in Freundschaft und Familie*. Weinheim: Psychologie Verlags Union.

Kelley, H. (1992). Common-sense psychology and scientific psychology. *Annual Review of Psychology, 43*, 1-23.

Kenyon, G. M., Birren, J. E., & Schroots, J. J. F. (Eds.). (1991). *Metaphors of aging in science and the humanities*. New York: Springer.

Kessler, G. E. (1995). *Voices of wisdom*. (2nd ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Kidner, D. (1985). *The wisdom of Proverbs, Job and Ecclesiastes: An introduction to wisdom literature*. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press.

Kincaid, J. R. (1997, November 2). Darwin's Rottweiler: T. H. Huxley may have been the most contentious man who ever lived. *The New York Times Book Review*, 14.

Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, B. (1973). Toward a theory of proverb meaning. *Proverbium, 22*, 821-827.

Kitagawa, J. M. (1984). History of Buddhism. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 3, pp. 403-414). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Klein. (1997). Nobels Vermächtnis, oder die Wandlungen des Idealischen.

Klein, C. (1994). *Kohelet und die Weisheit Israels*. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer.

Klein, U. (??). Kardinaltugenden. In J. Ritter & K. Gründer (Eds.), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (Vol. 4, pp. 695-696). Basel: Schwabe.

Klix, F. (1995). Stabilität und Wandlungen in geistigen Dispositionen des Menschen. In F. Klix, G. Albrecht, F.-H. Lange, H. Böhme, D. Nebel, & B. Graefrath (Eds.), *Globaler Wandel II: Evolution — Mensch — Technik*. Berlin: Leibniz-Sozietät.

Klose, H.-U. H. (1997). Perspektive der alternden Arbeitsgesellschaft. *Forum, 9*.

Kohlberg, L. (1994). *Moral development: A compendium. Vol. 3 : Kohlberg's original study of moral development (B. Puka, Ed.)*. New York: Garland.

Koslowski, P. (1988). Die Postmodernität der Weisheitstradition. *Scheidewege, 18*, 110-119.

Kramer, D. A. (1986). Relativistic and dialectical thought in three adult age-groups. *Human Development, 29*, 280-290.

Kramer, D. A. (1990). Conceptualizing wisdom: The primacy of affect-cognition relations. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), *Wisdom: Its nature, origins, and development* (pp. 121-141). New York: Cambridge.

Kramer, D. A. (2000). Wisdom as a classical source of human strength: Conceptualization and empirical inquiry. *Journal of Social and Clinical Inquiry, 19*, 83-101.

Kraut, R. (1989). *Aristotle on the human good*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kraut, R. (Ed.). (1997). *Plato's republic: Critical essays*. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield.

Krings, H. (1989). Sapientia est ordinare. In W. Oelmüller (Ed.), *Philosophie und Weisheit* (pp. 161-165). Paderborn: Schöningh.

Kristeller, P. O. (1967). Petrarch. In P. Edwards (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of philosophy* (Vol. 7, pp. 126-128). New York: Macmillan.

Kuhl, J. (1986). Aging and models of control: The hidden costs of wisdom. In M. M. Baltes & P. B. Baltes (Eds.), *The Psychology of Control and Aging* (pp. 1-33). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Kuhn, T. S. (1995, April 28). Weltbilder der Wissenschaften. *Die Zeit*.

Kunstmann, J. G. (1938). *The hoopoe: A study in European folklore.* Unpublished Dissertation, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL.

Kunstmann, J. G. (1981). The bird that fouls its nest. In W. Mieder & A. Dundes (Eds.), *The wisdom of many: Essays on the proverb* (pp. 190-210). New York: Garland Publishing.

Kusch, M. (1997). The sociophilosophy of folk psychology. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 28*, 1-25.

Kwong, Y. (1995). *Wisdom in Korean families: Its development, correlates, and consequences for life adaptation.* Unpublished Doctoral thesis, Free University of Berlin.

Labouvie-Vief, G. (1990). Wisdom as integrated thought: Historical and developmental perspectives. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), *Wisdom: Its nature, origins, and development* (pp. 52-83). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Labouvie-Vief, G. (1995). *Psyche and Eros: Mind and gender in the life course*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). *Metaphors we live by*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lambert, W. G. (1960). *Babylonian wisdom literature*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Lang, B. (1986). *Wisdom and the Book of Proverbs*. New York: The Pilgrim Press.

Lang, F. R., Görlitz, D., & Seiwert, M. (1992). Altersposition und Beurteilungsperspektive als Faktoren laienpsychologischer Urteile über Entwicklung. *Zeitschrift für Entwicklungspsychologie und Pädagogische Psychologie, 24*, 298-316.

Laslett, P. (1995). *Das dritte Alter: Historische Soziologie des Alterns*. Weinheim und München: Juventa.

Law, V. (1995). *Wisdom, authority and grammar in the seventh century*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Lea, K. M., & Urbach, P. M. (1994). Bacon, Frances. In McHenry (Ed.), *The new Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Vol. 14, pp. 564-569). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Lea, L. (1990). *Wisdom: Don't live life without it*. Nashville, Tennessee: Oliver-Nelson Books.

Lee, D. M. (1994). Becoming an expert: Reconsidering the place of wisdom in teaching adults. In J. D. Sinnott (Ed.), *Interdisciplinary handbook of adult lifespan learning* (pp. 234-248). Westport, CN: Greenwood.

Lehrer, K., Lum, B. J., Slichta, B. A., & Smith, N. D. (Eds.). (1996). *Knowledge, teaching and wisdom*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Lehrer, K., & Smith, N. D. (1996). Knowledge, teaching and wisdom. In K. Lehrer, B. J. Lum, B. A. Slichta, & N. D. Smith (Eds.), *Knowledge, teaching and wisdom* (pp. 3-17). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Lerner, R. M. (Ed.). (1998). *The handbook of child psychology. Vol. 1: Theoretical models of human development (W. Damon, Ed.-in-Chief)* (5th ed.). New York: Wiley.

Lerner, R. M., & Busch-Rossnagel, N. A. (Eds.). (1981). *Individuals as producers of their development: A life-span perspective*. New York: Academic Press.

Lerner, R. M., & Busch-Rossnagel, N. A. (1981). Individuals as producers of their development: Conceptual and empirical bases. In R. M. Lerner & N. A. Busch-Rossnagel (Eds.), *Individuals as producers of their development: A life-span perspective* (pp. 1-36). New York: Academic Press.

Lessing, G. E. (??). Nathan der Weise, *Gesammelte Werke*. München: Hanser.

