â To Delegates to the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference
Restart of Japanâs Monju Fast Breeder Reactor - Implications for Nuclear
Proliferation, Nuclear Safety and Energy Supply
On May 6, Japanâs Monju Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor1 was restarted, after being shut down for
over 14 years due to an accident involving a sodium leak and a fire. It is a great irony that a
plutonium-fueled fast breeder reactor was restarted at a time when unprecedented international
attention is being given to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and security. We wish to draw
your attention to some of the implications of the Monju restart, in particular in relation to nuclear
proliferation, nuclear safety and energy supply.
Implications for Nuclear Proliferation
The key nuclear proliferation issue associated with fast breeder reactors is the use and production of
plutonium, which can be used to build nuclear weapons. Japanâs fast reactor program uses
plutonium as fuel and plans to âbreedâ more plutonium than it consumes.2
Although Japanâs nuclear power facilities are under IAEA safeguards, the bulk-handling facilities
needed to support the operation of fast reactors like Monju (reprocessing plants and plutonium fuel
fabrication plants) cannot be effectively safeguarded against diversion. Moreover, the IAEA cannot
meet its inspection goals at such facilities through the use of material accountancy alone. In fact, the
plant used to fabricate Monjuâs initial core, the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility, lost track of 70
kilograms of plutonium, and the plant had to be shut down for several years to resolve the
discrepancy.
Japan already has over 47 tons of separated plutonium, nearly 10 tons of which is stockpiled in
Japan. The rest is held in Europe. If the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant ever operates to full capacity,
a further 8 tons of plutonium will be separated each year from spent nuclear fuel. Japan plans to use
some of this plutonium as MOX fuel in its fleet of light water reactors and in fast reactors Joyo and
Monju. However, because Japan will continue to separate plutonium there is little prospect that
Japanâs massive stockpile of weapons-usable plutonium will be eliminated, or even brought into
line with consumption any time soon.
Use of plutonium in the civil nuclear fuel cycle also increases nuclear terrorism risks. The April 13,
2010 Communiqué of the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington recognized that âhighly
enriched uranium and separated plutonium require special precautionsâ. Both of these materials can
be used to produce nuclear weapons, yet far more attention was paid to the risks associated with the
use of highly enriched uranium than those of plutonium. In fact, as pointed out by Gareth Evans,
Co-Chair of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, the
Summit should have given more attention to the problems associated with plutonium.3 The
relatively limited attention given to plutonium was undoubtedly because some U.S. allies, including
Japan, use plutonium in their nuclear power programs.
In addition to the direct proliferation risks associated with Japanâs program to separate and re-use
plutonium, the example set by Japan encourages other countries to pursue plutonium-based nuclear
power programs. However, widespread use of plutonium would dramatically increase the
proliferation risks associated with the civil use of nuclear energy. As pointed out in the NGO
presentation on nuclear energy, delivered to this NPT Review Conference on May 7,
âSeparation of plutonium through reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and the creation of a
global plutonium economy exacerbates the problem. It is fundamentally contrary and
counterproductive to the NPT commitment to retire nuclear weapons, since it would put
weapons-usable materials directly into global commerce.â4
Civil plutonium stockpiles create serious instabilities in the NPT regime. As noted above, separated
plutonium cannot be effectively safeguarded. Any country that possesses separated âcivilâ
plutonium could be only a short time awayâdays to weeksâfrom producing nuclear weapons
should it choose to break out of its NPT obligations.
Implications for Nuclear Safety and Energy Supply
Fast breeder reactors, which use plutonium, are not needed to ensure the supply of energy. In fact,
they have been highly unreliable in providing energy. The history of Japanâs plutonium fuel cycle
program, and the plutonium fuel cycle programs of other countries clearly demonstrate that there
are major safety and economic problems that will prevent fast reactors from being reliable
producers of energy. Continuing to pour money into research and development will only prevent
other safe, secure, and economically viable alternatives from being developed.