Levi, A. W. (1984). Philosophy, history of western: Modern philosophy. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 14, pp. 261-275). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Levi, A. W. (1984). Philosophy, history of western: Nature, involvements, and writing of the history of philosophy. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 14, pp. 248-250). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Levi, A. W. (1994). Classical British empiricism. In R. McHenry (Ed.), *The new Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Vol. 25, pp. 751-752). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Levi, A. W. (1994). Philosophy, the history of western. In R. McHenry (Ed.), *The new Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Vol. 25, pp. 733-760). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Levi, A. W., Fritz, K. v., & Maurer, A. (1994). Philosophy, the history of western. In R. McHenry (Ed.), *The new Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Vol. 25, pp. 733-760). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Levine, J. M., Resnick, L. B., & Higgins, E. T. (1993). Social foundations of cognition. *Annual Review of Psychology, 44*, 585-612.

Lewis, M. D. (1995). Cognition-emotion feedback and the self-organization of developmental paths. *Human Development, 38*, 71-102.

Lichtenstein, M. H. (1987). Hokhmah. In M. Eliade (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of religion* (Vol. 6, pp. 415-418). New York: Macmillan.

Lin, Y. (Ed.). (1943). *The wisdom of Confucius*. New York: Random House.

Lin, Y. (Ed.). (1966). *The wisdom of Confucius*. New York: Modern Library.

Little, T. D. (1998). Sociocultural influences on the development of children's action-control beliefs. In J. Heckhausen & C. S. Dweck (Eds.), *Motivation and self-regulation across the life span* (pp. 281-315). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Locke, J. (1690). *Essay concerning human understanding*.

Luer, G., & Lass, U. (1997). *Erinnern und Behalten: Wege zur Erforschung des menschlichen Gedächtnisses*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Luper-Foy, S. (Ed.). (1987). *Nozick and his critics*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.

Lüsebrink, H.-J. (1991). Inszenierungsformen von Weisheit im Frankreich des Aufklärungszeitalters und der Französischen Revolution. In A. Assmann (Ed.), *Weisheit: Archäologie der literarischen Kommunikation III* (pp. 425-536). München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.

M.St. (1984). Taoism. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 17, pp. 1034-1055). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Maar, C., Obrist, H. U., & Pöppel, E. (Eds.). (2000). *Weltwissen — Wissenswelt: Das globale Netz von Text und Bild*. Köln: Dumont.

Maciel, A., Sowarka, D., Smith, J., & Baltes, P. B. (1991). The semantic meaning of wisdom.

Maciel, A., Sowarka, D., Smith, J., Staudinger, U. M., & Baltes, P. B. (1995). *Dimensions of a wise person: Interrelating implicit and explicit theories of wisdom*. Unpublished manuscript, Berlin: Max Planck Institute for Human Development and Education.

Maciel, A., Staudinger, U. M., Smith, J., & Baltes, P. B. (1992). Wisdom-related knowledge: A first look at its correlates of psychometric intelligence and personality in an age by professional specialization paradigm.

MacIntyre, A. (1984). *After virtue*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Mack, B. L. (1973). *Logos und Sophia: Untersuchungen zur Weisheitstheologie im hellenistischen Judentum*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

MacNabb, D. G. C. (1967). Hume, David. In P. Edwards (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of philosophy* (Vol. 4, pp. 74-90). New York: Macmillan.

Maercker, A. (1992). Weisheit im Alter. *Münchner Medizinische Wochenschrift, 134*, 518-522.

Maercker, A. (1993). *Existentielle Konfrontation: Eine Untersuchung im Rahmen eines psychologischen Weisheits-Paradigmas.*

Maercker, A., Böhmig-Krumhaar, S., & Staudinger, U. (1998). Existentielle Konfrontation als Zugang zu weisheitsbezogenem Wissen und Urteilen: Eine Untersuchung von Weisheitsnominierten. *Zeischrift für Entwichlungs- und Pädagogische Psychologie.*

Maercker, A., & Staudinger, U. M. (1991). Weisheit aus psychologischer Sicht - ein Expertenwissen in grundlegenden Lebensfragen. *Spektrum der Wissenschaft, 1*, 23-26.

Maercker, A., Staudinger, U. M., & Baltes, P. B. (1992). *Wisdom-related knowledge: The sample case of existential life management.*

Magnusson, D. (1995). Individual development: A holisitc, integrated model. In P. Moen, G. H. Elder Jr., & K. Lüscher (Eds.), *Examining lives in context: Perspectives on the ecology of human development* (pp. 19-60). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Magnusson, D. (1996). Foreword: Towards a developmental science. In D. Magnusson (Ed.), *The life-span development of individuals: Behavioral, neurobiological and psychosocial perspectives. A synthesis* (pp. xv-xvii). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Magnusson, D. (Ed.). (1996). *The life-span development of individuals: Behavioural, neurobiological and psychosocial perspectives*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Magnusson, D. (in press). The logic and implications of a person approach. In R. B. Cairns, L. R. Bergman, & J. Kagan (Eds.), *The individuals as a focus in developmental research* (pp. xx-xx). New York: Sage.

Manchester, W. R. (1988). *The last lion: Winston Churchill. Vol. 2: Alone, 1932-1940*. New York: Little, Brown & Co.

Mandl, H., & Reinmann-Rothmeier, G. (1995). *Weisheit - antiquiertes Wunschbild oder aktueller denn je? Befunde, Konzepte und Überlegungen zum Phänomen Weisheit (Forschungsbericht Nr. 53)*. München: Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Lehrstuhl für Empirische Pädagogik und Pädagogische Psychologie.

Mannheim, K. (1929). *Ideologie und Utopie*. Bonn: Cohen.

Mannheim, K. (1936). *Ideology and utopia: An introduction to the sociology of knowledge*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.

Marböck, J. (1971). *Weisheit im Wandel*. Bonn: Peter Hanstein Verlag.

Marcel, G. (1954). *Le déclin de la sagesse*. Paris: Plon.

Markus, H., & Cross, S. (1990). The interpersonal self. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), *Handbook of personality: Theory and research* (pp. 576-608). New York: Guilford Press.

Markus, H., & Nurius, P. (1986). Possible selves. *American Psychologist, 41*, 954-969.

Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1994). A collective fear of the collective: Implications for selves and theories of selves. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20*, 568-579.

Marquard, O. (1965). Zur Geschichte des philosophischen Begriffs "Anthropologie" seit dem Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts. In E. W. Böckenförde & et al. (Eds.), *Collegium philosophicum* (pp. 209-239). Basel: Schwabe.

Marquard, O. (1989). Drei Betrachtungen zum Thema "Philosophie und Weisheit". In W. Oelmüller (Ed.), *Philosophie und Weisheit* (pp. 275-287). Paderborn: Schöningh.

Maturana, H. R., & Varela, F. J. (1992). *The tree of knowledge: The biological roots of human understanding*. Boston, MA: Shambhala.

Maurer, A. A. (1967). Nicholas of Cusa. In P. Edwards (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of philosophy* (Vol. 5, pp. 496-498). New York: Macmillan.

Maurer, A. A. (1984). Philosophy, history of western: Medieval philosophy. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 14, pp. 256-261). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Maxwell, N. (1980). Science, reason, knowledge, and wisdom: A critique of specialism. *Inquiry, 23*, 19-81.

Maxwell, N. (1984). *From knowledge to wisdom*. New York: Basil Blackwell.

Maxwell, N. (1991). How can we build a better world? In Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Ed.), *EInheit der Wissenschaften* (pp. 388-427). Berlin: de Gruyter.

May, K. M. (1993). *Nietzsche on the struggle between knowledge and wisdom*. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan.

Maynes, M. J. (1995). *Taking the hard road*. North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press.

McAdams, D. P., & de St. Aubin, E. (Eds.). (1998). *Generativity and adult development: How and why we care for the next generation*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

McDemott, R. A. (1993). Transpersonal worldviews: Historical and philosophical reflections. In ?? (Ed.), *Paths beyond ego* (pp. 206-212). ??: ??

McDowell, J. (1980). The role of eudaimonia in Aristotle's ethics. In A. O. Rorty (Ed.), *Essays on Aristotle's "Ethics"* (pp. 359-376). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

McFadden, S. H. (1986). *The wisdom and humor of aging persons: Perspektives on transformed narcissism in later life (Ph.D. Thesis, 1984).* , University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor.

McKay, H. A., & Clines, D. J. A. (Eds.). (1993). *Of prophets' visions and the wisdom of sages*. Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press.

McKnight, S. A. (1991). *The modern age and the recovery of ancient wisdom*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.

Meacham, J. A. (1983). Wisdom and the context of knowledge: Knowing that one doesn't know. In D. Kuhn & A. Meacham (Eds.), *On the development of developmental psychology* (pp. 111-134). Basel: Karger.

Meacham, J. A. (1990). The loss of wisdom. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), *Wisdom: Its nature, origins and development* (pp. 181-211). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mehan, H. (1984). Institutional decision-making. In B. Rogoff & J. Lave (Eds.), *Everyday cognition: Its development in social context* (pp. 41-66). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Mehlig, J. (Ed.). (1987). *Weisheit des alten Indien. Bd. 1: Vorbuddhistische und nichtbuddhistische Texte*. München: C. H. Beck.

Mehlig, J. (Ed.). (1987). *Weisheit des alten Indien. Bd. 2: Buddhistische Texte*. München: C. H. Beck.

Mei, Y. P. (1984). Confucianism. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 4, pp. 1091-1109). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Mellers, B. A., Schwartz, A., & Cooke, A. D. J. (1998). Judgment and decision making. *Annual Review of Psychology, 49*, 447-477.

Merrill, J. C. (1994). *Legacy of wisdom: Great thinkers and journalism*. Ames: Iowa State University Press.

Merton, R. K. (1991). *Introduction to sociology*. (3rd ed.). San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Michaud, R. (1984). *La littérature de sagesse*. (Vol. I). Paris: Les Editions du Cerf.

Michaud, R. (1987). *Qohélet et l'hellénisme*. (Vol. II). Paris: Les Editions du Cerf.

Michaud, R. (1988). *Ben Sira et le judaisme*. (Vol. III). Paris: Les Editions du Cerf.

Midgley, M. (1989). *Wisdom, information and wonder: What is knowledge for?* London: Routledge.

Mieder, W. (1993). *Proverbs are never out of season: Popular wisdom in the Modern Age*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Mieder, W. (1997). *The politics of proverbs*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

Mieder, W., & Dundes, A. (1981). *The wisdom of many: Essays on the proverb*. New York: Garland Publishing.

Mittelstraß, J. (1992). Wieviel Aufklärung verträgt der Mensch? In E. P. Fischer (Ed.), *Ist die Wahrheit dem Menschen zumutbar?* (pp. 17-29). München/Zürich: Piper.

Modrak, D. K. W. (1987). *Aristotle: The power of perception*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Moen, P., Elder Jr., G. H., & Lüscher, K. (Eds.). (1995). *Examining lives in context: Perspectives on the ecology of human development*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Molenaar, P. C. M., Boomsma, D. I., & Dolan, C. V. (1993). A third source of developmental differences. *Behavior Genetics, 23*, 519-524.

Momigliano, A. (1975). The fault of the Greeks. *Daedalus, 19*, 9-19.

Moravcsik, J., & Temko, P. (Eds.). (1982). *Plato on beauty, wisdom, and the Arts*. Towota, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.

Morgan, D. F. (1981). *Wisdom in the Old Testament traditions*. Atlanta: John Knox Press.

Morganroth Gullette, M. (1988). *Safe at last in the middle years*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Morton, A. (1996). Folk psychology is not a predictive device. *Mind, 105*, 119-135.

Murphey, M. G. (1961). *The development of Peirce's philosophy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Murphy, R. E. (1981). Hebrew wisdom. *Journal of American Oriental Society, 101*, 21-34.

Murphy, R. E. (1981). *Wisdom literature: Job, Proverbs, Ruth, Canticles, Ecclesiastes and Esther*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.

Murphy, R. E. (1990). *The tree of life*. New York: Doubleday.

Nagel, T. (1980). Aristotle on eudaemonia. In A. O. Rorty (Ed.), *Essays on Aristotle's "Ethics"* (pp. 1-14). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Nagel, T. (1997). *The last word*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Nakamura, H. (1984). Buddhist philosophy. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new Encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 3, pp. 425-431). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Negussie, B. (1988). *Traditional wisdom and modern development*. Stockholm: University of Stockholm Press.

Neugarten, B. L. (1968). *Middle age and aging: A reader in social psychology*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Neusner, J., & Neusner, N. M. M. (Eds.). (1990). *To grow in wisdom: An anthology of Abraham Joshua Heschel*. Lanham, Maryland: Madison Books.

Nichols, R. (1996). Maxims, "practical wisdom," and the language of action. *Political Theory, 24*, 687-705.

Nicholson, J. (1987, June 14). The project: How you responded. *The Sunday Times*, (pp. 55).

Nisbet, R. A. (1980). *History of the idea of progress*. New York: Basic Books.

Nisbett, R. E., & Ross, L. (1980). *Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of social judgment*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Nisker, W. S. (1990). *Crazy wisdom*. Berkeley, CA: Ten Speed Press.

Norman, A. P. (1996). Teaching wisdom. In K. Lehrer, B. J. Lum, B. A. Slichta, & N. D. Smith (Eds.), *Knowledge, teaching and wisdom* (pp. 253-266). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Nowotny. (1989). *Eigenzeit: Entstehung und Strukturierung eines Zeitgefühls*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Nozick, R. (1989). *The examined life: Philosophical meditations*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Nozick, R. (1989). What is wisdom and why do philosophers love it so? In R. Nozick (Ed.), *The examined life: Philosophical meditation* (pp. 267-278). New York: Simon & Schuster.