A recent report by the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) sums up the problems of fast
breeder reactors as follows:
The problems described in the country case studies in the following chapters make it hard
to dispute Admiral Hyman Rickoverâs summation in 1956, based on his experience with a
sodium-cooled reactor developed to power an early U.S. nuclear submarine, that such
reactors are âexpensive to build, complex to operate, susceptible to prolonged shutdown
as a result of even minor malfunctions, and difficult and time-consuming to repair.â5
In the same IPFM report Tatsujiro Suzuki discusses Japanâs fast reactor program.
Japan remains officially committed to the fast breeder reactor and closed fuel cycle
systems. However, the fast breeder reactor commercialization date has receded far into
the future while the fast breeder reactor R&D budget has been shrinking. Japanâs
continued commitment to the fast breeder reactor appears largely driven by
socio-political factors affecting Japanâs management of the back-end of the light-water
reactor fuel cycle and R&D management. 6
There is considerable opposition to Monju within Japan. Attached is a statement that was signed by
29 Japanese scientists preceding the restart of Monju. In particular, the statement addresses
problems associated with the safety and organizational culture of Monjuâs owner and operator, the
Japan Atomic Energy Agency. Fourteen years after the sodium accident in 1995, it is very doubtful
that these problems have been rectified.
Conclusion
Japan's fast reactor and reprocessing program will not help meet Japanâs energy needs. At the same
time it complicates efforts to control the spread of weapons-usable materials and provides potential
proliferators an excuse to justify their own programs. The restart of the Monju FBR undermines
Japanâs claim to leadership in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
Recommendations
In view of the problems outlined above, we urge delegates to the 2010 NPT Review Conference to:
1) Call upon the Government of Japan to abandon its fast-breeder and reprocessing program.
2) Support a Comprehensive Fissile Material Ban that includes civil plutonium programs.
New York, May 21, 2010
Notes
1. Monju is located in Tsuruga City in Fukui Prefecture on the Japan Sea side of Japanâs main island
of Honshu. It has an electrical power output of 280MW.
2. When FBRs are used in "breeder" mode, plutonium is produced in a blanket of depleted uranium
around the core. The plutonium produced in the blanket has a concentration of 98% plutonium-239,
the most convenient plutonium isotope for nuclear weapons production. It is relatively easy to
separate this plutonium, because the depleted uranium blanket is less contaminated with highly
radioactive fission products than regular spent fuel.
3. Extract from âNuclear summit seeks to boost protection without new treatiesâ, by Randy Woods
and Rennie MacKenzie, published in Nucleonics Week (15-Apr-10).
Speaking April 12 in Washington, nonproliferation expert Gareth Evans cautioned that
world leaders should not lose sight of plutonium's importance. Evans, who is co-chair of
the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, was speaking at a nuclear
security meeting in Washington hosted by the Fissile Materials Working Group, a
coalition of more than 40 nonproliferation academics and advocates.
"At the same time that the use of HEU is diminishing â although not quickly enough
â plutonium, particularly in the form of mixed oxides, is coming into more widespread
use," he said.
4. The NGO paper on nuclear energy and Article IV of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty
delivered at the 2010 NPT Review Conference is available on the following link:
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2010/ngostatements/NuclearEnergy.pdf5. Fast Breeder Reactor Programs: History and Status, A research report of the International Panel
on Fissile Materials, February 2010, page 3.
http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/rr08.pdf6. ibid., page 60. Since writing the article Tatsujiro Suzuki has been appointed Vice-Chairman of
the Japan Atomic Energy Commission.
Letter endorsed by the following groups
International
Greenpeace International
International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
Japan
Citizensâ Nuclear Information Center
Friends of the Earth Japan
Green Action
Greenpeace Japan
Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs (Gensuikin)
Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies
Peace Boat
Korea
Citizensâ Institute for Environmental Studies
Energy Justice Actions
Green Korea United
Korea Federation for Environmental Movements
Korean Womenâs Association United
Korean Women's Environmental Network
Peace Network
People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy
Uljin Social Policy Institute
Europe
Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment (UK)
Ãsterreichisches Ãkologie-Institut (Austrian Institute of Ecology)
Umweltinstitut MÃŒnchen e.V. (Munich Environmental Institute) (Germany)
World Information Service on Energy (Netherlands)
USA
Friends of the Earth US
Greenpeace USA
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Nuclear Information and Resource Service
Physicians for Social Responsibility
Union of Concerned Scientists