Nozick, R. (1993). Instrumental rationality and its limits. In R. Nozick (Ed.), *The nature of rationality* (pp. 133-181). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Nozick, R. (1993). *The nature of rationality*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Nozick, R. (1997). *Socratic puzzles*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Nussbaum, M. C. (1986). *The fragility of goodness: Luck and ethics in Greek tragedy and philosophy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Nussbaum, M. C. (1994). *The therapy of desire: Theory and practice in hellenistic ethics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Nussbaum, M. C. (1997). *Cultivating humanity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

O'Connor, K. M. (1988). *The wisdom literature*. Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier.

Oelmüller, W. (Ed.). (1989). *Philosophie und Weisheit*. Paderborn: Schöningh.

Oettingen, G. (1996). Positive fantasy and motivation. In P. M. Gollwitzer & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), *The psychology of action: Linking cognition and motivation to action* (pp. 236-259). New York: Guilford Press.

Oettingen, G. (2000). Expectancy effects on behavior depend on self-regulatory thought. *Social Cognition, 18*, 101-129.

Oruka, O. H. (Ed.). (1990). *Sage philosophy: Indigenous thinkers and modern debate on African philosophy*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Orwoll, L. (1990). *Wisdom in later adulthood: Personality and life history correlates (Ph.D. Thesis, 1989).* , Ann Arbor.

Orwoll, L., & Achenbaum, W. A. (1993). Gender and the development of wisdom. *Human Development, 36*(274-296).

Orwoll, L., & Perlmutter, M. (1990). The study of the wise person: Integrating a personality perspective. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), *Wisdom: Its nature, origins and development* (pp. 160-177). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Osgood, N. J., & Sontz, A. H. L. (Eds.). (1989). *The science and practice of gerontology*. New York: Greenwood Press.

Pantridge, M. (1990, October). How to be middle-aged and how not to be. *Boston Magazine*, 96-101, 152-155.

Pascual-Leone, J. (1990). An essay on wisdom: Toward organismic processes that make it possible. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), *Wisdom: Its nature, origins and development* (pp. 244-278). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Passmore, J. (1967). Philosophy. In P. Edwards (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of philosophy* (Vol. 6, pp. 216-226). New York: Macmillan.

Pasupathi, M., & Baltes, P. B. (2000). Wisdom. In A. E. Kazdin (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of psychology* (Vol. 8, pp. 249-253). New York: Oxford University Press.

Peirce, C. S. (1965). A neglected argument for the reality of God. In C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss (Eds.), *Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Vol. VI: Scientific metaphysics* (Vol. VI, pp. 311-339). Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

Peng, K., & Nisbett, R. E. (1999). Culture, dialectics, and reasoning about contradiction. *American Psychologist, 54*, 741-754.

Peng, K., & Nisbett, R. E. (2000). Dialectical responses to questions about dialectical thinking. *American Psychologist, 55*, 1067-1068.

Perdue, L. G. (1991). *Wisdom in revolt: Metaphorical theology in the Book of Job*. (Vol. 29). Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press.

Perlmutter, M. (Ed.). (1990). *Late-life potential*. Washington, DC: Gerontological Society of America.

Perry, J., & Bratman, M. (Eds.). (1986). *Introduction to philosophy: Classical and contemporary readings*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Perry, T. A. (1993). *Wisdom literature and the structure of proverbs*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Peterson, G. R. (1997). Cognitive science: What one needs to know. *Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science, 32*, 615-627.

Petrarca. (1354). De Sapientia (In: De remediis utriusque fortunae).

Petras, K., & Petras, R. (1995). On wisdom. In K. Petras & R. Petras (Eds.), *The whole world book of quotations: Wisdom from women and men around the globe throughout the centuries* (pp. 305-307). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Pieper, J. (1964). *Das Viergespann*. München: Kösel-Verlag.

Pifer, A., & Bronte, L. (Eds.). (1986). *Our aging society: Paradox and promise*. New York: Norton.

Plessner, H. (1965). *Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch: Einleitung in die philosophische Anthropologie*. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Pompa, L. (1975). *Vico: A study of the new science*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Popkin, R. H. (1967). Charron, Pierre. In P. Edwards (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of philosophy* (Vol. 1, pp. 81-83). New York: Macmillan.

Popkin, R. H. (1987). Skepticism. In M. Eliade (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of religion* (Vol. 13, pp. 341-343). New York: Macmillan.

Powell, D. (Ed.). (1985). *The wisdom of the novel: A dictionary of quotations*. New York: Garland.

Prajnaparamitas, A. (1970). *The perfection of wisdom in eight thousand slokas (Translated by Edward Conze)*. Calcutta: Asiatic Society.

Price, M. (1964). *To the palace of wisdom*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Prigogine. Interview with.

Prigogine. (1978). Time, structure, and fluctuations. *Science, 201*, 777-785.

Puka, B. (1994). Kohlberg´s original study of moral development. In B. Puka (Ed.), *Moral development: A compendium* (Vol. 4,). New York: Garland.

Quispel, G. (1987). Sophia. In M. Eliade (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of religion* (Vol. 13, pp. 416-417). New York: Macmillan.

Rad, G. v. (1965). *The message of the prophets*. New York: Harper.

Rad, G. v. (1965). *Old Testament theology*. Oliver and Boyd: Edinburgh.

Rahula, W. (1984). Buddha. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new Encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 3, pp. 369-374). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Randall, J. H. (1960). *Aristotle*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Raphals, L. (1992). *Knowing words: Wisdom and cunning in the classical tradition of China and Greece*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Rathunde, K. (1995). Wisdom and abiding interest: Interviews with three noted historians in later life. *Journal of Adult Development, 2*, 159-172.

Reese, J. M. (1983). *The Book of Wisdom, Song of Songs*. Wilmington: Michael Glazier.

Reimer, M. (1999). *Eine inhaltsanalytische Untersuchung impliziter Annahmen zur Weisheitsontogenese.* Unpublished Master's thesis, Free University of Berlin.

Rescher, N. (1988). *Rationality: A philosophical inquiry into the nature and the rational of reason*. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.

Resnick, L. B., Levine, J. M., & Teasley, S. D. (1991). *Perspectives on socially shared cognition*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Restak, R. M. (1997). *Older and wiser: How to maintain peak mental ability for as long as you live*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Rice, E. F., Jr. (1958). *The renaissance idea of wisdom*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Ricklefs, R. E., & Finch, C. E. (1995). *Aging: A natural history*. New York: Freeman.

Rickman, H. P. (1967). Dilthey, Wilhelm. In P. Edwards (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of philosophy* (Vol. 2, pp. 403-407). New York: Macmillan.

Riegel, K. F. (1973). Dialectical operations: The final period of cognitive development. *Human Development, 16*, 346-370.

Riley, M. W., & Riley, J. W., Jr. (Eds.). (1989). The quality of aging: Strategies for interventions. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 503*(Special issue).

Rippel, P. (1990). Francis Bacons allegorische Revolution des Wissens. In P. Rippel (Ed.), *Francis Bacon: Weisheit der Alten* (pp. 93-127). Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch.

Robinson, D. N. (1990). Wisdom through the ages. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), *Wisdom: Its nature, origins, and development* (pp. 13-24). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Robinson, J. M. (1975). Jesus as Sophos and Sophia: Wisdom traditions in the gospels. In R. L. Wilken (Ed.), *Aspects of wisdom in Judaism and early Christianity* (pp. 1-17). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Rochefoucauld, F. d. l. (1678). *Nouvelles Reflexions Ou Sentences Et Maximes Morales*. Paris: Barbin.

Rochefoucauld, F. d. l. (1694). *Moral maxims and reflections (English version)*. London: Gillyflower, Sare, and Everingham.

Rogers, T. B. (1990). Proverbs as psychological theories.. Or is it the other way around? *Canadian Psychology, 31*, 195-207.

Rogoff, B. (1990). *Apprenticeship in thinking: Cognitive development in social context*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Rogoff, B. (1990). Cognitive development in sociocultural context. In B. Rogoff (Ed.), *Apprenticeship in thinking: Cognitive development in social context* (pp. 3-22). New York: Oxford University Press.

Rogoff, B. (1990). Shared thinking and guided participation: Conclusions and speculations. In B. Rogoff (Ed.), *Apprenticeship in thinking: Cognitive development in social context* (pp. 189-210). New York: Oxford University Press.

Rogoff, B., & Lave, J. (Eds.). (1984). *Everyday cognition: Its development in social context*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Roochnik, D. (1990). *The tragedy of reason: Toward a platonic conception of logos*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Rorty, A. O. (1980). *Essays on Aristotle's "Ethics"*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Rorty, A. O. (1980). Introduction. In A. O. Rorty (Ed.), *Essays on Aristotle's "Ethics"* (pp. 1-6). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Rorty, A. O. (1996). *Essays on Aristotle's rhetoric*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Rorty, R. (1982). *Consequences of pragmatism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Rorty, R. (1987). Pragmatism and philosophy. In K. Baynes, J. Bohman, & T. McCarthy (Eds.), *After philosophy: End or transformation?* (pp. 21-66). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Rorty, R. (1998). *Truth and progress*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Rosch, E., & Lloyd, B. B. (Eds.). (1978). *Cognition and categorization*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Rösler, W. (1991). Die sieben Weisen. In A. Assmann (Ed.), *Weisheit: Archäologie der literarischen Kommunikation III* (pp. 357-365). München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.

Ross, G. (1996). Metaphysical skepticism and the teaching of philosophy. In K. Lehrer, B. J. Lum, B. A. Slichta, & N. D. Smith (Eds.), *Knowledge, teaching and wisdom* (pp. 245-252). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Rubin, D. C. (1995). *Memory in oral traditions*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Rudolph, K. (1987). Wisdom. In M. Eliade (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of religion* (Vol. 15, pp. 393-401). New York: Macmillan.

Ruisel, I. (1996). Implicit theories of intelligence in adolescents. *Studia Psychologica, 38*, 23-33.

Runco, M. A. (1998). Personal explicit theories of creativity. *Journal of Creative Behavior, 32*, 1-17.

Ryan, S. (1996). Wisdom. In K. Lehrer, B. J. Lum, B. A. Slichta, & N. D. Smith (Eds.), *Knowledge, teaching and wisdom* (pp. 233-242). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Rybash, J. M., Hoyer, W. J., & Rodin, P. A. (1986). *Adult cognition and aging:Developmental changes in processing, knowing and thinking*. Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press.

Ryff, C. D. (1982). Self-perceived personality change in adulthood and aging. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 42*, 108-115.

Ryff, C. D. (1995). Psychological well-being in adult life. *Current Directions in Psychological Science, 4*, 99-104.

Saatkamp, H. J. J. (Ed.). (1995). *Rorty and pragmatism*. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press.

Salk, J. (1973). *THe survival of the wisest*. New York: Harper & Row.

Salthouse, T. A. (1991). *Theoretical perspectives on cognitive aging*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Sampson, A., & Sampson, S. (Eds.). (1988). *The Oxford book of ages*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sampson, R. J. (1993). *Crime in the making: Pathways and turning points through life*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Sarna, N. M. (1984). Biblical writings: Old Testament canon, texts, and versions. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new Encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 881-895). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Saunders, T. B. (1902). *The wisdom of Schopenhauer*. New York: G. A. S. Wieners.

Schaie, K. W., & Willis, S. L. (1996). *Adult development and aging*. New York: HarperCollins.

Schmid, H. H. (1966). *Wesen und Geschichte der Weisheit*. Berlin: Alfred Töpelmann.

Schopenhauer, A. (1851). *Parerga und Paralipomena: Kleine philosophische Schriften*. Berlin: A. W. Hahn.

Schopenhauer, A. (1851/1963). Aphorismen zur Lebensweisheit. In W. F. v. Löhneysen (Ed.), *Parerga und Paralipomena: Kleine philosophische Schriften* (pp. 373-?). Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Schopenhauer, A. (1851/1963). Vereinzelte, jedoch systematisch geordnete Gedanken über vielerlei Gegenstände. In W. F. v. Löhneysen (Ed.), *Parerga und Paralipomena: Kleine philosophische Schriften* (Vol. V,). Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Schopenhauer, A. (1856/1974). *Aphorismen zur Lebensweisheit*. Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag.

Schopenhauer, A. (1856/1974). Vom Unterschiede der Lebensalter. In R. Marx (Ed.), *Aphorismen zur Lebensweisheit* (pp. 234-263). Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag.

Schopenhauer, A. (1961). *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Schopenhauer, A. (1961). *Sämtliche Werke (bearbeitet und herausgegeben von W. von Löhneysen)*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Schopenhauer, A. (1999). *Die Kunst, glücklich zu sein*. München: C. H. Beck.

Schowalter, J. E. (1991). Editor's note: What is wisdom? What is it worth? *Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 30*, 873.

Schuon, F. (1961). *Stations of wisdom*. London: John Murray.

Schwartz, B. I. (1964). *In search of wealth and power: Yen Fu and the West*. New York: Harper & Row.

Schwartz, B. I. (1975). The age of transcendence. *Daedalus, 19*, 1-7.

Schwartz, B. I. (1975). Transcendence in Ancient China. *Daedalus, 19*, 57-68.

Schwartz, B. I. (1975). Wisdom, revelation, and doubt: Perspectives on the first millennium B.C. *Daedalus, 19*(Special issue).

Scott, R. B. Y. (1970). The study of the wisdom literature. *Interpretation: A Journal of Bible and Theology, 24*, 20-45.

Scott-Kakures, D. (1995). Erstwhile vindicationism. *American Philosophical Quarterly, 32*, 205-224.

Sears, E. (1986). *The ages of man: Medieval interpretations of the life cycle*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Sears, E. (1986). Moralized life. In E. Sears (Ed.), *The ages of man: Medieval interpretations of the life cycle* (pp. ??-155). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Sehon, S. R. (1997). Natural-kind terms and the status of folk psychology. *American Philosophical Quarterly, 34*, 333-345.

Seibt, G. (1996, September 21). Die drei Wege der modernen Literaturkritik. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.

Seitel, P. (1969). Proverbs: A social use of metaphor. *Genre, 2*, 143-161.

Settersten, R. A., Jr. (1997). The measurement of age, age structuring, and the life course. *Annual Review of Sociology, 23*, 233-261.

Shakespeare. Wisdom passages from "As You Like It" and "The Tempest.

Sheppard, G. T. (1980). *Wisdom as a hermeneutical construct*. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Sherman, N. (1989). *The fabric of character: Aristotle's theory of virtue*. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.

Sherman, N. (1997). *Making a necessity of virtue: Aristotle and Kant on virtue*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Shklar, J. N. (1966). Introduction. In J. N. Shklar (Ed.), *Political theory and ideology* (pp. 1-21). New York: Macmillan.

Shklar, J. N. (1966). *Political theory and ideology*. New York: Macmillan.

Shklar, J. N. (1984). *Ordinary vices*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Shklar, J. N. (1986). Injustice, injury, and inequality: An introduction. In F. S. Lucash (Ed.), *Justice and equality here and now* (pp. 13-33). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Shupak, N. (1993). *Where can wisdom be found? The sage's language in the Bible and in ancient Egyptian literature*. Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht.

Shweder, R. A. (1990). Cultural psychology: What is it? In J. Stigler, R. A. Shweder, & G. Herdt (Eds.), *Cultural psychology: Essays on comparative human development*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Shweder, R. A. (1991). *Thinking through cultures*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Shweder, R. A., & Sullivan, M. A. (1990). The semiotic subject of cultural psychology. In L. Pervin (Ed.), *Handbook of personality theory and research* (pp. 399-416). New York: Guilford Press.

Siegel, J. E. C. (1973-74). Virtù in and since the Renaissance. In P. P. Wiener (Ed.), *Dictionary of the history of ideas: Studies of selected pivotal ideas* (Vol. 4, pp. 476-486). New York: Scribner.

Siegfried, J. (Ed.). (1994). *The status of common sense in psychology*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Simon, H. A. (1983). *Reason in human affairs*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Simon, H. A. (1991). *Models of my life*. New York: Basic Books.

Skinner, E. A. (1995). *Perceived control*. (Vol. 8). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Skinner, E. A. (1996). A guide to constructs of control. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71*, 549-570.

Skinner, E. A., Chapman, M., & Baltes, P. B. (1988). Children's beliefs about control, means-ends, and agency: Developmental differences during middle childhood. *International Journal of Behavioural Development, 11*, 369-388.

Skorupski, T. (1987). Prajña. In M. Eliade (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of religion* (Vol. 11, pp. 477-481). New York: Macmillan.

Slote, M. (1983). *Goods and virtues*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Slote, M. A. (1992). *From morality to virtue*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Smith, J. (1996). Planning about life: Toward a social-interactive perspective. In P. B. Baltes & U. M. Staudinger (Eds.), *Interactive minds: Life-span perspectives on the social foundation of cognition* (pp. 242-275). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, J., & Baltes, P. B. (1990). A study of wisdom-related knowledge: Age/cohort differences in responses to life planning problems. *Developmental Psychology, 26*, 494-505.

Smith, J., Dixon, R. A., & Baltes, P. B. (1989). Expertise in life-planning: A new research approach to investigating aspects of wisdom. In M. L. Commons, J. D. Sinnott, F. A. Richards, & C. Armon (Eds.), *Beyond formal operations II* (Vol. 1, pp. 307-331). New York: Praeger.

Smith, J., Staudinger, U. M., & Baltes, P. B. (1994). Occupational settings facilitating wisdom-related knowledge: The sample case of clinical psychologists. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 62*, 989-999.

Sneill, B. (1938). *Leben und Meinungen der Sieben Weisen*. München: Ernst Heimeran Verlag.

Solomon, J. (1990). *The signs of our time: The secret meanings of everyday life*. New York: Harper & Row.

Solso, R. L. (Ed.). (1997). *Mind and brain sciences in the 21st century*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Sorabji, R. (1980). Aristotle on the role of intellect in virtue. In A. O. Rorty (Ed.), *Essays on Aristotle's "Ethics"* (pp. 201-219). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Sowarka, D. (1989). *Weisheit im Kontext von Person, Situation und Handlung (Studien und Berichte 48)*. Berlin: Max Planck Institute für Bildungsforschung.

Sowarka, D. (1989). Weisheit und weise Personen: Common-Sense-Konzepte älterer Menschen (Wisdom and wise persons: Common-sense views from elderly people). *Zeitschrift für Entwicklungspsychologie und Pädagogische Psychologie, 21*, 87-109.

Sowarka, D., Cornelius, S. W., Smith, J., & Baltes, P. B. (1990). The prototypical meaning of wisdom and wise persons.

Spiers, A. (Ed.). (1884). *Bacon's essays and Wisdom of the ancients*. Boston: Little, Brown.

Spohr, w. (1937). *Die Narrenschaufel*. Berlin: Scherl.

Spohr, W. (1954). *Glorie des Alters*. Berlin: Peters Verlag.

Staddon, J. E. R. (Ed.). (1980). *Limits to action*. New York: Academic Press.

Stam, H. J. (1990). Rebuilding the ship at sea: The historical and theoretical problems of constructionist epistemologies in psychology. *Canadian Psychology, 31*, 239-253.

Staude, J.-R. (Ed.). (1981). *Wisdom and age: The adventure of later life*. Berkeley: Ross Books.

Staude, J.-R. (1981). "The wisdom of experience": Spirituality, autobiography, and adult life: Perspectives from lifespan psychology and literature.

Staudinger, U. M. (1990). Lebensrückblick: Ein Weg zur Weisheit? [Life review: A path to wisdom?]. *Psychologie Heute, 17*, 60-64.

Staudinger, U. M. (1992). Altersintelligenz, Lebenserfahrung und Weisheit [Old age intelligence, life experience, and wisdom]. In H. Häfner & M. Hennerici (Eds.), *Psychische Krankheiten und Hirnfunktion im Alter* (pp. 1-14). Stuttgart: Fischer.

Staudinger, U. M. (1996). Wisdom and the social-interactive foundation of the mind. In P. B. Baltes & U. M. Staudinger (Eds.), *Interactive minds: Life-span perspectives on the social foundation of cognition* (pp. 276-318). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Staudinger, U. M., & Baltes, P. B. (1994). Psychology of wisdom. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of intelligence* (Vol. 1, pp. 143-152). New York: Macmillan.

Staudinger, U. M., & Baltes, P. B. (1995). Gedächtnis, Weisheit und Lebenserfahrung: Zur Ontogenese als Zusammenwirken von Biologie und Kultur (Memory, wisdom and life experience: Ontogenesis as interaction between biology and culture). In D. Dörner & E. V. d. Meer (Eds.), *Gedächtnis. Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Friedhart Klix* (pp. 433-484). Göttingen, Germany: Hogrefe.

Staudinger, U. M., & Baltes, P. B. (1996). Interactive minds: A facilitative setting for wisdom-related performance? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71*, 746-762.

Staudinger, U. M., & Baltes, P. B. (1996). Weisheit als Gegenstand psychologischer Forschung. *Psychologische Rundschau, 47*, 57-77.

Staudinger, U. M., & Dittmann-Kohli, F. (1992). Lebenserfahrung und Lebenssinn. In P. B. Baltes & J. Mittelstraß (Eds.), *Zukunft des Alterns und gesellschaftliche Entwicklung* (pp. 408–436). Berlin: de Gruyter.

Staudinger, U. M., Lopez, D., & Baltes, P. B. (1997). The psychometric location of wisdom-related performance: Intelligence, personality, and more? *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23*, 1200-1214.

Staudinger, U. M., Maciel, A., Smith, J., & Baltes, P. B. (1996). *What predicts wisdom-related knowledge? A first look at the role of personality, intelligence, and training and practice in clinical psychology*. Berlin: Max Planck Institute for Human Development and Education.

Staudinger, U. M., Maciel, A. G., Smith, J., & Baltes, P. B. (1993). *Brief report: What predicts wisdom-related knowledge? A first look at the role of personality, intelligence, and professional*

specialization (Techn. Rep.). Berlin, Germany: Max Planck Institute for Human Development and Education.

Staudinger, U. M., Maciel, A. G., Smith, J., & Baltes, P. B. (1998). What predicts wisdom-related performance? A first look at personality, intelligence, and facilitative experiential contexts. *European Journal of Personality, 12*, 1-17.

Staudinger, U. M., Marsiske, M., & Baltes, P. B. (1995). Resilience and reserve capacity in later adulthood: Potentials and limits of development across the life span. In D. Cicchetti & D. J. Cohen (Eds.), *Developmental psychopathology: Vol. 2. Risk, disorder, and adaptation* (pp. 801–847). New York: Wiley.

Staudinger, U. M., Smith, J., & Baltes, P. B. (1992). Wisdom-related knowledge in a life review task: Age differences and the role of professional specialization. *Psychology and Aging, 7*, 271-281.

Staudinger, U. M., Smith, J., & Baltes, P. B. (1994). *Manual for the assessment of wisdom-related knowledge*. Berlin: Max-Planck-Institut für Bildungsforschung.

Staudinger, U. M., Sowarka, D., Maciel, A. G., & Baltes, P. B. (1997). *Subjective theories of wisdom and the Berlin Wisdom Theory*. Unpublished manuscript: Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany.

Stern, P. (1997). The rule of wisdom and the rule of law in Plato's *Statesman*. *American Political Science Review, 91*, 264-276.

Sternberg, R. J. (1985). Implicit theories of intelligence, creativity, and wisdom. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49*, 607-627.

Sternberg, R. J. (1986). Intelligence, wisdom, and creativity: Three is better than one. *Educational Psychologist, 21*, 175-190.

Sternberg, R. J. (1990). *Metaphors of mind: Conceptions of the nature of intelligence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sternberg, R. J. (1990). Understanding wisdom. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), *Wisdom: Its nature, origins, and development* (pp. 3-9). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sternberg, R. J. (1990). Wisdom and its relations to intelligence and creativity. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), *Wisdom: Its nature, origins, and development* (pp. 142-149). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sternberg, R. J. (Ed.). (1990). *Wisdom: Its nature, origins, and development*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sternberg, R. J. (Ed.). (1994). *Encyclopedia of human intelligence*. New York: Macmillan.

Sternberg, R. J. (1996). Styles of thinking. In P. B. Baltes & U. M. Staudinger (Eds.), *Interactive minds: Life-span perspectives on the social foundation of cognition* (pp. 347-365). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sternberg, R. J. (1998). A balance theory of wisdom. *Review of General Psychology, 2*, 347-365.

Sternberg, R. J. (1999). The theory of successful intelligence. *Review of General Psychology, 3*, 292-316.

Sternberg, R. J., & Berg, C. A. (Eds.). (1992). *Intellectual development*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Sternberg, R. J., & Detterman, D. K. (1986). *What is intelligence?* Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Sternberg, R. J., & Kolligian, J. J. (1990). *Competence considered*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Sternberg, R. J., & Ruzgis, P. (Eds.). (1994). *Personality and intelligence*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Sternberg, R. J., & Wagner, R. K. (Eds.). (1986). *Practical intelligence: Nature and origins of competence in the everyday world*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sternberg, R. J., Wagner, R. K., Williams, W. M., & Horvath, J. A. (1995). Testing common sense. *American Psychologist, 50*, 912-957.

Stich, S. P. (1983). *From folk psychology to cognitive science*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Stich, S. P. (Ed.). (1990). *The fragmentation of reason: Preface to a pragmatic theory of cognitive evaluation*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Stich, S. P. (1990). A pragmatic account of cognitive evaluation. In S. P. Stich (Ed.), *The fragmentation of reason: Preface to a pragmatic theory of cognitive evaluation* (pp. 129-158). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Stich, S. P. (1990). Something between a preface and an introduction. In S. P. Stich (Ed.), *The fragmentation of reason: Preface to a pragmatic theory of cognitive evaluation* (pp. 1-28). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Stolleis, M. (Ed.). (1995). *Juristen: Ein biographisches Lexikon von der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert*. München: C.H. Beck.

Strough, J., Berg, C. A., & Sansone, C. (1994). Goals for solving everyday problems across the life span: Age and gender differences in the salience of interpersonal concerns. *Developmental Psychology, 32*, 1106-1115.

Suphan, B. (Ed.). (1877-1913). *Herders sämmtliche Werke (33 Volumes)*. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung.

Swanton, M. (1975). *Anglo-Saxon prose*. London: Dent.

Sydiaha, D. (1996). The scientific credibility of folk psychology. *CHOICE, 33*, 1873.

Syrbius, J. J. (1707). *De definitione sapientiae commentatio brevis*. Litteris Müllerianis: Jenae.

Takahashi, M. (2000). Toward a culturally inclusive understanding of wisdom: Historical roots in the East and West. *International Journal of Aging and Human Development, 51*, 217-230.

Takahashi, M., & Bordia, P. (2000). The concept of wisdom: A cross-cultural comparison. *International Journal of Psychology, 35*, 1-9.

Taranto, M. A. (1989). Facets of wisdom: A theoretical synthesis. *International Journal of Aging and Human Development, 29*, 1-21.

Taylor, A. (1931). *The proverb*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Taylor, A. (1965). The study of proverbs. *Proverbium, 1*, 1-22.

Taylor, A. E. (1984). Socrates. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Vol. 16, pp. 1001-1005). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Taylor, S. H. (1958). *The Statesman*. New York: Mentor.

Templeton, J. M. (1997). *Worldwide laws of life*. Radnor, PA: Templeton Foudation Press.

Tentori, K., Osherson, D., Hasher, L., & May, C. (2001). Wisdom and aging: Irrational preferences in college students and older adults. *Cognition, 81*, B87-B97.

Tetens, J. N. (1777). *Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung*. Leipzig, Germany: Weidmanns Erben und Reich.

Tetlock, P. E. (1984). Cognitive style and political belief systems in the British House of Commons. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46*, 365-375.

Tetlock, P. E. (1986). A value pluralism model of ideological reasoning. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50*(819-827).

Tetlock, P. E. (1989). Structure and function in political belief systems. In A. R. Pratkanis, S. J. Breckler, & A. G. Greenwald (Eds.), *Attitude, structure, and function*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Tetlock, P. E. (1991). Learning in U.S. and Soviet foreign policy: In search of an elusive concept. In G. Breslauer & P. E. Tetlock (Eds.), *Learning in the U.S. and Soviet foreign policy* (pp. 3-61). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Tetlock, P. E., & Boettger, R. (1989). Accountability: A social magnifier of the dilution effect. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57*, 388-398.

Tetlock, P. E., & Kim, J. I. (1989). Accountability and judgment processes in a personality prediction task. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52*, 700-709.

Thayer, H. S. (1967). Pragmatism. In P. Edwards (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of philosophy* (Vol. 6, pp. 430-436). New York: Macmillan.

Thayer, H. S. (1975). Introduction. In W. James (Ed.), *Pragmatism* (pp. xi-xxxviii). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Thomasius, C. (1710/1971). *Kurzer Entwurf der politischen Klugheit, sich selbst und andern in allen menschlichen Gesellschaften wohl zu raten und zu einer gescheiten Conduite zu gelangen*. Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum.

Tomasello, M., & Call, J. (1997). *Primate cognition*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Torrey, N. L. (1967). Diderot, Denis. In P. Edwards (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of philosophy* (Vol. 2, pp. 397–403). New York: Macmillan.

Tucci, G. (1984). Buddhism. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new Encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th ed., Vol. 3, pp. 374-403). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. *Science, 185*, 1124-1131.

Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. *Science, 211*, 453-458.

Ulich, R. (Ed.). (1954). *Three thousand years of educational wisdom*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Upton, C. (1959). *What is wisdom?* London: Linden Press.

Urmson, J. O. (1980). Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. In A. O. Rorty (Ed.), *Essays on Aristotle's "Ethics"* (pp. 157-170). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Vaillant, G. E. (1993). *The wisdom of the ego*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Valentini, J. L. V. (1782). *Opera omnia*. ??: Valentiae Edetanorum.

VanEtten, T. (Ed.). (1987). *Ways of Indian wisdom*. Santa Fe, NM: Sunstone Press.

Veyne, P. (1993). *Weisheit und Altruismus*. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer.

Vivves, J. L. (1524). *Introductio ad sapientiam*.

Vlastos, G. (1990). *Socrates: Ironist and moral philosopher*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Voorwinde, S. (Ed.). (1981). *Wisdom for today's issues*. Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed
Publishing Co.

Waldenfels, H. (Ed.). (1988). *Lexikon der Religionen*. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder.

Walker, L. J., & Pitts, R. C. (1998). Naturalistic conceptions of moral maturity. *Developmental Psychology,*
34, 403-419.

Walsch, J. A. (1988). *The pursuit of wisdom*. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press.

Walsh, W. H. (1967). Kant, Immanuel. In P. Edwards (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of philosophy* (Vol. 4, pp. 305-
324). New York: Macmillan.

Weinstein, D. (1984). Renaissance. In R. P. Gwinn, C. E. Swanson, & P. W. Goetz (Eds.), *The new*
encyclopaedia Britannica (15th ed., Vol. 15, pp. 660-671). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Weischedel, W. (Ed.). (1968). *Immanuel Kant: Werkausgabe in 12 Bänden*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Wellman, H. M. (1990). *The child's theory of mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Welsch, W. (1988). Philosophie zwischen Weisheit und Wissenschaft: Die aktuelle Balance. In W. Oelmüller
(Ed.), *Philosophie und Wissenschaft* (pp. 115-126). Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh.

Welsch, W. (1989). Weisheit in einer Welt der Pluralität. In W. Oelmüller (Ed.), *Philosophie und Weisheit* (pp.
214-274). Paderborn: Schöning.

Welsch, W. (1995). *Vernunft: Die zeitgenössische Vernunftkritik und das Konzept der transversalen Vernunft*.
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Whiting, B. J. (1989). *Modern proverbs and proverbial sayings*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Whybray, R. N. (1965). *Wisdom in proverbs*. Guildford and London: Billing & Sons Ltd.

Wiggins, D. (1980). Deliberation and practical reason. In A. O. Rorty (Ed.), *Essays on Aristotle's "Ethics"* (pp.
221-240). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Wilkes, K. V. (1980). The good man and the good for man in Aristotle's ethics. In A. D. Rorty (Ed.), *Essays*
on Aristotle's "Ethics" (pp. 341-357). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Williams, B. (1980). Justice as a virtue. In A. D. Rorty (Ed.), *Essays on Aristotle's "Ethics"* (pp. 189-199). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Willis, S. L., Schaie, K. W., & Hayward, M. (Eds.). (1997). *Societal mechanisms for maintaining competence in old age*. New York: Springer.

Wilson, A. M. (1967). Encyclopédie. In P. Edwards (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of philosophy* (Vol. 2, pp. 505-508). New York: Macmillan.

Wink, P., & Helson, R. (1999). Practical and transcendent wisdom: Their nature and some longitudingal findings. *Journal of Adult Development, 4*, 1-15.

Wittgenstein, L. (1953). *Philosophical investigations*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wundt, M. (1940). *Die Sachlichkeit der Wissenschaft: Wissenschaft und Weisheit*. Tübingen: Mohr.

Yang, S.-Y. (2001). Conceptions of wisdom among Taiwanese Chinese. *Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology, 32*, 662-680.

Yoo, Y. H. (1972). *Wisdom of the Far East*. Washington: Far Eastern Research and Publications Center.

Zedler, J. H. (1732-50/1961-64). *Großes vollständiges Universal-Lexikon (reprint of: Großes vollständiges Universal Lexikon aller Wissenschaften und Künste, 1732-50)*. Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt.

Zedler, J. H. (1732-50/1962). Weisheit. In J. H. Zedler (Ed.), *Großes vollständiges Universal-Lexikon (reprint of: Großes vollständiges Universal Lexikon aller Wissenschaften und Künste,1732-50)* (Vol. 54, pp. 1114-1182). Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt.

Zirkel, S., & Cantor, N. (1990). Personal construal of life tasks: Those who struggle for independence. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58*, 172-185.